大乘法苑義林章 3.25

3.25

下辨捨。捨中分二：一捨相、二捨緣。捨相者，初得功能念念增長，令不新長但順舊住，不同前位更不新生，即名為捨。非捨昔者曾得體無名捨，不同小乘無得屬己。其身語二表發無表者，初念名得，第二念中即名為捨。雖有相續，不名發無表之表，但是隨轉非定轉故。不由於此發身語故有之，三性皆不定故。佛即不爾，非佛已外皆未曾得，念念新生。佛是曾得，但順舊住，由但不萎歇故，不名捨戒。故《唯識》云「依於思願善惡分限假立無表，佛願無萎故不名捨，不同因位。不爾，諸佛功德應非圓滿，念念新生，有未曾得故。不爾，前後諸佛應有勝劣，前佛戒多、後佛小故。發無表之表唯在於初，自餘表業非無表因。其無表業，且別解脫無表。」五十三說「苾芻五眾律儀，五緣故捨。一由捨所學處故、二由犯根本罪故、三由形沒二形生故、四由善根斷故、五由棄捨眾同分故。」捨所學處者，謂律中說作法棄捨。謂對比丘互跪作法，起棄語言，戒方成捨。若作捨心，雖起語言，不對比丘依法言捨，但名戒羸，其戒不捨。後作罪時，乃名污戒，沙門所攝，非為白衣。由此苾芻名捨學處。近事、近住各起不同分心，非作對他方成捨故。犯根本罪者，依《十輪經》第四卷說犯重不捨。彼云「善男子！若有苾芻，於諸根本性重罪中隨犯一罪。雖名破戒惡行苾芻，而於親教和合僧中，所得律儀猶不斷絕。乃至棄捨所學尸羅，猶有白法香氣隨逐。國王大臣諸在家者，無有律儀，不應輕慢及加擿罰。如是苾芻雖非法器，退失聖法、穢雜清眾，破壞一切沙門法事，不得受用四方僧物，而於親教和合僧中，所得律儀不棄捨故，猶勝一切在家白衣。犯性罪者尚應如是，況犯其餘諸小遮罪，是故不許國王大臣諸在家者輕慢及加摘罰。」此有二釋：《瑜伽》第四十釋菩薩戒中云「若起上纏犯根本罪，即便捨戒，無慚愧故。尚令焚滅一切善根，況所受戒。上品纏者，於本四罪數數現行，都無慚愧深生愛樂，見是功德說名上纏，非暫現行即名棄捨。然不共住治罰法故，非失戒義。中下纏犯，其戒不捨。」《瑜伽》據彼上品纏犯，《十輪》但據中下纏犯。故《涅槃經》第三十四卷，迦葉菩薩問當來世二十一對諍論之義，此當第十八對。至第三十五卷中，佛為釋云：「善男子！我於經中作如是說：若有比丘犯四重已，不名比丘，名破比丘，亡失比丘，不復能生善芽種子。譬如焦種不生果實，如多羅樹頭若斷壞即不生菓。犯重比丘亦復如是。我諸弟子聞是說已，不解我意，唱如是言：如來說諸比丘犯重禁已失比丘戒。善男子！我於經中為純陀說四種比丘。一者究竟到道，《俱舍》云勝道沙門；二者示道；三者受道，新云命道；四者污道，犯四重者即是污道。我諸弟子聞是說已，不解我意，唱言：如來說諸比丘犯四重已不失禁戒。」準觀文意，若犯四重一向失戒，則應解意。一向不失，亦應解意，云何不解？故知上下二品心犯，有其失不失別。雖諸經中多說若有犯四重禁，誦持此呪罪皆消滅，不說戒體重還生不生。其《大方等陀羅尼經》第四卷說「文殊師利白佛言：『若有比丘於佛滅後毀犯四重，若比丘尼毀八重，若菩薩及沙彌尼、優婆塞、優婆夷若毀如是一一諸戒，當云何滅如是等過？』佛言：『若惡比丘毀四重禁，默然受於供養而不改悔，當知是比丘必受地獄苦而無疑也。我今當出良藥救彼比丘。』

Next is the explanation of relinquishment. Relinquishment is divided into two: first, the characteristics of relinquishment; second, the conditions for relinquishment. As for the characteristics of relinquishment: the capacity initially obtained increases moment by moment; when it is made not to grow anew but merely to abide conforming to the old, differing from the preceding state where it no longer freshly arises, this is called relinquishment. It is not that relinquishing the substance formerly obtained so that it becomes non-existent is called relinquishment; it is not like the Hīnayāna where non-possession belongs to oneself. As for the two manifests of body and speech generating the unmanifest: the first moment is called obtaining, and in the second moment it is called relinquishment. Although there is continuity, it is not called a manifest that generates the unmanifest, but is merely concordant, not necessarily concordant. It is not because of generating body and speech through this that it exists, because the three natures are all indeterminate. The Buddha is not like this; anyone other than a Buddha has not obtained it previously, and it freshly arises moment by moment. A Buddha has previously obtained it and merely abides conforming to the old; because it never withers or wanes, it is not called relinquishing the precepts. Therefore the *Cheng weishi lun* says: 'The unmanifest is nominally established based on the limits of good and bad intentions and vows. Because a Buddha's vows never wither, it is not called relinquishment, unlike the causal stage. Otherwise, the virtues of the Buddhas would not be complete, freshly arising moment by moment, having what was not previously obtained. Otherwise, earlier and later Buddhas would have superiority and inferiority, because an earlier Buddha's precepts would be many and a later Buddha's would be few.' The manifest that generates the unmanifest is only at the beginning; other manifest karmas are not causes of the unmanifest. As for the unmanifest karma, it refers for now to the prātimokṣa unmanifest. Fascicle fifty-three [of the *Yogācārabhūmi*] says: 'The monastic restraint of the five groups of bhikṣus is relinquished through five conditions: first, by relinquishing the training rules; second, by committing a fundamental offense; third, by the loss of gender and the arising of two genders; fourth, by the severing of roots of wholesome; fifth, by relinquishing the generic similarity of sentient beings.' Relinquishing the training rules means what the Vinaya describes as relinquishment by formal procedure. That is, kneeling opposite a bhikṣu and performing the procedure, giving voice to relinquishment, only then is the precept relinquished. If one produces the intention to relinquish, and although one gives voice to it, one does not speak the relinquishment in accordance with the Dharma opposite a bhikṣu, this is merely called weak precepts, and the precepts are not relinquished. When committing an offense later, it is then called defiled precepts; one is still subsumed under the status of a śramaṇa and is not a layperson. Thus a bhikṣu relinquishes the training rules in this way. Lay practitioners and one-day observers each produce an intention of a different class; they do not perform it opposite another person for it to become a relinquishment. As for committing a fundamental offense: according to the fourth fascicle of the *Daśacakra-sūtra*, committing a grave offense does not relinquish [the precepts]. It says: 'Good son! If there is a bhikṣu who commits any one of the fundamental natural grave offenses, although he is called a precept-breaking bhikṣu of evil conduct, yet within the harmonious Saṃgha of the preceptor, the restraint he has obtained is not yet severed. Even up to relinquishing the śīla of the training, the fragrance of white dharmas still accompanies him. Kings, ministers, and all laypeople have no restraint; they should not show disrespect, nor should they inflict punishment. Although such a bhikṣu is not a vessel of the Dharma, has fallen away from the noble Dharma, pollutes the pure assembly, and ruins all monastic rites of a śramaṇa, not being permitted to enjoy the property of the Saṃgha of the four directions, yet because within the harmonious Saṃgha of the preceptor the restraint he obtained has not been relinquished, he is still superior to all lay white-robed people. If one who commits a natural offense is still like this, how much more so for one who commits other minor proscriptive offenses! Therefore kings, ministers, and all laypeople are not permitted to show disrespect or inflict punishment.' Regarding this there are two explanations: The fortieth fascicle of the *Yogācārabhūmi*, explaining the bodhisattva precepts, says: 'If one arouses the highest entanglement and commits a fundamental offense, one immediately relinquishes the precepts, because there is no shame or remorse. It even causes all roots of wholesomeness to be incinerated, how much more so the precepts one has undertaken! As for the highest entanglement: one repeatedly engages in the fundamental four offenses, entirely lacks shame and remorse, deeply generates fondness and delight, and sees them as virtues—this is called the highest entanglement; merely engaging in them temporarily is not called relinquishment. However, because of the disciplinary rule of non-cohabitation, it does not mean the precepts are lost. If one commits them with medium or weak entanglement, one's precepts are not relinquished.' The *Yogācārabhūmi* is based on committing them with the highest entanglement, while the *Daśacakra-sūtra* is merely based on committing them with medium or weak entanglement. Therefore, in the thirty-fourth fascicle of the *Mahāparinirvāṇa-sūtra*, when Bodhisattva Kāśyapa asks about the meanings of the twenty-one pairs of disputes in future ages, this corresponds to the eighteenth pair. Arriving at the thirty-fifth fascicle, the Buddha explains for him: 'Good son! In the sūtras I have spoken thus: If a bhikṣu commits the four grave offenses, he is no longer called a bhikṣu, he is called a broken bhikṣu, a lost bhikṣu; he can no longer sprout the seeds of wholesomeness. Just as a scorched seed does not produce fruit, and just as a tāla tree does not produce fruit if its crown is severed, so too is a bhikṣu who commits a grave offense. My disciples, having heard this explanation, did not understand my intention and proclaimed thus: The Tathāgata says that bhikṣus who commit grave prohibitions lose the bhikṣu precepts. Good son! In the sūtras I explained four kinds of bhikṣus for Cunda: first, one who has thoroughly attained the path—the *Abhidharmakośa* calls this the śramaṇa of the supreme path; second, one who shows the path; third, one who receives the path—the new [translation] calls this living by the path; fourth, one who pollutes the path—one who commits the four grave offenses is precisely one who pollutes the path. My disciples, having heard this explanation, did not understand my intention and proclaimed: The Tathāgata says that bhikṣus who commit the four grave offenses do not lose the prohibitive precepts.' Evaluating the textual meaning: if committing the four grave offenses unconditionally lost the precepts, then they should have understood the intention. If they were unconditionally not lost, they should also have understood the intention; why did they not understand? Therefore we know that committing them with the two grades of mind, high and low, has the distinction of losing or not losing. Although many sūtras say that if one commits the four grave prohibitions, reciting and upholding this dhāraṇī will cause all offenses to be eliminated, they do not state whether the essence of the precepts is regenerated or not. The fourth fascicle of the *Mahāvaipulya-dhāraṇī-sūtra* says: 'Mañjuśrī said to the Buddha: "If a bhikṣu after the Buddha's passing violates the four grave offenses, or if a bhikṣuṇī violates the eight grave offenses, or if a bodhisattva, a śrāmaṇerikā, an upāsaka, or an upāsikā violates each such precept, how should such transgressions be eliminated?" The Buddha said: "If an evil bhikṣu violates the four grave prohibitions, silently receives offerings, and does not reform and repent, you should know that this bhikṣu will certainly suffer the torments of hell without doubt. I shall now dispense a good medicine to rescue that bhikṣu."