華嚴五十要問答 1.84

1.84

三於自宗中隨義分別者，問：何不明不癡善根？答：屬通大地慧數攝故。又問：大煩惱中餘五何不明耶？答：邪解，即通大地中解脫攝也。不正憶，憶攝也。不順知，即慧攝也。失念，念攝也。又相隱故，亂即定攝也。又不稱理，定即名亂相隱也。又十使中五見，則通中慧攝也。癡，入大煩惱中無明攝也。又上所廢者，竝為除惑入道便故也。問：是中善大地是何漏無漏？答：是人無我智漏無漏。問：此諸大地有攝心煩惱及所知障不？答：此諸心數不攝心煩惱。就所知障內有攝不攝，障定者攝世間心煩惱，不攝第二。對彼大小二乘顯其廢立者，問：無慚無愧此中何故從隨煩惱？答：無慚及無愧有其二義，一據體說、二據用論。由用成過大故，依小乘入不善性。若據自體，類與小惑同，故入此大乘隨煩惱攝。問：何故大乘增失念及散亂等，小乘不說？答：小乘初教其心狹劣，相著者明、相隱者不說。問：遍行、別境、大惑、隨煩惱及不定等名，於小乘中何故不說？答：小乘心數，聖者立意為治麁惑，不假細說。今此等名通治細惑，故細分別，與彼入道義相當故。問：小乘大地及諸使等名，於彼大乘何故不說？答：大地等名本成麁相，於大乘中即是初入方便之教。為此義故，於細教中無要不說也。欲知聖意，以四句明之：一體強而用弱，如大煩惱等，此約大乘數之半，即瞋等也。二用強而體弱，如無慚無愧等，此將小乘對大乘說。三體相用俱強，如大煩惱大地等，此約小乘說。四體用俱弱，如隨煩惱等，此約大乘說。於中仍有相續廢興，有親成助成、成過大小、去疑進道有便無便，佛遂廢立不同。大小二宗更互立名，不等非一，可準思攝。問：十種煩惱體用俱強，何故小乘初教不說？答：小乘智淺。如小乘文，不善及煩惱使等，竝約相用強處說。又對指相覆相成教意，如三結三隨轉，宜可思之。又如《瑜伽論》說：如是等輩俱有相應心所有法，是名助伴，同一所緣不同一行相，一時俱有一一而轉，各自種子所生更互相應，有行相、有所緣、有所依。問：如是諸心法，幾依一切處心，生一切地、一切時、一切耶？答：五，謂作意等，思為後邊。幾依一切處心生一切地，非一切時非一切耶？答：亦五，謂欲等，慧為後邊。幾唯依善，非一切處心生、非一切地、非一切時、非一切耶？答：謂信等，不害為後邊。幾唯依染污，非一切處心生、非一切地、非一切時、非一切耶？答：謂貪等，不正知為後邊。幾依一切處心生，非一切地、非一切時、非一切耶？答：謂惡作等，伺為後邊。因此總料簡，其文假實義略有四種：一對性空，餘一切法皆是假有，依無住本立一切法故。二約名言，因緣互為發起，則一切法竝通假實，因緣故實、果起故假。三約三性法相，遍計即空，情謂實有，真實性體故實，理有依他緣發故假。四品類增微善惡違順以明假實，則如此論，心所有法乃至不相應等以明假實，《瑜伽》、《顯揚》等亦然，竝相望顯義，漸次成法。若俗諦相隱及違善而有理用者為假，若相顯彰而有體事用向善者為實有也。何以故？聖者為欲對小機人方便顯法空故。文義云何？八識，約事用處明，故皆是實。五十五法，若依《瑜伽》，二十七法是實有，餘皆假立。二十七者，遍行五。別境五。善中有七，除不放逸捨，是無貪瞋癡及以精進，於此四上假立，故有不害。復於無瞋上假立故。《瑜伽》云「云何諸善法，幾是世俗有？幾是實物有？答：三是世俗有，謂不放逸、捨及不害。所以者何？不放逸捨是無貪無瞋無癡精進分。即是法離染義建立為捨，治雜染義故立不放逸，不害即是無瞋分，無別實物也。」根本煩惱有六，五實一假。論云「根本六煩惱中，幾世俗有？幾實物有？答：一見是世俗有，是慧分故。餘實物有，別心法故。」隨順惱假實者，依《瑜伽論．決擇》中說，不定四亦入隨煩惱，即二十四總名隨煩惱分，亦不說邪欲、邪勝解。依〈本地分〉中有二十六，加邪欲、邪勝解，廣如彼釋。復次此隨煩惱，幾世俗有？幾實物有？謂無慚、無愧、不信、懈怠此四是實，餘是假有。忿、恨、惱、嫉、害，此五是瞋分，皆世俗有。慳、憍、掉舉三是貪分，亦世俗有。覆、誑、諂、惛沈、睡眠、惡作、忘念、散亂、惡慧九法癡分，皆世俗有。放逸是貪瞋癡懈怠分，是世俗有。尋伺二法是發語言心加行分及慧分，故是假有。若依《雜集論》，二十二是實物有，餘為假有。二十二者，遍行五。別境五。善有七是實物有，餘四假有。故下論云「無癡者，謂報教證智，決擇為體。又決擇者，謂慧勇懃俱，故知無癡用慧為性。」不放逸捨竝云依止正懃無貪無瞋癡，是故依此四法假立。不害者是無瞋善根一分，故是假有。根本煩惱有十，五是實有，五是假有，慧分故。隨煩惱及四不定合二十四，皆是假有。故論云「當知忿等是假建立，離瞋等外無別體故。」忿恨惱嫉害此五是瞋一分，同《瑜伽論》。慳、憍、掉舉此三是貪分，與《瑜伽》同。放逸依止懈怠及貪瞋癡四法假立，亦同《瑜伽》。無漸、無愧是貪瞋癡分，不信、懈怠是癡一分，竝是假立，不同《瑜伽》，《瑜伽》此四實物有。誑、諂二法是愚癡一分。散亂一法是貪瞋癡分。忘念、不正知是煩惱相應，定慧為體。覆、睡眠、惛沈、惡作四法是愚癡分。尋、伺二法，或思性或慧性，謂於推度不推度位義別故。前《瑜伽》隨煩惱中九，謂覆、諂、誑、惛沈、睡眠、惡作、忘念、散亂、惡慧，竝是癡分。此論唯覆、惛沈、睡眠、惡作四是愚癡分，餘五不同，謂散亂一法是貪瞋癡分，誑、諂二法是貪癡分，忘念、不正知是煩惱中念。所以有此不同者，當知竝是諸作論者方便交絡顯其異義，隨其增微廢興差別，理不相違。若依《毘曇》纏垢隨煩惱通是貪瞋癡疑五見九使家依，唯除慢使。此中大乘但是貪瞋癡依，非餘使依。所以然者，二宗交絡各顯一義。奘法師云「西方諸師隨煩惱中七實有，無慚、無愧、不信、懈怠四有別體，論有成文。惛沈、掉舉、散亂三法亦有別體，所以得知。」解云：為掉舉是貪分故，仍離貪外別得有體，如貪不與瞋相應。掉舉若爾，則不與一切煩惱相應過。當知惛沈、散亂亦言癡分，故知亦有別體。今準《雜集論》，但隨煩惱中噵是貪瞋癡一分及依止貪瞋癡等，皆是假有；若言是貪瞋癡等者則實有。今此隨煩惱內無慚、無愧、惛沈、掉舉、不信、懈怠、心亂七使是貪瞋癡分，餘之十三或言一分、或言依止此，準之皆是假有。不定四法亦有別體，由不定故。又若有別體，與遍行何別？答：遍行隨起則與行同，不定現前由與事別，此宜思之。又此四法望上不足、望下有餘耳。奘法師云「無癡善根別有體性。」《瑜伽》中善十一內三是假有，捨、不放逸、不害此三假有，餘是實有。又大悲用無癡為性，與二十二根慧根不言相攝，故知別有性。如文中將無癡對三慧釋者，但對三慧等釋顯無癡，非即一體。若準此等義，心所有法中三十實有，餘為假有。三十者，前二十二內加七隨煩惱及無癡也。依起差別、具緣多少、作業種類不同、名別廢興等，竝如《瑜伽》及《成唯識論》釋。亦有智者分判大乘準小乘解釋。大乘文量恐不可極，宜審定。心數微細難可了知，略舉一隅以示後學也。

Third, in distinguishing [mental factors] according to their meaning within one's own school, question: Why is the wholesome root of non-delusion not explicitly explained? Answer: Because it is subsumed under the factor of discernment (prajñā) within the universal mental states (mahābhūmika). Further question: Among the major defilements, why are the remaining five not explicitly explained? Answer: Erroneous resolution is subsumed under liberation within the universal mental states. Incorrect recollection is subsumed under recollection. Non-compliance in understanding is subsumed under discernment. Forgetfulness is subsumed under mindfulness. Furthermore, because its mark is concealed, distraction is subsumed under concentration. Moreover, failing to accord with reason, concentration is called distraction, its mark being concealed. Furthermore, among the ten proclivities, the five views are subsumed under discernment within the universals. Delusion enters into the major defilements, subsumed under ignorance. In addition, those eliminated above were all for the sake of facilitating the eradication of defilements and entry into the Path. Question: Among these, what kind of taintedness or untaintedness are the wholesome universal states? Answer: They are tainted and untainted in terms of the knowledge of the non-self of persons. Question: Do these universal states subsume the mental defilements and the cognitive hindrance? Answer: These mental factors do not subsume the mental defilements. Within the cognitive hindrance, some subsume it and some do not: those that hinder concentration subsume the worldly mental defilements, but do not subsume the second [aspect]. Setting [this] against both Hīnayāna and Mahāyāna to clarify what is eliminated and what is established, question: Why do shamelessness and unconscionableness follow the secondary defilements here? Answer: Shamelessness and unconscionableness have two aspects: first, spoken of in terms of essence; second, discussed in terms of function. Because their faults in function are great, they are classified as unwholesome in nature according to Hīnayāna. If considered in terms of their own essence, their category is identical to minor afflictions; hence they enter into and are subsumed under the secondary defilements of Mahāyāna. Question: Why does Mahāyāna add forgetfulness, distraction, and so forth, while Hīnayāna does not speak of them? Answer: The initial teaching of Hīnayāna has a narrow and inferior mind: what has obvious marks is explained, while what has concealed marks is not spoken of. Question: Why are designations such as omnipresent, specific-object, major affliction, secondary defilement, and indeterminate not spoken of in Hīnayāna? Answer: Regarding the mental factors of Hīnayāna, the Noble One's intention in establishing them was to remedy coarse defilements, not requiring subtle exposition. Now these designations universally remedy subtle defilements, and therefore they are distinguished in detail, corresponding properly to the meaning of entering the Path. Question: Why are names such as the Hīnayāna universal states and the various proclivities not spoken of in Mahāyāna? Answer: Names such as the universal states originally establish coarse characteristics; within Mahāyāna, they are merely the teaching of the initial expedient entry. For this reason, in the subtle teaching they are not necessary and thus not spoken of. If one wishes to know the intention of the Noble One, it is clarified through four propositions: 1. The essence is strong while the function is weak, like the major defilements and so forth; this is spoken of according to half of the Mahāyāna mental factors, namely anger and so forth. 2. The function is strong while the essence is weak, like shamelessness, unconscionableness, and so forth; this speaks of Hīnayāna in contrast to Mahāyāna. 3. Essence, mark, and function are all strong, like the major defilement universal states and so forth; this is spoken of in terms of Hīnayāna. 4. Essence and function are both weak, like the secondary defilements and so forth; this is spoken of in terms of Mahāyāna. Herein, there are still eliminations and adoptions across continuous sequences, direct generation and auxiliary generation, the relative magnitude of the fault produced, and the convenience or lack thereof in removing doubts and advancing on the Path; thus the Buddha differed in what he eliminated and established. The two schools of Mahāyāna and Hīnayāna alternately established terms, which are neither equal nor single, as can be gathered by deduction. Question: The ten defilements have both strong essence and strong function; why does the initial teaching of Hīnayāna not speak of them? Answer: The wisdom of Hīnayāna is shallow. As in the Hīnayāna texts, the unwholesome, defilements, proclivities, and so forth are all spoken of in terms of the places where marks and functions are strong. Furthermore, regarding the teaching intention of pointing out obvious marks versus hidden marks—like the three fetters and their three secondary attendants—this should be reflected upon. Furthermore, as the Yogācārabhūmi says: These kinds of associated mental factors that arise together are called companions; sharing a single objective support, they do not share a single cognitive mode; arising simultaneously together, they evolve one by one; produced from their respective seeds, they mutually associate, having cognitive modes, objective supports, and bases. Question: Among such mental factors, how many arise based on the mind in all places, in all grounds, at all times, and universally? Answer: Five, namely attention and so forth, ending with volition. How many arise based on the mind in all places and in all grounds, but not at all times and not universally? Answer: Also five, namely desire and so forth, ending with discernment. How many arise only based on the wholesome, not based on the mind in all places, not in all grounds, not at all times, and not universally? Answer: Namely faith and so forth, ending with non-harming. How many arise only based on the defiled, not based on the mind in all places, not in all grounds, not at all times, and not universally? Answer: Namely greed and so forth, ending with incorrect knowing. How many arise based on the mind in all places, but not in all grounds, not at all times, and not universally? Answer: Namely regret and so forth, ending with investigation. Consequently, summarizing and examining the matter, the meaning of nominal versus real in its texts has roughly four kinds: 1. In contrast to emptiness of nature, all other phenomena are nominally existent, because all phenomena are established based on the root of non-abiding. 2. In terms of nominal designation, causes and conditions mutually give rise to each other; thus all phenomena are both nominal and real: real because of causes and conditions, and nominal because results arise. 3. In terms of the characteristics of the three natures, the imaginary is empty, being emotionally conceptualized as really existent; the consummate nature is real because of its essence; and the dependent nature is nominal because it is generated through conditions within principle. 4. Clarifying nominal and real through the grades of increase and decrease, wholesome and unwholesome, contrary and accordant: this treatise clarifies nominal and real from mental factors down to the unassociated formations; the Yogācārabhūmi, the Prakaraṇāryavācā, and so forth are also like this, all demonstrating the meaning in mutual reference and progressively establishing the teachings. If, in conventional truth, its marks are concealed and it has principle-function contrary to the wholesome, it is nominal; if its marks are manifest and prominent, having an essential entity and functioning toward the wholesome, it is really existent. Why is this? Because the Noble One wished to expediently reveal the emptiness of phenomena for those of inferior capacity. What are the textual meanings? The eight consciousnesses are explained in terms of actual function, and so are all real. Among the fifty-five factors, if according to the Yogācārabhūmi, twenty-seven factors are really existent, and the rest are all nominally established. The twenty-seven are: the five omnipresent; the five specific-object; within the wholesome there are seven, excluding non-negligence and equanimity, which are nominally established upon non-greed, non-anger, non-delusion, and vigor, and because of this non-harming is also nominally established upon non-anger. The Yogācārabhūmi states: 'How many among the wholesome factors are conventionally existent? How many are substantial entities? Answer: Three are conventionally existent, namely non-negligence, equanimity, and non-harming. Why is this? Non-negligence and equanimity are portions of non-greed, non-anger, non-delusion, and vigor. Establishing the meaning of detachment from defilement in phenomena is equanimity; establishing the meaning of remedying mixed defilement is non-negligence; non-harming is simply a portion of non-anger, having no separate substantial entity.' The root defilements are six, five real and one nominal. The treatise states: 'Among the six root defilements, how many are conventionally existent? How many are substantial entities? Answer: One, view, is conventionally existent, being a portion of discernment. The rest are substantial entities, being separate mental factors.' As for the nominal and real among secondary defilements, according to what is said in the *Viniścayasaṃgrahaṇī* of the Yogācārabhūmi, the four indeterminates also enter the secondary defilements, totaling twenty-four called the secondary defilement category, which also does not mention improper desire and improper resolve. According to the *Maulī Bhūmiḥ*, there are twenty-six, adding improper desire and improper resolve, as explained at length therein. Furthermore, among these secondary defilements, how many are conventionally existent? How many are substantial entities? Namely shamelessness, unconscionableness, non-faith, and indolence—these four are real, while the rest are nominally existent. Wrath, resentment, affliction, jealousy, and cruelty—these five are portions of anger, all conventionally existent. Avarice, arrogance, and restlessness—these three are portions of greed, also conventionally existent. Concealment, deceit, flattery, torpor, sleep, regret, forgetfulness, distraction, and bad discernment—these nine phenomena are portions of delusion, all conventionally existent. Negligence is a portion of greed, anger, delusion, and indolence, and is conventionally existent. Initial application and sustained application—these two phenomena are portions of the mind's preparatory efforts to produce speech, as well as portions of discernment, and therefore are nominally existent. If according to the Abhidharmasamuccaya-vyākhyā, twenty-two are substantial entities, and the rest are nominally existent. The twenty-two are: the five omnipresent; the five specific-object; within the wholesome, seven are substantial entities and the other four are nominally existent. Hence the lower text of the treatise states: 'Non-delusion refers to the knowledge from retribution, teaching, and realization, having decisive judgment as its essence. Furthermore, decisive judgment means being accompanied by discernment and courageous diligence; thus we know non-delusion takes discernment as its nature.' Non-negligence and equanimity are both said to rely upon correct diligence, non-greed, non-anger, and non-delusion; therefore they are nominally established based on these four phenomena. Non-harming is a portion of the wholesome root of non-anger, and is therefore nominally existent. The root defilements are ten: five are really existent, and five are nominally existent, being portions of discernment. The secondary defilements and the four indeterminates combine to make twenty-four, all of which are nominally existent. Hence the treatise states: 'It should be known that wrath and the others are nominally established, having no separate entity apart from anger and so forth.' Wrath, resentment, affliction, jealousy, and cruelty—these five are a portion of anger, the same as in the Yogācārabhūmi. Avarice, arrogance, and restlessness—these three are portions of greed, the same as the Yogācārabhūmi. Negligence is nominally established relying on the four phenomena of indolence, greed, anger, and delusion, also the same as the Yogācārabhūmi. Shamelessness and unconscionableness are portions of greed, anger, and delusion; non-faith and indolence are a portion of delusion; all are nominally established, differing from the Yogācārabhūmi, which regards these four as substantial entities. Deceit and flattery are a portion of delusion. Distraction is a portion of greed, anger, and delusion. Forgetfulness and incorrect knowing are associated with defilement, having concentration and discernment as their essence. Concealment, sleep, torpor, and regret—these four phenomena are portions of delusion. Initial application and sustained application are either of the nature of volition or of discernment, differing in meaning according to whether one is in the state of investigation or non-investigation. Previously, in the Yogācārabhūmi, nine among the secondary defilements—namely concealment, flattery, deceit, torpor, sleep, regret, forgetfulness, distraction, and bad discernment—were all portions of delusion. This treatise has only four—concealment, torpor, sleep, and regret—as portions of delusion, while the other five differ: distraction is a portion of greed, anger, and delusion; deceit and flattery are portions of greed and delusion; forgetfulness and incorrect knowing are mindfulness within defilements. The reason there are these differences is that one should know these are all the expedients of the treatise masters interweaving to reveal different meanings; conforming to the distinctions of their increase, decrease, elimination, and adoption, in principle they do not conflict. If according to the Abhidharma, the fetters, entanglements, and secondary defilements are universally the bases of the nine proclivities—greed, anger, delusion, doubt, and the five views—excluding only the proclivity of pride. Here in Mahāyāna, they are bases only of greed, anger, and delusion, not of the other proclivities. Why is this so? The two schools interweave, each revealing one meaning. Master Xuanzang said: 'Among the Western masters, seven of the secondary defilements are really existent: shamelessness, unconscionableness, non-faith, and indolence have distinct entities, as supported by explicit textual evidence in treatises. The three phenomena of torpor, restlessness, and distraction also have distinct entities; how is this known?' The explanation says: 'Because restlessness is a portion of greed, it still obtains an entity distinct from greed, just as greed is not associated with anger. If restlessness were like that, it would incur the fault of not being associated with all defilements. It should be known that torpor and distraction are also said to be portions of delusion, and thus one knows they also have distinct entities.' Now, in accordance with the Abhidharmasamuccaya-vyākhyā, whenever secondary defilements are said to be 'a portion of greed, anger, or delusion' or 'relying upon greed, anger, delusion, etc.', they are all nominally existent; if they are said to be 'greed, anger, delusion, etc.', then they are really existent. Now, within these secondary defilements, the seven proclivities of shamelessness, unconscionableness, torpor, restlessness, non-faith, indolence, and mental distraction are portions of greed, anger, and delusion; the other thirteen are either said to be 'a portion' or said to 'rely upon this'—deducing from this, they are all nominally existent. The four indeterminate phenomena also have distinct entities, because they are indeterminate. Furthermore, if they have distinct entities, how do they differ from the omnipresent factors? Answer: The omnipresent, as soon as they arise, are identical with the mental activity, whereas the indeterminate become manifest through being distinct from the affair; this should be reflected upon. Furthermore, these four phenomena are insufficient when compared to those above, but more than sufficient when compared to those below. Master Xuanzang said: 'The wholesome root of non-delusion has a separate essential nature.' In the Yogācārabhūmi, among the eleven wholesome factors, three are nominally existent: equanimity, non-negligence, and non-harming—these three are nominally existent, and the rest are really existent. Furthermore, great compassion takes non-delusion as its nature, and it is not said to be subsumed under the discernment faculty among the twenty-two faculties; therefore we know it has a distinct nature. As for the textual passages explaining non-delusion in contrast to the three wisdoms, they merely explain it against the three wisdoms to reveal non-delusion, not that they are of one identical entity. If based on these meanings, thirty among the mental factors are really existent, and the rest are nominally existent. The thirty are: within the former twenty-two, adding the seven secondary defilements and non-delusion. The distinctions of arising, the number of conditions possessed, the differences in types of karmic action, and the specific names, eliminations, and adoptions are all explained as in the Yogācārabhūmi and the Vijñaptimātratāsiddhi-śāstra. There are also wise masters who demarcate Mahāyāna according to Hīnayāna explanations. The volume of Mahāyāna texts is perhaps boundless; one should examine and determine them carefully. Mental factors are subtle and difficult to comprehend; I have briefly raised one corner to instruct later students.