註華嚴法界觀門 1.44

1.44

真也。釋下句。然前云色舉體是真空，此云青黃無體莫不皆空者，雖云青黃，即兼長短等，必依質礙有青黃等故。空有三義以破於色：一無邊際義，謂空若有邊，則有色法在空界外。空既無有際畔，則占盡十方邊量、無有其外，更於何處而有色等法耶？二無壞義，諸惑者云：空雖無外，何妨色等秖在空界之中？故以無壞義破之。謂若有物入於空中，則隨此物大小分量穿破於空以容其物，如橛入地中、釘錐之類入於木中，皆隨橛等大小分量穿於地等。若地等不破，則不容橛等而入。救曰：如水不可穿破，而容物入水中。何妨虛空亦爾？破曰：水雖不破，然物入時，隨物大小分量排之以容其物。以水性至柔，不妨流動移轉故。虛空豈同此水被排之動轉耶？三無雜義，謂惑者又云：空界無外、空體無壞，不妨萬物皆在空中，以空是虛通無罣礙故，能含容故。破曰：若物在空中，空又不壞不轉，其物與空應相混雜。如一團堅密之物方亭一尺，此方尺分量之空既不壞不轉，元在本方一尺分量之處則與此方尺之物豈非雜耶？若言不雜，則須一去一存。若言俱存又不雜者，則一尺之分各占五寸之地。如此轉不相應也。若言俱存俱遍一尺之分，理亦不然。何者？以空與色有二相違，不應全體同遍當處。何者二違？一空是無物，色是有物；二空是虛通，色是質礙。不可方尺分中，言全是無物，復言全是有物。又不可言全是虛通，復言全是質礙。豈有此理耶？故上云青黃之相非是真空之理，此云青黃莫不皆空也。是知虛空既無邊無壞無雜，則空中必定無有色，故云即空也。

This is the true [emptiness]. It explains the second clause. Now, previously it was said that the entire substance of rūpa is true emptiness, whereas here it is said that blue and yellow are devoid of substance and none of them is not empty: although blue and yellow are mentioned, they include long and short and so forth, because blue and yellow and the like necessarily depend on physical obstruction. Emptiness has three meanings with which to refute rūpa: First is the meaning of being without boundary. If space had a boundary, then there would be rūpa-dharmas outside the realm of space. Since space has no boundary, it occupies all the measures and edges of the ten directions without any exterior; where else could there be dharmas such as rūpa? Second is the meaning of being indestructible. Deluded people say: Although space has no exterior, what prevents rūpa and so forth from simply existing within the realm of space? Hence it is refuted by the meaning of being indestructible. If an object enters into space, then according to the size and measure of this object, it would pierce and rupture space in order to accommodate that object, just as a stake entering into the ground, or an awl or nail entering into wood, each pierces the ground and so forth according to the size and measure of the stake and the like. If the ground and so forth were not ruptured, they would not allow the stake and so forth to enter. They rescue their position by saying: Water cannot be pierced or ruptured, yet it accommodates objects entering into the water. What prevents space from being likewise? The refutation says: Although water is not ruptured, when an object enters, [the water] is displaced according to the size and measure of the object so as to accommodate that object. Because the nature of water is extremely soft, it does not prevent flowing and shifting. Could space be like this water, displaced and set into motion? Third is the meaning of being without mixture. Deluded people say again: The realm of space has no exterior, and the substance of space is indestructible; what prevents the ten thousand things from all being in space, since space is unobstructed openness and can contain them? The refutation says: If an object is in space, and space is neither destroyed nor shifted, the object and space should be mixed together. Take a solid, dense object measuring exactly one cubic foot: since space of the measure of one cubic foot is neither destroyed nor shifted and originally remains in the very place measuring one cubic foot, how could it not be mixed with this one-cubic-foot object? If you say they are not mixed, then one must depart and one must remain. If you say both remain and yet are not mixed, then each occupies five inches of the one-foot space. In this way, it is increasingly untenable. If you say both remain and both pervade the measure of the one foot, the principle is also not so. Why? Because space and rūpa have two mutual contradictions, so their entire substances cannot simultaneously pervade that very place. What are the two contradictions? First, space is non-existence of objects, whereas rūpa is existence of objects. Second, space is unobstructed openness, whereas rūpa is physical obstruction. Within the space of one square foot, one cannot say it is entirely devoid of objects and also say it is entirely existent with objects; nor can one say it is entirely unobstructed openness and also say it is entirely physical obstruction. How could there be such a principle? Therefore, above it says that the characteristics of blue and yellow are not the principle of true emptiness, and here it says that blue and yellow are none of them not empty. From this it is known that since space is without boundary, indestructible, and unmixed, within space there is certainly no rūpa; hence it is said to be identical to śūnyatā.