大乘法苑義林章 4.27

4.27

Fifth, distinguishing by questions and answers: Among these views, how many are bound to the desire realm? How many are bound to the form realm? How many are bound to the formless realm? One should examine, verify, and explain them one by one from top to bottom. Second, it is asked: Why is it that in the theory of universal eternalism there are only twenty up to eighty [eons], and none exceeding or less than this? Why is there also no positing of birth, nor of rapid intellect? Third, in partial eternalism, why is there no positing of descending from the second dhyāna and above in the form realm? Why are there no two heavens or the other destinies within the desire realm? Fourth, why are universal and partial [eternalism] both eternalist views and designated with the name 'eternalist views', whereas [the views positing] perception and so forth are also [eternalist] yet not designated with the name 'eternalist views', but designated as '[positing] perception' and so on? Fifth, why does annihilationism not posit annihilation after the remaining stages and the three bad destinies? Sixth, why does causelessness not have causelessness after bodies and so forth of the remaining stages? Seventh, why are the formless realm and so on, as well as the preparatory stages for the four fundamental [dhyānas], not posited as nirvāṇa? Why are humans and gods combined into one nirvāṇa, whereas they are distinguished in annihilationism? Eighth, how many of these views arise after [clinging to] a self identical to the aggregates, and how many arise after [clinging to] a self apart from the aggregates? Ninth, it is asked: Why are view-[attachment], rule-[and-vow attachment], as well as the view of self and other false views, not counted among the sixty-two and other numbers of views? Tenth, it is asked: Why are only the two ends established, and the present not established as an intermediate end?