量處輕重儀 2.30

2.30

First, saṅgha property of the permanent locally restricted category refers to property that, by delimitation of boundary, does not extend to other monasteries and perpetually provides for a distinct dwelling; hence it is called so. What is the nature of these items? That is to say, fields, orchards, rooms and buildings, mountains and forests, ponds and marshes, human servants, livestock, and so forth. If one steals or damages these items, the offenses fall into two tiers: if there is an overseer, the offense is reckoned with respect to the custodian (that is, the administrator); if there is no guardian, it is reckoned comprehensively with respect to the saṅgha—if [the value] reaches five [māṣas], all are expelled, and if it does not reach that, it must be dealt with by the community. Some say that those who steal saṅgha property incur only a sthūlātyaya, because its substance pervades the saṅgha of the four directions and thus the money [stolen from any single monk] does not reach five [māṣas]. As in the Vinaya where at times some monks stole and divided saṅgha property, taking it as four shares, and incurred only a sthūlātyaya—the text establishes this as proof. I, however, deem this not to be the case. Why? The Vinaya was based on a temporary obstruction of the saṅgha. Originally, because [a monk] committed evil deeds in a village and defiled lay families, the saṅgha went to expel him; therefore, he devised this scheme: by dividing the property and temporarily assigning it to a saṅgha of four persons, they would have no secure place to dwell. With internal wealth not being harmed and external traces further purified and settled, using this to obstruct the saṅgha could be considered a clever expedient. However, since it was originally not permanent, the offense did not actually consummate. The Vinaya was based on his original intention and provisionally reckoned the offense according to his mental intent. That is why Śāriputra and Maudgalyāyana deeply examined the circumstances and grounds, and returning to the original plot, clearly judged that it was not consummated, thereby causing the saṅgha to continue using it as before. If theft is definitely reckoned, it directly follows the amount of the property; although the offenses are ranked in two tiers (namely, reaching five is a pārājika, and less than five is a sthūlātyaya), they unquestionably pertain to it. If one forcibly seizes these items, one faces the ultimate punishment with respect to the owner: because one harms me, the other is punished, and the offense is consummated. If one returns it to me without harm, the offense remains a preliminary action; because it is a preliminary action, it may be recovered, leaving both sides without flaw. Because consummation pertains to the other, self and other are equally troubled. This appears in the Mahāsāṃghika, and the sacred authority is clear in the Samantapāsādikā and Vibhāṣā. Thus that Vinaya says: 'There was an administrative monk who used saṅgha property for both Buddha and Dharma purposes. The Buddha said: "It is a pārājika."' How could this be understood as extending a preliminary action with respect to the [saṅgha of] the four directions? If you suspect that in the permanent property of the four directions heavy and light property are mixed, that text also says: 'Even if one were able to assemble the saṅgha of the ten directions to divide this property together, it would still not be permitted.' Therefore we know that comprehensively regarding the single saṅgha, it is taken as a single owner as a whole, and ultimately there is no dividing this property. How can one, referring to numbers, say it can be divided? Saying it can be divided refers only to manifest property of the four directions and permanent property of the four directions. The root Vinaya text actually says: 'Neither the saṅgha, nor many people, nor a single person may divide this property, sell this property, or take it for oneself.' This was said on a different occasion due to a transgression. If the various traditions are integrated, dividing and selling are distinct: thus the Vinaya allows the exchange of fields and lands, and the treatises permit the sale of rooms and halls. When permitted, it is openly and publicly conducted; when prohibited, it is to block mental faults. If there are those who must subtly seize it, they cannot but do so subtly—all this refers to the thief's intent being hesitant and undecided. Now that specific ownership has already been settled, how can it be seized back? If one deliberately seizes it, one is still implicated in it. Therefore the root Vinaya says: 'At that time, someone seized the property of a robber; the Buddha said it was a pārājika, which is called a thief robbing a thief again.' The correct teaching is like this. To seize and strip it is even more difficult: since one caused the other to commit theft, the present stolen goods must be surrendered; once the stolen goods are reclaimed, the offense is falsely reckoned—since the property was not damaged, the theft was incurred in vain. If legal officials follow this, they would pursue their investigations with severe excess, presenting the nine unnatural deaths and forever prolonging the five injustices into the future. I consider ordinary words difficult to rely upon, whereas the intention of the sages is easy to discern: one should rely on the clear decisions of the Mahāsāṃghika according to whether the property is heavy or light. If after the death of members of the fivefold assembly property classified as heavy is misjudged, it will be clarified below. If there is a specific owner and a guardian, the two offenses are reckoned with respect to the owner (if one guards it with prudence, it is reckoned with respect to the saṅgha; if one is lazy and neglects to store it securely, it is reckoned with respect to the negligence of the guardian). If the manifest saṅgha collectively divides or sells it together, it is all reckoned with respect to the permanent property (namely, reaching five requires expulsion, while less is a sthūlātyaya), all explained in accordance with the features as in the Great Commentary. Thus the textual evidence is as sharp and clear as the division of heaven and the rending of earth; its form and voice are vast—who could be confused by it? If those who remain muddled without repenting cling to past habits, it is truly because evil types are difficult to cast out suddenly.