大乘法苑義林章 3.29

"'[Recite it] for ninety-seven days, forty-nine times per day, before making one confession.'" [The sūtra] extensively explains the methods for extinguishing transgressions for bodhisattvas, śrāmaṇeras, and others. In the first fascicle of that sūtra, when it speaks of dhāraṇīs, it also says: "Those who have violated the bhikṣu precepts, the bhikṣuṇī precepts, and the like should make one confession. If [the roots of the precepts] are not restored, that is impossible, unless their mind is not sincere." Therefore, one knows that by committing a grave offense one does not lose the precepts, but it is only called defiling the precepts. If it were not so, how could they subsequently regain purity? What is stated in the *Foming jing* is also largely the same. In terms of the *Sifen lü*, as with the Sarvāstivāda, committing a grave offense does not entail losing [the precepts]. "Not dwelling together" is a disciplinary measure, not the meaning of losing the precepts. The second [view] says: When committing a grave offense, regardless of the mental state, one definitely loses the precepts. Fascicle 53 says, "because by committing a grave offense, one relinquishes them." The *Bodhisattvabhūmi*, in fascicle 40, explaining the bodhisattva precepts, says: "If, by means of a weak or middling entanglement, one violates the four pārājika dharmas, one does not relinquish the pure moral discipline of the bodhisattva; but violating them with a strong entanglement is called relinquishing it. If bodhisattvas violate the four pārājika dharmas, repeatedly performing them without any shame or remorse, and deeply cherishing and regarding them as meritorious, one should know that this is called violating them with a strong entanglement. It is not the case that bodhisattvas, by temporarily performing a pārājika dharma just once, thereby relinquish the pure moral discipline of the bodhisattva. Just as when bhikṣus commit a pārājika dharma, they immediately relinquish the prātimokṣa precepts." The meaning here is: The pure precepts of a bodhisattva are lost through an offense committed with a strong entanglement; it is not that for bodhisattvas an offense committed with a middling or weak entanglement is also called a loss, whereas when bhikṣus commit a grave offense, they lose them immediately. This conversely shows that when a bhikṣu commits a grave offense, even with a middling or weak mind, he also immediately loses the precepts; with bodhisattvas it is not so, which is why it says that it is not the case that a bodhisattva, by temporarily performing [a pārājika] once, is called having committed [an offense that loses them], and so forth. If one reads the treatise's text continuously, its doctrinal trajectory is also extensive. Therefore, one knows that when a bodhisattva commits a grave offense, there is losing and not losing [the precepts], but when a bhikṣu of broken discipline commits a grave offense, he definitely loses the precepts. One cannot use the bodhisattva precepts' having loss and non-loss upon committing a grave offense to prove that bhikṣus are the same; for a bhikṣu's aspiration is vast and profound, serving as a Dharma vessel, whereas a bodhisattva guides and gathers all kinds of beings. Therefore, fascicle 40 says: "Because of this, when a bodhisattva commits a grave offense and loses the precepts, he may receive them [again] in this life. A bhikṣu, in his present life, is not fit to receive them again, because the intention and thought of evil aspiration damages the good vessel. If one loses the precepts through the emergence of both sexes, the severance of good roots, or ritual renunciation, then because subsequently the former circumstance is absent, one may receive them in this life, as the precepts were not defiled." Texts such as the *Shilun jing* protect the saṅgha of the final Dharma age to quell slander and convert the worldly, and therefore say they are not lost; it is not that in reality they are not lost. The *Nirvāṇa-sūtra*, because of this, [holds that] committing a grave offense is an actual loss, and not losing them is to quell slander; therefore, those who say they are definitely lost or definitely not lost have all failed to understand the intention. In the Vaipulya sūtras, it is merely that through confession the grave offense is extinguished; the statement that they are "restored" is an accommodating expression, so there is no contradiction either. Thus the sūtra says: "For a person who commits a grave offense, the World-Honoured One does not permit him to consume even a single mouthful of saṅgha food, to tread with a single heel upon the ground of a vihāra, and expels him from all monastic duties." Therefore the Buddha also said: "One should quickly pull out the tares among the rice; one should quickly select and discard rotten ridgepoles and beams; one should quickly winnow out the chaff from the seeds; one should quickly banish those who merely bear the name of bhikṣus." Therefore, one knows that committing a grave offense definitely constitutes losing the precepts. That the Vinaya itself states there is no offense refers to before the precepts were first instituted, to madness and mental confusion, or to being overwhelmed by the torments of illness. Although there is this explanation saying the precepts are not lost, [the other view] has abundant textual support and correct reasoning. Furthermore, those who violate the precepts actually have three mental states; why should only one class cause the loss of the precepts? Therefore, the former explanation is good. Regarding "loss of gender characteristics and emergence of both gender characteristics," there are two explanations of the loss of gender characteristics. The first says: When one gender characteristic is lost and there is no gender characteristic, one does not lose the precepts. Just as when one enters the state of an ārya, although one may lose the gender characteristic, the precepts are not lost. Although it is known that an ārya does not become genderless, if, for example, one obtained the precepts while an ordinary person and was subsequently eaten by insects, and at the time of being eaten by insects one immediately entered the seeing of truth, at that time the former precepts were all not lost; because having entered the seeing of truth one does not lose the precepts, yet one may lose the gender characteristic. When it says "loss of gender characteristics," it means that when both gender characteristics emerge, the former single gender characteristic must change and disappear before the two gender characteristics are formed; it is not that becoming genderless immediately causes the loss of the precepts. If one was originally genderless and could not receive the full ordination, that is because one's aspiration is inferior and one is not a vessel for the path; whereas after receiving the precepts, one may become genderless because one's intention is not inferior. The second [view] says: They should be relinquished through six conditions, because when one gender characteristic is lost, the precepts are definitely relinquished. When two gender characteristics subsequently emerge, the former single gender characteristic is still present; how could that be called "loss"? Rather, both [loss of gender] and becoming genderless cause the loss of the precepts. The treatise mentions [them] in one place, but in reality there are six conditions. There is no such thing as having entered the seeing of truth and being eaten by insects; one cannot disrupt the Great Vehicle's meaning with the Hīnayāna. If so, for all those who gradually expire, dying first from below, could it be that once [death] passes the gender characteristics, they immediately lose the precepts, and upon reviving later must receive the precepts again? What would be wrong with this? Since the precepts were already relinquished when there was no gender characteristic earlier, why must death be required? If so, it would be newly born here, and relinquished later here. Fascicle 1 of the *Yogācāra* says: "Only at the final thought does one die." At the state of death, all are originally genderless; how could there further be relinquishment at death? If two gender characteristics are present from the beginning, one cannot receive the precepts; if two gender characteristics emerge later, one also definitely relinquishes the precepts. With genderlessness it is not so: if present from the beginning, one cannot receive them, but if it arises later, they are not relinquished. The vessel of two gender characteristics is vile, for male and female defilements are constantly present together, obstructing one from being a Dharma vessel. If genderlessness is present at first, the principle is the same; but if it occurs later, [the precepts] are not lost, because it does not destroy one's original nature and does not obstruct the noble state. Two gender characteristics, however, cause ruin, because they obstruct the noble stage. Therefore, the *Kośa* says: "Possessing the anājñātamājñāsyāmīndriya, one definitely possesses thirteen [indriyas]—namely, the five beginning with faith, body, life, mind, the four feelings excluding the grief indriya, and the anājñātamājñāsyāmīndriya." It does not say that one definitely possesses either the male or female [indriya]; therefore, one knows that noble ones may also be genderless. Regarding the "severance of good roots": There are two minds with which one receives the precepts, namely, the innate and the preparatory. It is the innate good that is severed, not the preparatory good. For one who receives them with a mind of preparatory good, the precepts have already been lost on the preparatory path prior to the severance of good roots; with the severance of good roots serving as the condition, it is also called the severance of good. If they are received with an innate mind, only when false view arises and becomes manifest are the precepts lost. However, the precepts may be received with three grades of mind, whereas false view requires nine grades before good is completely severed. The precepts are likewise: it only says they are relinquished upon the severance of good, not that they are relinquished at the first [grade]. Regarding "abandoning the sa-bhāgatā": This refers to relinquishment at death. In the final moment, the mind at the precise point of death exists in the present; the precepts also exist in the present, and are not yet called already relinquished, but may be called currently being relinquished. Just as the supreme mundane dharma relinquishes the nature of an ordinary worldling, if one has already died, the precepts enter the past, and one currently abides in the intermediate existence and so forth; because the precepts have already been relinquished, it is called relinquishment, owing to the separation from the ordinary worldling.

These refer to individually receiving the monastic vows of a bhikṣu and so forth, not the discipline of the bodhisattva vows. Fascicle fifty-three states: 'If the True Dharma is destroyed or the True Dharma disappears, although one does not newly receive the bhikṣu discipline, what has already been received before, one should know, is not abandoned. Why is this? Because at that time the aeon of disintegration has actively arisen, and not a single sentient being, lacking impaired intention, is able to receive the full monastic precepts, much less are there any who realize the fruits of asceticism (śrāmaṇya). Therefore, one cannot receive them, [yet] previous precepts are not lost.' The discipline of an upāsaka is abandoned through three conditions: first, the arising of a discordant mind—this includes the force of a time limit, receiving and renouncing them for a set number of years, since an upāsaka is permitted for a short time, a long time, or for the rest of one's life; second, the severing of the roots of goodness; third, abandoning the shared bodily class (i.e. dying). When the True Dharma disappears, as with the bhikṣu discipline, one should know by reason that there is no abandonment through committing a major offense, nor is there abandonment through the loss of sexual organs or the arising of both sexual organs. Fascicle eight of the Abhidharmasamuccaya states: 'Question: If one only trains in one portion of the training rules of an upāsaka, is one said to possess the upāsaka discipline, or is one said not to possess it? Answer: One should say that one possesses it, yet it is called an infraction of the precepts.' Thus we know that committing a major offense does not cause the loss of the upāsaka precepts. That same fascicle further asks: 'Question: As for the ṣaṇḍha, paṇḍaka, and so forth, are they barred from receiving the upāsaka precepts, or are they not barred? Answer: They are not barred from receiving the upāsaka discipline. However, their nature is barred because they are incapable of serving the two monastic communities.' The case is the same for those with both sexual organs: the afflictions of both male and female constantly manifest together, making them incapable of approaching and serving the two communities; therefore, it is not separately stated. Fascicle fifty-three states: 'Why is it that although a ṣaṇḍha or a paṇḍaka receives the refuges and can also guard all the training rules of upāsakas, they do not obtain the name of upāsaka? Answer: An upāsaka is one who is able to personally approach and serve the communities of bhikṣus and bhikṣuṇīs. Although they can guard the discipline they have received, they should not frequently approach and serve the two monastic communities. Nor should the two monastic communities approach and look after such types with caressing or touching, nor should they approach them as they would an upāsaka; therefore, they do not obtain the name of upāsaka. However, in their receiving and guarding of all the training rules, one should know that the merit is equal and without difference.' Thus we know that when sexual organs are lost or both sexual organs arise, one also does not lose the upāsaka precepts. The discipline of fasting (upavāsa) is also abandoned through three conditions: first, by the passing of sunrise—this only accommodates a class of beginners, because there is no distinct dharma that obstructs the precepts. If one's mental vow is fulfilled, even if one resolves on many days, on what grounds would it not be obtained? Thus we know this is merely the Buddha's teaching expediently established to transform beginners; second, by the arising of a discordant mind; third, by abandoning the shared bodily class. There is no abandonment through committing a major offense, nor through the loss of sexual organs or the arising of both sexual organs, whose meanings are as explained above. Regarding the absence of abandonment through the severing of the roots of goodness, there are two explanations. One says: In principle there should be four conditions. Here, the arising of a discordant mind subsumes two kinds of abandonment: first, the arising of a mind of renunciation. A mind of renunciation means giving rise to the thought of not keeping them, which is unlike the bhikṣu who exclusively performs a formal act; second, the severing of the roots of goodness—because the upāsaka precepts lack abandonment at sunrise, whereas the upavāsa precepts have it. Combining these two under the name of 'arising of a discordant mind'—with one implicit and the other explicit, reflecting each other—incurs no fault. For example, if one had previously generated the preparatory stages of false view and had not yet severed [the roots of goodness], receiving the precepts today, one would thereupon sever the roots of goodness. Therefore, we believe there should be four, but here it is explained as three. The second says: There are only three conditions. Because the period of one day and night is extremely short, one does not need to separately generate the preparatory stages for severing the roots of goodness; hence there is no such abandonment. If one had previously generated the preparatory stages, one would be unable to receive the precepts; even if one were to receive them with a weak or middling mind, one could not obtain them, because only a superior mind can arouse the precepts, just as only superior false view severs the roots of goodness. As for the bodhisattva vows, fascicle forty states: 'They are abandoned through two conditions: first, renouncing the great vow of unexcelled complete bodhi; second, manifesting superior entanglement and committing an act of defeat (pārājika).' Fascicle seventy-five of the Section on Determination states: 'Furthermore, the causes and conditions for abandonment are, in brief, four: first, resolutely generating a discordant mind with the intent to cease and renounce; second, in the presence of a discerning person, deliberately uttering words of renunciation and speaking to renounce them; third, generally or individually violating the four defeat-offenses, generating the fundamental transgressions; fourth, if with superior entanglement, generally or individually violating what accords with the four defeat-offenses, committing the offenses of concordance.' It further states: 'These three types of precepts are maintained and harmonized by the discipline precepts. If one is able to diligently guard these, one can also guard the rest. If one cannot do so here, one cannot with the rest. Therefore, if one violates the discipline precepts, it is called violating all bodhisattva disciplines. Hence, if one loses the precepts upon committing the four major offenses and committing the offenses of concordance, it is because in both cases one violates the discipline, for the discipline precepts are the root. If one does not abandon them, one should know that they continue along in subsequent lives as well.' In the Bodhisattvabhūmi, regressing from the bodhi mind subsumes the first two of the four in the Determination, while committing offenses with superior entanglement subsumes the latter two. Committing the four fundamentals and the four concordant offenses with superior entanglement all result in losing the precepts. Severing the roots of goodness is subsumed within the arising of a discordant mind, and so it is not discussed. Furthermore, upon regressing from the bodhi mind, one has already lost the precepts previously; therefore, when severing the roots of goodness, abandonment is not mentioned again. The Section on Determination states: 'If one does not abandon these bodhisattva precepts, one should know that they continue along in subsequent lives as well.' Fascicle forty states: 'Even though bodhisattvas take rebirth throughout the worlds of the ten directions, wherever they are born, they do not abandon the pure discipline of the bodhisattva vows. This is because these bodhisattvas do not abandon the great vow of bodhi, nor do they manifest offenses with superior entanglement. Even though they forget their original mindfulness upon taking rebirth in another life, when they encounter a good friend, they once again regain awareness and mindfulness of the bodhisattva vows. Although they receive them repeatedly, it is neither a new reception nor a new acquisition, because the mind of the received vow extends to the end of the future, and because the mind is broad and vast. The others cannot do so, because their mental vows are narrow. Even if they generate a broad mind, its force cannot achieve this.' By this standard, if bhikṣus, upāsakas, or upavāsakas have not abandoned them in this life, they can also receive them again without it being a new acquisition. Fascicle forty-one states: 'If one loses the discipline precepts by committing an act of defeat with superior entanglement, after disclosing and repenting to eliminate it, one should receive them again. The procedure for disclosure is as with middling entanglement. If one commits an act of defeat with middling entanglement, one should, in the presence of three or more persons who are able to understand and receive the meaning expressed in speech—persons of the Hīnayāna or Mahāyāna—disclose and repent to eliminate the wrong deeds (duṣkṛta), up to the detailed explanation. If one commits an act of defeat with weak entanglement or other violations, one should disclose and repent before a single person endowed with the virtues described above.'

‘If there is no such virtuous person before whom one may confess, one should purify one's intention, generate a resolve in one's own mind, [vowing:] “I shall definitively guard against it in the future and never commit it again.” In this way, one emerges from the offense and is restored to purity. As for those who do not commit an offense: those who are insane or oppressed by suffering when committing a grave offense are not called offenders.’ In accordance with this, for both classes—upāsakas and upavāsathas—violating a precept does not constitute relinquishment. One should go before a virtuous person capable of granting [reception], or make a vow by oneself, confessing and vowing so as to emerge from one's transgression and restore the purity of one's precepts. The four pārājika dharmas and the ancillary dharmas are as explained in the newly translated Bodhisattva Precepts composed by Maitreya and other texts. Those without gender or with dual gender are not barred from receiving the precepts, because [the bodhisattva precepts] gather and embrace broadly; nor is it said that they relinquish them. According to these principles, the precepts of bhikṣus and others within the bodhisattva precepts are not relinquished at death, with dual gender, at sunrise, or the like. Because the [bodhisattva's] mind is broad and vast, they cannot be received separately. Dhyāna discipline is relinquished through four conditions: First, relinquishment through cessation; that is, emerging from that concentration and giving rise to a mind of a different category, because [this] precept accords with the mind. Second, relinquishment through non-functioning; that is, relinquishment through changing planes, when being born from a lower or higher plane into a higher or lower plane. Third, relinquishment through loss of function. Fourth, relinquishment through permanent absence; upon entering nirvāṇa without remainder, everything is relinquished and never again accomplished, because once one falls away from dhyāna and the like, it is never accomplished again. Anāsrava discipline is relinquished through five conditions: First, relinquishment through cessation; that is, emerging from that mind and giving rise to a mind of a different category, because it conforms to the mind. Second, relinquishment through temporary absence; that is, relinquishment through falling away. For those liberated by wisdom and bodily witnesses, when falling away from pleasant abiding in the present life, the concentration of cessation, and the like, or when being born into a lower plane and the like, this is not falling away from the noble fruits to give rise to defilements. The above two are called temporary relinquishments; they are brought to presence again in the present life. Third, relinquishment through attaining a fruit; the fourteenth fascicle of the Abhidharmasamuccaya states: ‘At the stages of abhisamaya, when realizing the subsequent superior path, one relinquishes the previously attained inferior path. Just as when realizing the path subsumed by this fruit, one immediately relinquishes the path subsumed by this approach [to the fruit], because it will not become present again.’ Fourth, relinquishment through refining the faculties; the fifty-seventh fascicle of the ‘Decisions’ states: ‘How many pudgalas refine their faculties? Answer: All those in training (śaikṣa), and five among those beyond training (aśaikṣa)—the lineages of falling away, thought, guarding, abiding, and capable of penetration; not pratyekabuddhas, nor bodhisattvas, because their faculties are by nature sharp.’ The fourteenth fascicle of the Abhidharmasamuccaya states: ‘If bodhisattvas are by nature of sharp faculties, why are they instructed to cultivate the refining of faculties? It is to cause them, relying on sharp-inferior faculties, to induce sharp-medium faculties, and relying on sharp-medium faculties, further to induce sharp-superior faculties.’ That text itself harmonizes this: ‘Earlier it was said that bodhisattvas are by nature of sharp faculties, yet later it was said that from time to time they should cultivate the refining of faculties; this is because within their own category there are further three grades, inferior and so forth, which successively induce one another, which is called refining the faculties. Were it not so, sharp faculties would be of only a single grade.’ The fifty-seventh fascicle states that immovable [arhats] and pratyekabuddhas do not refine their faculties because they do not advance toward their own vehicle. Bodhisattvas do not refine them because they do not advance toward another vehicle. It is not that immovable ones and pratyekabuddhas do not advance toward another vehicle, nor that bodhisattvas do not advance toward their own vehicle. The fifty-seventh fascicle says: ‘A stream-enterer who refines faculties also attains [the fruit of] once-returner. A once-returner who refines faculties does not attain [the fruit of] non-returner, because the antidote is difficult to obtain and what is attained is vast. A non-returner who refines faculties only advances toward detachment from desire, but does not attain the stage beyond training; this should be understood as before. Faculties must be refined for five reasons: first, because slight wholesomeness is incomplete; second, to induce superior concentration; third, to plant the power of extensive learning; fourth, to plant the power of doctrinal debate and discernment; fifth, to plant the power of patience in observing the profound Dharma. Therefore, one must refine the faculties.’ Thus, apart from attaining the fruit, there is also relinquishing the path-concomitant discipline through refining the faculties. Fifth, upon entering nirvāṇa without remainder, everything is permanently relinquished. For the latter three relinquishments, the seeds are never again accomplished. Although it is known that dhyāna relinquishment is explained by four conditions, and anāsrava relinquishment by five conditions, subsuming their categories there is one condition: that is, when a different mind arises, all are relinquished. Because manifest intention is avijñapti, relinquishment has already been explained within the preliminary expedients of the various conditions; now, explaining the categories as continuously arising in the present, it is said that they are relinquished through four conditions and five conditions. Although there is no direct canonical text for the discipline of non-restraint (asaṃvara), it is relinquished through four conditions: First, relinquishment by vow; making a binding vow before the Buddha or elsewhere never to do it again, like relinquishing discipline, because one relinquishes that intention. Second, relinquishment by receiving precepts; if one receives the precepts of monastic renunciation or of an upāsaka, all [non-restraint] is permanently relinquished. If one receives the upavāsatha precepts and forms the thought of permanent relinquishment, it is likewise permanently relinquished. If it is relinquished by momentum of intention, once dawn passes and the upavāsatha precepts are relinquished, it resumes again, because that evil intention was not permanently relinquished. Third, relinquishment by attaining concentration; because the various concentrations and path-precepts are by nature contrary to evil. Fourth, relinquishment at the end of life; because the binding period ceases. Some say: it is also relinquished when one's gender vanishes or dual gender arises, because the support has changed. Others say: this is not so. These two [conditions] are permitted not to relinquish discipline and [allow one] to receive discipline. How much more so for non-restraint, which is solely an evil intention; their vessel is also like that, so there is no such relinquishment. The fifty-third fascicle states: ‘One should know that as long as this person has not yet relinquished the intention of non-restraint, they may always be called one of non-restraint. Day by day, because their unwholesome intentions are broadly accumulated and their unwholesome karma is frequently manifested, one should know that non-merit steadily increases.’ Therefore, we know that the previous four relinquishments are correct. Some say: there is no relinquishment by vow; just as an illness will never heal without taking medicine, one must definitely receive precepts, attain concentration, or end one's life. This too is not so, because its intention is relinquished, just as in relinquishing discipline. Therefore, the earlier explanation is correct. If intermediate avijñapti is posited—though there is no direct canonical text—according to the fifteenth fascicle of the Abhidharmakośa-bhāṣya, it is relinquished through six conditions: First, relinquishment through the breaking of the receptive mind; that is, relinquishing what was received, forming the thought: ‘From this moment on, I abandon what was previously received.’ Second, breaking of momentum; that is, by pure faith, the momentum and prescribed limit of defilement are broken. Just as with a released arrow, a potter's wheel, and the like, when the momentum is exhausted, it stops. Third, breaking of action; that is, following what was received, one no longer acts thereafter. Fourth, breaking of the object; that is, the four requisites, utensils, nets, snares, and other matters given away. Fifth, breaking of life span; that is, because the basis of support undergoes transformation. Sixth, breaking of the wholesome roots; that is, when initiating the preparation to sever the wholesome roots, one immediately relinquishes the avijñapti induced by the wholesome roots. Although the branches and categories of manifest (vijñapti) and unmanifest (avijñapti) for the ten wholesome courses of action differ, for the most part they are said to be the same as the upāsaka precepts. However, in their relinquishment, expiration of the prescribed period is added—such as one day and night, or the like. Because of the length of the time period, once the term expires, it is abandoned.”