大乘法苑義林章 3.19

3.19

First, explaining the names, which contains two parts: first, listing the names; second, explaining the meanings of the names. As for listing the names: first, manifest form; second, unmanifest form. Formerly these were named active form and inactive form. Manifest form has two kinds: first, bodily manifest karma; second, vocal manifest karma. This applies across the three vehicles. If explained according to the Mahāyāna, there is an opinion that manifest karma also has three kinds, with mental manifestation added. Fascicle 53 of the Yogācārabhūmi states: "If one has no desire to manifest to another, but merely gives rise to a thought on one's own, inwardly deliberating in mind without uttering speech, but merely producing active manifest mental karma that is wholesome, defiled, or indeterminate—therefore there is mental manifestation." That which this mental manifestation produces as the unmanifest is exclusively wholesome in nature. Bodhisattvas also attain it, and it has only three factors, being based on the paths of karma, excluding the defiled and indeterminate. When the karma is preponderant, it produces the unmanifest, but otherwise it does not. There is an opinion: the unwholesome also has the unmanifest, which is accomplished only when the paths of the ten unwholesome karmas are extremely grave. The latter three mental manifestations also produce the unmanifest; what flaw is there in this reasoning? Those subsumed within the hundred conducts are all named restraint; the converse of this is precisely the nature of non-restraint. Hence we know that the three mental [karmas] also produce the unmanifest. How could the volition seeds that produce bodily and vocal [actions] be named unmanifest, while intense mental volition alone is not named unmanifest? Thus we know that all three manifestations have the unmanifest, because among the three punitive karmas, mental punishment is the gravest, and because the sages' mental grudge killed many living beings. The verse in the Viṃśikā says: "The empty lands of the Mātangas and others—how were they [destroyed] through the wrath of the sages? Mental punishment is a great crime; how could this again be accomplished?" Mental unmanifest [karma] extends to the wholesome and unwholesome, but is not of the two indeterminate kinds. However, the mental unmanifest is not material in nature, because it does not produce active bodily or vocal form, and that which produces bodily and vocal [actions] is subsumed under those very [forms]. There is an opinion: although the general teachings mention mental manifestation, no specific passage is found stating that it has the unmanifest. The volition that produces bodily and vocal [actions] is manifested externally and is most intense; perfuming the seeds with preponderance, it can produce the unmanifest. Mental volition arises inwardly, manifesting and knowing only to oneself, and is not the most intensely forceful; though it perfumes seeds, its function is not redoubled; hence only body and speech have the unmanifest. As for the sages' mental grudge being described as constituting mental punishment, even if it constitutes a grave crime, how could there be an unmanifest? Nor is this subsumed under non-restraint. If, because restraint has a hundred conducts, mental karma were also established as possessing the unmanifest of non-restraint, why did the Baifa [lun] not state it separately? If relying on this view, although one receives the ten wholesome [precepts] and the seeds of the ten wholesome [deeds], and although there are ten classes of functional capacities termed the restraint morality, it is only for the seven factors that the unmanifest is posited. The name 'restraint' is broad, whereas the unmanifest is restricted; it is not the case that because something is termed restraint it must possess the unmanifest. Therefore, the meanings of restraint and the unmanifest are distinct from each other. Thus fascicle 53 of the Yogācārabūmi states: "If the volition of abstention is contrary to non-restraint, then by the preponderant force of abstention, operating conjoined with the five faculties, it is termed restraint." This states that the preceding volition of abstaining from bodily and vocal [misdeeds] is termed restraint; why must it be an unmanifest before it can be termed restraint? Moreover, that fascicle states: "There are eight kinds of restraint: first, restraint capable of initiating; second, restraint of undertaking; third, restraint of protection; fourth, restraint of restoration; fifth, lower-grade restraint; sixth, middle-grade restraint; seventh, upper-grade restraint; eighth, pure restraint. If, before properly receiving it, one first forms this thought: 'I shall definitely receive such abstention'—this is named restraint capable of initiating. When one is properly undertaking the morality of abstention, this is named the restraint of undertaking. Thereafter, through the preponderant force of the five faculties, operating conjoined with those seeds, frequently giving rise to shame and remorse so as not to commit offenses, this is named the restraint of protection. If through loss of mindfulness an offense occurs and one promptly repents and eliminates it, this is named the restraint of restoration. If one abstains from a small portion for a short time, abstaining only oneself without urging others to abstain, without praising and without rejoicing, this is named lower-grade. If one abstains from a large portion for a long time, abstaining oneself and also urging others, yet without praising and without rejoicing, this is named middle-grade. If one abstains from all for the rest of one's life, abstaining oneself and also urging others, and also praising and rejoicing, this is named upper-grade. That of dhyāna and that which is anāsrava are named pure." Since this initial [restraint] capable of initiating is already named restraint, why must restraint necessarily be an unmanifest? Therefore, although the hundred conducts are all named restraint, that which produces the unmanifest lies only in the first seven. Fascicle 14 of the Kośa cites a scriptural verse: "Restraint of body is good; good is restraint of speech; restraint of mind is good; good is universal restraint." The word 'restraint' is also spoken of the mental faculty; how could it constitute an unmanifest? If relying on the former two explanations, bodily and vocal restraint and non-restraint are material in substance; because they lack physical resistance and obstruction, they differ from the class of matter, and are therefore subsumed under a separate category. This volition conjoined with mind is not like those: it neither produces matter nor obstructs matter, and is not designated with the name 'matter'. Since it is perfumed by active volition that cognizes and reflects, it is only nominally termed an unmanifest with respect to the volition seeds, yet its substance is volition, being subsumed under the aggregate of formations. Therefore, in the Baifa [lun] it is not separately stated. Just as mental wrong view subsequently manifests in body and speech—since the subsequent manifestation in body and speech is named non-restraint, why should the initial two volitions not be so named? Just as in the case of the initial two volitions within restraint, even if the mental unmanifest is merely intermediate, what flaw would there be? Among these three expositions, the last is the orthodox one. It is because manifesting externally in body and speech causes others to know it that there is preponderant intensity. Within unmanifest form, there are roughly three classes: first, the unmanifest of restraint; second, the unmanifest of non-restraint; third, the unmanifest of neither-restraint-nor-non-restraint. Fascicle 8 of the Abhidharmasamuccaya states: "Karma is threefold: first, restraint karma; second, non-restraint karma; third, neither-restraint-nor-non-restraint karma. Neither-restraint-nor-non-restraint karma refers to all wholesome and unwholesome karma of that kind, whether giving and the like, or striking and the like; karmas not subsumed under restraint or non-restraint are all included here." Fascicle 53 of the 'Viniścaya' [of the Yogācārabhūmi], having explained restraint and non-restraint, states: "Excepting the restraint and non-restraint karmas as previously explained, all wholesome and unwholesome bodily, vocal, and mental karmas should be known as entirely subsumed under neither-restraint-nor-non-restraint." Fascicle 54 states: "As for the distinctions in the functions of matter, they refer to manifest and unmanifest, and the functions subsumed under restraint, non-restraint, and neither-restraint-nor-non-restraint. Since giving and the like are stated to be this karma, one definitely knows that this karma also has an unmanifest." For what reason was it initially stated that manifest and unmanifest are only within restraint and non-restraint, and not in the intermediate? What is the intention behind this? Thus fascicle 14 of the Abhidharmakośa states: "The unmanifest is threefold: restraint, non-restraint, and neither." There is an opinion that the intermediate possesses only manifest karma, and only when upper-grade volition perfumes seeds with superior force is there an unmanifest. Fascicle 1, 54, etc., of the Xianyang [shengjiao lun] state that form belonging to the dharmāyatana has three kinds: first, restraint; second, non-restraint; third, mastery in concentration; they do not state that the neither[-restraint-nor-non-restraint] has an unmanifest. Although various passages say there is intermediate karma, they do not clearly state that it has an unmanifest; hence intermediate manifestation lacks unmanifest form. If relying on the first view, what prevents the intermediate from arousing earnest and vigorous intention and possessing upper-grade volition, while restraint may be lax and possess middle-grade volition? How could the intensity of seed-perfuming be identical in meaning in establishing an unmanifest, yet intermediate karma be excluded? If one holds that because restraint and non-restraint must possess complete factors, their volition seeds perfume with superior strength so as to have an unmanifest, whereas the intermediate is not so—then the hundred conducts would also not be restraint, since there are also complete and partial divisions, etc. For it is accepted that the upāsaka precepts allow a minor reception. Although various passages speak of the unmanifest belonging to the dharmāyatana as having only two classes, the nature of intermediate karma is also only twofold, being subsumed under those two. Being included in these two, it is not separately stated, but its substance is not non-existent. If relying on the latter view, this is also not so. In all intermediate states, compared to restraint and the like, volition is entirely of the lower grade; it is not that intermediate karma can possess an unmanifest. Since there is no explicit text between the two explanations, one may adopt or reject either. Next, explaining the meanings of the names: The aggregate and collection of the faculties, great elements, and derived matter are called the 'body'. The five faculties and four sense-objects, both the primary producers and the derived products, all obtain the designation 'body'. But because the bodily faculty is the gathering place of all dharmas, it uniquely relies on the name 'body'. Furthermore, it is called 'body' in the sense of being a support. The Weishi lun states: "In the sense of substance, support, and aggregation, it is collectively called 'body'." It is also because the bodily faculty is that upon which numerous dharmas rely that it is uniquely labeled with the name 'body'. Thus the Yogācāra states: "That which is attended by all faculties and is comprehensively accumulated is called 'body'." Although it bears a collective designation, it is specifically a particular name. 'Manifest' (biao) means to manifest and display, manifesting one's own inner mind to indicate it to others. Formerly it was called 'bodily action' (shenzuo), but the meaning is not congruent, since the unmanifest also has the meaning of action and creation. The substance of the manifest is precisely the manifest form of the rūpāyatana. The manifestation relying on the body is called 'bodily manifestation'—this is a tatpuruṣa compound. 'Karma' means action and creation; if it is the manifest form of the rūpāyatana, it is called 'bodily manifest karma'. The manifestation relying on the body is called 'bodily manifestation', and bodily manifestation being identical with karma is called 'bodily manifest karma'—this is an explanation as a karmadhāraya compound. Now, taking the volition that moves the body and manifests as bodily manifest karma: the karma of moving the bodily manifestation is a tatpuruṣa compound. 'Speech' refers to spoken language, having sound as its substance. The meanings of 'manifest' and 'karma' are both explained as above. This can manifest what is desired, expressing the intention of the inner mind and manifesting it to others; therefore it is named 'vocal manifestation'. Alternatively, speech is that upon which syllables and the like rely; because it conveys syllables and the like and can signify and express, it is named 'speech'. The substance of speech is itself the manifestation—this is a karmadhāraya compound. Vocal manifestation is itself karma, karma belonging to vocal sound. Now, taking the volition capable of producing vocal manifestation as vocal manifest karma: the karma that produces vocal manifestation is named vocal manifest karma—this is explained as a tatpuruṣa compound. Conjoined with the mind and activating the mind, it is named 'mental manifestation' and named 'mental karma'—both are explanations by proximity (upacāra). If one says that mental manifestation is itself karma, it is a karmadhāraya compound. The unmanifest of the three—body, speech, and mind—are all tatpuruṣa compounds. In treatises such as the Karmasiddhi, the text and meaning are both clear, hence they are not cited. Restraint is threefold: first, prātimokṣa restraint; second, dhyāna restraint, formerly called the precept concurrent with concentration, also called dhyāna restraint; third, anāsrava restraint, also called the morality loved by the noble ones, formerly called the precept concurrent with the path. Preventing offenses separately is called 'separate' (prati-); both that which can prevent and that which is prevented obtain the designation 'separate'. Precept is itself liberation, because it liberates from evil. The liberation from the separate—'separate' belongs to that which is prevented—is an explanation as a tatpuruṣa compound. The separate is itself liberation—'separate' belongs to that which can prevent—is an explanation as a karmadhāraya compound. 'Lü' means rules and methods, and 'yi' means standard and deportment. Ancients had an explanation stating: 'lü' means class, and 'yi' means pattern. The pattern of classes is called restraint (saṃvara); this applies to both good and evil, so an evil precept is called non-restraint. Now we explain: only that wholesome precept obtains the name, as it can serve as a rule and method, and can serve as a standard and deportment; hence it is named restraint. Just as when speaking of 'subduing' (vinaya), it is both regulating and subduing. This is also like that: it is both rule and deportment. Prātimokṣa being identical with restraint is an explanation as a karmadhāraya compound. Another explanation: prātimokṣa is the specific name of this precept, while restraint is the general designation of all precepts. To differentiate it from others, one should say 'the restraint of prātimokṣa'—which is an explanation as a tatpuruṣa compound. Fascicle 14 of the Abhidharmakośa states: "At the first moment it is named prātimokṣa, also named restraint, and also named the fundamental path of karma. From the second thought-moment onward until it is abandoned, it is not named prātimokṣa, but named the restraint of prātimokṣa; it is not named the path of karma, but named the subsequent arising." Now this may also be accepted. As for dhyāna and the like: being inherently free from obstacles such as agitation, pride, and depression is called 'quietude' (dhyā-); intently thinking on a single deliberation and examining the objective sphere is called 'contemplation' (na). Being both contemplating and quiet is called dhyāna; the quietude of contemplation is called dhyāna; both explanations are acceptable. Dhyāna is a different name for concentration (samādhi). Fascicle 12 of the Yogācāra states that concentration is also named samāhita, samādhi, samāpatti, one-pointedness of mind, and also named dhyāna. Therefore, restraint is volition; the restraint conjoined with dhyāna is explained by proximity. 'Anāsrava' has the meaning of being free from faults, like non-greed and the like; it cannot be explained by the six compound types. If anāsrava belongs to the noble path, its substance is the restraint conjoined with the anāsrava. If anāsrava is itself the restraint, because the substance of volition is anāsrava, it admits both explanations: proximity and karmadhāraya. It is also that which is loved by the noble ones; the precept loved by the noble ones is an explanation as a tatpuruṣa compound. As for non-restraint: 'non' (a-) means non-being or negation; that which cannot be taken as a rule and cannot be a standard deportment is called non-restraint. Like ignorance (avidyā) and the like, it is also not among the six compound types. It is not like bad śīla (duḥśīla) or the śīla of another's evil: taking śīla as that which is detested is called bad śīla, which is a bahuvrīhi compound. Śīla is a Sanskrit word, translated here as 'coolness'. An evil-doing person detests śīla, hence it is called bad śīla; it is not that śīla is evil that it is called bad śīla. Ancients explained: śīla means precept; bad śīla is precisely an evil precept. Thereby they raised the objection: if precept is explained as preventing offenses, then there are precepts that do not prevent offenses; if volition is explained as action, then there are volitions that do not act. Now we explain that this is not so. It was because they did not skillfully explain the name that they had this difficulty. Śīla is not fever and torment; how could an evil substance be śīla? If challenged in reverse: if an evil substance is not śīla, and detesting śīla is called bad śīla, then an evil substance should also not be a view, and detesting a view would be called a bad view. This objection is not parallel. 'View' is explained by investigation and seeking; both good and evil equally investigate and seek. 'Coolness' is śīla, and śīla is not an evil substance. Because of this, non-restraint is that which cannot be taken as a standard, not that it is an evil standard. As for neither-restraint-nor-non-restraint: that which cannot be a standard deportment like restraint is called non-restraint; that which is not impossible to follow as a rule like non-restraint is called non-non-restraint. Since there is a double negation, it is also not among the six compound types. Alternatively, it can be explained: being neither restraint nor non-restraint is a karmadhāraya compound. Restraint and the like being identical with the unmanifest are all karmadhāraya compounds. The unmanifest of restraint is an explanation as a tatpuruṣa compound. The unmanifest of concentration and the path, distinguishing the specific from the general, can also be tatpuruṣa compounds.