摩訶止觀 10.11

10.11

三、學佛法成外道：執佛教門而生煩惱，不得入理。《大論》云：「若不得般若方便，入阿毘曇，即墮有中；入空，即墮無中；入昆勒，墮亦有亦無中。」《中論》云：「執非有非無，名愚癡論。」倒執正法，還成邪人法也。若學摩訶衍四門即失般若意，為邪火所燒，還成邪人法。故《百論》正破外外道。今大乘論師炎破《毘曇》、《成實》，謂是計有、無外道。然《成論》云：「三藏中實義，空是。」此乃似無意。又同百家之是，異百家之非，捉義出沒，又似因中亦有果亦無果意，又似昆勒意。當時論起，人皆得道；今時執者，乃是人失，何關法非？此應從容，不可雷同迦毘羅等。若以大破小，如《淨名》所斥，取其不見中理與外道同，非是奪其方便之意。

Third, studying the Buddha's teaching and becoming tīrthikas: clinging to the Buddhist doctrinal gates and giving rise to afflictions, failing to enter the principle. The Mahāprajñāpāramitopadeśa says: "If one does not attain the skillful means of prajñā, then entering the Abhidharma, one falls into existence; entering emptiness, one falls into non-existence; entering the Piṭaka of Kāraṇḍa (Kunle), one falls into both existence and non-existence." The Mūlamadhyamakakārikā says: "Clinging to neither existence nor non-existence is called foolish talk." Inversely clinging to the true Dharma, it turns back into the doctrine of wrong people. If one studies the four gates of the Mahāyāna and thereby loses the intent of prajñā, being burned by wrong fire, it likewise turns into the doctrine of wrong people. Hence the Śatakaśāstra primarily refutes external tīrthikas. Now the Mahāyāna treatise masters fiercely refute the Abhidharma and the Tattvasiddhi-śāstra, asserting that they are tīrthikas clinging to existence and non-existence. However, the Tattvasiddhi-śāstra says: "Emptiness is the true meaning within the Tripiṭaka." This resembles the intent of non-existence. Furthermore, it agrees with the correctness of the hundred schools and differs from the errors of the hundred schools, grasping at meanings that appear and disappear, which again resembles the intent that an effect both exists and does not exist in the cause, and also resembles the intent of the Piṭaka of Kāraṇḍa. When those treatises arose at that time, people all attained the path; those today who cling to them are simply in personal error—what does this have to do with the Dharma being flawed? Here one should be judicious and not equate them unreflectively with Kapila and the rest. If one refutes the Hīnayāna by means of the Mahāyāna, like the rebuke in the Vimalakīrtinirdeśa, it is because their failure to see the principle of the middle is identical to that of tīrthikas, not that it deprives them of the intent of skillful means.