大乘法苑義林章 5.37

5.37

第三無記法十因者，若取外法名無記法，唯得有無記之隨說因，因體可通三性，因中表故。顯果上實無記極成。因通有漏無漏，唯有為也。果體唯無記，唯有漏有為。言無記即因者，若據內聲性是無記名隨說因者，即有無記法即隨說因，因體唯無記、唯有漏、唯有為，果通一切。風聲等是能詮者，何妨外法有即因耶？言觀待者，於中有四句。若所受待所受者，即所待為因、能待為果，果因性等，以因顯形待水等，形等為因果故。若能受待能受者，即因果等，性亦同故，以俱受數為觀待因。若依此義，外法無此句也。若依待所受有能受者，所受是因，是無記法，即因體唯無記，唯有為，有漏。果性通三性，唯有為非無為，通有無漏，唯心心所法觸受數也。若待能受有所受者，因體有為，通有漏無漏，有三性。果性唯無記，唯有漏、有為，唯色法也。若無記之觀待因，因體寬果性狹。若無記即觀待者，因性狹果即寬也。其牽引、生起二因，唯得有無記法即因，以取外麥等種子假故也。言攝受因者，若無記法之攝受因，唯得有二依，謂作用、士用。因通三性、唯有為、有漏，果唯無記、唯有為、有漏也。若無記法即攝受因者，因果性同也。其引發因者，唯有無記法即引發因，因果性同。言定異因者，亦只得有無記法即定異，果因體等。言同事因者，若無記法之同事因，因寬果狹，准前可解。若無記法即同事因，因狹果寬。言相違因者，唯得有無記之相違因，因果性同也。若據雪等是外無記，何妨亦有無記法即相違因，因果體等也。言不相違因者，若無記之不相違因，因體通一切，果唯極狹。若無記即相違因，因果性等。

Third, the ten causes of indeterminate phenomena: If one takes external phenomena to be indeterminate phenomena, one only obtains the conventional-expression cause of the indeterminate. The essence of the cause can be common to the three natures, because it manifests in the cause, revealing that the real indeterminate on the effect is definitively established. The cause is common to sāsrava and anāsrava, and is only conditioned; the essence of the effect is only indeterminate, only sāsrava and conditioned. Regarding the indeterminate being itself the cause: If considered according to internal sound-nature being indeterminate and termed the conventional-expression cause, then there is an indeterminate phenomenon that is itself the conventional-expression cause: the essence of the cause is only indeterminate, only sāsrava, only conditioned, and the effect is common to all. If the sound of wind and so forth is what can express, what objection is there that external phenomena have [a case of being] itself the cause? As for reliance: within this there are four alternatives. If relying on what is experienced, what is experienced exists: that which is relied upon is the cause, and that which relies is the effect; the nature of effect and cause is equal, because the cause shows visible shape relying on water and so forth, with shape and so forth serving as cause and effect. If relying on the experient, the experient exists: cause and effect are equal and their nature is also the same, because both are the mental factor of feeling serving as the reliance cause. According to this meaning, external phenomena do not have this alternative. If based on relying on what is experienced, the experient exists: what is experienced is the cause and is an indeterminate phenomenon, so the essence of the cause is only indeterminate, only conditioned and sāsrava; the nature of the effect is common to the three natures, only conditioned and not unconditioned, common to sāsrava and anāsrava, and is only the mind and mental factors of contact and feeling. If, relying on the experient, what is experienced exists: the essence of the cause is conditioned, common to sāsrava and anāsrava, and has the three natures; the nature of the effect is only indeterminate, only sāsrava and conditioned, and is only material phenomena. If it is the reliance cause of the indeterminate, the essence of the cause is broad and the nature of the effect is narrow. If the indeterminate is itself the reliance [cause], the nature of the cause is narrow and the effect is broad. For the two causes of drawing-forth and generating, one only obtains indeterminate phenomena being themselves the causes, because one conventionally posits the seeds of external wheat and so forth. As for the sustaining cause: If it is the sustaining cause of indeterminate phenomena, it only obtains two bases, namely function and human effort; the cause is common to the three natures, only conditioned and sāsrava, and the effect is only indeterminate, only conditioned and sāsrava. If an indeterminate phenomenon is itself the sustaining cause, the natures of cause and effect are the same. As for the initiating cause: one only has indeterminate phenomena being themselves the initiating cause; the natures of cause and effect are the same. As for the determinative difference cause: one also only obtains indeterminate phenomena being themselves the determinative difference [cause]; the essences of effect and cause are equal. As for the co-working cause: If it is the co-working cause of indeterminate phenomena, the cause is broad and the effect is narrow, which can be understood following the above. If an indeterminate phenomenon is itself the co-working cause, the cause is narrow and the effect is broad. As for the opposing cause: one only obtains the opposing cause of the indeterminate; the natures of cause and effect are the same. If considering frost and so forth as external indeterminates, what objection is there that there is also an indeterminate phenomenon that is itself the opposing cause, with the essences of cause and effect being equal? As for the non-opposing cause: If it is the non-opposing cause of the indeterminate, the essence of the cause is common to all, and the effect is extremely narrow. If the indeterminate is itself the opposing cause, the natures of cause and effect are equal.