華嚴經內章門等雜孔目章 4.37

4.37

夫自是非彼、美己惡人，物莫不然。以皆然故，舉世紛紜，無自正者也。斯由未達是非之患。云其患者，乃有十種不可：一是非無適主、二自性不定、三彼我俱有、四更互因生、五互不相及、六隱顯有無、七性自相違、八執者情偏、九是非差別、十無是無非。初明無適主者，此云我是、彼云我是，彼此競取，乃令是無定從；彼復云此非、此復云彼非，彼此競興，遂使非無適趣。惑者必欲以是歸自、以非屬彼者，此有何理而可然也？理不然故，強為之者莫不致敗耳。物豈知其然哉？二自性不定者，是性是於是，或復是於非；非性非於非，亦或非於是。然愚者竊竊，唯言是是、不許是非，亦許非非、不論非是，自謂得理，不患其失。且共論之。若以是是於是，即有二是過：一所是過、二能是過。所是過者，所是若是，是已是，何用是？所是若非是，應言是非是，云何言是是？能是過者，待所故說能，所是既不立，能是亦不成。能所俱不成故，何處當有是也。若復非於非，其過亦如此。例是取悟，勿更分別。理盡於此，是以不可也。三彼我俱有者，此是而非彼、彼是而非此。此之與彼，各有一是一非。惑者唯自謂有是、不言有非，謂彼唯非、不許有是。斯有何理而可然乎？四更互因生者，非因自是心生，是因非他心起。以從自是心生故，此即自是者非、非他非也。是復從非他心生故，此乃他非者是、非我是也。然惑者偏欲取是自歸、以非許人。無如此理，故不可也。五互不相及者，凡是自非他者，本欲望非至彼，然彼猶自謂為是；以猶自謂為是，故即驗非不至彼。非他自是者，亦希是至此，然猶為彼所非；以彼非故，即明是不至此。是不至此，而言我是；非不至彼，復謂他非。理窮於此，故不然也。六隱顯有無者，尋夫物情惑也，莫不同於自是、均於詳非。均詳非故，舉世無是，我當云何獨有是也。同於自是，則天下無非。以無非故，我何所非？然惑者謂有是可是、有非可非。義乃不然，故不可也。七性自相違者，是則性自違非、非乃性自害是，以我獨欲立是定非，是既立已，必為多非非一是。是多非非故，一是那可是？以是不可是故，則非何所非？無所非故，非則自非矣。自非則無非，非是則無是。惑者礭欲以是定非、用非非是者，未足然也。八執情偏者，夫物之偏也，皆不見彼之所見，唯自知其所知。以自知其所知故，因即以為是；不見彼之所見故，謂彼唯非。若乃見彼所見，謂之非者，或容可爾。既不見彼所見，而言彼非者，彼何必非也。若復自知其所知，因以自是者，此則是已私是，若為使他亦謂之是也。以此過故，無理可然。九是非差別者，然滯俗之輩，以是為是、以非為非，此乃麁免以是為非、以非為是者顛倒失也。然物外高趣，以是非為非、用無是非為是，此亦免於是非之一失，猶自存於一是一非。是非雖同，理趣胡越。而惑者聞是則謂凡聖同是、聞非復謂賢愚共非。失理致此，未足然也。十無是無非者，若夫以是非為非、無是非為是者，彼且惡於是非，猶不免是非累也。而欲惡於其累，別更有所存者，然其所上已存於心，亦未免於累也。將欲不累，莫若無心。以無心故，誰謂為是非？是非亡矣，彼我隨喪。彼我喪故，得失亦無也。不然於然、不可於可，爾乃任放無為、逍遙累外耳。此又順性起，故錄附之。

Now, asserting oneself to be right and the other to be wrong, praising oneself and condemning others—among living things there are none not like this. Because all are like this, the whole world is in turmoil, and none can correct themselves. This stems from failing to comprehend the faults of right and wrong. As for these faults, there are ten kinds of unacceptability: first, right and wrong have no definite master; second, their self-nature is indefinite; third, both self and other possess both; fourth, they arise mutually dependent on each other; fifth, they do not reach each other; sixth, they conceal or reveal presence and absence; seventh, their natures are mutually contradictory; eighth, the grasping mind is biased; ninth, the distinctions of right and wrong; tenth, neither right nor wrong. First, explaining that they have no definite master: this one says 'I am right,' and that one says 'I am right'; both contend to seize it, and thus make 'right' have nothing definite to follow. That one further says 'this is wrong,' and this one further says 'that is wrong'; both contend to raise it, and thus cause 'wrong' to have no definite locus. For the deluded to insist on taking 'right' as belonging to oneself and assigning 'wrong' to the other—what principle is there by which this could be so? Since in principle it cannot be so, among those who force it there are none who do not meet with defeat. How could living things know why this is so? Second, that their self-nature is indefinite: the nature of 'right' may be right toward right, or again it may be right toward wrong; the nature of 'wrong' may be wrong toward wrong, or also wrong toward right. Yet the foolish whisper together, only saying that right is right without admitting that right is wrong, and admitting that wrong is wrong without discussing whether wrong is right; they consider themselves to have attained the principle, never worrying about their error. Let us discuss it together. If one takes right as being right toward right, there are two faults: first, the fault of the object of right; second, the fault of the agent of right. As for the fault of the object of right: if the object of right is right, since it is already right, what need is there to make it right? If the object of right is not right, one should say that right is not right; why say that right is right? As for the fault of the agent of right: 'agent' is spoken of in dependence on the object; since the object of right is not established, the agent of right is also not achieved. Since neither agent nor object is achieved, where could there be 'right'? If one further takes wrong as wrong toward wrong, its fault is also like this. Realize [it] by analogy with this; do not make further conceptual distinctions. The principle is exhausted in this, and therefore it is inadmissible. Third, that both self and other possess both: this is right and not that; that is right and not this. This and that each have one right and one wrong. The deluded only say of themselves that they have right and do not say they have wrong, and say that the other only has wrong without allowing them to have right. What principle is there by which this could be so? Fourth, that they arise mutually dependent on each other: 'wrong' is born dependent on the mind that considers itself right; 'right' arises dependent on the mind that considers the other wrong. Because it is born from the mind that considers itself right, this is the 'wrong' of the self-righteous, not the other's wrong. Because 'right' is further born from the mind that considers the other wrong, this is the 'right' of the one who makes the other wrong, not my right. Yet the deluded biasedly desire to take 'right' to belong to themselves and assign 'wrong' to others. There is no such principle, and therefore it is inadmissible. Fifth, that they do not reach each other: whoever is right in oneself and wrongs the other originally wishes for 'wrong' to reach that other, yet that other still considers himself to be right; because he still considers himself to be right, this verifies that 'wrong' does not reach that other. One who wrongs the other and is right in oneself also hopes that 'right' reaches this [self], yet one is still wronged by that other; because one is wronged by that other, this clarifies that 'right' does not reach this [self]. 'Right' does not reach this [self], and yet one says 'I am right'; 'wrong' does not reach that other, and yet one says 'the other is wrong.' Principle is exhausted in this, and therefore it is not so. Sixth, concealing or revealing presence and absence: examining the delusions of worldly sentiment, none are not identical in considering themselves right and equal in scrutinizing others as wrong. Because they equally scrutinize others as wrong, the entire world is without right; how could I alone have right? If they are identical in considering themselves right, then all under heaven is without wrong. Since there is no wrong, what could I consider wrong? Yet the deluded say there is a right that can be right and a wrong that can be wrong. The meaning is not so, and therefore it is inadmissible. Seventh, that their natures are mutually contradictory: 'right' by nature contradicts wrong; 'wrong' by nature harms right. When I alone desire to establish 'right' and determine 'wrong', once this 'right' is established, it will inevitably be negated as wrong by many 'wrongs' against this one 'right'. Since this one 'right' is negated by many 'wrongs', how can this one 'right' be right? Because 'right' cannot be right, then what is there for 'wrong' to make wrong? Since there is nothing to make wrong, 'wrong' then of itself is wrong. If it of itself is wrong, then there is no wrong; if 'wrong' negates 'right', then there is no right. For the deluded to obstinately desire to use right to determine wrong and use wrong to negate right is not sufficient to be so. Eighth, that the grasping mind is biased: the bias of living beings is that they all fail to see what the other sees, and only know what they themselves know. Because they only know what they themselves know, they consequently take it to be right; because they do not see what the other sees, they say the other is only wrong. If they saw what the other saw and called it wrong, that might perhaps be permissible. But since they do not see what the other sees, to say that the other is wrong—why must the other be wrong? If, further, one only knows what one knows and consequently considers oneself right, this is only one's private right; how could one cause others to also call it right? Due to this fault, there is no principle by which it could be so. Ninth, the distinctions of right and wrong: those who are bogged down in the worldly take right as right and wrong as wrong; this merely avoids the upside-down error of taking right as wrong and wrong as right. However, the lofty purports beyond worldly things take right and wrong as wrong and use the absence of right and wrong as right; this also avoids the single error of right and wrong, yet still preserves one right and one wrong. Although right and wrong are alike [in words], their purports are as far apart as the northern Hu and the southern Yue. Yet when the deluded hear 'right', they say ordinary beings and noble ones are identically right; when they hear 'wrong', they further say the worthy and the foolish are jointly wrong. To lose principle to this extent is not sufficient to be so. Tenth, neither right nor wrong: if one takes right and wrong as wrong and the absence of right and wrong as right, one merely detests right and wrong and still does not escape the burden of right and wrong. And if one desires to detest its burden and preserve something else apart from it, what one esteems is already preserved in the mind, and one has still not escaped the burden. If one wishes not to be burdened, nothing is better than having no mind. Because there is no mind, who could speak of right and wrong? When right and wrong have vanished, 'that' and 'I' are obliterated accordingly. Because 'that' and 'I' are obliterated, gain and loss also do not exist. Not asserting as so what is so, not approving as admissible what is admissible—then one naturally acts with unforced non-action, wandering free and unfettered beyond all burdens. This also accords with the arising of nature; therefore, it is recorded and appended here.