大乘法苑義林章 2.46.2

2.46.2

細分有四：一立性宗，即小乘中淺說諸法各有體性，薩婆多等也； 二破性宗，即小乘中深說諸法假有無性，《成實論》等也； 三破相宗，即大乘中淺破諸法因緣之相，宣說諸法畢竟空寂，《中》、《百》等論也； 四顯實宗，即大乘中深說妄情所取諸法畢竟非有，真實法界常住不壞，《涅槃》等也。 於此四中皆有二諦。 上七番中，初三是其立性宗中所辨二諦，次二是其破性宗中所辨二諦，次一破相宗中所辨二諦，後一顯實宗中所辨二諦。 今此文中，以深攝淺故備論之。 就初宗中，依婆沙等，具說有七番，不能繁引。 一情理分別，妄情所取我眾生等以為世諦，無我之理為第一義。 二假實分別，瓶衣、車乘、舍宅、軍林，如是一切假名之有名為世諦； 陰、界、入等實法之有為第一義。 故《雜心》云「若法分別時，捨名即說等。 分別無所捨，是說第一義。 」三理事分別，陰、界、入等事名為世諦，其十六行法相道理為第一義。 四縛解分別，苦集是世，滅道第一。 五劣勝分別，苦集及道，理中非上，同名世諦； 滅諦精勝，說為第一。 六空有分別，於彼四諦十六行中，除空無我皆名世諦； 空與無我理中精妙，說為第一。 七行教分別，教名世諦，行名第一。 故《雜心》云「經律阿毘曇，是名俗正法。 三十七覺品，是名第一義。 」今此但彰初之三門，餘略不辨。 第一先就情理分二。 五陰和合稱言某甲，凡隨所稱計有我人，是名世諦； 聖人解陰無有某甲，離陰亦無，名第一義。 第二約就假實分二。 先分二法； 有名有實是其實法； 陰、界、入等依名求法，有體可得，故言有實。 有名無實是其假法，瓶衣、車乘、舍宅、軍眾，如是一切假施設其名，推求無體，故曰無實。 下就諦辨，假為世諦，實為第一。 第三約就理事分二。 事為世諦，理為第一。 事有假實，如我眾生乃至兔角、旋火輪等，是其假事，諸陰、界、入是其實事，此等一切同名世諦； 苦集滅道法相道理為第一義。 次下就其破性宗中以辨二諦，於中兩門：前門就其假法空有以辨二諦，後門就其實法空有以辨二諦。 就前門中，先明世諦。 世法有五，後於是五法心無顛倒名第一者，知其性空不亦實性名無顛倒。 就後門中，若燒割等名世諦者，五陰諸法同名世諦。 無燒割等名第一者，諸法性空名第一義。 次下就其破相宗中以辨二諦。 八苦之相以為世諦，無八苦相為第一義。 問曰：此宗所辨二諦，與前何別？ 古來釋云：前說因緣假有以為世諦，此宗宣說妄相之有以為世諦。 前宗宣說無性之空為第一義，此宗宣說無相之空為第一義。 有斯別耳。 次就第四顯實宗中以辨二諦，事相緣起以為世諦，法性緣起名第一義。 先喻、後合。 喻相云何？ 譬如一人隨用分多，若其走時名為走者，收刈之時名收刈者，如是所說父母生邊名為世諦，因緣生邊名為第一。 古來解云：因緣所生凡有六重。 一事因緣所生，如《毘曇》說。 二法因緣所生，唯苦無常生滅法數。 三假因緣所生，如《成實》說。 四妄相因緣所生，猶如幻化。 五是妄想因緣所生，如夢所見。 六是真實因緣所生，所謂佛性十二因緣如水起波。 前五緣生竝是世諦，今據第六故名第一。 上解雖精，今解小別。 此中二諦，唯明顯實宗中二諦，不說小乘及破相二諦，顯實自有破於相故。 諸小乘計二十部殊，佛豈懸為大唐所有說二小宗所有二諦？ 由此應言：後七番中，初番舉事釋前依人以立二諦。 經言「凡夫隨其所稱名為世諦，出世之人如其性相而能知之名第一義。 」故知但是重顯前義，令知二諦依人相待亦建立之。 以下六番，依法勝劣相對建立。 雖不分明差別分別，義推即是此中四重。 前第二番有名無實是世俗者，即此初俗，《顯揚》等說如我有情等，正與此同。

Dividing in detail, there are four: First, the school that establishes intrinsic nature (立性宗), which is the shallow explanation within the Hīnayāna that all phenomena each possess an essential nature—the Sarvāstivādins and so forth. Second, the school that refutes intrinsic nature (破性宗), which is the profound explanation within the Hīnayāna that phenomena are provisionally existent and without intrinsic nature—the *Tattvasiddhi-śāstra* and so forth. Third, the school that refutes marks (破相宗), which is the shallow refutation within the Mahāyāna of the conditioned marks of phenomena, proclaiming that all phenomena are ultimately empty and tranquil—treatises such as the *Mūlamadhyamakakārikā* and the *Śata-śāstra*. Fourth, the school that reveals reality (顯實宗), which is the profound explanation within the Mahāyāna that all phenomena grasped by deluded sentiment are ultimately non-existent, while the true dharmadhātu is eternal and indestructible—the *Nirvāṇa-sūtra* and so forth. Within these four, each has two truths. Among the seven pairs above, the first three are the two truths distinguished within the school that establishes intrinsic nature; the next two are the two truths distinguished within the school that refutes intrinsic nature; the next one is the two truths distinguished within the school that refutes marks; and the last one is the two truths distinguished within the school that reveals reality. Now in this text, because the profound encompasses the shallow, they are fully discussed. Regarding the first school, according to the *Vibhāṣā* and others, seven pairs are fully set forth, which cannot be cited at length. First, distinguishing between sentiment and principle: the self, sentient beings, and so forth grasped by deluded sentiment are taken as conventional truth; the principle of non-self is the supreme truth. Second, distinguishing between the provisional and the real: provisional existents such as vases, garments, carts, houses, armies, and forests are called conventional truth; real existents such as the aggregates, realms, and bases are the supreme truth. Thus the *Saṃyuktābhidharmahṛdaya* states: 'When a phenomenon is analyzed, and upon discarding its name, [it is no longer identified as such], it is said [to be conventional]. When upon analysis nothing is discarded, that is said to be the supreme [truth].' Third, distinguishing between facts and principle: facts such as the aggregates, realms, and bases are called conventional truth; their principle regarding the characteristics of phenomena with respect to the sixteen aspects of the noble truths is the supreme truth. Fourth, distinguishing between bondage and liberation: suffering and origination are conventional; cessation and the path are supreme. Fifth, distinguishing between the inferior and the superior: suffering, origination, and the path, not being the highest within principle, are together called conventional truth; the truth of cessation is refined and superior, so it is said to be supreme. Sixth, distinguishing between emptiness and existence: among the sixteen aspects of those four truths, excluding emptiness and non-self, all are called conventional truth; emptiness and non-self are refined and subtle within principle, so they are said to be supreme. Seventh, distinguishing between practice and teaching: teaching is called conventional truth; practice is called supreme. Thus the *Saṃyuktābhidharmahṛdaya* states: 'The sūtras, vinaya, and abhidharma are called the conventional true Dharma. The thirty-seven factors of awakening are called the supreme truth.' Here we merely indicate the first three gates, leaving the rest unelaborated. First, dividing into two based on sentiment and principle: when the five aggregates assemble, they are designated as 'so-and-so'; ordinary persons follow that designation and reckon there to be a self and a person—this is called conventional truth. The noble ones understand that within the aggregates there is no 'so-and-so', nor is there one apart from the aggregates—this is called the supreme truth. Second, dividing into two according to the provisional and the real: first divide into two classes of phenomena. Those having names and having reality are real phenomena: seeking the phenomena according to their names regarding the aggregates, realms, and bases, their substance can be found, hence they are said to 'have reality'. Those having names but lacking reality are provisional phenomena: vases, garments, carts, houses, and armies—regarding all such things, their names are provisionally established, but upon investigation no substance exists, hence they are said to 'lack reality'. Below, distinguishing them according to the truths: the provisional is the conventional truth; the real is the supreme truth. Third, dividing into two according to facts and principle: facts are conventional truth; principle is supreme. Facts include both provisional and real: the self, sentient beings, and up to a rabbit's horn or a whirling firebrand are provisional facts; the aggregates, realms, and bases are real facts; all of these are together called conventional truth. The principle of the characteristics of the phenomena of suffering, origination, cessation, and the path is the supreme truth. Next, below, distinguishing the two truths within the school that refutes intrinsic nature, wherein there are two gates: the former gate distinguishes the two truths according to the emptiness and existence of provisional phenomena; the latter gate distinguishes the two truths according to the emptiness and existence of real phenomena. In the former gate, conventional truth is explained first. There are five worldly phenomena; subsequently having an mind free of inversion regarding these five phenomena is called the supreme: knowing their intrinsic nature to be empty and not taking it to be a real nature is called non-inversion. In the latter gate, if burning, cutting, and so forth are called conventional truth, then all phenomena of the five aggregates are together called conventional truth. That there is no burning, cutting, and so forth being called the supreme means that the emptiness of the intrinsic nature of all phenomena is called the supreme truth. Next, below, distinguishing the two truths within the school that refutes marks: the marks of the eight sufferings are taken as conventional truth; the absence of the marks of the eight sufferings is the supreme truth. Question: What is the difference between the two truths distinguished by this school and the preceding one? The ancient explanation states: The former school stated that provisional existence through dependent arising is the conventional truth; this school proclaims that existence as delusive marks is the conventional truth. The former school proclaimed that the emptiness of intrinsic nature is the supreme truth; this school proclaims that the emptiness of marks is the supreme truth. There is merely this difference. Next, distinguishing the two truths within the fourth school that reveals reality: dependent arising of phenomenal marks is taken as conventional truth; dependent arising of the dharmatā is called the supreme truth. First an analogy, then the application. What is the mark of the analogy? Just as one single person has many divisions according to function: when running, he is called a runner; when harvesting, he is called a harvester. Likewise, what is spoken of from the side of being born of parents is called conventional truth; from the side of being produced by causes and conditions, it is called supreme. The ancient explanation states: That which is produced by causes and conditions has altogether six levels: 1. Produced by the causes and conditions of facts, as explained in the *Abhidharma*. 2. Produced by the causes and conditions of dharmas: solely the categories of phenomena that are suffering, impermanent, arising, and ceasing. 3. Produced by provisional causes and conditions, as explained in the *Tattvasiddhi*. 4. Produced by causes and conditions of delusive marks, like an illusion or apparition. 5. Produced by causes and conditions of delusive conceptualization, like what is seen in a dream. 6. Produced by causes and conditions of reality: namely, the twelve links of dependent arising of Buddha-nature, like water rising as waves. The first five produced by conditions are all conventional truth; now taking the sixth, it is called supreme. Although the above explanation is refined, the present explanation is slightly different. The two truths here exclusively reveal the two truths within the school that reveals reality, without speaking of the Hīnayāna or the two truths of the school that refutes marks, because the revelation of reality itself refutes marks. The various Hīnayāna tenets differ across the twenty schools; how could the Buddha have spoken in advance of the two truths of the two Hīnayāna schools present in the Great Tang? Because of this, one should say: Among the latter seven pairs, the first pair raises facts to explain the former establishment of the two truths based on persons. The sūtra states: 'Ordinary persons follow their designations, which is called conventional truth; supramundane persons are able to know them according to their nature and marks, which is called supreme truth.' Therefore we know this merely re-manifests the former meaning, allowing one to know that the two truths are also established in mutual dependence based on persons. The following six pairs are established relative to each other based on the superiority or inferiority of dharmas. Although they do not make clear-cut distinctions, inferred by principle they are precisely the four levels here. The second pair above, stating that having names without reality is conventional, is precisely the first conventional truth here; what the *Xianyang* and other treatises explain regarding the self, sentient beings, and so forth precisely accords with this.