華嚴經明法品內立三寶章 2.52

2.52

第二、就法說者，巾喻真如如來藏，兔喻眾生生死等，非一非異亦有十門，准喻思之，可知。又兔即生即死而無礙，巾即隱即顯而無礙，此生死隱顯逆順交絡，諸門鎔融，並准前思攝可解。二、顯義者，有四門：一開合、二一異、三相是、四相在。初開合者，先開、後合。開者，俗諦緣起中有四義：一諸緣有力義、二無力義、三無自性義、四事成義；真諦中亦有四義：一空義、二不空義、三依持義、四盡事義。合者三門：一合俗、二合真、三合二。初者，有三：一約用，謂有力無力無二故；二約體，謂性無性無二故；三無礙，謂體用無二，唯一俗諦。合真者，亦三：一約用，謂依持成俗即是奪俗，全盡無二故；二約體，空不空無二故；三無礙，謂體用無二故。三、合二者，有四門：一約起用門，謂真中依持義與俗中有力義無二故；二約泯相門，謂真中盡俗與俗中無力無二故；三約顯實門，謂真中不空義與俗中無性義無二故；四成事門，謂真中空義與俗中存事義無二故。開合門竟。理事即不即門者，此中理事相即不相即、無礙融通各有四句：初不即中四句者，一二事不相即，以緣相事礙故；二二事之理不相即，以無二故；三理事不相即，以理靜非動故；四事理不相即，以事動非靜故。二相即中四句者，一事即理，以緣起無性故；二理即事，以理隨緣事得立故；三二事之理相即，以約詮會實故；四二事相即，以即理之事無別事。是故事如理而無礙。

Second, speaking in terms of Dharma: the kerchief is a metaphor for tathatā and the tathāgatagarbha; the rabbit is a metaphor for the saṃsāra of sentient beings, and so forth. Neither one nor different also has ten gates, which can be understood by contemplating them in accordance with the metaphor. Furthermore, the rabbit is immediately born and immediately dies without obstruction; the kerchief is immediately hidden and immediately apparent without obstruction. The alternating interweaving of saṃsāra and hiding/manifestation, contrary and conforming, and the fusing of the various gates, can all be understood by contemplating and subsuming them according to the preceding [explanation]. Second, the clarification of meanings has four gates: (1) unfolding and combining, (2) oneness and difference, (3) mutual identity, and (4) mutual presence. First, unfolding and combining consists of first unfolding and then combining. As for unfolding, in the conventional truth of dependent origination there are four meanings: (1) the meaning that the various conditions have efficacy, (2) the meaning of being without efficacy, (3) the meaning of being without self-nature, and (4) the meaning of phenomena being accomplished; within ultimate truth there are also four meanings: (1) the meaning of emptiness, (2) the meaning of non-emptiness, (3) the meaning of supporting, and (4) the meaning of completely exhausting phenomena. As for combining, there are three gates: (1) combining the conventional, (2) combining the ultimate, and (3) combining the two. As for the first, there are three [aspects]: first, in terms of function, meaning that having efficacy and lacking efficacy are non-dual; second, in terms of essence, meaning that having nature and lacking nature are non-dual; third, unobstructedness, meaning that essence and function are non-dual, being solely the single conventional truth. Combining the ultimate also has three [aspects]: first, in terms of function, meaning that supporting to accomplish the conventional is itself the subversion of the conventional, being completely exhausted and non-dual; second, in terms of essence, emptiness and non-emptiness are non-dual; third, unobstructedness, meaning that essence and function are non-dual. Third, combining the two has four gates: (1) in terms of giving rise to function, meaning that the supporting meaning in the ultimate is non-dual with the efficacious meaning in the conventional; (2) in terms of obliterating characteristics, meaning that the exhaustion of the conventional in the ultimate is non-dual with the lack of efficacy in the conventional; (3) in terms of revealing reality, meaning that the non-empty meaning in the ultimate is non-dual with the natureless meaning in the conventional; (4) in terms of accomplishing phenomena, meaning that the empty meaning in the ultimate is non-dual with the preserving of phenomena in the conventional. The gate of unfolding and combining is concluded. As for the gate of whether principle and phenomena are identical or not identical: herein, the mutual identity and non-identity of principle and phenomena, and their unobstructed fusion, each have four propositions. First, among the four propositions of non-identity: (1) two phenomena are not mutually identical, because the conditioned characteristics of phenomena obstruct each other; (2) the principle of two phenomena is not mutually identical, because there are not two; (3) principle and phenomena are not mutually identical, because principle is quiescent and not active; (4) phenomena and principle are not mutually identical, because phenomena are active and not quiescent. Second, among the four propositions of mutual identity: (1) phenomena are identical with principle, because dependent origination is devoid of self-nature; (2) principle is identical with phenomena, because principle follows conditions so that phenomena come to be established; (3) the principles of two phenomena are mutually identical, because converging in reality is through conventional designation; (4) two phenomena are mutually identical, because phenomena that are identical with principle have no distinct phenomena. Therefore, phenomena are like principle and are unobstructed.