華嚴經內章門等雜孔目章 1.54

1.54

Eighth, taking the internal as the basis of the external to prove consciousness-only: how is this known? Because everything is consciousness, it is the basis. External phenomena are established relying on consciousness; lacking an essence, they are empty. One should know that what is within consciousness is the basis of phenomena; the mistaken establishment of other phenomena cannot be relied upon. Ninth, the completion of the results of the three wisdoms: the dharmas of hearing, contemplation, and cultivation from subtle to gross are all accomplished by the fundamental consciousness, the tathāgatagarbha. How is this known? Because the perfuming of hearing flows from true suchness, one should know that true suchness is the basis of the three wisdoms; receiving perfuming it forms seeds, progressively gaining superiority, whereas other phenomena lack this. Question: If so, since true suchness possesses virtues that merely flow out of itself, why does it need to rely further on perfuming? Answer: True suchness truly does not preserve its own nature, but arises only by waiting upon conditions; therefore, we speak of perfuming. Tenth, in terms of experiential enjoyment: conditioned arising and consciousness rely mutually upon one another, becoming causes and effects for each other before experiential enjoyment can be attained, clarifying consciousness-only. If the ālaya did not gather experiential enjoyment, conditioned arising would not accomplish experiential enjoyment. Therefore, the treatise says: 'All dharmas are stored in consciousness, / And consciousness in dharmas likewise. / These two mutually serve as causes, / And also constantly as effects for each other.' This verse is spoken regarding the experiential enjoyment of manifest consciousness. As for the meaning of this experiential enjoyment, the treatise says: 'One is called the consciousness of conditions, / The second is called the consciousness of experience. / Discerning experience is called discrimination, / Giving rise to mental factors such as volition.' This experiential enjoyment generally accomplishes seeds and manifest consciousness; both the generating and the leading are established and realized without falsehood, as extensively stated in the treatise. Seventh, regarding whether causes and conditions are complete or incomplete: the ālayavijñāna is generated solely by mutual causation, and there is no other cause. Other phenomena are not like this: the twelvefold conditioned arising is merely the generation of experiential enjoyment through the decisive condition. Conditioned arising has three conditioned arisings, namely the decisive condition, the objective-condition, and the immediate condition. Why is it like this? Answer: The twelvefold conditioned arising and the like are conventional characteristics, spoken in accordance with phenomena. Conditions are not like the ālaya; its rational nature does not rely on phenomenal expressions, but speaks of mutual cause and effect solely in terms of the initial portal of arousal, and the rest can be deduced accordingly. Furthermore, in terms of the esoteric [meaning], all four conditions are possessed. Eighth, reconciling designations to return to the correct to clarify that the ālaya exists: the Liang translation of the treatise says: 'Furthermore, persons within the correct Dharma, although they aspire to and delight in non-self and oppose the view of selfhood, still have self-love regarding the ālayavijñāna.' Explanation: The previous 'furthermore' referred to persons outside the Buddha-Dharma; this 'furthermore' refers to persons within the Buddha-Dharma, who themselves have three grades: first, those in correct contemplation; second, those in correct cultivation; third, those who are learners. Among these three grades of persons, two subdue the view of self, and one eliminates the view of self. Why is this? The former two know non-self by inference, and the latter one knows non-self by realization; hence it is said that they 'oppose the view of selfhood.' Because self-love has been habitually practiced for a long time in the ālayavijñāna, even though they oppose the view of selfhood, self-love still constantly accompanies them in the fundamental consciousness; therefore, the view of selfhood is not the object of emotional attachment. If one takes the designation of ālaya as meaning ālaya, it is supreme. Now in terms of this meaning, the designation of ālaya applies only to the fundamental consciousness, and its meaning is supreme; if it designates the locus of the two views of self—in persons and in dharmas—then it is not supreme. The meaning of ālaya should be understood according to this.