止觀輔行傳弘決 3.44

3.44

○次明得失中，初以思議不思議雙標得失。自他俱爾，是故雙標。圓離性計及能化他，方名為得。「若言」下，出性過之相。此釋性義不殊諸文而語勢稍別，以諸文中皆約自他單說故也。如單約智，秖云智自是智名自性智，由境故智名他性智，境智因緣故智名共性智，離境離智故智名無因智。若單約境，準智可知。雖復單說義必雙明，是故此中境智對說。今初文云「不相由藉」者，文似自然，乃是自性。何者？智不由境是自性智，境不由智是自性境，為相對說故云不相由。故智中云「智由心生，自能照境」。「如炬照物」下，譬自性境也。「若言」下，他性境智。言「相由而有」者，文似共性，乃是他生。智由於境名他性智，境由於智名他性境，為相對說故云相由。「譬長短相待」者，亦是兩向對說為譬。長待於短如他性智，短待於長如他性境。「若言境不自境」下，明共性境智。文似無因，乃是共性。何者？不獨由智故境，亦不獨由境故境，境智因緣故境，約智亦爾，故成共生。既不專由，故云不獨。亦應譬云不獨由長、不獨由短，由長短故得有於長，亦由長短故得有短。如因五寸及以一尺，和合方知五寸為短、和合方知一尺為長，是故境智俱名因緣。「若言」下，無因性也。「皆不如上三種」者，如云不由智故境，亦不由境故境，亦不由境智因緣故境，智亦如是；亦應譬云不由短故而有於長，不由長故而有於長，不由長短得有於長，短亦如是。如云不由五寸一尺長短而知五寸之短，不由五寸一尺長短而知一尺之長也。此計意欲非於前三，而所計最劣。「所以者何」下，釋計招過，過增苦集而失道滅。初文是集。從「業生故」下是苦。初集中云「有四取」等者，依於四句而起取著，故名「依倚」。有依倚故自是非他，名為「愛恚」。愛恚生故亦生癡慢，如是次第八十八使，故云「一切」。由意是非而生戲論，戲論則為諍競之本，諍競生故起於身業，轉至未來苦海無已，苦果深廣故名為「海」。「當知」下，結計成過為生死本。是故四計能為生死之本，名「生死本」。「故龍樹」下，約破性明得。「伐」者傾倒也，即是破也。破他生云「那得相由」者，亦約對破故云相由。準此破自，文亦應云諸法非自，那得不相由境智。若單說者，破自秖應云法不自生，那得自境智亦如是。破他應云法不他生，那得由智故境智亦如是。尚無自他及以共生，豈有無因？能破四性，不獨破他外計而已，龍樹正用此為觀法，亦是用此通申佛意、成諸教觀。而世人昧之，別立觀法，誠為未可。故《大經》三十六「佛告須跋：『汝今能觀於實相，則破一切諸有苦。』須跋言：『何名實相？』佛言：『無相之相名為實相。』須跋言：『何名無相之相？』佛言：『一切無自相，亦復無他相，無自他共相，亦無無因相，乃至無有一切諸相。』」第三十師子吼歎佛言：「如來世尊破邪道，開示眾生正真路，行此道者獲安隱，是故稱佛為導師。非自非他之所作，亦非共作無因作。」前令須跋聞常取果，即別圓意兼於藏通。若師子吼歎如來者，唯在圓別。是故諸教皆離性執，但於所破深淺不同，諸經論中斯例甚眾。故此破性雖在衍門，三藏多觀因緣生滅。既破生滅，亦無自他共等三計，況復生滅元破邪無，是故四教亦可通用。「今以」下，次明今家用龍樹破法，滅前苦集以成二空。性破即性空，無依即相空，空非二邊故云「常一」，則能見於中智般若。次「以是」下，不自生等以對四教。準應教教各破四性，隨義便故。欲以此四攝彼四故，故以四性對於四教。兼知四句義旨幽深，故前後文以此四句總對別對。教教各四名別對也，四句對四名總對也。復識四教因緣不同，乃至四教自然亦別，並在一念一時俱破。何者？如此方俗典有計元氣而生，即是計自。有計父母而生，即是計他。有計由元氣故假於父母，即是計共。有計自然即是無因。故《莊》云「天其運乎？地其處乎？日月諍於所乎？孰主張是？孰綱維是？孰居無事而推行是？」莊既不達緣起之法，而亦不知誰張於天、誰綱於地、誰推日月？不測其業，故推依報而屬自然。《老》計守雌，自然猶薄。如此計者，欲比西方，優劣天隔。故知此土昏俗計自然等，有言無行。況今文自然，圓人所計；乃至自生，是三藏所計。故知義異名同，善須斟酌。文中但舉初後，中間準知。又第十卷釋君弱臣彊等，但以自他各對界內界外二教。如第七卷釋助道中，而以生等對四教進。但以生名與進義同，望今復別，故知隨義不可一準。今此三藏對於生生以為自者，三藏人云：境常生滅，豈關於智？今境生滅，名自生境。無智而已，有必生滅。亦不由境今智生滅，自生智也。以生不生為他性者，通教人云：由無生智照境無生，他性境也。由無生境發無生智，他性智也。如云「諸法不生故般若不生，般若不生故諸法不生。」以不生生為共性者，別教人云：由於本有理體為自，復藉緣修方便為他，真緣和合能生一切。又出假時，由所化境及以大悲內外和合方能利他。又由諸法與俗智合方能利他。以不生不生為無因者，圓教人云：不可思議非境非智若照不照境自天然，名境不生。若觀不觀智常本有，名智不生。境智冥一，假為立名。文中略引身子、淨名以證初後，中間應以三乘無說以證通教，無言菩薩以證別教。一一句中皆云「苦集不生」者，斥前性計。有性計故苦集增長，是故今以法性觀之，求生生之自不可得故，乃至求不生不生之無因亦不可得；若當分者，即是當教證無生理，是故句句皆云不可說。「雖不」下，為他還作四句而說，一一悉中皆作四說。「雖作」下，結成二空。言「如前」者，具如向來始從若言下乃至心行處滅文是也。「故金光明」下，引證。彼四卷經第三〈散脂品〉云「不可思議智光，不可思議智炬，不可思議智行，不可思議智聚，不可思議智境。」今文云「照」。經又云光炬聚者，秖是歎智具德耳。智行者，秖是智所導行。智境者，秖是智所照境。總而言之秖是境智行三。一一皆云不思議者，明境智行更互相冥。雖復相冥，境行必由智照智導，故一一句皆云智也。今文為明智境相即，且略於行，理亦應具。「若破」下，判權實。此是不思議權實。

Next, in explaining benefit and loss, [the text] first designates both benefit and loss through the conceivable and inconceivable. It is thus for both oneself and others, and therefore both are designated. Only when one is completely free from the conceptual grasping of intrinsic nature and able to transform others is it called 'benefit'. Below, from 'If one says...', [the text] exposes the characteristics of faults regarding intrinsic nature. This explanation of the meaning of intrinsic nature does not differ from other passages, yet the rhetorical thrust is slightly distinct, because other passages all explain it solely in terms of self or other. For instance, if solely discussing wisdom, one merely says: wisdom of itself being wisdom is called wisdom of self-nature; wisdom arising due to the object is called wisdom of other-nature; wisdom arising from the conditioning of object and wisdom is called wisdom of shared nature; wisdom free from both object and wisdom is called wisdom without cause. If solely discussing the object, it can be understood by analogy with wisdom. Although they are stated singly, the meaning must encompass both; therefore, here object and wisdom are stated in counterpart. Now, the opening line saying 'they do not depend on each other' resembles spontaneity, yet it refers to self-nature. Why so? Wisdom not depending on the object is wisdom of self-nature; the object not depending on wisdom is an object of self-nature. Because they are stated in mutual relation, it is said that they 'do not depend on each other'. Hence, regarding wisdom, it says: 'Wisdom arises from the mind and can naturally illuminate the object.' Below, 'like a torch illuminating an object' illustrates the object of self-nature. Below, 'If one says...' indicates the object and wisdom of other-nature. Saying 'existing by depending on each other' resembles shared nature, yet it refers to arising from the other. Wisdom arising due to the object is called wisdom of other-nature; the object arising due to wisdom is called the object of other-nature. Being stated in mutual relation, it is said that they 'depend on each other'. 'Like the mutual dependence of long and short' is also an analogy stated from both sides in counterpart: long depending on short is like wisdom of other-nature; short depending on long is like the object of other-nature. Below, from 'If one says that an object is not an object of itself...', [the text] explains the object and wisdom of shared nature. The phrasing resembles causelessness, yet it refers to shared nature. Why so? An object is not an object solely due to wisdom, nor is it an object solely due to the object; an object exists due to the conditioning of object and wisdom. The same holds true when explained of wisdom; hence it constitutes shared arising. Since it does not solely depend [on one], it is said 'not solely'. One should also illustrate it by saying: it is not solely due to the long, nor is it solely due to the short; due to both long and short one can have the long, and also due to both long and short one can have the short. For example, depending on five inches and one foot, only in combination does one know that five inches is short, and only in combination does one know that one foot is long. Therefore, both object and wisdom are termed conditions. Below, 'If one says...' refers to causeless nature. 'All are unlike the above three kinds' is like saying: an object is not due to wisdom, nor is it due to the object, nor is it due to the conditioning of object and wisdom; wisdom is also like this. One should also illustrate it by saying: having the long is not due to the short, nor is it due to the long, nor is having the long obtained from both long and short; short is also like this. It is like saying that without depending on the lengths of five inches and one foot one knows the shortness of five inches, or without depending on the lengths of five inches and one foot one knows the length of one foot. This view intends to negate the prior three, yet the view taken is the most inferior. Below, from 'Why is this so?', [the text] explains that harboring views incurs faults, faults increase suffering and origination, and one loses the path and cessation. The first passage concerns origination. From 'Because of the arising of karma...' downward is suffering. In the initial [section on] origination, 'there are four graspings' and so on means that one gives rise to grasping based on the four propositions, and hence it is called 'reliance'. Because of reliance, one affirms oneself and negates others, which is termed 'attachment and resentment'. Because attachment and resentment arise, ignorance and arrogance also arise; thus progressively follow the eighty-eight afflictions, and therefore it says 'all'. Due to mental affirmations and negations, conceptual proliferation arises; conceptual proliferation then serves as the root of dispute. Because dispute arises, bodily karma is generated, revolving onward to the future sea of suffering without end; the fruits of suffering are deep and wide, and are therefore called a 'sea'. Below, from 'One should know...', [the text] concludes that holding views becomes a fault and serves as the root of birth-and-death. Therefore, the four views are able to serve as the root of birth-and-death, and are called the 'root of birth-and-death'. Below, from 'Therefore Nāgārjuna...', [the text] clarifies benefit through refuting intrinsic nature. 'To fell' means to topple, which is precisely to refute. In refuting arising from other, saying 'How could they depend on each other?' also refutes from the standpoint of mutual counterpart; hence it says 'depend on each other'. By analogy to this refutation of self, the text should also say: all dharmas are not self; how could object and wisdom not depend on each other? If stated singly, refuting self should simply say: dharmas do not arise from self; how could self-object and wisdom also be like this? Refuting other should say: dharmas do not arise from other; how could it be that due to wisdom there is an object, with wisdom being likewise? Since there is not even self, other, or shared arising, how could there be causelessness? Being able to refute the four natures does not merely refute the external views of others; Nāgārjuna specifically took this as the method of contemplation, and also used this to universally express the Buddha's intent and establish the contemplations of the various teachings. Yet worldly people are blind to this and separately establish methods of contemplation, which is truly inadmissible. Hence, the thirty-sixth [scroll of] the Great Sūtra states: 'The Buddha told Subhadra: "If you can now contemplate the true mark, you will destroy all the sufferings of existence." Subhadra said: "What is called the true mark?" The Buddha said: "The mark of marklessness is called the true mark." Subhadra said: "What is called the mark of marklessness?" The Buddha said: "All [dharmas] have no mark of self, nor do they have a mark of other, nor a mark of self and other combined, nor a mark of causelessness, up to having no marks whatsoever."' In the thirtieth [scroll], Lion's Roar praised the Buddha, saying: 'The Tathāgata, the World-Honoured One, has destroyed heterodox paths / And revealed to sentient beings the correct and true path; / Those who practice this path attain security, / And therefore the Buddha is called the Guide. / It is not made by self nor by other, / Nor is it made jointly nor without cause.' The former [passage], causing Subhadra to hear the permanent and grasp the fruit, embodies the intent of the distinctive and perfect [teachings] while encompassing the Tripiṭaka and shared [teachings]. The praise of the Tathāgata by Lion's Roar pertains solely to the perfect and distinctive [teachings]. Therefore, all teachings are free from adherence to intrinsic nature, yet they differ in the depth of what they refute; instances of this in the sūtras and treatises are extremely numerous. Thus, although this refutation of intrinsic nature resides in the Mahāyāna, the Tripiṭaka mostly contemplates the arising and cessation of conditioned arising. Since arising and cessation are refuted, there are also no three views of self, other, or shared [arising], not to mention that arising and cessation fundamentally refute heterodox non-existence; hence it can also be universally applied across the four teachings. Below, from 'Now with...', [the text] next explains that our school uses Nāgārjuna's method of refutation to eradicate the former suffering and origination so as to accomplish the two empties. The refutation of intrinsic nature is the emptiness of nature; the absence of reliance is the emptiness of marks. Emptiness being neither of the two extremes, it is said to be 'constantly one'; then one can perceive the middle wisdom and prajñā. Next, from 'Therefore...' downward, not arising from self and so forth are correlated with the four teachings. By rights, each teaching should separately refute the four natures, but [this is done] according to expository convenience. Wishing to subsume those four by these four, the four natures are therefore correlated with the four teachings. One also knows that the import of the four propositions is profound; therefore, the preceding and subsequent texts correlate these four propositions generally and specifically. Each teaching having four is called specific correlation; the four propositions correlated with the four [teachings] is called general correlation. Furthermore, one recognizes that conditioned arising in the four teachings differs, and even spontaneity in the four teachings is also distinct; they are all refuted together in a single thought at a single time. Why so? In the secular classics of this land, some posit arising from primordial qi, which is positing self[-arising]. Some posit arising from father and mother, which is positing other[-arising]. Some posit that due to primordial qi one depends on father and mother, which is positing shared [arising]. Some posit spontaneity, which is causelessness. Hence Zhuangzi says: 'Does heaven revolve? Does earth stay still? Do sun and moon contend for their places? Who directs this? Who maintains this? Who dwells in non-action and propels this along?' Since Zhuang[zi] did not understand the dharma of dependent origination, he also did not know who spread out heaven, who bound earth, or who propelled the sun and moon. Unable to fathom their karma, he attributed the dependent reward to spontaneity. Laozi's view of 'abiding by the female' regards spontaneity more subtly. When views such as these are compared with those of the Western land, the difference in superiority and inferiority is as vast as heaven and earth. Thus one knows that the murky worldly [views] of this land, such as positing spontaneity, have words without practice. What is more, spontaneity in the present text is what the person of the perfect [teaching] views; up to self-arising, which is what the person of the Tripiṭaka views. Hence one knows that while the names are the same, the meanings differ, and one must carefully weigh them. The text merely mentions the beginning and end; the middle may be known by inference. Moreover, the tenth fascicle's explanation of 'the ruler is weak and the ministers are strong' merely correlates self and other separately with the teachings within and beyond the realms. As in the seventh fascicle's explanation of auxiliary paths, arising and so forth are correlated with the progress in the four teachings. However, because the name 'arising' shares the meaning of 'progress', in view of the present passage it is different again; hence one knows that according to context it cannot be uniformly judged. Here, the Tripiṭaka being correlated with the arising of arising as 'self' means: the person of the Tripiṭaka says that objects are constantly arising and ceasing—how could that concern wisdom? An object's arising and ceasing now is called a self-arising object. Without wisdom that is all; with it, there must be arising and ceasing. Nor is it due to the object that wisdom now arises and ceases; it is self-arising wisdom. Taking arising of non-arising as other-nature means: the person of the shared teaching says that due to wisdom of non-arising one illuminates the non-arising object, which is an object of other-nature. Due to the non-arising object, wisdom of non-arising is generated, which is wisdom of other-nature. As it says: 'Because all dharmas do not arise, prajñā does not arise; because prajñā does not arise, all dharmas do not arise.' Taking non-arising of arising as shared nature means: the person of the distinctive teaching says that due to the originally existing principle-essence acting as self, and further relying on the expedient of practice through conditions acting as other, the combination of the real and conditions can give rise to everything. Furthermore, when stepping forth into the provisional, only through the inner and outer combination of the object to be transformed and great compassion is one able to benefit others. Also, only through the union of all dharmas with worldly wisdom is one able to benefit others. Taking non-arising of non-arising as causelessness means: the person of the perfect teaching says that the inconceivable is neither object nor wisdom; whether illuminated or not illuminated, the object is inherently spontaneous, which is called the non-arising of the object. Whether contemplated or not contemplated, wisdom is constantly and fundamentally present, which is called the non-arising of wisdom. Object and wisdom are darkly unified; names are only provisionally established for them. The text briefly cites Śāriputra and Vimalakīrti to substantiate the beginning and end; the middle should be substantiated for the shared teaching by the three vehicles' having no exposition, and for the distinctive teaching by the silent bodhisattvas. In each and every proposition it says 'suffering and origination do not arise', which rebukes the former views of intrinsic nature. Because there are views of intrinsic nature, suffering and origination multiply; therefore, when now contemplating them with dharma-nature, seeking the self[-nature] of the arising of arising cannot be found, up to seeking the causelessness of the non-arising of non-arising also cannot be found. If considered from their own standpoint, it is precisely that teaching's realization of the principle of non-arising; therefore, every proposition says 'inexpressible'. Below, from 'Although not...', [the Buddha/bodhisattva] still speaks to others using the four propositions, expounding the four [propositions] within each and every mode of instruction. Below, from 'Although making...', [the text] concludes by establishing the two empties. Saying 'as before' refers fully to the text from 'If one says' down to 'the path of mental activity ceases'. Below, from 'Therefore the Suvarṇaprabhāsa...', [the text] cites scriptural evidence. The third chapter, 'Saṃjñāya' [recte: Saṃjñeya/Saṃjaya], in the four-scroll version of that sūtra states: 'Inconceivable light of wisdom, inconceivable torch of wisdom, inconceivable practice of wisdom, inconceivable collection of wisdom, inconceivable object of wisdom.' The present text says 'illuminates'. The sūtra also says light, torch, and collection merely to praise wisdom's possession of virtues. Practice of wisdom is simply the practice guided by wisdom. Object of wisdom is simply the object illuminated by wisdom. In sum, they are simply the three: object, wisdom, and practice. That each is called 'inconceivable' clarifies that object, wisdom, and practice are mutually submerged in each other. Even though they are mutually submerged, object and practice must depend on wisdom's illumination and wisdom's guidance; therefore, every single line says 'wisdom'. To clarify the mutual identification of wisdom and object, the present text temporarily omits practice, though in principle it must also be complete. Below, from 'If refuting...', [the text] evaluates provisional and real. This is the inconceivable provisional and real.