八識規矩補註 1.30

1.30

Among the eight consciousnesses, only this sixth [consciousness] possesses all [fifty-one] caittas without mutual conflict. Its sarvatraga, viniyata, kuśala, and mūlakleśa [factors], together with the ten great secondary afflictions among the three [types of] upakleśas, have been explained above. Here we explain only the three mūlakleśas—arrogance (māna), doubt (vicikitsā), and wrong view (kudṛṣṭi)—along with the ten minor secondary afflictions and the four aniyata [factors], making seventeen dharmas in all. Arrogance has as its nature relying on oneself to hold oneself haughty toward others, and has as its activity obstructing non-arrogance and producing suffering; for when one is arrogant, one's mind is not humble toward virtue and the virtuous, and from this, saṃsāric transmigration is endless and one undergoes various sufferings. Doubt has as its nature vacillation regarding the truths and principles, and has as its activity obstructing non-doubt and the kuśala dharmas; for when one vacillates, goodness is not produced. Wrong view has as its nature defiled prajñā that inverts inferences regarding the truths and principles, and has as its activity obstructing right view and bringing about suffering; for those with wrong view mostly undergo suffering. In general, there are five such views: the view of identity (satkāyadṛṣṭi), extreme view (antagrāhadṛṣṭi), false view (mithyādṛṣṭi), attachment to views (dṛṣṭiparāmarśa), and attachment to precepts and rituals (śīlavrataparāmarśa). As for wrath (krodha) among the minor secondary afflictions, it has as its nature flaring up in anger against disadvantageous objects present before oneself, and has as its activity obstructing non-wrath and taking up weapons—weapons refers to arms, for those harboring wrath mostly produce violent bodily actions. Resentment (upanāha) has as its nature keeping enmity without letting it go by harboring malice preceded by wrath, and has as its activity obstructing non-resentment and causing vexation; for one who harbors resentment cannot endure and is constantly vexed. Wrath and resentment are both parts of ill will (dveṣa). Concealment (mrakṣa) has as its nature hiding one's own committed transgressions out of fear of losing profit and reputation, and has as its activity obstructing non-concealment and causing remorseful vexation; for one who conceals transgressions must later suffer remorse and lack peace; it belongs to parts of greed (rāga) and delusion (moha). Affliction (pradāsa) has as its nature pursuing and contacting vicious, hostile stubbornness preceded by wrath and resentment, and has as its activity obstructing non-affliction and stinging biting speech; it is also a part of ill will. Jealousy (īrṣyā) has as its nature being unwilling to bear another's prosperity and being envious out of dedication to one's own reputation and profit, and has as its activity obstructing non-jealousy and causing grief; for when a jealous person hears or sees another's prosperity, they deeply harbor grief and lack peace; it is also a part of ill will. Parsimony (mātsarya) has as its nature hoarding stingily through clinging to the Dharma and wealth, unable to give them away, and has as its activity obstructing non-parsimony and accumulating meanly; for a parsimonious person's mind is largely mean and grasping, accumulating wealth and the Dharma without letting go; this belongs to a part of greed. Deceit (māyā) has as its nature fraudulence through pretending to possess virtue in order to obtain profit and reputation, and has as its activity obstructing non-deceit and engaging in wrong livelihood; for a deceitful person harbors ulterior motives and mostly displays untrue matters of wrong livelihood; this belongs to parts of greed and delusion. Flattery (śāṭhya) has as its nature crookedness through fabricating deceptive conduct in order to mislead others, and has as its activity obstructing non-flattery and resisting instruction; for a crooked person bends to the times and contrives skillful means to cater to another's will so as to mislead them, or conceals their own faults and is unreceptive to the correct teachings of teachers and friends; it also belongs to parts of greed and delusion. Harmfulness (vihiṃsā) has as its nature injuring without compassion for sentient beings, and has as its activity obstructing non-harmfulness and tormenting; for one who is harmful torments others; it is subsumed under a part of ill will. Pride (mada) has as its nature infatuated haughtiness through deep defiled attachment to one's own flourishing circumstances, and has as its activity obstructing non-pride and serving as a basis for defilement; for one intoxicated by pride generates and increases all defiled dharmas; this is a part of greed. Non-pride is precisely non-greed. Among the twenty upakleśas, the ten dharmas beginning with wrath, together with forgetfulness (muṣitasmṛti), incorrect comprehension (asaṃprajanya), and heedlessness (pramāda), are distinctive phases of the mūlakleśas, whereas the remaining seven are their outflows. Regarding the four aniyatas, the verse states: 'The aniyatas are remorse and drowsiness, with investigation and scrutiny making two pairs.' These differ from the preceding five categories of caittas, which definitively pervade the eight consciousnesses, three natures, times, or bhūmis; these four dharmas are all indefinite. Therefore, the Yogācārabhūmi further differentiates the five categories by the 'four all-pervasives', stating: 'The sarvatraga factors have all four; the viniyata factors have only the first two; the kuśala factors have only one, namely all bhūmis; the defiled factors lack all four; and the aniyata factors have only one, namely all natures.' Regarding remorse, the prose commentary states: 'Remorse is called kaukṛtya; for bad deed is the cause and remorse is its essence. Since the essence is the cause, the treatise says that remorse is called bad deed, which expresses the relation of cause and effect.' That is, it has as its nature regretting an action that has been done with evil intent, and has as its activity obstructing calming (śamatha). Śamatha is called calming because it can calm and halt the mind. Drowsiness (middha) has as its nature rendering the body unfree and the mind utterly dark, dull, and faint, and has as its activity obstructing discernment (vipaśyanā). Discernment brings the object back to the mind, and its essence is prajñā. If this drowsiness can render the body and mind thus, how could a mind-lacking drowsiness render it so? Does it proceed from a minded drowsiness? In truth, lack of mind is not called drowsiness, for drowsiness is a caitta possessing the function of rendering [the mind so]; since that [mind-lacking state] has no essence, how could it have this function? Hence it is not called drowsiness. Investigation (vitarka) has as its nature coarse operation in seeking, making the mind hurried regarding objects of mental expression; scrutiny (vicāra) means examining, having as its nature subtle operation that makes the mind hurried regarding objects of mental expression. The activity and function of both dharmas are to serve as the basis for the states of ease or unease of body and mind. 'Objects of mental expression' refers to the fact that the objects grasped by the mind mostly rely on names and words; hence they are called objects of mental expression. Both of these share parts of intention (cetanā) and prajñā as their essence: if they cause the mind to be at ease, that is the part of cetanā; if they cause the mind to be uneasy, that is the part of prajñā. This is because cetanā is gradual and subtle, while prajñā is abrupt and coarse. If so, then when causing ease, cetanā is used without prajñā; and when causing unease, prajñā is used without cetanā. Why then is it said that they use both together? Great Master Tongzhao explains this with primary and secondary roles: if cetanā is primarily used, the abrupt prajñā follows cetanā and can cause the mind to be at ease; if prajñā is primarily used, the gradual cetanā follows prajñā and also causes unease. This explanation does not contradict their using both together. This meaning of association has five aspects: time, basis, form, object, and essence. Mind-king and caittas arise at the same time, share the same supporting sense-faculty, have identical forms in their darśanabhāga, share the same perceptual object, and have the same singular essence; therefore they attain association.