大乘法苑義林章 5.47

5.47

Fourth, distinguishing the nominal and the real: Below, the sixth fascicle states: 'Subtle atoms have no substance; they are partitioned and broken down by wisdom.' Xianyang, fascicle 5, states: 'Wisdom breaks down coarse matter to the utmost fine limit, establishing subtle atoms, not because they possess substance; therefore, it is said that subtle atoms have neither arising nor cessation.' The Yogācārabhūmi, fascicle 3, states: 'Within a material cluster there has never been a subtle atom; when arising from seeds, it arises solely as an aggregation; nor do subtle atoms assemble to form coarse matter.' The Weishi also states: 'Reaching the extremity of matter, subtle atoms are nominally established.' Fascicle 54 and others all state the same as this. Therefore, the first two kinds of matter are both nominal existence. The Cheng weishi lun states: 'Namely, on the basis of the limits of wholesome and unwholesome intention and aspiration, unmanifest matter is nominally established.' The Karmasiddhi also states: 'On the basis of the state where the two kinds of seeds have not been damaged, wholesome and unwholesome unmanifest restraint is nominally established.' Proofs for this are very numerous; therefore, matter induced by undertaking is also nominal existence. Xianyang, fascicle 18, states: 'Seven things are devoid of reality: three images, four echoes.' Therefore, matter of conceptualization is also nominal existence. Fascicle 54 states: 'Matter falling under the sensory base of phenomena has the real and the nominal. If it is the sphere of concentration with majestic power, like transformations, that fruit, that sphere, and the objective matter of consciousness associated with it, are substantially existent entities.' The Cheng weishi lun states: 'The ālayavijñāna transforms into the ten sensory bases of matter, and the real matter manifested that falls under the sensory base of phenomena; therefore, the substance of matter that is the fruit of concentration is substantially existent.' Within this, one opinion holds: Among the five kinds of matter, the first four are nominally existent, and only the fifth is real. When the Xianyang lun speaks of the seven nominally existent things, it only speaks of restraint and non-restraint as nominal, not saying that the fruit of concentration is also nominally existent. The Yogācārabūmi only states that within the matter of the sensory base of phenomena, the matter of concentration with majestic power is a substantially existent entity, while restraint and non-restraint are both nominally existent, nor does it state that within this matter of the sphere of concentration there is nominal existence as well. Another opinion holds: The fifth also admits of nominal existence. For bodhisattvas, the two vehicles, and others, the liberations, bases of overcoming (abhibhvāyatana), and bases of totality (kṛtsnāyatana) have nominal image-matters that completely lack real practical function. If not subsumed by this, under what matter would they be included? Because they are spheres of concentration, they are not subsumed under the five sensory objects. Their nature is not subtle atoms, nor is it unmanifest matter. Those liberations and the like are definitely not conceptualization, and consequently they are also not the former four kinds of matter; if they were not the fifth, they would have no belonging, and these five kinds of matter would fail to subsume phenomena exhaustively. Furthermore, it cannot be said that because they are images they are subsumed under conceptualized matter; could all concentrated minds be mere fabrications? Do anāsrava minds and the like lack nominal images? Because the Buddha's wisdom is fully capable of manifesting all images. This treatise also says: 'The matter that is the sphere of the dhyānas and liberations is named matter born of concentration. However, what is transformed by noble ones can all become real, because it is extremely superior.' The Yogācārabūmi solely stated that to be born of concentration, and because those nominal representations are not superior, it omitted them without mentioning them. What ordinary worldlings transform merely causes others to see it but cannot be practically enjoyed and used; how could it not be nominal? Xianyang, fascicle 1, states that in matter induced by concentration, from the three grades of mind arise the nature of image-matter that is their object, and the nature of perfected matter that is what they make. The former is nominal matter, and the latter is real matter. Furthermore, Xianyang, fascicle 18, states among the seven nominal matters that images are nominally existent. Again, the matter of the sensory base of phenomena has twelve characteristics, the first of which is images. If nominal images are not the fruit of concentration, since that treatise does not state that outside unmanifest matter and the fruit of concentration there is any further matter of the sensory base of phenomena, under what matter would that image-matter be subsumed? Therefore, we know that the fruit of concentration has both nominal and real. The latter opinion is the better one, because it accords with reason and scripture.