止觀輔行傳弘決 5.29

5.29

○「問」下，次明修德不思議境。即是自行須明行相，故以問答推檢而為行體。如前理性本無性過，約修門說須明離計，故約四性以為徵問。然此問中且約所起對理自具而為研覈，其實但推本具理心，恐生計故，故須此覈。故下答文但離橫等四句執竟，還歸本理一念三千。又此問答亦名料簡，前云理性又云修具，即名推檢而為料簡無復別途。又此理具變為修具，一一修具無非理具，所以將理對修料簡，令識修具全是理具，乃達理具即空即中。故妙境初文，章安料簡云：「法性自爾，非作所成，如一塵中有大千經卷。」故知章安深領玄旨。「答」者，然此破性不同三教，前之三教或約遠理、或約事行、或約俗諦，推因緣法生即無生。今此不爾，約理本無四性計相，凡情易執約執破性。寄二論破者，論隨教道順物機緣，恐迷者執權即成性過，故寄破之令成圓極。言「無沒無明」者，即阿黎耶識無始恒有，故云無沒。沒謂失沒，恒不失故，不同俱生及現行等。「若從」下，示各計人，以成過相。心成自性，緣即他性。「若法性」下，以他破自。「法性非心非緣」者，還舉其所計准理破之。法性之理既非心緣，地人所計義當於心。法性非心，若許心具；法性非緣，亦應緣具。何得不許《攝論》黎耶？此即破地師也。「若言」下，以自破他，還以道理破其所計。法性之外無別黎耶，若許黎耶依持，則許法性依持；若不關者，義理乖各，是故不關義必不成。若即是者，何得不許法性依持？此破攝師也。「又違」下，次引經論示計有過。經論皆云「非內非外」等及「非自他」等，二論師何得各計一邊？經即《大品》文也。「更就」下，約譬檢過。初文先定，「若依」下徵責，「四句」下結成無生。「心喻」下合，恐寫者誤，喻中既以眠心相對，今合應云心喻法性，眠喻黎耶，夢事則喻生一切法；縱使眠人亦有不睡時者，秖應改云睡喻黎耶。若言睡人亦有不夢時者，今文但取夢時為喻。四句推夢雖不可得而夢事不無，若為他說還依四句，不可順計言自他等。此之三千亦復如是，二師何得各計一邊？然雖破計，說必順機。何但說爾，觀亦隨宜。故《觀心論》中觀於一句各生三十六法，良由於此。已明橫破竟。

From "Question:" onwards, next is explained the inconceivable object of cultivated virtue. That is to say, in one's personal practice one must clarify the characteristics of practice, and therefore by questions and answers one examines and scrutinizes them to serve as the essence of practice. Just as the aforementioned intrinsic nature is originally free from the error of self-nature, when explained in terms of the approach of cultivation one must clarify freedom from conceptual clinging, and therefore the interrogation is framed in terms of the four natures. However, while this question momentarily investigates the arisen [factors] against the innate endowment of principle, in reality it merely scrutinizes the mind of originally endowed principle; fearing that conceptual clinging may arise, it is necessary to make this examination. Therefore, the subsequent answer merely leaves behind the attachments to the four alternatives, such as the horizontal, and ultimately returns to the original principle of the three thousand [realms] in a single thought. Furthermore, this question and answer is also called a critical appraisal: previously speaking of the nature-principle and then of the cultivated endowment, this examination and inquiry is precisely a critical appraisal, with no other separate approach. Moreover, this innate endowment of principle transforms into the cultivated endowment, and each single cultivated endowment is nothing other than the innate endowment of principle; therefore, evaluating principle against cultivation allows one to realize that the cultivated endowment is entirely the innate endowment of principle, thereby penetrating that the innate endowment of principle is identical to emptiness and the middle. Hence, in the introductory passage on the wondrous object, Zhang'an's critical appraisal states: "The dharma-nature is naturally so, not brought about through contrivance, just like a scroll of scripture of a great chiliocosm contained in a single dust mote." Thus we know that Zhang'an deeply grasped the profound purport. As for the "Answer," this refutation of inherent nature is not the same as in the three teachings: the preceding three teachings rely either on the distant principle, or on phenomenal practice, or on conventional truth, scrutinizing the conditioned arisal of dharmas to show that arisal is non-arisal. Here it is not so: in principle there are fundamentally no characteristics of clinging to the four natures; ordinary sentiments easily grasp [at them], so inherent nature is refuted based on that clinging. In relying on the two treatises for the refutation, the treatises conform to the pedagogical method to suit the capacities of sentient beings; fearing that deluded persons clinging to the provisional would incur the error of self-nature, the text borrows them to refute it, thereby consummating the perfect and ultimate. Regarding "un-submerged ignorance": this is the ālaya-vijñāna, which has existed eternally from beginningless time, and is therefore called "un-submerged." "Submerged" means lost and submerged; because it is eternally unlost, it is not the same as innate and active [defilements]. From "If from..." onwards, the respective proponents of clinging are identified to establish their erroneous characteristics. Mind becomes self-nature, and conditions become other-nature. From "If the dharma-nature..." onwards, the "self" is refuted through the "other." "The dharma-nature is neither mind nor conditions": again citing what they cling to, it is refuted according to reason. Since the principle of dharma-nature is neither mind nor conditions, what the Ti [lun] masters hold corresponds in sense to mind. If dharma-nature is not mind, yet mind is allowed to possess it, then since dharma-nature is not conditions, conditions should also possess it. Why then do they not accept the ālaya of the She[lun]? This refutes the Dilun masters. From "If it is said..." onwards, the "other" is refuted through the "self," again using reason to refute what they hold. Outside of the dharma-nature there is no separate ālaya; if you allow the ālaya to be the basis and support, you must allow the dharma-nature to be the basis and support. If they are unrelated, their principles conflict, and therefore the meaning of being unrelated is definitely untenable. If they are identical, why do you not allow dharma-nature to be the basis and support? This refutes the Shelun masters. From "Furthermore, this contradicts..." onwards, next sūtras and treatises are cited to show that their clinging is erroneous. Sūtras and treatises all state "neither internal nor external" and "neither self nor other"; how can the masters of the two treatises each cling to one side? The sūtra refers to the text of the Dapin. From "Further examining..." onwards, errors are examined through an analogy. The opening passage first establishes [the premise]; from "If it depends..." onwards, it cross-examines; from "The four propositions..." onwards, it concludes with non-arisal. From "Mind is analogized..." onwards, it provides the application. Fearing copyists' errors: since the analogy contrasts the sleeping mind, its application here should state that the mind is analogized to dharma-nature, sleep is analogized to the ālaya, and dream-events are analogized to the arisal of all dharmas; even if a sleeping person sometimes does not slumber, it should simply be revised to say that slumber is analogized to the ālaya. If one says that a slumbering person sometimes does not dream, the present text merely takes the time of dreaming as the analogy. Although scrutinizing dreams through the four propositions reveals that they cannot be found, dream-events are not non-existent; if explaining to others, one still relies on the four propositions, and must not conform to clinging by asserting self, other, and so forth. These three thousand [realms] are also like this: how can the two masters each cling to one side? Yet although clinging is refuted, exposition must conform to capacities. Not only is it expounded thus, but contemplation also adapts to what is suitable. Therefore, in the Guanxin lun, contemplating a single phrase generates thirty-six dharmas for each, precisely for this reason. The horizontal refutation is now concluded.