能顯中邊慧日論 1.13.4

1.13.4

云「為回轉謗法者，言無量時。 」故非第一。 若不如是，何故分二？ 又論自云「若無因緣生如是心者，一闡提等無涅槃性，應發菩提心。 」不爾，不應經論之中俱作二說。 若云：論自會訖，將此為定。 《莊嚴》、《佛地》亦分明說無性之人畢竟不成佛，何故不定？ 故知二說各據性別，經論無違。 若云：《涅槃經》中佛亦自會，障未來故名為無性，必當得故名為有性者。 亦不應理。 此據時邊，說必當得，非畢竟者。 若不如是，何故第十云「假使一切無量眾生一時成熟阿耨菩提已，此諸如來亦復不見彼一闡提得成菩提。 」諸佛有滅盡期，可云此人時長故不見佛。 無涅槃時，如何言不見？ 以此故知有畢竟無性，於《莊嚴論》廣作餘通，徒設劬勞。 又引《攝論》云「聖弟子言：此全無少分善根而棄捨，佛觀知有而度之」者，知有微少不具因，《莊嚴論》說不具因，即是餘生微少善根。 無此微少名畢竟無性者。 此亦不爾。 無微少善許後作佛，還是時邊，何名畢竟？ 未曾起得微少善者，乃是一向行惡行，時邊所收，非畢竟無性。 若云：畢竟後不作佛，何故次下云「已說無性，次說令入。 」此亦不爾。 言令入者，以彼論文前說有性、後說無性，有無相對說。 次說令入者，說有性令入。 不爾，如何云「若無性差別則無乘差別」等。 又云：《攝論》具障而闕因，諸佛不得自在。 無性釋云「具障謂煩惱業異，異熟闕因。 諸無涅槃因具障，雖前佛不自在，後佛有自在。 」例闕因者，應知亦爾。 彼說非理。 煩惱感果雖俱有定，即有報盡之時。 報盡之時，佛得自在，令使涅槃。 無因之者，於此位中佛不自在，不得令有。 豈有自然有因之時，各於彼位佛方教化？ 若本無因後自然有，亦本凡夫決定自然成聖，何故假善友佛等為緣？ 於此至理應深可思，如不能悟，余無自在。

It states: 'For the sake of turning around those who slander the Dharma, it is said to be an immeasurable time.' Therefore it is not the first. If it were not so, why divide them into two? Furthermore, the treatise itself says: 'If without causes and conditions such a mind arises, then the icchantika and others who lack the nature of nirvāṇa should generate the bodhicitta.' Otherwise, the sūtras and treatises should not both make two statements. If you say: the treatise itself having harmonized it, takes this as definitive; yet the Mahāyānasūtrālaṅkāra and Buddhabhūmisūtraśāstra also clearly state that persons without gotra ultimately do not become buddhas; why are they not definitive? Therefore one knows that the two explanations are each based on the difference of gotra, and there is no contradiction between sūtras and treatises. If you say: in the Nirvāṇasūtra the Buddha also personally harmonizes this, stating that because of obstructing the future it is named lacking the gotra, but because they will definitely attain it, it is named having the gotra—this too does not accord with reason. This is spoken in terms of a temporal limit, stating that they will definitely attain it, not those who are ultimately [without gotra]. If it were not so, why does fascicle ten state: 'Even if all immeasurable sentient beings were simultaneously matured in anuttarabodhi, these Tathāgatas still would not see that icchantika attain bodhi'? If the buddhas had a time of final cessation, one could say that because this person's time is so long, they do not see the Buddha. Since there is no time of nirvāṇa [for the buddhas], how could one say they do not see? From this one knows that there are those who are ultimately agotraka; to construct other extensive interpretations of the Mahāyānasūtrālaṅkāra is merely wasted effort. Furthermore, citing the Mahāyānasaṃgraha which says: 'The noble disciples say: "This one is completely devoid of even a minor root of wholesomeness and abandon him," but the Buddha sees and knows that it exists and delivers him'—knowing that there is a subtle, incomplete cause; the Mahāyānasūtrālaṅkāra says an incomplete cause is precisely a subtle root of wholesomeness from other lives. If one lacks this subtle one, it is called ultimately agotraka. This too is not so. If one who lacks subtle wholesomeness is allowed to become a buddha later, that is still a temporal limit; how could it be called ultimate? One who has never been able to give rise to subtle wholesomeness is one who purely practices evil conduct, which is subsumed under a temporal limit, not an ultimate agotraka. If you say: If they ultimately do not become buddhas later, why does it state immediately below: 'Having explained the lack of gotra, next it explains causing them to enter'? This too is not so. Speaking of causing them to enter is because that treatise text previously spoke of having gotra and later spoke of lacking gotra, speaking of presence and absence in opposition to each other. When it next speaks of causing them to enter, it speaks of causing those who have the gotra to enter. Otherwise, how could it say: 'If there were no difference in gotra, then there would be no difference in vehicles,' and so forth? Furthermore, it is said: Regarding the Mahāyānasaṃgraha's statement, 'Possessing obstacles yet lacking the cause, the buddhas do not attain mastery,' Asamāhita (Wuxing) explains: '"Possessing obstacles" refers to the afflictive karma being different, and maturation lacking the cause. As for those who lack the cause of nirvāṇa and possess obstacles, although the previous buddhas lacked mastery, later buddhas will have mastery.' By analogy with lacking the cause, one should know it is also like this. His explanation is unreasonable. Although afflictions producing retribution are both definite, there is a time when the retribution is exhausted. When retribution is exhausted, the buddhas attain mastery and cause them to attain nirvāṇa. But as for those who lack the cause, even in this stage the buddhas lack mastery and cannot cause them to have it. Could there naturally be a time when the cause exists, such that only at each of their stages do the buddhas then teach and transform them? If, originally lacking the cause, later it naturally exists, then also, originally being ordinary beings, they would definitely and naturally become noble ones; why rely on good friends, buddhas, and so forth as conditions? One should deeply contemplate this ultimate principle; if you are unable to awaken to it, I have no mastery over it.