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止觀輔行傳弘決 3.60

止觀輔行傳弘決 3.60

Language
Classical Chinese

3.60

次明大者,亦初示觀法。「大人」下,引能乘人及能詮教,驗知是大。「衍中」下,引證共乘。「譬如」下,譬也。「今」下,合。可知。「例如」下,引例。凡有例義有反有順,此中反以小乘例大。如小中有大仍名為小,何妨大中有小仍名為大?「所言」下,對辨法體。有兩重法譬,先析、次體。初析中云「三藏名假」等者,總攬五陰假名眾生,生是假名,陰是實法。既計法實,析令入空。「今大乘」下,次明體者,陰與眾生皆不可得,是故皆假。此中雖以鏡像譬衍,借使少宗聞鏡像喻亦謂為實。如《婆沙》四十二「問云:水鏡中像為實不實?譬喻者言:不實,以鏡面不相入故。毘曇者言:像是有法。何者?是色入故,為眼識所得。問:既不相入,云何是實?答:既若干生色為色入故,非一種生色而為色入。如因日因珠生大、因月因珠生水,雖所生各異,非無其實。緣鏡緣面而生於像,非無像用,能生眼識非無其實。響化亦然。」故毘曇人計像緣起,別有一具四大造色,故是實有。衍人所見一切不實,以像不實喻外不實,故以易譬難。言婆沙譬喻師者,即正量部異師所見。計不實故,亦似衍門所見如幻,而非婆沙之宗,故毘曇師不受斯見。「引佛在一方木上」者,正示體觀。論十二云「佛在耆闍崛山,與諸比丘入王舍城。道中見有一大方木,佛敷尼師壇坐其木上,告諸比丘:『若比丘入禪心得自在,能令此木作地則成實地。何以故?木有地水火風分故。如一美色,婬人見之為人,不淨觀者見為不淨,無預之人心無所適,故隨人見所取不同。』」令文從義。而云「變金為土」等者,亦以金中有土分故,如木為土。「又引端㲲」等者,論釋三種有中,初云端㲲析至極微,總而觀之無常無我,是為析空。復有觀空如觀此㲲,㲲本不生、今亦不滅,是故亦與金土喻同。金為土時,金本無生、金亦不滅;土為金時,土本無生、金亦不滅(云云)。乃至十八空,如第五卷說。故引㲲有空性,如木有土性,以證即空。此十八空,義通三教(云云)。「復次」下,釋隨情隨理者,文中具作共及不共兩理意者,重以此文釋於大小。初明小空云佛佛性,故知三藏空拙,一向判屬隨情。「大乘」去,約隨理以明大空。何者?三藏雖空,此空由於滅事而得,故名隨事。若大乘空,此空由於即事而得,故名隨理。理即事故即義該深,故即空中含於不空,名為佛性。故幻化空通通通別,所以用於尋幻等譬。言「尋幻得幻師」者,譬觀幻化以見通理。言「尋幻師得幻法」者,譬觀空理以見不空。夢喻亦爾,尋夢得眠,尋眠得心,比幻可見。若爾,「尋幻色心得無明」下,即是合文。云何以喻而不相應,但云尋幻得無明、尋無明得佛性,而不云尋幻得真、尋真得佛性耶?答:真諦之理即是無明,但深觀真即見佛性,即是觀於無明見性。又世人秖云尋心見性,不云尋色而得見性。且置外色直爾觀陰,世人何曾見陰佛性?

Next, in explaining the great [vehicle], first the contemplation method is indicated. From "great beings" onward, it cites the people who can ride [the vehicle] and the teachings that explain it, proving and knowing that it is the great. From "in the [Mahā]yāna" onward, it cites proof for the shared vehicle. From "for example" onward, is an analogy. From "now" onward, is the application. It is readily understood. From "by analogy with" onward, examples are cited. In general, analogical meanings can be contrary or conforming; here, contrary to expectation, the Small Vehicle is used as an analogy for the Great. Just as there is the great within the small, yet it is still named small, why should there not be the small within the great, yet it is still named great? From "what is called" onward, the essence of phenomena is distinguished comparatively. There are two tiers of phenomena and analogies: first, analysis; second, the essence. In the first, on analysis, the phrase "the Tripiṭaka speaks of provisional names" and so forth means that comprehensively seizing upon the five aggregates is provisionally called a "sentient being"; "being" is a provisional name, while the aggregates are real dharmas. Since dharmas are grasped as real, they are analyzed to enter emptiness. From "now in the Mahāyāna" onward, next the essence is explained: the aggregates and sentient beings are both unattainable; therefore both are provisional. Here, although the reflection in a mirror is used as an analogy for the Mahāyāna, even if those of lesser schools hear the mirror-reflection analogy, they also consider it real. As stated in Fascicle 42 of the *Vibhāṣā*: "Question: Is the reflection in water or a mirror real or unreal? The Dārṣṭāntikas say: It is unreal, because the mirror and the face do not enter into each other. The Abhidharmikas say: The reflection is an existent dharma. Why? Because it is a form-base (rūpāyatana) and is grasped by the eye-consciousness. Question: Since they do not enter into each other, how can it be real? Answer: Since various produced forms constitute a form-base, it is not only one kind of produced form that constitutes a form-base. Just as fire is produced due to the sun and a jewel, and water is produced due to the moon and a jewel—though what is produced is distinct in each case, it is not without real reality. Relying on the mirror and relying on the face, the reflection is produced; it is not without the function of a reflection, and its ability to produce the eye-consciousness is not without real reality. Echoes and phantom transformations are also like this." Thus the Abhidharma theorists grasp the reflection as arising from conditions and having a separate set of derived forms made of the four great elements, so it is really existent. What the Mahāyāna followers see is entirely unreal; using the unreality of the reflection to illustrate the unreality of external things, the easy is used to analogize the difficult. What is called the Dārṣṭāntika masters of the *Vibhāṣā* are the views of distinctive masters of the Sāṃmitīya school. Because they grasp it as unreal, they also resemble what the Mahāyāna gate sees as illusion-like; yet it is not the main doctrine of the *Vibhāṣā*, so the Abhidharmikas do not accept this view. "Citing the Buddha on a square block of wood" directly indicates the contemplation of the essence. Fascicle 12 of the treatise (*Dazhidulun*) says: "The Buddha was on Mount Gṛdhrakūṭa and entered Rājagṛha with the monks. On the road they saw a large square block of wood. The Buddha spread his niṣīdana, sat upon that wood, and addressed the monks: 'If a monk enters meditation and achieves mental mastery, he can make this wood become earth, and it will become real earth. Why is this? Because the wood has the portions of earth, water, fire, and wind. It is like a beautiful woman: a lustful person sees her as a human, one who contemplates impurity sees her as impure, and a person uninvolved has a mind with nowhere inclined. Thus, in accordance with what people see, what is apprehended differs.'" The text is made to follow the meaning. And saying "transforming gold into earth" and so forth is also because there is a portion of earth within gold, just like wood becoming earth. Regarding "also citing the length of cotton cloth" and so forth, in the treatise's explanation of the three kinds of existence, it first says that analyzing the length of cotton cloth down to atomic particles and comprehensively contemplating it as impermanent and non-self is analytical emptiness. Furthermore, there is the contemplation of emptiness like contemplating this cloth: the cloth is originally unproduced and now likewise does not perish; therefore it is also the same as the analogy of gold and earth. When gold becomes earth, the gold is originally unproduced and the gold likewise does not perish; when earth becomes gold, the earth is originally unproduced and the gold likewise does not perish (and so forth). Up to the eighteen kinds of emptiness, as explained in Fascicle 5. Therefore, citing that the cloth possesses the nature of emptiness, like the wood possessing the nature of earth, proves identity with emptiness. These eighteen kinds of emptiness, in meaning, run through the three teachings (and so forth). From "furthermore" onward, in explaining conforming to sentiment and conforming to principle, within the text both the shared and non-shared principles are fully treated; this passage is used again to explain the great and the small. First, in explaining the small emptiness, it speaks of "Buddha and Buddha-nature"; thus we know the Tripiṭaka's emptiness is clumsy and is categorically classified under conforming to sentiment. From "Mahāyāna" onward, it explains the great emptiness in terms of conforming to principle. Why? Although the Tripiṭaka is empty, this emptiness is attained through the annihilation of phenomena, and is therefore called conforming to phenomena. If it is Mahāyāna emptiness, this emptiness is attained through identity with phenomena, and is therefore called conforming to principle. Principle being identical to phenomena, the meaning of identity is profound; therefore, identity with emptiness contains within it the non-empty, which is called Buddha-nature. Hence the emptiness of illusions and transformations runs through the shared, distinct, and perfect teachings; that is why analogies such as tracing the illusion are used. "Tracing the illusion and finding the illusionist" is an analogy for contemplating illusions and transformations to see the shared principle. "Tracing the illusionist and finding the illusory art" is an analogy for contemplating the principle of emptiness to see the non-empty. The dream analogy is also like this: tracing the dream one finds sleep; tracing sleep one finds the mind; by comparison with the illusion it can be seen. If so, from "tracing illusory form and mind one finds ignorance" onward is the application of the text. Why does it not correspond to the analogy, but only says tracing illusion one finds ignorance, and tracing ignorance one finds Buddha-nature, instead of saying tracing illusion one finds the true, and tracing the true one finds Buddha-nature? Answer: The principle of the truth of the real is itself ignorance; simply by deeply contemplating the real one sees Buddha-nature, which is contemplating ignorance to see the nature. Moreover, worldly people only speak of tracing the mind to see the nature, but do not speak of tracing form to attain seeing the nature. Setting aside external form and directly contemplating the aggregates, when have worldly people ever seen the Buddha-nature in the aggregates?

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