大乘法苑義林章 5.35
大乘法苑義林章 5.35
- Language
- Classical Chinese
5.35
第三三性互辨因果寬狹者,於十因中,且清淨者,若清淨之隨說因者,因體通三性,有漏無漏有為;其果唯無漏有為、無為善性也。若清淨法即隨說因,因體唯有為、無漏、善性也,果通一切法也。觀待因者,若清淨法之觀待因,因體通三性,有漏無漏、有為無為也。果唯無漏,通有為無為,唯善性也。若善清淨即觀待因,因體通有為無為,唯無漏,定是善性也。果法通三性,有漏無漏、有為無為。於中四句。若待所受有所受者,如待前理有後理起,因果性等。若待能受有能受者,如待見道有修道者,因果性同也。若待所受有能受者,如緣真如理,果因性等,因唯無為。若待能受有所受者,依現行見方得此理,因是有為,果皆無為。餘同也。言牽引、生起二因者,唯得清淨法,即牽引、生起因。因果性等,唯有為相無無為,唯無漏、唯善性,無有不善及無記。若據有為無漏,遠望攝無為果,彼既是疎,此因親不取也。攝受因者,若清淨之攝受因,因體通有漏無漏、有為無為,有三性。果體唯無漏非有漏,通有無為,唯善性也。若清淨即攝受因,因體通有為無為,唯無漏、唯善性也。果性唯無漏,通有為無為,唯善性也。若據平等智攝起染污末那,何妨果法亦通有漏,有三性然。言引發因者,若清淨法之引發因,因體通有漏無漏,唯有為,唯善性,以論言同類勝品引故。既言於勝品亦得為因,何妨三性俱能引耶?果法唯無漏,通有無為,定唯善性。若清淨法即引發因,因唯有為、無漏、善性。果唯無漏、有為無為、唯善性也。言定異因者,若清淨法即定異因,因唯有為、無漏、善性,果通有為無為等。若清淨法之定異因,因唯有為,果是無為。同事因者,若清淨法之同事因,因體通三性、有為無為、有漏無漏也。果法唯無漏,通有為無為,唯是善性也。若清淨法即同事因,因體唯無漏,通有為無為,唯善性也。果法唯無漏,通有為無為,唯善性。若能同辨相,得末那識起,果法何妨通三性也。言相違因者,唯得有清淨之相違因,不得有持業也。因體通二性,不善、有覆無記故。若總言之,何妨亦通三性耶?唯有為非無為,唯有漏性也。果法通有為無為,唯無漏,唯善性也。言不相違因者,若清淨之不相違因,因寬果狹。若清淨法即不相違因,因狹果寬,准前釋也。
Third, the mutual determination of the broad and narrow scopes of cause and effect in the three natures. Among the ten causes, first, regarding the pure: If it is the conventional-expression cause of the pure, the essence of the cause is common to the three natures, sāsrava and anāsrava, [and] conditioned; its effect is only anāsrava conditioned and unconditioned, of good nature. If a pure phenomenon is itself the conventional-expression cause, the essence of the cause is only conditioned, anāsrava, and of good nature, while its effect is common to all phenomena. Regarding the reliance cause: If it is the reliance cause of pure phenomena, the essence of the cause is common to the three natures, sāsrava and anāsrava, conditioned and unconditioned; the effect is only anāsrava, common to conditioned and unconditioned, and only of good nature. If a good, pure [phenomenon] is itself the reliance cause, the essence of the cause is common to conditioned and unconditioned, only anāsrava, and definitely of good nature; the effect phenomena are common to the three natures, sāsrava and anāsrava, conditioned and unconditioned. Within this there are four alternatives: If, relying on what is experienced, what is experienced exists: for example, relying on a prior principle, a subsequent principle arises—the nature of cause and effect is equal. If, relying on the experient, the experient exists: for example, relying on the path of seeing, there is the path of cultivation—the nature of cause and effect is the same. If, relying on what is experienced, the experient exists: for example, taking the principle of tathatā as an object—the nature of cause and effect is equal, and the cause is only unconditioned. If, relying on the experient, what is experienced exists: it is depending on the active perception that one only then attains this principle—the cause is conditioned, and the effects are all unconditioned. The rest are the same. As for the two causes of drawing-forth and generating: one only obtains pure phenomena that are themselves the causes of drawing-forth and generating. The nature of cause and effect is equal; it is only of conditioned characteristics and without the unconditioned, only anāsrava, only of good nature, having neither the unwholesome nor the indeterminate. If one considers conditioned anāsrava [phenomena] as remotely embracing an unconditioned effect, since that is a remote [condition], these causes do not take it directly. Regarding the sustaining cause: If it is the sustaining cause of the pure, the essence of the cause is common to sāsrava and anāsrava, conditioned and unconditioned, and has the three natures; the essence of the effect is only anāsrava and not sāsrava, common to conditioned and unconditioned, and only of good nature. If the pure is itself the sustaining cause, the essence of the cause is common to conditioned and unconditioned, only anāsrava, and only of good nature; the nature of the effect is only anāsrava, common to conditioned and unconditioned, and only of good nature. If one considers that the equality wisdom embraces and raises the defiled manas, what objection is there that the effect phenomena are also common to sāsrava and have the three natures? As for the initiating cause: If it is the initiating cause of pure phenomena, the essence of the cause is common to sāsrava and anāsrava, only conditioned, and only of good nature, because the treatise states that it is initiated by superior categories of the same kind. Since it states that it can also serve as a cause for superior categories, what objection is there that all three natures are capable of initiating? The effect phenomena are only anāsrava, common to conditioned and unconditioned, and definitely only of good nature. If a pure phenomenon is itself the initiating cause, the cause is only conditioned, anāsrava, and of good nature; the effect is only anāsrava, conditioned and unconditioned, and only of good nature. As for the determinative difference cause: If a pure phenomenon is itself the determinative difference cause, the cause is only conditioned, anāsrava, and of good nature; the effect is common to conditioned, unconditioned, and so forth. If it is the determinative difference cause of pure phenomena, the cause is only conditioned, and the effect is unconditioned. As for the co-working cause: If it is the co-working cause of pure phenomena, the essence of the cause is common to the three natures, conditioned and unconditioned, sāsrava and anāsrava; the effect phenomena are only anāsrava, common to conditioned and unconditioned, and only of good nature. If a pure phenomenon is itself the co-working cause, the essence of the cause is only anāsrava, common to conditioned and unconditioned, and only of good nature; the effect phenomena are only anāsrava, common to conditioned and unconditioned, and only of good nature. If it can co-produce the characteristics so that the manas-consciousness arises, what objection is there that the effect phenomena are common to the three natures? As for the opposing cause: one only obtains the opposing cause of the pure, and one cannot have the karmadhāraya [compound]. The essence of the cause is common to the two natures, being unwholesome and veiled-indeterminate. If spoken of generally, what objection is there that it is also common to the three natures? It is only conditioned and not unconditioned, and only of sāsrava nature; the effect phenomena are common to conditioned and unconditioned, only anāsrava, and only of good nature. As for the non-opposing cause: If it is the non-opposing cause of the pure, the cause is broad and the effect narrow. If a pure phenomenon is itself the non-opposing cause, the cause is narrow and the effect broad, to be explained following the above.
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