大乘法苑義林章 7.14

7.14

First is the section on permanence and impermanence. The Suvarṇaprabhāsa states: 'The three bodies are such that they are spoken of as permanent on account of certain senses, and spoken of as impermanent on account of certain senses. As for the transformation body, it constantly turns the wheel of the Dharma; therefore, in every place it continues incessantly through such and such expedient means, and for this reason it is spoken of as permanent. Because it is not the source [body] and its complete function is not fully manifest, it is for this reason spoken of as impermanent.' The Mahāyānasūtrālaṃkāra states: 'There are three kinds of permanence: first, permanence of inherent nature; second, uninterrupted permanence; and third, continuous permanence.' The Buddhabhūmy-upadeśa states: 'This transformation body reappears after having vanished; because transformations are inexhaustible, it is continuous permanence. Because its support is permanent, it is also spoken of as permanent; because it has arising and cessation, it is also impermanent.' This agrees precisely with the sūtra. The Suvarṇaprabhāsa states: 'As for the response body, because it is continuously uninterrupted from beginningless time, and because it is held and maintained by the dharmas unshared by all Buddhas, its function is not exhausted as long as sentient beings are not exhausted, and for this reason it is spoken of as permanent. Because it is not the source [body] and its complete function is not manifest, it is therefore spoken of as impermanent.' The Buddhabhūmy-upadeśa states: 'It is uninterrupted permanence, because it constantly experiences the joy of the Dharma without interruption. Because its support is permanent, it is also spoken of as permanent. Relying on this sense of permanence, the Mahāparinirvāṇa-sūtra speaks of obtaining permanent form and so forth. If one says that the Tathāgata's body is impermanent, why does this person's tongue not fall out? Because it arises from causes and has arising and cessation, it is also spoken of as impermanent.' Various treatises as well as chapter thirty-five of the Mahāparinirvāṇa-sūtra all state: 'There are four kinds of declaration: first, categorical declaration; second, analytical declaration; third, counter-questioning declaration; and fourth, dismissive declaration.' These declarations are of two kinds: first, the four declarations concerning persons; second, the four declarations concerning dharmas. Regarding the four declarations concerning persons: first, if it is asked, "Do all who are born die?", one should answer, "Yes"—this is a categorical declaration. Second, if it is asked, "Do those who die take rebirth?", one should answer with an analysis: "Those who possess kleśas die and take rebirth; those without kleśas die and do not take rebirth"—this is an analytical declaration. Third, if it is asked, "Is a human superior?", one should counter-question them: "Compared to what? If compared to gods?", one answers that they are inferior; "If compared to others?", one answers that they are superior—this is a counter-questioning declaration. Fourth, if it is asked, "Does the self exist or not?", one should dismiss it without answering—this is a dismissive declaration. Regarding the four declarations concerning dharmas: first, if it is asked, "Do all arisen [dharmas] perish?", one answers, "Yes"—this is a categorical declaration. Second, if it is asked, "Do perished [dharmas] arise again?", one answers analytically: "Those with causes and conditions perish and arise again; those without causes and conditions perish and do not arise again. The five aggregates of the two vehicles lack the condition of great compassion, so after perishing in [nirvāṇa] without remainder of fuel, they do not arise again. The Tathāgata's body falls only within the category of dharmas and does not fall within the category of [saṃsāric] rebirth; because he possesses great compassion and his original vows are not exhausted, and because causes and conditions exist, it perishes and arises again"—this is an analytical declaration. Third, if it is asked, "Is a śrāvaka's wholesome mind superior or inferior?", one should counter-question them: "Compared to what?", and answer according to the comparison—this is a counter-questioning declaration. Fourth, if it is asked whether the sixth aggregate is wholesome or unwholesome, one should dismiss it without answering—this is a dismissive declaration. Since the Buddha's enjoyment body falls within the category of dharmas, that what has arisen is able to perish is a categorical declaration; therefore, it cannot be said to be permanent by inherent nature. If one admits that what arises from causes is said to be permanent, it would contradict inference. In the Suvarṇaprabhāsa it states: 'As for the dharmakāya, it is not a conditioned dharma, nor does it have distinct characteristics; because difference does not exist and it is its own source, it is therefore spoken of as permanent. The dharmakāya of suchness is not a conditioned dharma, nor does it have distinct characteristics. Because the dharmakāya of the wisdom of suchness is its own source, principle and wisdom are vast, darkly coalescing without characteristics, just like empty space; therefore it is spoken of as permanent.' The Buddhabhūmy-upadeśa states: 'The dharmakāya of suchness is permanent by nature; because it is free from all conceptual construction and free from conceptual proliferation, and inherently abides permanently without arising and cessation, it is therefore spoken of as permanent.' Relying on this, the Nirvāṇa [sūtra] states: 'The Buddha is the Dharma; the Dharma is the Saṅgha; the Saṅgha is permanent; the permanent is empty space; empty space is Buddha-nature; Buddha-nature is the dharmakāya. The body of the wisdom of suchness is uninterrupted permanence; sentient beings are inexhaustible, and original vows are unending. Furthermore, it does not enter nirvāṇa and has no interruption in the interim, coalescing with wisdom boundlessly like space, and is also free from conceptual construction and all conceptual proliferation; therefore it is spoken of as permanent.' For those who state only that suchness is the dharmakāya, it is permanent only by nature. The Mahāyānasaṃgraha asks: 'Since the Buddha's enjoyment body and transformation body are impermanent, why do sūtras say that the Tathāgata's body is permanent?' It answers itself: 'Because the dharmakāya upon which these two rely is permanent.' Asvabhāva explains: 'This does not mean the bodies themselves are permanent, but that they rely on a permanent body.' This shows that the nisyanda [-kāya] and the transformation body are permanent in a figurative sense, not permanent by nature. Furthermore, because those two bodies are continuously enjoyed without cessation and repeatedly manifest transformations without ever ending—just like continually experiencing pleasure or continually giving food—one should know that the permanence of the Tathāgata's body is also like this. Asvabhāva explains: 'Furthermore, because the enjoyment body is continuously enjoyed without cessation, it is like when the worldly speak of continually experiencing pleasure. Although experiencing pleasure is not permanently without interruption, one nonetheless says "continually experiencing". The Buddha's enjoyment body is also like this.' Respective bodhisattvas experience joy without cessation, and although it is not permanently abiding, it is also spoken of as permanent. Thus the Śrīmālādevī-sūtra states: 'The Tathāgata's form is inexhaustible, and wisdom is also likewise.' Because the Buddha's transformation body repeatedly manifests transformations and does not permanently break off—just as in the world one speaks of continually giving food, where although it is not without interruption, one nevertheless repeatedly gives, and with this uninterrupted intention it is called continually giving food; the transformation body is also like this, because it repeatedly manifests transformations without permanently ending—the speaking of these two bodies as permanent is an intentional permanence.