能顯中邊慧日論 4.17

Question: If all sentient beings naturally have a differentiation of five gotras, why does the first fascicle of the Upāsakaśīla Sūtra (Suśarmā's Sūtra) state: "If one says that sentient beings have a bodhisattva gotra, this is called an outsider teachings (tīrthika)"? And further says: "The three kinds of bodhi have no fixed gotra (niyata-gotra). If there were a fixed gotra, those who have already generated the mind of a śrāvaka or pratyekabuddha could not generate the mind of anuttarā samyaksaṃbodhi." And continuing up to: "If there is one who has a fixed gotra, this is called an outsider teaching. Why is that? Because the outsider teachings lack cause and effect." Answer: That Suśarmā Sūtra refutes the attachment to an effect already existing within the cause, and so forth; or it means that clinging literally to the words is identical to outsider teachings, but it does not refute having a cause. Were it not so, it would contradict what the Laṅkāvatārasūtra says regarding the characteristics of the five vehicle gotras. When it says that the three bodhis have no fixed gotra, this is spoken in reference to the indeterminate gotra (aniyata-gotra), and also to refute the clinging to permanence as lacking cause and effect. Were it not so, the Laṅkāvatārasūtra states: "Mahāmati! I teach the realized Dharma of five kinds of vehicle gotras. What are the five? The first is the realized Dharma of the śrāvakayāna gotra; the second is the realized Dharma of the pratyekabuddhayāna gotra; the third is the realized Dharma of the tathāgatayāna gotra; the fourth is the realized Dharma of the indeterminate vehicle gotra; the fifth is the realized Dharma of the agotraka vehicle gotra." The "Discipline Chapter" of the Bodhisattvaśīla Sūtra states: "Having the śrāvaka gotra, one attains the śrāvaka path," and so forth. Among the ten causes of purification in the Bodhisattvabhūmidhāra, it says: "Those of the śrāvaka gotra enter parinirvāṇa by means of the śrāvakayāna," and so forth. Asaṅga and Maitreya also state that there are five distinctions; could they be identical to outsider teachings? Furthermore, they themselves accept that the five gotras are newly formed, also calling them the bodhisattva gotra and so on; thus they should likewise be identical to outsider teachings, because the sūtra text does not say: "If there is an inherently existent bodhisattva gotra, this is identical to outsider teachings." Question: If the five gotras naturally exist beforehand, why does the fourth fascicle of the Ru Lengqie [jing] state: "Mahāmati! Discriminating that confusing Dharma as inverted or non-inverted can generate two kinds of gotras. What are the two? The first is capable of generating the ordinary person gotra; the second is capable of generating the noble person gotra. Mahāmati! That noble person gotra is capable of generating three differentiated gotras, namely śrāvaka, pratyekabuddha, and Buddha, because of the differentiated gotras of their realms"? Answer: What is spoken of here as "generating" means that by present vāsanā they are caused to manifest. The Mahāyānasaṃgraha says: "It is unreasonable that the vāsanā of hearing and so forth should produce no fruit. It does not refer to the bīja being originally nonexistent and newly generated only at the present time." Were it not so, would the ordinary person gotra also be said to be generated such that it was originally nonexistent and only now arises? Question: If one says that if the buddhadhātu exists, it is inherently existent, it should be permanent like space; if it does not exist, it is permanently nonexistent, and should be identical to a hare's horn. If so, it would contradict what the Nirvāṇa Sūtra says. It says: "Because of existence, it refutes the hare's horn; because of nonexistence, it refutes empty space. One who speaks thus does not slander the Three Jewels." Answer: The intent of the Nirvāṇa Sūtra is to have one contemplate phenomenal nature: because it arises and ceases through causes and conditions, it is not permanent like empty space; because it exists with respect to dependent arising, it is not nonexistent like a hare's horn. It does not refute the distinction between sentient beings who possess and lack the gotra. Question: Although phenomenal buddhadhātu varies in its presence and absence, the buddhadhātu of principle is omnipresent. If so, one must accept that all sentient beings will attain Buddhahood. Why is that? The Buddhagotraśāstra and others cite: "Therefore a sūtra says: 'If there were one possessing pure nature who does not attain Buddhahood, there is no such possibility.'" Answer: This is in reference to the intention of equality, not that all will attain Buddhahood. Furthermore, as the "Chapter on Merits" of the Buddhagotraśāstra says: "In the bodies of people with roots of good there is capacity; in the bodies of people without roots of good there is no capacity." Since in the bodies of people without roots of good there is no merit, how could one cause those without the gotra of practice to have the gotra of practice within their bodies? Moreover, the Sambhāraśāstra, referring to the determined gotra, says: "Those who have already obtained the fruit of non-learning definitely will not become Buddhas, just as a rice seed without a husk definitely will not sprout." Can it be that all do not become Buddhas? Therefore, the various sūtras and treatises each rely on a particular meaning, and none are contradictory. Question: If phenomenal buddhadhātu exists, namely being inherently existent and not produced through new vāsanā, what text clearly states this? Answer: Fascicle 57 of the Yogācārabhūmi says: "When born in Naraka, the manifestation of the three roots is definitely not accomplished. With regard to their bījas, they are either accomplished or not accomplished: those possessing the dharma of parinirvāṇa accomplish them, while those who do not possess the dharma of parinirvāṇa do not accomplish them." This text is stated in reference to birth in a destiny, not in reference to apparitional birth. It is based on presently existing bījas, not on the future. Were it not so, their active manifestations would also arise in the future; how then could it be said that they are not accomplished? The first chapter, "Gotra Chapter", of the Mahāyānasūtrālaṅkāra also says: "Gotra has substantial reality, owing to four kinds of distinction: first, by the distinction of realm; second, by the distinction of faith; third, by the distinction of practice; fourth, by the distinction of fruit." And it continues up to: "If there were no distinction of gotra, then there would be no distinction of faith, practice, and fruit." Due to these four kinds of distinctions, one should know that gotra has substantial reality. Furthermore, fascicle 21 of the Yogācārabhūmi says: "What is gotra? It means that a pudgala abiding in a gotra has the dharma of bījas, and because of their present existence, the pudgala abiding in the gotra, if encountering superior conditions, will have capability and strength to obtain and realize that nirvāṇa." It also says: "Question: Now what is the substantial entity of this gotra? Answer: Attached to the basis, having such characteristics, it is subsumed under the six sense-bases. Successively transmitted from beginningless time, it is naturally obtained." It also says: "Such bījas do not have distinct characteristics apart from the six sense-bases; they are the excellence of the six sense-bases in such categories and states, successively transmitted from beginningless time, naturally obtained, possessing such characteristics and verbal designations, termed the gotra, bīja, dhātu, and prakṛti." The text of the Bodhisattvabhūmi and the "Virtuous Practice Chapter" of the Bodhisattvaśīla Sūtra, and so on, are all similar in text, and one must not interpret them differently by saying that the gotra of nature is a gotra formed through cultivation. The treatise says: "A person without the gotra, because of lacking the gotra, even if generating the mind and diligently cultivating vigorous effort, will definitely not attain ultimate anuttarā samyaksaṃbodhi." Therefore one should know that even if one does not generate the mind and does not cultivate expedient means, one is still entitled to be named a holder of the gotra. The first fascicle of the Anuttarāśraya Sūtra says: "Ānanda! What is the Tathāgata-dhātu? Why is the Tathāgata as a dhātu inconceivable? Ānanda! All sentient beings have excellent types of skandhas, dhātus, and āyatanas manifesting internally and externally, flowing continuously from beginningless time, naturally obtained, giving rise to luminous, wondrous goodness." Since it says there are excellent types of skandhas, āyatanas, and dhātus manifesting internally and externally, flowing from beginningless time, it clearly is not the principle of reality (tathatā), nor is it newly arisen.

The *Yogācārabhūmi* further states: "Next, concerning all the characteristics possessed by one who abides in the gotra: they are contrary to all the characteristics of a pudgala without nirvāṇa-dharma; you should know that this is called a pudgala abiding in the gotra." All the characteristics are contrasted in six pairs of characteristics, as explained in detail therein. It further states: "Or there is one who merely abides in the gotra, yet has neither entered upon [the path] nor attained departure: this refers to a pudgala who is endowed with the seeds of the supramundane noble dharmas, but has not yet attained close association with virtuous spiritual friends or the hearing of the correct Dharma, has not yet attained correct faith in the Dharma and Vinaya properly awakened to and properly taught by the Tathāgata, has not maintained pure precepts, has not gathered vast learning, has not increased wisdom and renunciation, and has not subdued views—this is called merely abiding in the gotra while having neither entered upon [the path] nor attained departure." Furthermore, in the explanation of the ten causes in the thirty-eighth fascicle of the *Yogācārabhūmi*, and in the explanation of the ten causes in the *Bhadraśīlasūtra* and the *Bodhisattvabhūmidhāra*, which clarify that the gotra is innate, the passages are all similar, so they are not cited in full to avoid verbosity. Fascicle 4 of the *Buddhagotraśāstra* states: "'The five dharmas that possess a beginningless associated wholesome nature'—the commentary explains: 'Without beginning' means that since wisdom (prajñā), great compassion, dhyāna-concentration, and the dharmakāya are obtained by nature and are innate, it is therefore said to be 'without beginning'. If the anāsrava were produced from the sāsrava, then the causes of wisdom, great compassion, dhyāna-concentration, and so on would be phenomena with a beginning; how could they be without beginning? If produced from the sāsrava, how could they be called 'obtained by nature'?" Fascicle 4 of the *Ratnagotravibhāga* states: "There are two kinds of buddhadhātu: the first is like a subterranean treasure, and the second is like a fruit on a tree," and so forth. According to the meaning of that text, the subterranean treasure is an analogy for tathatā, and the fruit on the tree is an analogy for wisdom, and so on. Hence it next says: "Based on the first analogy, one knows that there is the first dharmakāya; based on the second analogy, one knows that there are the two buddha-bodies and two kinds of buddhadhātu; both are spoken of as existing from beginningless saṃsāra, without clarifying that the anāsrava is innate and not merely newly arisen. Furthermore, if anāsrava seeds were merely newly arisen, then the sāsrava hearing and perfuming would be the sākṣāt-hetupratyaya for supramundane correct view." Why does the Liang translation of the *Mahāyānasaṃgraha* state: "The Buddha, the World-Honoured One, said: 'Hearing the voice from another and proper reflection by oneself: through these two causes, correct view is produced.'" The commentary states: "In the class of purity, correct view is the foremost; what dharma serves as the adhipatipratyaya for this correct view? It refers to hearing the voice from another and proper reflection by oneself. These two causes are precisely the adhipatipratyaya for correct view." And further down it says: "'Through these two causes, correct view is produced; these two causes are the adhipatipratyaya for correct view.' What is now spoken of as 'cause' (hetu) is a general term; that is, a condition (pratyaya) is spoken of as a cause." Furthermore, the treatise states: "The mundane mind is associated with proper reflection; the supramundane pure mind is associated with correct view; at no time can they arise together and perish together." The commentary states: "Proper reflection and the wisdom of proper cultivation arise from the four foundations of mindfulness, and the stage of worldly supreme dharmas (laukikāgradharma) is their position. This mind has not yet realised and seen the four noble truths, so it is called the 'mundane mind'. Having already realised and seen the four noble truths, it is called 'supramundane'. Being a dharma free from intrinsic nature, it is an attainment through cultivation, so it is called the 'pure mind'. Correct view is the first factor among the eightfold noble path; this correct view is inseparable from the thirty-seven factors of awakening." And further down it says: "Since it arises from the thirty-seven factors of awakening, it attains the supramundane. From beginningless time, the mundane and supramundane minds have never possessed the meaning of arising together and perishing together, because their natures are contrary." The treatise says: "Therefore, this mundane mind is not perfumed by the pure mind. Since there is no vāsanā, it should not be capable of becoming a supramundane seed." The commentary states: "If the wisdom of reflection were perfumed by the supramundane mind, it could become a supramundane seed. Since there is no meaning of being perfumed, the meaning of a supramundane seed is not established." According to this text of the treatise, if an anāsrava seed were produced through new perfuming, it would only be produced as a result of being accompanied by the anāsrava. Since there is no anāsrava prior to the path of seeing (darśanamārga), how could the sāsrava perfume to form the anāsrava? If one allows that the sāsrava perfumes an anāsrava seed, one should not object to another that a seed cannot be perfumed when not accompanied by the anāsrava, since one personally accepts that something not accompanied by the anāsrava perfumes an anāsrava seed. Question: If prior to the path of seeing, the sāsrava hearing and perfuming cannot produce the anāsrava, why does the treatise state: "Although it is a mundane dharma, it forms the supramundane mind"? The commentary explains: "Just as the mental consciousness, although a mundane dharma, can penetrate the tathatā of the four noble truths and counter the hindrances to the four noble truths, it forms the supramundane mind. The śrutavāsanā is also like this: although it is a mundane dharma, because both its cause and fruit are supramundane dharmas, it also forms the supramundane mind." Answer: Because the innate anāsrava is subtle, hidden, and difficult to know, relying on the superior adhipatipratyaya of sāsrava perfuming, the innate anāsrava seed is revealed. This very seed, at the stage of perfuming, is also called śrutavāsanā. Hence the treatise next says: "Why is this?" The commentary explains: "Why is this? This dharma is solely supramundane and not a mundane dharma, because there are four kinds of antidotes." According to this, since it says it is solely supramundane and not a mundane dharma, it is clear that it is not sāsrava. Furthermore, the treatise states: "When this supramundane pure mind of the seed has not yet arisen, it is an antidote to all manifest defilements." According to this, we know that prior to the path of seeing, at the stage of sāsrava perfuming, there is already the seed of the anāsrava mind. It also states: "The seed is precisely the śrutavāsanā; the bodhisattva's faculty of unknown-knowing (anājñātamājñāsyāmīndriya) is called the supramundane pure mind. Before this mind is present, it is śrutavāsanā, belonging to the stage of the wisdom of hearing and reflection, within the stage of hearing and reflection." According to this, we know that the statement that sāsrava perfuming forms the supramundane mind is spoken in terms of the adhipatipratyaya. Furthermore, it is explained in detail therein, so to be brief, it is not cited further. Question: Since all sentient beings equally possess tathatā and the eighth consciousness, why are these not accepted as the pradhāna-hetu of a buddha? Answer: Since tathatā itself does not produce, it also does not directly serve as a pradhāna-hetu that produces dharmas, as has been clarified before. If one accepts that the eighth consciousness is the pradhāna-hetu of a buddha, it would then be anāsrava. Furthermore, it is only by countering the sāsrava eighth consciousness that one can attain buddhahood; if one accepts the eighth consciousness as the pradhāna-hetu of a buddha, it should then be capable of countering the eighth consciousness itself. If so, it would contradict the Liang translation of the *Mahāyānasaṃgraha*, which states: "How could the fruit-retribution consciousness of all seeds become the cause of the class of impurity if it can serve as the cause of the supramundane pure mind that counters defilement?" The commentary explains: "If one posits the mūlavijñāna as the supramundane cause that counters defilement, then one cannot take the mūlavijñāna as the cause of the class of impurity. The class of impurity refers to the truth of the origination [of suffering] and the truth of suffering; because they are seeds of karma and defilements, they are the truth of origination." And further down it says: "Since it is posited as the antidote to defilement and the cause of the supramundane mind, it should no longer be spoken of as the cause of the class of impurity." According to this, the sāsrava eighth consciousness is not the pradhāna-hetu of a buddha.

Furthermore, the eighth consciousness is shared identically by all, with no distinction among the three vehicles; thus, in the *Bodhisattvabhūmidhāra*, the *Shanjie jing*, the "Bodhisattvabhūmi", and so forth, where the cause of determinate differentiation and the differences among the gotras of the three vehicles are clarified, as well as in the "Subduing" chapter, the distinctions among the gotras of the three vehicles could never be properly established. Therefore, the originally existing anāsrava bījas adhering to this consciousness are the pradhāna-hetu of a buddha.
Question: If tathatā is not accepted as the pradhāna-hetu of a buddha, how is it that the *Buddhagotraśāstra* says the principle of tathatā is the pradhāna-hetu of a buddha, and faith, prajñā, and so on are the pratyaya-hetus of a buddha? And the *Yogācārabhūmi* also says: "They arise from bījas that have tathatā as their cognitive object (ālambanapratyaya)"?
Answer: These two treatises' passages have already been reconciled above; now they are re-explained once more. Saying that "they arise from bījas that have tathatā as their cognitive object" is merely a metaphorical statement taking the cognitive object as a bīja; tathatā is not in reality the bīja of conditioned phenomena. Just as faith, prajñā, and so forth are said to be the bījas of the four virtues, yet the four virtues of the dharmakāya are not generated by them but are permanently abiding phenomena, called "bījas" metaphorically because they are revealed by them. Therefore the Liang *Mahāyānasaṃgraha* says: "Śrutavāsanā is merely the bīja of the path to the four virtues; the path to the four virtues can accomplish and reveal the four virtues. The four virtues are originally existent and do not arise from bījas; they are called 'bījas' by taking their name from the cause." Based on this, one knows that the mental constituents of the four wisdoms take that tathatā as an object and arise, and tathatā is called a bīja only metaphorically. If one accepts that tathatā is an actual bīja capable of producing conditioned phenomena, this would contradict the first of the seven definitions of bīja in the *Yogācārabhūmi*, that an impermanent phenomenon serves as a cause, and it would also contradict the passage on the three natures in the *Buddhagotraśāstra* where an existent entity produces an existent entity.
Question: If there are dviyāna practitioners of determinate gotra who do not become buddhas, this contradicts fascicle 36 of the *Nirvāṇa Sūtra*, which says: "Stream-enterers, once-returners, non-returners, arhats, and pratyekabuddhas will all become buddhas; if one hears this teaching and does not generate faith, [...] it is called ever-drowned." And the *Saddharmapuṇḍarīka Sūtra* says: "Whether śrāvakas or bodhisattvas, hearing the Dharma I preach, even down to a single verse, all will become buddhas without doubt", and so forth.
Answer: This is spoken with respect to the practitioners of the four fruits of the śrāvaka and pratyekabuddhas of indeterminate gotra all becoming buddhas. Hearing it and not having faith is called ever-drowned, etc.; it does not mean that all of both determinate and indeterminate gotra will become buddhas. Were it not so, why does the *Nirvāṇa Sūtra* itself say: "They say that all attain buddhahood because they do not understand my intention"? Furthermore, how could the *Bodhisambhāraśāstra* and so forth not have seen the *Nirvāṇa Sūtra*, yet still state that they do not become buddhas?
Question: Regarding the claim that there are icchantikas who definitely do not become buddhas, how is it that fascicle 36 of the *Nirvāṇa Sūtra* says: "If a person has a discrepancy between mind and mouth, expressing differences, saying that an icchantika does not attain bodhi, that person also slanders the Buddha, Dharma, and Saṅgha"?
Answer: According to the sense of this passage, if one says that an icchantika definitely does not attain bodhi, this is called slandering the Buddha, Dharma, and Saṅgha; it does not exclude a few who do enter. If that were so, this would again contradict the *Ratnagotravibhāga*, which says: "Previously stating that icchantikas never enter nirvāṇa and have no nature for nirvāṇa was intended to turn around their mind of slandering the Mahāyāna and their mind of not seeking the Mahāyāna; it was spoken with reference to an immeasurable period of time, because in reality they possess the pure nature." And the *Buddhagotraśāstra* says: "The statement that there is a gotra is an explicit teaching. The statement that there is no gotra is an implicit teaching. [...] Furthermore, because it is weighty, the Buddha observes that all sentient beings possess an intrinsically pure nature, and so in later times they will definitely attain the pure dharmakāya." Based on this, one knows that there is no icchantika who lacks the buddhadhātu, nor is there any sentient being who does not become a buddha.
Answer: This is said on the basis of the intention of the equality of the principle nature, and refers to the second type among the 'ever-drowned' in the *Nirvāṇa Sūtra*, who although not an icchantika is also called 'ever-drowned', and to the second person among the three types of beings without the capacity for nirvāṇa in the *Wushangyi jing* and elsewhere; the fifth person with the gotra of no-gotra in the *Laṅkāvatāra* is also harmonized in this way; this does not harmonize the icchantika who is called ever-drowned, one each among the seven persons, and the first being without the capacity for nirvāṇa in the *Wushangyi jing*.
Question: If so, why do both the *Ratnagotravibhāga* and the *Buddhagotraśāstra* cite a sūtra stating that an icchantika who falls into the definitely false assembly has two kinds of bodies: first, the fundamental dharmakāya; second, the body born of will; and the wisdom-light of the Buddha-sun shines upon these two bodies? As for the dharmakāya, it is the principle of tathatā. As for the body born of will, from the principle of tathatā arises the Buddha's radiance out of pity for the icchantika. Regarding the two bodies of the icchantika: first, to cause the dharmakāya to arise; second, to cause the preparatory practice to increase and the bodhisattva practices to be cultivated, so that contemplation can be accomplished.
Answer: This is spoken with respect to an icchantika who possesses the gotra. Otherwise, it would contradict the earlier chapter "Functions and Capacities", which says: "Sentient beings in the indeterminate assembly give rise to these two matters as functions; it does not say that those in the determinate assembly do so." It also says: "This person has the pure portion as a condition and the pure nature as a cause, and therefore accomplishes this contemplation; it is not without causes and conditions. If it were not accomplished by these two matters, the contemplation would lack causes and conditions. Just as an icchantika lacks the nature of nirvāṇa, they would have to attain this contemplation." Since an icchantika lacks this contemplation, one definitely knows that causes and conditions are required for contemplation before it can appear in one without gotra. Since contemplation is not conceded, it is clear that one without gotra cannot become a buddha. Furthermore, it is also the same as fascicle 9 of the *Nirvāṇa Sūtra*, which says: "'The radiance of great nirvāṇa enters into the pores of all sentient beings and can serve as a cause of bodhi'—this meaning is not correct. Why is that? World-Honoured One! If those who commit the four grave offences, commit the five heinous acts, and are icchantikas have the radiance enter their bodies to serve as a cause of bodhi, what difference would such people have from those who purely maintain the precepts and cultivate all wholesome dharmas? [...] The Buddha said: 'Good man! Excepting the icchantika, when all other sentient beings have heard this sūtra, they can all make it a cause and condition of bodhi. Those into whose pores the sound of the Dharma and the radiance enter will definitely attain anuttarā samyaksaṃbodhi.'" Based on this, one knows that when the *Buddhagotraśāstra* and other treatises cite the sūtra saying that the wisdom-light of the Buddha-sun shines upon the icchantika's body to make it grow, this refers to those who possess the gotra. When the *Nirvāṇa Sūtra* speaks of excepting the icchantika, it refers to those without the gotra. Otherwise, why would there be a difference between excepting and not excepting them? It also says: "If one hears this *Mahāparinirvāṇa Sūtra*, even if one has committed the four grave offences and the five heinous sins of immediate retribution, it can still serve as a cause and condition of bodhi. The class of icchantikas is not like this; although they hear and receive this wonderful classic, they cannot produce the cause of the path to bodhi." There are also many similes: just as water does not stay on withered wood or rocky mountains, and just as scorched seeds never sprout even when encountering sweet rain. It also says: "Even if all immeasurable sentient beings simultaneously accomplished anuttarā samyaksaṃbodhi, these Tathāgatas would still not see that icchantika attain bodhi." This is the explicit teaching of the *Nirvāṇa Sūtra*; how could one not believe that there are those who do not become buddhas?

Therefore, one knows that when the sūtras say there are icchantikas called "those without gotra", and yet also say they will attain buddhahood, this refers to those who possess bījas, with "non-existence" spoken with intentional meaning (saṃdhi). The differences, additions, and subtractions among the vehicles differ, as is explained at length elsewhere. I have briefly explained the general outline; the rest should be reasoned and evaluated accordingly.