大乘法苑義林章 4.46

4.46

第四心所相應者，第七識中俱生我見，《成唯識》第四卷，有說：心所唯九法俱，謂遍行五，我癡、我見、我慢、我愛。欲希未合，此唯任運無欲也。勝解印持未定，此恒緣定，無勝解也。念記曾習，此緣現境無念也。定專一境，此恒別緣無定也。慧即我見，故別不說。一切隨惑，竝依煩惱前後分位差別假立。此恒一類，故無隨惑。惡作追悔，眠外緣起。尋伺俱發言，淺深推度轉。此一類緣，故彼無也。見見不俱無餘四見，二取邪見分別而生。我所邊見，依我見起，故此不俱。貪、嗔相返，見、疑相違，染淨相異。故此唯九。有義：十五俱。前九加慧，別門說故。及五隨惑，謂惛、掉、不信、懈怠、放逸。《對法》第六說遍染故。忿等十麁，此識細故。無慚、無愧唯不善故。散亂外緣，此識內故。不正知犯軌則，此不爾，故不俱。忘念者，要念曾習。此不爾，故唯十五。有義：說十九俱。前九加六隨，謂不信、懈怠、放逸、忘念、散亂、惡慧，《決擇》五十五說遍染故。竝念、定、慧，及惛沈。專注一境不捨有定，無明重有惛沈。無掉者，相違故。有義：此俱有二十四，前九及十隨惑，〈決擇〉五十八說放逸、散亂、掉舉、惛沈、不信、懈怠、邪欲、邪勝解、邪念、不正知遍染心故，加別境五。如實義者，此俱十八，前九加八隨。雖無聖教，理准定有，謂惛沈、掉舉、不信、懈怠、放逸、忘念、散亂、不正知。無明為性者，此得俱故。加別境慧，義門別故。無欲解者，不遍染故。雖有五說，第五為正，不違教理。故第六識俱俱生薩迦耶見，與遍行五，別境五，根本三惑謂愛、慢、癡。隨煩惱中，初十定不俱，彼行麁故。此有五說。第一說不與隨惑俱，無別分位故；第二說五隨俱；第三說六隨俱；第四說十隨俱；第五說八隨俱，以此為正。不定四中與三種俱，除悔一種。悔行相麁，我見等細故。餘皆不違。善、染相違，不與善俱。今據正義，總應容與二十四俱，如前思計。分別我見二十七俱，加根本嗔，竝無慚、愧，欲界不善得相應故。此說欲義，非定俱故。

Fourth, association with mental factors: regarding the innate view of a self in the seventh consciousness, in the fourth fascicle of the Cheng weishi lun, some say: it is associated solely with nine dharmas, namely, the five omnipresent [mental factors], self-delusion, view of self, self-pride, and self-love. Aspiration (chanda) hopes for what is not yet united, whereas this [consciousness] operates solely spontaneously without aspiration. Resolve (adhimokṣa) holds firmly to the undetermined, whereas this [consciousness] constantly takes a determinate object, lacking resolve. Mindfulness (smṛti) remembers what was previously practiced, whereas this [consciousness] takes a present object, lacking mindfulness. Concentration (samādhi) focuses exclusively on a single object, whereas this [consciousness] constantly takes a distinct object, lacking concentration. Prajñā is itself the view of a self, so it is not stated separately. All secondary defilements (upakleśa) are hypothetically established based on the differential states before and after the fundamental defilements; this [consciousness] is constantly uniform, so it has no secondary defilements. Regret (kaukṛtya) is remorse; sleep (middha) arises conditioned by external factors. Investigation and analysis (vitarka and vicāra) both generate speech, operating with shallow or deep deliberation. This [consciousness] takes a uniform object, so those do not exist. Views do not co-occur with views, so there are no other four views; the two attachments and false view arise through discrimination. The view of extremes regarding what belongs to a self arises based on the view of a self, so it does not co-occur with this. Greed and ill will are mutually contrary; view and doubt are mutually opposed; defilement and purity are mutually different. Therefore, this [consciousness] is associated with only nine. Another position holds: it is associated with fifteen. The previous nine are added to prajñā, because it is explained under a distinct category; and five secondary defilements, namely torpor (styāna), restlessness (auddhatya), lack of faith (aśraddhā), indolence (kausīdya), and heedlessness (pramāda). Fascicle 6 of the Abhidharmasamuccaya says they pervade defilement. The ten coarse defilements such as anger (krodha) are excluded because this consciousness is subtle. Shamelessness (āhrīkya) and lack of conscience (anapatrāpya) are solely unwholesome. Distraction (vikṣepa) takes external objects, whereas this consciousness is inward. Non-clear knowledge (asaṃprajanya) violates rules of conduct, whereas this is not the case, so they do not co-occur. Forgetfulness (muṣitasmṛtitā) requires remembering what was previously practiced; this is not the case, so there are only fifteen. Another position holds: it is stated to be associated with nineteen. To the previous nine are added six secondary defilements, namely lack of faith, indolence, heedlessness, forgetfulness, distraction, and faulty prajñā (kudṛṣṭi), because the fifty-fifth fascicle of the "Viniścayasamgrahaṇī" says they pervade defilement; together with mindfulness, concentration, and prajñā, as well as torpor. Focusing on a single object without abandoning it possesses concentration; heaviness of ignorance possesses torpor. Restlessness does not exist, because they are mutually contrary. Another position holds: this is associated with twenty-four: the previous nine and ten secondary defilements—since the fifty-eighth fascicle of the "Viniścayasamgrahaṇī" says that heedlessness, distraction, restlessness, torpor, lack of faith, indolence, wrong aspiration, wrong resolve, wrong mindfulness, and non-clear knowledge pervade defiled minds—plus the five determinative [mental factors]. As for the true doctrine: this is associated with eighteen: the previous nine plus eight secondary defilements. Although there is no sacred teaching [explicitly enumerating them], by reasoning it is certain they exist, namely: torpor, restlessness, lack of faith, indolence, heedlessness, forgetfulness, distraction, and non-clear knowledge. Those whose nature is ignorance are able to co-occur with this. Prajñā from the determinative factors is added because its doctrinal aspect is distinct. Aspiration and resolve do not exist because they do not pervade defilement. Although there are five positions, the fifth is correct, not contradicting teaching or reasoning. Therefore, the innate satkāyadṛṣṭi associated with the sixth consciousness is associated with the five omnipresent factors, the five determinative factors, and the three fundamental defilements, namely love, pride, and delusion. Among the secondary defilements, the first ten definitely do not co-occur, because their activity is coarse. Regarding this, there are five positions: the first position holds that it is not associated with secondary defilements, because there are no distinct states; the second position holds that it is associated with five secondary defilements; the third position holds that it is associated with six secondary defilements; the fourth position holds that it is associated with ten secondary defilements; the fifth position holds that it is associated with eight secondary defilements, taking this as correct. Among the four indeterminate factors, it is associated with three kinds, excluding regret. The activity of regret is coarse, whereas the view of self and so forth are subtle. The rest do not conflict. Wholesomeness and defilement are mutually contrary, so it does not co-occur with wholesome [factors]. Now, relying on the orthodox doctrine, overall it should admit association with twenty-four, as reasoned previously. The discriminative view of a self is associated with twenty-seven, adding fundamental ill will, together with shamelessness and lack of conscience, because in the desire realm the unwholesome can be associated. This states the meaning in the desire realm, not that they are determinately associated.