摩訶止觀 2.42

2.42

As for earth having no hardness: if one says earth exists, existence is substantial, and substantiality is the meaning of hardness; if one says earth is non-existent, or both existent and non-existent, or neither existent nor non-existent—these, being reified, are all the meaning of hardness. Now it is shown that it is ultimately unobtainable, obliterating its hard nature. As for the nature of water not abiding: to say that water exists is precisely abiding, up to saying that water is neither existent nor non-existent is also precisely abiding. Now it neither abides in the four propositions of existence, nor abides in the four propositions of non-existence, nor abides in the ineffable; therefore it is said that the nature of water does not abide. As for the nature of wind having no obstruction: to contemplate wind as existent is obstruction, up to saying that wind is neither existent nor non-existent, having neither the four propositions of non-existence; therefore it is said that the nature of wind has no obstruction. As for the fire element being insubstantial: fire does not arise from itself, up to it does not arise causelessly; originally having no svabhāva, it exists in dependence on conditions, hence it is said to be insubstantial. Contemplating form being thus, sensation, perception, volition, and consciousness each enter the limit of true reality.