止觀輔行傳弘決 10.9

10.9

次明附佛法外道者，亦因佛經以為生計之由。此二宗計，出《大論》第一。二宗通云龜毛兔角無常無我，方廣復計空幻為宗。言犢子所計我在第五藏者，出四句外。問：論明四句，何故與今文異？今文與五陰各四，合二十句，即是外計二十身見。先列四句竟，次引論證，論文並與《毘曇》不同。答：文異義同。論第一釋犢子中云「如《犢子阿毘曇》四句云：五眾不離人，人不離五眾。不可說五眾是人，不可說人是五眾，人是第五不可說藏中所攝。」故知《毘曇》前之二句，即攝身見二十句，二十句秖是四句，約於五眾成二十耳。《毘曇》後之兩句，明我在於四句之外，故云不可說五眾是人等也。「今犢子」下，辯同異。今犢子計我，與外外道總有四異：一外外計我在四句內，今犢子在外。二者外外從本四人開成二十，今犢子計但是一人。三者外外計我為真或常或斷，今犢子計仍為俗諦。四者外外計於神我，今犢子但是人我。為是義故，名附佛法，異於六師。所以今文引二十身見，正當犢子所破之我，我即四句一異大小。又云「三世及無為」者，三世可解，無為即是虛空無為。以外道亦計虛空是常等，故今犢子謂我過於四句之外，必不以數緣為第四句及不可說藏。犢子亦用數緣而破於我。次釋方廣道人者，初出所計。言「讀佛十喻」等者，前犢子所計依於小乘，今方廣所計依於大乘，故因十喻而生計也。十喻，如前釋。應知方廣亦具四義，非大乘門：一者不識所依真理、二者不識所起惑相、三者不識能計生使、四者觀法不能破計。是故宗雖附於佛法，猶名外道。故龍樹於《大論》中引來斥之。三學佛法中，先小、次衍。初引《大論》「不得般若方便」等者，犢子失於小乘方便，方廣失於衍門方便。論文意云：學佛法者尚墮有無，乃至衍門失意亦為邪火所燒，況復犢子方廣等耶？言方便者，謂通真之門計以為實，失能通門名失方便。況犢子等能所俱失，寧非外道耶？「中論云執非有非無」等者，引大喻小。衍門雖勝，若執雙非以破空有尚成愚癡，況復小乘執第四門而非見耶？「故百論」等者，此中諸意正斥論師破小為外，若生執見大亦成外，何獨小乘？若無執見，小門亦是，何獨大耶？如何頓破同彼外人？初明《百論》正意，「大乘論師」下明謬破之失。所言「炎」者，如火之炎，炎即是旁。立大破小為正，破小為外是旁。亦云：論師名炎，作如是破。若破二論師能計之心，起愛起恚，實同外道。今大乘論師直破他二論為計有無外道，故成失也。所以下文救云「論起之處人皆得道，乃至不可雷同迦毘羅」等。若大破小，秖可巧拙偏圓相形，一往貶挫引進而已，不應頓爾同彼外道，故大乘師此破成謬。從「然成論云」下，引論文救，實是空義，不同外計。言「似無」者，正空之無似於無見，而實顯理永異邪無。若以小無似於邪無而便破者，大乘亦似，何獨小乘？「又同百家之是」等者，次評家判於論師與《百論》宗破立同異，二家並以論宗為是、所破為非。論師與《百論》同宗大乘，故云同百家之是。論師破小、《百論》破外，故云「異百家之非」。

Next, explaining the non-Buddhists who attach themselves to the Buddha-Dharma: they too take Buddhist sūtras as the basis for generating their views. The assertions of these two traditions derive from Fascicle 1 of the Dazhidulun. Both traditions generally hold that tortoise hair and hare horns are impermanent and not-self, while the Fangguang (Vaitulya) further asserts emptiness and illusion as its doctrine. Regarding the Vātsīputrīya assertion that the self resides in a fifth receptacle, this falls outside the four propositions. Question: The treatise explains the four propositions; why is that different from the present text? The present text posits four for each of the five aggregates, totaling twenty propositions, which are precisely the twenty identity-views asserted by externalists. Having first listed the four propositions, it next cites the treatise as proof; yet the text of the treatise is completely different from the Abhidharma. Answer: The texts differ, but the meaning is the same. The first fascicle of the treatise, in explaining the Vātsīputrīyas, states: 'As the four propositions of the Vātsīputrīya-abhidharma say: The five aggregates are not separate from the person; the person is not separate from the five aggregates. One cannot say that the five aggregates are the person, nor can one say that the person is the five aggregates; the person is subsumed within the fifth ineffable receptacle.' Thus we know that the first two propositions of the Abhidharma already subsume the twenty propositions of identity-view. The twenty propositions are merely the four propositions, made into twenty with respect to the five aggregates. The latter two propositions of the Abhidharma clarify that the self lies outside the four propositions; hence it says that one cannot state the five aggregates to be the person, and so on. Below, from 'Now, the Vātsīputrīya...', it distinguishes the similarities and differences. The self asserted by the present Vātsīputrīyas has four differences in total from the external non-Buddhists: First, external non-Buddhists assert that the self lies within the four propositions, whereas the present Vātsīputrīyas hold it to be outside. Second, external non-Buddhists expand the original four persons into twenty, whereas the present Vātsīputrīyas assert only one person. Third, external non-Buddhists assert the self to be real, or permanent, or annihilated, whereas the present Vātsīputrīyas still regard it as conventional truth. Fourth, external non-Buddhists assert a spiritual self (puruṣa), whereas the present Vātsīputrīyas assert only a personal self (pudgala). Because of these meanings, they are called 'attached to the Buddha-Dharma' and differ from the six teachers. Therefore, when the present text cites the twenty identity-views, they correspond precisely to the self refuted by the Vātsīputrīyas—the self being the one, different, large, or small of the four propositions. It also says 'the three periods of time and the unconditioned': the three periods of time are understandable; the unconditioned is the unconditioned of space. Because non-Buddhists also hold that space is permanent and so forth, the present Vātsīputrīyas state that the self transcends the four propositions; they definitely do not take analytical cessation as the fourth proposition or the ineffable receptacle. The Vātsīputrīyas also employ analytical cessation to refute the self. Next, explaining the Fangguang practitioners: first, the views they hold are presented. Regarding 'reading the Buddha's ten metaphors' and so forth: the previous views of the Vātsīputrīyas were based on the Hīnayāna, while the present views of the Fangguang are based on the Mahāyāna; hence they give rise to their views on the basis of the ten metaphors. The ten metaphors are as explained previously. One should know that the Fangguang also possesses four aspects and is not a gate to the Mahāyāna: first, not recognizing the true principle relied upon; second, not recognizing the marks of delusion that arise; third, not recognizing the latent afflictions that can generate views; fourth, the contemplation methods being unable to refute the views. Therefore, although its doctrine is attached to the Buddha-Dharma, it is still called non-Buddhist. Hence Nāgārjuna cites and rebukes it in the Dazhidulun. In the third section, on studying the Buddha-Dharma, first comes the Hīnayāna and next the Mahāyāna. First, citing the Dazhidulun's 'failing to attain the skill-in-means of prajñā' and so on: the Vātsīputrīyas lose the skill-in-means of the Hīnayāna, while the Fangguang lose the skill-in-means of the Mahāyāna gate. The treatise means: even those studying the Buddha-Dharma still fall into existence and non-existence, and if one misapprehends the intention in the Mahāyāna gate one is likewise burned by the fire of perversion; how much more so for the Vātsīputrīya, Fangguang, and their like? Regarding 'skill-in-means': this refers to taking the gate that accesses the true as real; losing the gate that can access it is called losing skill-in-means. How much more so when the Vātsīputrīyas and others lose both that which accesses and that which is accessed—are they not truly non-Buddhists? Regarding 'the Mūlamadhyamakakārikā says: grasping at neither existence nor non-existence' and so on: this cites the Mahāyāna to illustrate the Hīnayāna. Although the Mahāyāna gate is superior, if one grasps at the negation of both to refute emptiness and existence, it still constitutes foolishness; how much more so when the Hīnayāna grasps at the fourth gate and fails to see it as a view? Regarding 'Therefore the Śataśāstra...' and so on: the various meanings here precisely rebuke the treatise masters for refuting the Hīnayāna as non-Buddhist. If grasping views are produced, the Mahāyāna also becomes non-Buddhist; why only the Hīnayāna? If there are no grasping views, the Hīnayāna gate is also correct; why only the Mahāyāna? How could one rashly refute them so as to equate them with those externalists? First it clarifies the correct meaning of the Śataśāstra; below 'the Mahāyāna treatise masters...', it clarifies the fault of erroneous refutation. What is called 'blaze' (yan) is like the blaze of a fire; a blaze is secondary (by the side). Establishing the Mahāyāna and refuting the Hīnayāna is primary; refuting the Hīnayāna as non-Buddhist is secondary. It is also said: the treatise master was named Yan, who made such a refutation. If one refutes the mind capable of forming views in the masters of the two treatises—giving rise to attachment and anger—it is indeed the same as a non-Buddhist. Now, the Mahāyāna treatise master directly refuted the other two treatises as being non-Buddhists asserting existence or non-existence; hence this constitutes an error. Therefore, the subsequent text rescues them, saying, 'Wherever the treatises arose, people all attained the path... and one must not sweepingly conflate them with Kapila' and so on. If the Mahāyāna refutes the Hīnayāna, one may only compare them in terms of skillful and clumsy, biased and perfect, temporarily deprecating them to guide and advance them; one should not abruptly equate them with those non-Buddhists. Hence this refutation by the Mahāyāna master constitutes an error. From 'However, the Tattvasiddhi says...' downward, it cites the text of the treatise to rescue it: this is truly the meaning of emptiness, not the same as externalist views. Regarding 'resembling non-existence': the non-existence of correct emptiness resembles the view of non-existence, yet in reality it reveals the principle and is forever different from perverse non-existence. If one refutes the Hīnayāna's non-existence simply because it resembles perverse non-existence, the Mahāyāna also resembles it; why only the Hīnayāna? Regarding 'further, agreeing with what the hundred schools deem right' and so on: next, the commentator evaluates the similarities and differences in what the treatise master and the Śataśāstra uphold and refute. Both houses take their treatise's doctrine to be right and what is refuted to be wrong. The treatise master and the Śataśāstra both take the Mahāyāna as their doctrine; hence it says 'agreeing with what the hundred schools deem right.' The treatise master refutes the Hīnayāna, while the Śataśāstra refutes externalists; hence it says 'differing from what the hundred schools deem wrong.'