能顯中邊慧日論 3.6

3.6

有義：前經說留壽行，《瑜伽論》等釋云：增壽至大菩提。然無漏業非變易親因，不捨根身即受變易生死，後教得無學果，捨分段身所知障為緣，新發妄無漏業，親感三界外變易生死，住三昧樂謂無餘涅槃，非滅盡定。從此覺已，始發大心。第八雖是有漏，煩惱盡故不屬界繫，名三界外。非離三界外有別眾生。然二乘種性雖有定不定殊，俱受變易，受變易已更不捨身，乃至金剛方始捨離。故《佛性論》云「唯有一生，名為有有」。若如《唯識論》等，不捨分段即受變易，云何名為生死？若謂剎那，即違《佛性論》說唯有一生；若謂命之始終，即違《瑜伽》增諸壽行。又言增壽，如何說死？既無有死，如何說生？又既不捨分段，《瑜伽》復無轉根之女人羅漢增壽。雖長女身，若為成佛，但可依經生智，凡夫不得妄有思度。此說不爾。二乘聖果回心向大，俱容得受變易生死。《勝鬘經》內據決定說，不定性者得無學果，決定回心不更復生，決受變易。有學不定雖亦回心受變易生，不決定故，經中不說。可以《勝鬘》不說有學回心，即不許《法華》會中有學趣大？是故《佛性論》等同《勝鬘經》，且據定受。《楞伽經》中據其頓悟怖煩惱者，說三意生。《瑜伽》、《佛地》同《法華》等俱許回心。既說回心，即容彼受變易生死。既無文障，明有學回心得受變易，亦為正說。彼無文障，此有文說。《涅槃》、《法華》并許回心，《瑜伽》、《佛地》許受變易，彼自說云「但可依經生智，凡夫不得妄有思度」者，彼豈大聖，此《瑜伽》等并遮止耶？又括其文意，略為十一過。言捨分段身別受變易者，出何聖教？《勝鬘經》等并無捨分段言，《瑜伽》、《佛地論》等皆言「無漏定願以資故業，令所感身漸勝令長」，《顯揚》十六云「依變化身得至佛位」，亦不言捨分段。《入大乘論》亦云住壽。不依經論，自意定之。又云「所知障為緣，新發妄無漏業，別感界外變易生死」者。此不應爾。若造新業為親感因，何故《佛性論》云「因緣生死，譬如須陀洹以上，但用故業不生新業。」若以無漏新招生死，此喻不成。又《緣起經》等，聖者不造感後有業。若非是有，經論不應云有有生死；若其是有，聖者如何造後有業？又復若許造後有業，那含不應雜修禪定資下故業生五淨居。若云大小力殊。此亦不爾。身勝劣別，何不得造？又若力殊，唯應菩薩造新業感，二乘力劣不能造感。又若菩薩許新造業感變易生，即大自在宮變易之身生報業，如何《十地論》云「後報利益，摩醯首羅智所生。」故《佛性論》云「譬如須陀洹以上，但用故業不生新業。」以此故知，《瑜伽》、《唯識》等云資故業，為其正說。若是無漏新感者，即集諦攝。雖安立諦非安立殊，不離四諦。無處說集，是非所斷、得通無漏、是應可修，但說集諦是其所斷、有漏非修。違理求文，故為不可。又若捨身更別受生為變易死，即違四記，無煩惱人死者不生。若云據分段說者，此亦不爾，豈彼變易非生攝耶？又約捨分段名死不生，此為分別，何須云無煩惱人死不生？如入見道捨諸難等，亦得云不生故。若云同分段生不名為捨，亦應同有漏第八不名為捨。既無死不生，應令大師隨虛妄說。又《入大乘論》云「問云：何住壽？答云：阿羅漢無煩惱，與八地菩薩同，善修如意足故，能隨意住世，乃至盡於生死。」羅睺羅、賓頭盧等盡住於世，若是捨分段，云何能隨意住世等？不信大師之日記云別受身。乖文立義，故亦為過。又云：無漏親感三界外生名變易生者，此亦不爾。新無漏業可非墮界，第八有漏何非界耶？若云離繫故名非界，此同舊說，何假再陳？又如煩惱能感生故，應能為繫。彼許所知實同煩惱，能發業感有漏第八，為菩提障。何非是繫？以彼云無漏生，如取為緣、有漏業因而生三有，即執變易如彼別生。既說如取等故，所知應繫，無漏集收。此說不許，故不應執變易別生。如《唯識》等名斷所知，雖留身住，無漏定願資其故業，則無是過。經言「如取為緣、有漏業用因而生三有」，少分喻耳。又《入大乘論》云「若汝言無煩惱者，我亦如是。若有親愛，信歸於我，當為汝說。問云：何住壽？答曰：阿羅漢無煩惱，與八住菩薩同，善修如意具足故，能隨意住世。」既言隨意住，明非別受生，亦不得言釋四十年前教。論文自引如羅睺等，故知兼釋《法華》等教。故《唯識》解不違經論，彼違故過。又云：受變易死，住三昧樂，謂無餘涅槃，非滅盡定。從此覺已，始發大心者，據不定性。《唯識》無違。若言定性，此亦不爾，違《楞伽》等，如前已引。而不能知根性有異，總說回心，違經及論。又《法華經》第二云「我等今者住最後身有餘涅槃」，不云無餘，《勝鬘》亦同。又復自說無學回心要住滅定，謂是無餘，從此起已方能趣大。今言非滅定，前後自違。背經立義，過之大也。又云：《唯識論》不捨分段即受變易，云何名為生死？若謂剎那，即違《佛性論》說唯有一生；若謂命之始終，即違《瑜伽》增諸壽行，增諸壽行即無有死有。既無有死，如何說生者。是亦不爾，生死名通。又如《無上依經》、《佛性論》等四種生死但名生死，非據各各死已別生方名生死。若云是變易身生死法故名為生死，亦轉分段生死之法成變易故名為生死，何過不許？若捨分段受生死，何名變易？又許無漏能為新業親招生死，《楞伽》復說三意生身，地位各別則應更受，何名一生？故所設難唐捐其功，其過五也。又云。既不捨分段，《瑜伽》復無轉根之文，女人羅漢若為成佛者。此亦不爾。若以《瑜伽》無轉根文，即許女身成佛者，《勝鬘經》、《佛性論》、《無上依經》亦無轉根之語。設縱捨身，二乘鈍根如何成佛？《瑜伽》、《唯識》無漏等資名一為變易，變易即是轉根之義。而不能知，其過之甚。又云：如上地道，破於上地感上地道，破於下地感上地報。二乘無漏破裂分段感變易生，於理何失者。此亦不爾。上地有漏道伏下不伏上，有漏可能感報；無漏之道通斷上下，非同有漏，如何能感？又云：《瑜伽論》說留根增壽，住在此洲遠離而住，餘不能見。准此論文，是留壽行，非變易生死。末代論師加增穿鑿，非《瑜伽》意者。此亦不爾。後代論師順文成理，不同彼說乖背《瑜伽》。《瑜伽》若許捨分段身別受變易，後代論師云資故業，可是增加。瑜伽不捨根身增壽者即是變易，不同二乘有漏定願所增壽行，非多劫故、人天同類皆可見故。又無著《顯揚論》中說為變化身，親光《佛地論》內云變易死。又《入大乘論》云「答云：阿羅漢無煩惱，與八住菩薩同，善修如意足故，能隨意住世，乃至盡於生死。」又云：如《僧祇》中說，青眼如來為化菩薩故，在光音天，與諸聲聞眾無量百千億那由他劫住。如彼天中，聲聞住壽多劫，當知此世界亦有聲聞能如是住。若要捨壽受身他處，何名住世？此界亦有等。又問云：為以此身住世？為更有餘身住？答：以實身而住世者，則無其義；若變化身住壽多劫，斯有是處。若更受身，即是實身，何名變化？故知增壽，轉穢本形名為變易。若如是者，依名取義，及往無違。若要捨身方受變易，何但名乖，亦違聖教。唯意不但非唯識師，無著、堅意諸菩薩等，亦彼云問略。敬凡不足，陵聖有餘。又云：如三界中煩惱為緣、有漏業為因生於三界。若有業煩惱未伏，定生三界。故知若有妄無漏業未斷，無明住地故受變易者。此亦不爾，如初果之人。又雖有三界業煩惱未斷，未必定受三界生方取無學，即於現身亦許得故。故知地上菩薩亦爾，即於現身得至果故。若云二乘有學能伏修惑可有不生者，菩薩亦能伏所知障，何要別生方能至果？又八地已上有無漏業，未斷無明住地，何不更受？為三意生唯一生耶？又十三不同中，第七云：《法華》、《智度論》等非三界攝，因緣非是三有業故，三界煩惱不能繫故者。不爾。《法華》何處說變易身云非界攝。若據惑盡分段之身，亦云界外。故下經云「以佛教門出三界苦，過三百旬」等。若論現身，八七五識及五根等并是有漏，如何非界？應知云變易出三界者，義亦同此。又從因緣生死云非界繫，若約五八等猶屬於界。雖非惑繫，體隨界故。若非界攝，應是出世。是出世者，與佛何殊？若云：有漏故與佛殊。既云有漏，如何非界？又復大乘處處經論辨界趣體唯依第八，而今不知，故亦成過。不同中，第十二云：《無上依經》、《佛性論》等，妄無漏業以為生死，與大菩提為其怨障。《瑜伽論》等由無漏定資身命住以取菩提者。此亦不爾。若不為取無上菩提，留身久住為斯修事？何故菩薩十地位中受變易身，與菩提為障？又《楞伽》第七云「大慧！菩薩以見寂靜三昧樂門，憶念本願大慈悲心度諸眾生。知十無盡如實行智，是故不即入於涅槃。大悲諸菩薩遠離妄分別之心」等。既云慈悲為眾生知十無盡如實行智等，豈可不知猶起妄無漏業受變易生與菩提為障？若由不知起妄無漏招變易生，應如凡夫造業感果，不唯一生，由業力故。若云故意受變易身，即何為障？只由有智障礙大菩提，為取菩提留身久住斷此智障。若不如是，即入涅槃。然經說為難、論名怨障者，以礙大菩提故。所以須受者，為欲斷除故。如勇健人有其怨敵，求怨敵然故，非不能避，逢怨被害為怨障，受變易身應知亦爾。又云：第二第三時教唯有定性二乘身智斷滅，第四第五時教二乘無實涅槃，五性皆當成佛，無斷滅也者。此亦不爾。自許《楞伽》為第五時教，但說退菩提心者向大，《勝鬘》為其了義說一乘者。復云：隨彼意欲而方便說，《法華論》釋不益決定聲聞。藥草喻中，論云「令知乘異，《涅槃》最在後陳。說皆成佛，不解我意。」以此准知，《瑜伽》、《深密》了義大乘，《楞伽》、《涅槃》咸皆符會。說教分為五時，定性悉皆成佛，無學無餘後始回心，捨分段身別受變易；既無聖教，但彼自言，非信人誰能順受？如有相違，後當會釋。

An opinion states: "The former sūtras speak of preserving the life-span, and treatises such as the Yogācārabhūmi explain this as 'increasing the life-span until great bodhi.' However, anāsrava karma is not the direct cause of transformed [birth-and-death]. Without abandoning the body with its sense-faculties, one undergoes the birth-and-death of transformation. In the later teachings, having attained the fruit of an aśaikṣa, one abandons the apportioned body; taking the cognitive obstacles as condition, newly initiated erroneous anāsrava karma directly produces transformed birth-and-death outside the three realms. Resting in the bliss of samādhi, one regards it as non-remainder nirvāṇa, not the cessation attainment. Awakening from this, one begins to generate the great aspiration. Although the eighth [consciousness] is sāsrava, because afflictions are exhausted it does not belong to the bound realms and is called 'outside the three realms.' It is not that apart from the three realms there are separate sentient beings. However, although the gotra of the dviyāna has the distinction of niyata and aniyata, both undergo transformation. Having undergone transformation, they no longer abandon the body, continuing thus until the vajra[-like samādhi], at which point they first abandon it. Thus the Buddhagotraśāstra says: 'There is only a single rebirth, which is termed existent existence.' If, as in the Vijñaptimātratāsiddhi and other works, one undergoes transformation without abandoning apportioned [birth-and-death], how could it be called birth-and-death? If one means moment-by-moment, it contradicts the Buddhagotraśāstra's statement that there is only a single rebirth. If one means from the beginning to the end of a lifespan, it contradicts the Yogācārabhūmi's 'increasing all activities of life-span.' Moreover, if it is said to increase the life-span, how can it be called death? Since there is no death, how can there be birth? Furthermore, since they do not abandon the apportioned [existence], the Yogācārabhūmi also contains no mention of a female arhat transforming faculties and increasing life-span. Even if a female body endures, if it is for the sake of attaining Buddhahood, one can only rely on the sūtras to give rise to understanding; ordinary people must not make arbitrary conjectures." This statement is incorrect. When the holy fruits of the dviyāna turn their minds toward the Mahāyāna, it is permissible in all cases that they undergo transformed birth-and-death. In the Śrīmālādevīsūtra, it is explained with reference to the determined [case]: those of aniyata-gotra who attain the fruit of an aśaikṣa definitively turn their minds and are no longer reborn [in the apportioned realm], definitively undergoing transformation. Although the śaikṣa of aniyata[-gotra] also turns the mind and undergoes transformed rebirth, because it is not definitive, it is not spoken of in the sūtra. Can one, because the Śrīmālādevī does not speak of the śaikṣa turning the mind, thereby disallow that śaikṣas in the Saddharmapuṇḍarīka assembly advance to the Great [Vehicle]? Therefore, treatises such as the Buddhagotraśāstra agree with the Śrīmālādevīsūtra, tentatively relying on those who definitively undergo [transformation]. The Laṅkāvatārasūtra speaks of three mind-made bodies with reference to those of sudden awakening who fear afflictions. The Yogācārabhūmi and the Buddhabhūmi[vyākhyāna] agree with the Saddharmapuṇḍarīka and others in all allowing the turning of the mind. Since they speak of turning the mind, it is permissible for them to undergo transformed birth-and-death. Since there is no text preventing it, that the śaikṣa who turns the mind clearly attains transformed [rebirth] is also the correct explanation. Their [view] lacks textual support, whereas ours has textual statements. The Nirvāṇa and Saddharmapuṇḍarīka both allow turning the mind, and the Yogācārabhūmi and Buddhabhūmi allow undergoing transformation. When they themselves say, "One can only rely on the sūtras to give rise to understanding; ordinary people must not make arbitrary conjectures," are they themselves great sages, such that these works like the Yogācārabhūmi are completely refuted by them? Furthermore, to summarize their textual meaning, there are briefly eleven errors: Regarding their claim that abandoning the apportioned body to separately receive transformed [rebirth], from which holy teaching does this come? Neither the Śrīmālādevīsūtra nor other works contain the words "abandoning the apportioned [body]"; treatises such as the Yogācārabhūmi and Buddhabhūmi all state that "anāsrava concentration and vows nourish past karma, causing the body so produced to gradually become superior and endure longer." Chapter sixteen of the Prakaraṇāryavācā states: "Relying on the transformation-body, one is able to arrive at the Buddha-stage," and it also does not speak of abandoning the apportioned [body]. The Mahāyānāvatāra also speaks of sustaining the life-span. Not relying on sūtras and treatises, they arbitrarily decide it by their own minds. Furthermore, their claim that "taking cognitive obstacles as condition, newly initiated erroneous anāsrava karma separately produces transformed birth-and-death outside the realms" should not be so. If newly created karma were the direct productive cause, why does the Buddhagotraśāstra say: "As for causal birth-and-death, it is like those above the srotāpanna, who only use past karma and do not generate new karma"? If one were to newly incur birth-and-death by means of anāsrava [karma], this analogy would not hold. Moreover, in the Pratītyasamutpādasūtra and other texts, holy ones do not create karma producing future existence. If it were not existence, sūtras and treatises would not speak of "existent existence birth-and-death"; if it were existence, how could a holy one create karma producing future existence? Furthermore, if one allows the creation of karma producing future existence, an anāgāmin should not, by commingled practice of dhyāna, nourish past lower karma to take birth in the five pure abodes. If they say the power between the great and the small is different, this too is not so: if there is a difference between superior and inferior bodies, why could it not be created? Moreover, if the powers are different, only bodhisattvas should create new karma to induce [birth], while the dviyāna, having inferior power, could not create it to induce [birth]. Furthermore, if bodhisattvas are permitted to newly create karma that induces transformed rebirth, that would be the fruition-rebirth karma of the transformed body in the palace of Maheśvara; why does the Daśabhūmika-śāstra say: "Fruition-benefit afterwards is produced by the wisdom of Maheśvara"? Therefore the Buddhagotraśāstra says: "Just as those above the srotāpanna only use past karma and do not produce new karma." From this it is known that the statements in the Yogācārabhūmi and Vijñaptimātratāsiddhi about "nourishing past karma" are the correct explanation. If it were newly induced by anāsrava [karma], it would be subsumed under the truth of origin. Although established and unestablished truths differ, they do not deviate from the four truths. Nowhere is it said that origin is non-abandonable, capable of being anāsrava, or something to be cultivated; it is only said that the truth of origin is to be abandoned, is sāsrava, and is not to be cultivated. Contradicting reason while seeking textual [support] is therefore untenable. Furthermore, if abandoning the body and separately taking rebirth were transformed death, this would contradict the four declarations: 'One without afflictions dies and is not reborn.' If they say this is based on apportioned [existence], this is also not so: is their transformed [existence] not subsumed under rebirth? Furthermore, if abandoning the apportioned is termed 'death and not being reborn,' this is a conceptual differentiation; why need it say 'one without afflictions dies and is not reborn'? For just as entering the path of vision abandons various hardships and the like, this can also be called not being reborn. If one says that being identical to apportioned rebirth is not termed abandonment, then being identical to the sāsrava eighth [consciousness] should also not be termed abandonment. Since there is no 'death and not being reborn,' this would cause the Great Master to speak falsely. Furthermore, the Mahāyānāvatāra states: 'Question: How does one sustain the life-span? Answer: Arhats have no afflictions; like bodhisattvas of the eighth stage, because they cultivate the bases of psychic power well, they can abide in the world according to their will, even until the end of birth-and-death.' Rāhula, Piṇḍola, and others all abide in the world; if they had abandoned the apportioned [body], how could they abide in the world according to their will? Distrusting the Great Master's daily records, they claim that a separate body is received. Contradicting the texts to establish a doctrine is therefore also an error. Furthermore, their claim that 'anāsrava directly producing rebirth outside the three realms is termed transformed rebirth' is also not so. Newly created anāsrava karma may indeed not fall into the realms, but why would the sāsrava eighth [consciousness] not be of the realms? If they say that because it is free from bondage it is called 'not of the realms,' this is identical to the old explanation; why need it be repeated? Moreover, just as afflictions can produce rebirth, so they should be able to bind. They admit that cognitive [obstacles] are truly like afflictions, capable of initiating karma to produce the sāsrava eighth [consciousness] and serving as obstacles to bodhi. Why are they not binding? Because they say anāsrava birth is like grasping as condition and sāsrava karma as cause giving rise to the three existences, they cling to transformation as being separately born in that way. Since they say it is 'like grasping,' cognitive [obstacles] should bind, and anāsrava would be subsumed under origin. This statement is not accepted; therefore one should not cling to transformation as separate rebirth. If, as in the Vijñaptimātratāsiddhi and other texts, it is called severing cognitive [obstacles], although the body is preserved to abide, anāsrava concentration and vows nourish its past karma, then there is no such error. The sūtra's statement 'like grasping as condition and sāsrava karma as cause giving rise to the three existences' is merely a partial metaphor. Furthermore, the Mahāyānāvatāra states: 'If you say there are no afflictions, I am also thus. If there is affection and you take refuge in me with faith, I shall explain it for you. Question: How does one sustain the life-span? Answer: Arhats have no afflictions; like bodhisattvas of the eighth stage, because they cultivate the bases of psychic power fully, they can abide in the world according to their will.' Since it says 'abide according to their will,' it is clear that there is no separate reception of rebirth; nor can one say this interprets the teaching from forty years prior. The text of the treatise itself cites cases like Rāhula; thus we know it also explains teachings such as the Saddharmapuṇḍarīka. Therefore the explanation of the Vijñaptimātratāsiddhi does not contradict sūtras and treatises, whereas their contradiction is an error. Furthermore, their claim that 'having undergone transformed death, one abides in the bliss of samādhi, regarding it as non-remainder nirvāṇa, not the cessation attainment; awakening from this, one begins to generate the great aspiration' is based on the aniyata-gotra. The Vijñaptimātratāsiddhi does not contradict this. If one claims it applies to the niyata-gotra, this too is not so, as it contradicts the Laṅkāvatārasūtra and other texts, as cited earlier. Failing to understand that there are differences in faculties and gotra, they universally speak of turning the mind, contradicting sūtras and treatises. Furthermore, the second fascicle of the Saddharmapuṇḍarīka states: 'We now abide in the remainder nirvāṇa of our final body,' not speaking of non-remainder; the Śrīmālādevī is also the same. Furthermore, they themselves say that when an aśaikṣa turns the mind, they must abide in the cessation attainment, regarding it as non-remainder, and only after arising from this can they advance to the Great [Vehicle]. Now they say it is not the cessation attainment, which is internally contradictory. Establishing a doctrine by turning one's back on the sūtras is the greatest of errors. Furthermore, regarding their claim: 'If the Vijñaptimātratāsiddhi holds that one receives transformation without abandoning the apportioned [body], how is it called birth-and-death? If one means moment-by-moment, it contradicts the Buddhagotraśāstra's statement that there is only a single rebirth; if one means from the beginning to the end of a lifespan, it contradicts the Yogācārabhūmi's increasing all activities of life-span, for if all activities of life-span are increased, there is no death; since there is no death, how can there be birth?' This too is not so, for the name 'birth-and-death' is general. Moreover, as in the Anuttarāśrayasūtra and Buddhagotraśāstra, the four kinds of birth-and-death are simply called birth-and-death; it is not based on separately taking rebirth after each respective death that it is called birth-and-death. If it is said to be called birth-and-death because it is the dharma of birth-and-death of the transformed body, it is also called birth-and-death because the dharma of apportioned birth-and-death is transformed to become transformed [birth-and-death]—what fault is there in accepting this? If one abandons the apportioned to undergo birth-and-death, why is it called 'transformation'? Furthermore, if you allow that anāsrava can be new karma directly incurring birth-and-death, and the Laṅkāvatārasūtra speaks of three mind-made bodies whose stages are distinct, then one should undergo them repeatedly; why call it a single rebirth? Therefore, the objection raised is in vain, which is the fifth error. Furthermore, regarding the claim: 'Since they do not abandon the apportioned [body], and the Yogācārabhūmi also lacks any text on transforming faculties, how could a female arhat attain Buddhahood?' This too is not so. If, because the Yogācārabhūmi lacks a text on transforming faculties, one allows that a female body attains Buddhahood, the Śrīmālādevīsūtra, Buddhagotraśāstra, and Anuttarāśrayasūtra also lack words on transforming faculties. Even supposing they abandoned the body, how could the dull faculties of the dviyāna attain Buddhahood? The Yogācārabhūmi and Vijñaptimātratāsiddhi hold that the nourishment by anāsrava and so forth is uniquely called 'transformation,' and transformation precisely has the meaning of transforming faculties. Failing to understand this is an extreme error. Furthermore, regarding the claim: 'Just as the path of an upper stage, destroying the [afflictions of] the upper stage, produces the path of the upper stage, and destroying the lower stage, induces the retribution of the upper stage; when the anāsrava of the dviyāna shatters the apportioned to induce transformed rebirth, what logical flaw is there?' This too is not so. The sāsrava path of an upper stage suppresses the lower but does not suppress the upper; being sāsrava, it can induce retribution. The path of anāsrava completely severs both upper and lower, not being identical to sāsrava; how could it induce [retribution]? Furthermore, regarding the claim: 'The Yogācārabhūmi speaks of preserving the faculties to increase the life-span, abiding in this continent in remote solitude, unseen by others. Following this treatise text, this is preserving the activities of life-span, not transformed birth-and-death. Later treatise masters added arbitrary elaborations that were not the intent of the Yogācārabhūmi.' This too is not so. Later treatise masters conformed to the text to establish the principle, unlike their claim which contradicts the Yogācārabhūmi. If the Yogācārabhūmi allowed abandoning the apportioned body to separately receive transformation, the later treatise masters' statement of 'nourishing past karma' could indeed be considered an addition. In the Yogācārabhūmi, increasing the life-span without abandoning the body with its faculties is precisely transformation; it is not like the activities of increasing the life-span through the sāsrava concentration and vows of the dviyāna, because it is not for many kalpas and because others of the human and deva realm can all see it. Furthermore, in Asaṅga's Prakaraṇāryavācā, it is described as a transformation-body, and in Bandhuprabha's Buddhabhūmivyākhyāna, it is called transformed death. Furthermore, the Mahāyānāvatāra states: 'Answer: Arhats have no afflictions; like bodhisattvas of the eighth stage, because they cultivate the bases of psychic power well, they can abide in the world according to their will, even until the end of birth-and-death.' It also states: 'As explained in the Mahāsāṃghika[-vinaya], the Tathāgata Nīlanetra, in order to transform bodhisattvas, resided in the Ābhāsvara heaven with an assembly of śrāvakas for immeasurable hundreds of thousands of myriads of koṭis of nayutas of kalpas. Just as in that heaven the śrāvakas sustained their life-span for many kalpas, one should know that in this world there are also śrāvakas who can abide thus.' If they had to abandon the life-span and receive a body elsewhere, how could it be called 'abiding in the world'? 'In this world there are also...' and so on. It also asks: 'Do they abide in the world with this body, or is there another body with which they abide?' Answer: 'To abide in the world with a real body is without basis; if it is a transformation-body sustaining life for many kalpas, there is such a possibility.' If they separately received a body, that would be a real body; how could it be called a transformation? Hence we know that increasing the life-span and transforming the defiled original form is called transformation. If it is so, grasping the meaning in accordance with the term and applying it to the past involves no contradiction. If one had to abandon the body before receiving transformation, not only would the name be discordant, it would also contradict the holy teachings. Their intention not only rejects the masters of Vijñaptimātrata, but also bodhisattvas such as Asaṅga and Dhiramati, whom they also question with brevity: having insufficient reverence for ordinary persons, they have more than enough contempt for sages. Furthermore, regarding the claim: 'Just as in the three realms afflictions are the condition and sāsrava karma is the cause for birth in the three realms; if there is karma and affliction not yet subdued, one is definitively born in the three realms. Thus we know that if there is erroneous anāsrava karma not yet severed, because of the ground of ignorance one undergoes transformation.' This too is not so, as in the case of a srotāpanna. Moreover, although they have karma and afflictions of the three realms not yet severed, it is not determined that they must undergo rebirth in the three realms before attaining the state of an aśaikṣa, for it is permitted that they attain it in the present body. Thus we know that bodhisattvas on the stages are also like this, because in the present body they can attain the fruit. If you say that the śaikṣa of the dviyāna can suppress the delusions of cultivation and thus may not be reborn, bodhisattvas can also suppress cognitive obstacles; why would they need a separate rebirth before they can attain the fruit? Furthermore, from the eighth stage onward, there is anāsrava karma and the ground of ignorance is not yet severed; why do they not undergo further [rebirth]? Are the three mind-made bodies only a single rebirth? Furthermore, among the thirteen differences, the seventh states: 'According to the Saddharmapuṇḍarīka and the Mahāprajñāpāramitāśāstra, it is not subsumed under the three realms, because the cause and condition are not the karma of the three existences and the afflictions of the three realms cannot bind it.' This is not so. Where does the Saddharmapuṇḍarīka speak of the transformed body as not being subsumed under the realms? If speaking of the apportioned body whose delusions are exhausted, it is also said to be outside the realms. Thus a later passage in the sūtra states: 'Through the Buddha's teaching, they escape the suffering of the three realms, traversing three hundred yojanas,' and so forth. If one considers the present body, the eighth, seventh, and five consciousnesses, as well as the five faculties and so forth, are all sāsrava; how could they not be of the realms? One should know that stating transformation is 'transcending the three realms' is also identical in meaning to this. Moreover, in terms of causal birth-and-death it is said not to be bound by the realms, but if considered in terms of the five [consciousnesses], the eighth [consciousness], and so forth, it still belongs to the realms. Although not bound by delusion, its substance follows the realms. If it were not subsumed under the realms, it should be supramundane. If it were supramundane, how would it differ from a Buddha? If you say: 'Because it is sāsrava, it differs from a Buddha,' then since you say it is sāsrava, how could it not be of the realms? Furthermore, the Mahāyāna sūtras and treatises in various places define the substance of the realms and destinies solely based on the eighth [consciousness]; now failing to understand this, they have also committed an error. Among the differences, the twelfth states: 'The Anuttarāśrayasūtra and Buddhagotraśāstra hold that erroneous anāsrava karma constitutes birth-and-death, which serves as an adversarial obstacle to great bodhi. Treatises such as the Yogācārabhūmi hold that through anāsrava concentration, the body and life-span are nourished to abide in order to attain bodhi.' This too is not so. If it were not for attaining unsurpassed bodhi, why would they preserve the body to abide for a long time to perform these practices? Why would the transformed body received by a bodhisattva on the ten stages be an obstacle to bodhi? Furthermore, the seventh fascicle of the Laṅkāvatāra states: 'Mahāmati! Because bodhisattvas see the gate of the bliss of tranquil samādhi, they remember their original vows and great compassion to cross sentient beings over. Knowing the ten inexhaustible wisdoms of true practice, they therefore do not immediately enter nirvāṇa. Bodhisattvas of great compassion are far removed from the mind of false discrimination,' and so on. Since it says that out of compassion for sentient beings they know the ten inexhaustible wisdoms of true practice, how could they not know and still initiate erroneous anāsrava karma to undergo transformed rebirth that serves as an obstacle to bodhi? If, through not knowing, they initiated erroneous anāsrava to induce transformed rebirth, it should be like ordinary persons creating karma to incur fruit, which is not merely a single rebirth, due to the power of karma. If you say they intentionally receive a transformed body, how is it an obstacle? It is merely because there is cognitive obstacle obstructing great bodhi that, in order to attain bodhi, they preserve the body to abide for a long time to sever this cognitive obstacle. If it were not so, they would immediately enter nirvāṇa. However, when sūtras speak of it as a difficulty and treatises call it an adversarial obstacle, it is because it obstructs great bodhi. The reason they must undergo it is that they wish to eradicate it. Just as a brave person has an enemy and seeks out the enemy for that reason, not because he is unable to avoid him, so being struck and harmed upon encountering the enemy is an adversarial obstacle; undergoing a transformed body should be understood in the same way. Furthermore, they say: 'The teachings of the second and third periods hold only that the body and wisdom of the dviyāna of niyata-gotra are severed and extinguished; the teachings of the fourth and fifth periods hold that the dviyāna has no real nirvāṇa, and all five gotras will become Buddhas without being severed and extinguished.' This too is not so. You yourselves accept the Laṅkāvatārasūtra as the teaching of the fifth period, yet it only speaks of those who regress from the bodhicitta turning toward the Great [Vehicle]. The Śrīmālādevī is considered definitive in teaching the Ekayāna, yet it also says it is an expedient teaching given according to their inclinations. The Saddharmapuṇḍarīkā-upadeśa explains that it does not benefit the determined śrāvaka. In the parable of the medicinal herbs, the treatise states: 'It causes them to know the difference of the vehicles. The Nirvāṇasūtra was stated last of all; in saying that all attain Buddhahood, it did not understand my intention.' From this it can be inferred that the definitive Mahāyāna of the Yogācārabhūmi and the Saṃdhinirmocana corresponds completely with the Laṅkāvatāra and Nirvāṇa. To say that the teaching is divided into five periods, that all those of determined nature attain Buddhahood, and that only after an aśaikṣa enters non-remainder do they turn their minds, abandoning the apportioned body to separately receive transformation—since this has no basis in the holy teachings and is merely their own assertion, who other than a gullible person could accept it? If there are contradictions, they will be harmonized and explained later.