能顯中邊慧日論 1.17

1.17

有義：《法華》一乘是了義說，三乘非了。問：一乘為實、三乘為權，《法華》等是。何故《深密》說一為權、四為真實？答：一乘有二，一密意一乘、二究竟一乘，有差別故。《深密》、《攝論》等是密意一乘，《法華》、《勝鬘》等是究竟一乘。何以得知有斯二類？以二義辨：一述異、二引兩文對顯。述異有九：一存三破二異、二說時前後異、三說位不同異、四滅別道同異、五分同全同異、六有會無會異、七合三開一異、八為人勝劣異、九說義不同異。此不應爾，九門俱非。初存三破異者，且判《深密》等存三為一故權，《法華》等破三明一故實，此前已顯謬判教文。二說時前後異，云《華嚴》、《深密》等四十年已前說故權，《法華》、《勝鬘》等是已後說故實。此亦不爾，若《法華》前存三明一故為密者，如《深密》等四十年後說，可如所判。已說小乘，有可存故，且縱為權。《華嚴》乃在三七前，曾未說小，則未有可存，如何亦判為隱密說？若通論後位說二乘時，亦應隱密通會後一，寧不許耶？故不可以前後判定。又復自判《攝論》一乘并是權密，即《法華》等盡《攝論》釋，同《深密》等一乘非了，如何得判前權後實？三說位不同異，云《解深密》等說如乳酪、如眾流位；一法一乘，如至醍醐，皆歸海位一者。此亦不爾。如乳等喻，且據一類不定性人從小向大者；各定根性，則不如是。若執喻說修行之者前後定爾，豈許頓悟亦由小耶？有不住則能趣大，應許酥等非從乳出。又《法華論》有聲聞如乳等、佛位如醍醐，豈許《深密》等所說一乘是聲聞位猶如乳等？又許菩薩有頓非漸，如何定判位異為權？若云《深密》對不定性位異為權者，以何得知為小不定判為不實？四滅別道同異，云密意一乘道等同故名之為一，究竟一乘二乘無滅至佛方有者。不爾，只有說三解脫為等，無說智德三乘共等，如何今判道等皆同？然《涅槃經》云「一道一緣」等者，約向大乘云同一道，非說三別所覺道同。又《深密經》云「相生勝義無自性，如是我皆已顯示，故於其中立一乘，非有情性無差別。」說無性同，即二乘無別滅，與《法華》等一乘何別？五分同全同異，云密意一乘人無我解脫身分段身同，法無我法身變易身身不同，究竟一乘此等皆同者。既判《攝論》等為密一乘，如何論文云「法無我解脫等故性不同」等。《顯揚論》云「即彼諸法約無差別相說故，乃至法無我平等故。」若云彼不許終終法無我平等者，豈《法華》一乘諸聲聞等已證法無我等耶？若云許當證故者，《攝論》等中亦許不定當得證故，如何為權？若云非說一切皆當同故者，《法華》亦爾，天親論釋不為定性，損驚怖故。若許定性，此等皆同，何不為說？又《楞伽》云「同入八地三昧樂門」者，是曾行大行，不說定性，豈許皆同？又違梁論，梁論云「前偈以了義說一乘，後偈以祕密義說一乘故。」又云「復名於法如平等意。諸聲聞等人，如來於《法華經》中為其授記。已得佛意，但得法如平等意，未得佛法身。若得此法如平等意，彼作是思惟：如來法如即是我法如。由如是意故說一乘。」准此論釋，豈《攝大乘論》等所明一乘是權，但人無我等同，《法華經》說究竟一乘法無我法身等皆同耶？六有會無會異中，云密意一乘不會，說三為方便；究竟一乘會，說二滅為方便者。不爾，不全會三者，據有定性故。言會三者，據不定性故。定不定性，《法華論》、《楞伽經》并有明說。若無定性但得作佛，何故《涅槃經》云「不解我意」，《勝鬘經》云「隨彼所欲而方便說」等？又《攝大乘》正指《法華經》云「復次於法華大集中，有諸菩薩名同舍利弗」等。《深密》云「非有情性無差別攝」，論平等故性不同。《法華論》云「為二種人說」。此皆會訖，如何言不會《法華》？由不披文，但道聽爾。七合三開一異中，云《深密》會昔合三乘為一乘，一非三中之文；《法華》會昔開一為三乘，一是三中之佛乘者。不爾，成道七日即說大乘。《法華經》云「雖復說三乘，但為教菩薩。」又云「雖示種種道，其實為一乘。」即會一代所說三乘，更於何時所說三乘，云是開一為三乘者？又說一乘，一乘即大乘，豈《解深密》接彼定性二乘為大？故為不可。又《解深密》依三無性說乘為一，《法華》亦同。論釋「十方佛土中，唯有一乘法，無二亦無三」，無二者，無二乘涅槃等。乃至云「聲聞辟支佛乘，非彼平等法身之體，以因果行觀不同故。」梁《攝論》云「乘有三義：一性、二行、三果，性即真如、行即十度、果即四德。」《法華經》一乘，即佛之知見，論云「依四義說：一者開即無上義，除一切智智，更無餘事，即菩提涅槃。二者示者同義，即聲聞辟支佛法身平等，法身平等者，佛性法身更無差別故。」此非但亦，即《攝論》一乘性也。「三者入者因義，為令證不退轉地，示現與無量智業故。」無量智業者，即《攝大乘》所行十度。又《攝論》、《法華》一乘若有差別，天親應解。既總會釋，准何判別？八為人勝劣異中，云密意一乘為鈍根說，究竟一乘為利根說。梁《攝論》云「有諸菩薩，於大乘根性已入法空，為此說一。」同《涅槃經》不為鈍根為利根說者。不爾，前判《攝論》一乘是密。今言密者，為鈍根說。《攝論》一乘既判為密，如何復引與《涅槃》同為利根說，豈不自相鉾楯？又《法華經論》云「為聲聞所依事故。」經云為諸聲聞說是大乘經、授聲聞記等，豈是利根迦葉同《涅槃》耶？《深密》告勝義生等，豈是鈍根聲聞耶？又復先度利根、次後中下，《涅槃》、《法華》俱在後說，豈為利根？故《如來莊嚴智慧光明經》云「文殊師利！依彼無邊法界眾生上中下性，如來放大智日光輪普照眾生亦復如是，初一切諸菩薩等，次辟支佛，次聲聞，次所信善根眾生，次住邪定聚眾生。」此等經文豈先鈍後利耶？又言：八種一乘為引不定菩薩聲聞故，即為鈍者。亦不爾，梁《攝論》云「為利根，八義一乘。第一即為聲聞、第二不定菩薩。」《法華論》云「二種聲聞如來與記，謂應化聲聞、退已還發菩提心者。」退已還發菩提心者，即不定性聲聞，云何得言究竟一乘為利根說？九說義不同異，云《攝論》一乘依十義說，《法華》一乘依四義說。說義不同，明知乘異者。不爾。何者？若云十、四義異，十權、四實。《顯揚》六義、《莊嚴》八義應分權實。彼既不爾，此云何然？又《法華經》說一乘體性有其四種，論云依四義明之。《攝論》等明說一乘意，依八種道理說，非出乘體。故梁論云「為何義故，說二乘人同趣一乘皆得作佛？」《莊嚴論》云「此中八意，佛說一乘。」又云「復有何義，以彼彼意而說一乘？偈曰『引接諸聲聞，攝住諸菩薩。於此二不定，諸佛說一乘。』」《法華論》云「為退菩提聲聞」，即引接聲聞不定之者。滿慈等記，即變化者。又《法華論》說三平等，云「復示現自身他身法身平等無差別故」，乃至云「以不知彼此佛性法身平等故。」即謂彼人，我證此法。彼人不得此，對治此故，與聲聞記。即明法平等人平等，與《攝論》等說一乘意何曾有異？謬分顯密欲誘嬰兒，引文對類，智者應撿。略陳述異之非，對類煩不具顯。教既謬陳顯密乘故，妄到實權說乘。文有不同，准此故皆說謬。

There is a position: The ekayāna of the Saddharmapuṇḍarīka is a teaching of definitive meaning, whereas the triyāna is non-definitive. Question: The ekayāna being real and the triyāna provisional holds true for the Saddharmapuṇḍarīka and the like; why then does the Saṃdhinirmocana teach that the single [vehicle] is provisional and the four [vehicles] are real? Answer: Because there are differences in the ekayāna, which is twofold: first, the ekayāna of intentional meaning; second, the ultimate ekayāna. The Saṃdhinirmocana, Mahāyānasaṃgraha, and the like are the ekayāna of intentional meaning, while the Saddharmapuṇḍarīka, Śrīmālādevī, and the like are the ultimate ekayāna. How is it known that these two classes exist? They are distinguished by two points: first, by describing their differences; second, by citing texts from both to contrast and reveal them. There are nine described differences: 1. The difference of preserving the three versus demolishing the two; 2. The difference of earlier and later times of proclamation; 3. The difference of different stages addressed; 4. The difference of distinct extinctions versus identity of the path; 5. The difference of partial identity versus total identity; 6. The difference of having convergence versus lacking convergence; 7. The difference of combining the three versus opening the one; 8. The difference of superior versus inferior capacities of the persons [addressed]; 9. The difference of distinct meanings explained. This [position] should not be so; all nine gates are incorrect. First, regarding the difference of preserving the three versus demolishing [the two]: to judge provisionally that the Saṃdhinirmocana and the like are provisional because they preserve the three to constitute the one, while the Saddharmapuṇḍarīka and the like are real because they demolish the three to elucidate the one—this has already been shown above to be an erroneous judgment of the doctrinal texts. Second, regarding the difference of earlier and later times of proclamation: it is claimed that texts like the Avataṃsaka and Saṃdhinirmocana are provisional because they were spoken before the forty-year mark, whereas the Saddharmapuṇḍarīka, Śrīmālādevī, and the like are real because they were spoken after it. This too is incorrect. If the preservation of the three to elucidate the one prior to the Saddharmapuṇḍarīka makes it esoteric, then if texts like the Saṃdhinirmocana were spoken after forty years, it could be as they judge. Since the Hīnayāna had already been taught and there was something to preserve, it might provisionally be granted as provisional. But the Avataṃsaka was taught within the first three weeks, when the Hīnayāna had never yet been taught; thus there was nothing yet to preserve, so how could it also be judged as a concealed, esoteric teaching? If one comprehensively considers that when the dviyāna was taught in later stages, it should also have esoterically integrated them into the later one [vehicle], why would this not be granted? Therefore, one cannot definitively judge on the basis of earlier versus later. Furthermore, having themselves judged that the ekayāna in the Mahāyānasaṃgraha is entirely provisional and esoteric, and since the Saddharmapuṇḍarīka and the like are fully interpreted by the Mahāyānasaṃgraha to be non-definitive in their ekayāna just like the Saṃdhinirmocana, how could they judge the earlier as provisional and the later as real? Third, regarding the difference of different stages addressed: it is said that the Saṃdhinirmocana and the like teach stages comparable to milk and curd, or to the various streams, whereas the one Dharma and one vehicle are comparable to reaching the stage of ghee, where all converge into the single ocean. This too is incorrect. Metaphors like milk are merely stated with respect to one class of persons of aniyata-gotra who turn from the small toward the great; for those whose faculties and gotra are individually determined, it is not so. If one adheres to the metaphorical teaching that practitioners must definitively proceed from earlier to later in this manner, would one grant that sudden awakening also depends upon the small? If there are those who advance directly to the great without abiding [in the small], one must grant that clarified butter does not necessarily emerge from milk. Furthermore, the Saddharmapuṇḍarīka-upadeśa has the śrāvaka compared to milk, and the Buddha-stage compared to ghee; could one grant that the ekayāna taught in the Saṃdhinirmocana and the like is the śrāvaka stage like milk? Moreover, having accepted that bodhisattvas may be sudden rather than gradual, how can one definitively judge the difference in stages to be provisional? If they say that the Saṃdhinirmocana is provisional because its difference in stages is addressed to the aniyata-gotra, how does one know to judge it as unreal on the basis of the lesser aniyata? Fourth, regarding the difference of distinct extinctions versus identity of the path: it is said that the intentional ekayāna is called 'one' because the paths are equal and identical, whereas the ultimate ekayāna holds that the dviyāna has no extinction, which exists only upon reaching the Buddha. This is not so. There is only the teaching that the three liberations are equal; there is no teaching that the wisdom and virtues of the triyāna are mutually equal, so how can they now judge that their paths and the like are completely identical? As for the Nirvāṇasūtra stating 'one path, one condition,' and so forth, this refers to advancing toward the Mahāyāna as being the same 'one path'; it does not say that the paths realized by the three distinct [vehicles] are identical. Furthermore, the Saṃdhinirmocanasūtra states: 'The naturelessness of characteristics, of arising, and of ultimate truth—all these I have fully revealed; therefore, based upon them, I established the ekayāna, not because there are no distinctions among the gotras of sentient beings.' Since it teaches identity in naturelessness, meaning that the dviyāna has no separate extinction, what difference is there with the ekayāna of the Saddharmapuṇḍarīka and the like? Fifth, regarding the difference of partial identity versus total identity: it is said that the intentional ekayāna holds that the liberation-body of personal selflessness and the saṃsāric body of fragmented life-lengths are identical, while the dharmakāya of phenomenal selflessness and the transformational body are not identical; whereas the ultimate ekayāna holds that all these are identical. Since they judge the Mahāyānasaṃgraha and the like to be the esoteric ekayāna, why does the treatise state: 'Because phenomenal selflessness and liberation are equal, their natures are not different,' and so forth? The Prakaraṇāryavācā states: 'Because those very dharmas are spoken of according to their undifferentiated aspect, up to their equality in phenomenal selflessness.' If they say that it does not accept the ultimate equality of phenomenal selflessness, have the śrāvakas and others of the Saddharmapuṇḍarīka ekayāna already realized phenomenal selflessness? If they say it is because it grants they will realize it in the future, the Mahāyānasaṃgraha and the like also grant that the aniyata will attain realization in the future, so how is it provisional? If they say it is not stating that all will identically [realize it] in the future, the Saddharmapuṇḍarīka is also like this; Vasubandhu's commentary explains that it is not for those of niyata-gotra, so as to avert frightening them. If those of niyata-gotra were granted to be identical in all these respects, why would it not be taught to them? Moreover, when the Laṅkāvatāra says 'together entering the door of the bliss of samādhi on the eighth stage,' this refers to those who had previously practiced the great practice, not to those of niyata-gotra; how could all be granted to be identical? Furthermore, this contradicts the Liang translation of the Saṃgraha, which says: 'The preceding verse teaches the ekayāna with definitive meaning, while the subsequent verse teaches the ekayāna with esoteric meaning.' It also says: 'It is also termed the intention of equality in the tathatā of dharmas. When the Tathāgata bestowed prophecy upon the śrāvakas in the Saddharmapuṇḍarīka, they had already understood the Buddha's intention; they had only attained the intention of equality in the tathatā of dharmas, but had not yet attained the Buddha's dharmakāya. Having attained this intention of equality in the tathatā of dharmas, they think: "The Tathāgata's tathatā of dharmas is precisely my tathatā of dharmas." Because of this intention, the ekayāna is taught.' According to this treatise's explanation, how could the ekayāna elucidated in the Mahāyānasaṃgraha and the like be provisional, being identical only in personal selflessness, while the ultimate ekayāna taught in the Saddharmapuṇḍarīka is identical in phenomenal selflessness, the dharmakāya, and so on? Sixth, regarding the difference of having convergence versus lacking convergence: it is said that the intentional ekayāna does not converge [them], teaching the three as an expedient, whereas the ultimate ekayāna converges [them], teaching the two extinctions as an expedient. This is not so. Not entirely converging the three is based on the existence of the niyata-gotra; speaking of converging the three is based on the aniyata-gotra. Both the Saddharmapuṇḍarīka-upadeśa and the Laṅkāvatārasūtra explicitly speak of both niyata and aniyata gotras. If there were no niyata-gotra and all simply became Buddhas, why would the Nirvāṇasūtra state 'they do not understand my intention,' and the Śrīmālādevīsūtra state 'taught expediently according to what they desire,' and so forth? Furthermore, the Mahāyānasaṃgraha directly points to the Saddharmapuṇḍarīka, stating: 'Furthermore, in the great assembly of the Saddharmapuṇḍarīka, there are bodhisattvas whose names are identical to Śāriputra,' and so forth. The Saṃdhinirmocana says: '[The ekayāna] is not subsumed because there are no distinctions among the gotras of sentient beings'; and treatises state that because of equality, natures are not different. The Saddharmapuṇḍarīka-upadeśa says: 'It is taught for two kinds of persons.' All these have fully integrated them; how can one say that the Saddharmapuṇḍarīka does not converge them? This is simply due to not opening the texts and merely relying on hearsay. Seventh, regarding the difference of combining the three versus opening the one: it is said that the Saṃdhinirmocana integrates the past by combining the triyāna into the ekayāna, where the one is not among the three; whereas the Saddharmapuṇḍarīka integrates the past by opening the one into the triyāna, where the one is the Buddha-vehicle among the three. This is not so. Seven days after attaining awakening, [the Buddha] immediately taught the Mahāyāna. The Saddharmapuṇḍarīka states: 'Although I again taught the triyāna, it was solely for the instruction of bodhisattvas.' It also states: 'Although various paths are displayed, in truth they are the ekayāna.' This integrates the triyāna taught throughout his lifetime; at what other time could the triyāna have been taught such that one could say it is opening the one into the triyāna? Moreover, speaking of the ekayāna: the ekayāna is precisely the Mahāyāna; would the Saṃdhinirmocana guide those dviyāna of niyata-gotra toward the great? Therefore, this is untenable. Furthermore, the Saṃdhinirmocana teaches that the vehicle is one on the basis of the three non-natures, and the Saddharmapuṇḍarīka is the same. The treatise explains: 'In the Buddha-lands of the ten directions, there is only the Dharma of the single vehicle, neither two nor three.' 'Neither two' means there is no nirvāṇa of the dviyāna, and so on, up to saying: 'The vehicle of the śrāvaka and pratyekabuddha is not the essence of that equal dharmakāya, because their cause, effect, practice, and contemplation are different.' The Liang Mahāyānasaṃgraha states: 'The vehicle has three meanings: first, nature; second, practice; third, fruit. Nature is tathatā; practice is the ten pāramitās; fruit is the four virtues.' The ekayāna of the Saddharmapuṇḍarīka is precisely the vision and knowledge of the Buddha. The treatise states: 'It is taught based on four meanings: 1. Opening is the meaning of the unexcelled; excluding the omniscient wisdom, there is no other matter—this is bodhi and nirvāṇa. 2. Revealing is the meaning of identity; that is, the equality of the dharmakāya of the śrāvaka and pratyekabuddha. The equality of the dharmakāya means that the buddhadhātu and dharmakāya have no further differentiation.' This is not only that; it is precisely the nature of the ekayāna in the Mahāyānasaṃgraha. '3. Entering is the meaning of cause; in order to cause them to realize the stage of non-retrogression, it manifests and bestows immeasurable karmic activity of wisdom.' Immeasurable karmic activity of wisdom is precisely the ten pāramitās practiced in the Mahāyānasaṃgraha. Furthermore, if there were a difference between the ekayāna of the Mahāyānasaṃgraha and the Saddharmapuṇḍarīka, Vasubandhu should have explained it. Since he synthesized and interpreted them comprehensively, on what basis can one judge them to be distinct? Eighth, regarding the difference of superior versus inferior capacities of the persons [addressed]: it is said that the intentional ekayāna is taught for those of dull faculties, while the ultimate ekayāna is taught for those of sharp faculties. The Liang translation of the Saṃgraha says: 'There are bodhisattvas who have already entered the emptiness of dharmas in their Mahāyāna gotra; for their sake, the one is taught.' This accords with the Nirvāṇasūtra in being taught not for those of dull faculties, but for those of sharp faculties. This is not so. Previously, they judged the ekayāna of the Mahāyānasaṃgraha to be esoteric. Now they say that what is esoteric is taught for those of dull faculties. Having already judged the ekayāna of the Saṃgraha to be esoteric, how can they now cite it as being identical with the Nirvāṇa in being taught for those of sharp faculties? Is this not a self-contradiction? Furthermore, the Saddharmapuṇḍarīka-upadeśa states: 'Because it is that upon which the śrāvakas rely.' The sūtra states that this Mahāyāna sūtra was taught for the sake of the śrāvakas and that prophecies were bestowed upon the śrāvakas; could they be of sharp faculties like Kāśyapa in the Nirvāṇa? In the Saṃdhinirmocana, it addresses Paramārthasamudgata and others; could they be śrāvakas of dull faculties? Furthermore, [the Buddha] first liberates those of sharp faculties, and subsequently those of middling and lower faculties; since both the Nirvāṇa and Saddharmapuṇḍarīka were taught later, how could they be for those of sharp faculties? Thus the Tathāgataguṇajñānācintyaviṣayāvatāranirdeśa states: 'Mañjuśrī! In accordance with the superior, middling, and inferior natures of sentient beings across the boundless dharmadhātu, the Tathāgata emits the sun-disc of great wisdom to illuminate sentient beings everywhere in just the same way: first all the bodhisattvas, next the pratyekabuddhas, next the śrāvakas, next the sentient beings with wholesome roots of faith, and next the sentient beings abiding in the determinately false assembly.' How could such sūtra passages imply that the dull come first and the sharp later? Moreover, to say that the eight kinds of ekayāna are taught for the sake of attracting aniyata bodhisattvas and śrāvakas, and are therefore for the dull—this too is not so. The Liang translation of the Saṃgraha states: 'For those of sharp faculties, there is the eightfold meaning of the ekayāna. The first is for the śrāvakas; the second is for the aniyata bodhisattvas.' The Saddharmapuṇḍarīka-upadeśa states: 'There are two kinds of śrāvakas upon whom the Tathāgata bestows prophecy: transformationally manifested śrāvakas, and those who regress and then re-generate the bodhicitta.' Those who regress and then re-generate the bodhicitta are precisely śrāvakas of aniyata-gotra; how can one say that the ultimate ekayāna is taught for those of sharp faculties? Ninth, regarding the difference of distinct meanings explained: it is said that the ekayāna of the Mahāyānasaṃgraha is taught based on ten meanings, whereas the ekayāna of the Saddharmapuṇḍarīka is taught based on four meanings. Because the meanings explained are different, it is clearly known that the vehicles are distinct. This is not so. Why? If they say that because ten and four meanings differ, the ten are provisional and the four are real, then the six meanings in the Prakaraṇāryavācā and the eight meanings in the Mahāyānasūtrālaṅkāra should also be divided into provisional and real. If those are not so, how could this be so? Furthermore, the Saddharmapuṇḍarīka teaches four kinds of essence of the ekayāna, and the treatise states that it is elucidated based on four meanings. The Mahāyānasaṃgraha and the like elucidate the intention behind teaching the ekayāna, stating it based on eight kinds of principles, rather than bringing forth the essence of the vehicle. Thus the Liang treatise says: 'For what purpose is it taught that persons of the dviyāna together advance toward the ekayāna and are all able to become Buddhas?' The Mahāyānasūtrālaṅkāra says: 'Herein, with eight intentions, the Buddha taught the ekayāna.' It also says: 'For what further meaning, and with what various intentions, is the ekayāna taught? The verse says: "Guiding and receiving the śrāvakas, gathering and maintaining the bodhisattvas; for these two kinds of aniyata, the Buddhas teach the ekayāna."' The Saddharmapuṇḍarīka-upadeśa says 'for the śrāvakas who regressed from bodhi,' which means guiding and receiving those śrāvakas of aniyata. The prophecy given to Pūrṇa Maitrāyaṇīputra and others is for the transformationally manifested ones. Furthermore, the Saddharmapuṇḍarīka-upadeśa explains the three equalities, saying: 'It also manifests the equality and non-differentiation of one's own body, the bodies of others, and the dharmakāya,' up to saying: 'Because they do not know the equality of each other's buddhadhātu and dharmakāya.' That is, they imagine: 'I have realized this dharma, while that person has not attained it.' To remedy this, prophecy is bestowed upon the śrāvakas. This demonstrates the equality of dharmas and the equality of persons; how has this ever differed from the intention of teaching the ekayāna in the Mahāyānasaṃgraha and the like? They erroneously divide the explicit and esoteric in order to deceive infants; when citing texts to make comparisons, the wise should examine them closely. Having briefly set forth the errors in their described differences, detailing their comparisons would be tedious and will not be fully presented. Since they have erroneously presented the explicit and esoteric vehicles of the teachings, they have falsely arrived at the real and provisional in teaching the vehicle. Because their textual [citations] are inconsistent, according to this, all their statements are erroneous.