止觀輔行傳弘決 5.31

5.31

○「當知」下，結前生後。結前自行、生後化他，自行若滿必有化他，故引多義結前生後。初約二諦也。第一義諦結前自行，推法不生。若世諦者欲為他說，說必四句以生三千，亦是舉況明有三千可為他說。「如佛告」下，即《大品》中佛告德女，世尊問、德女答，答文並是結前自行。「佛言如是有」者，生後化他。次引龍樹及更引《大經》四不可說，以結前，有因緣故；以生後，即有利他因緣故也。「雖四句」下，釋前諸文，結前生後。「四句冥寂」釋前自行以結前，「慈悲憐愍」釋前化他以生後。若聖若凡凡欲利他，皆須四句橫竪破執，乃可四句慈悲為他。然此為他與後起教其義不同，彼唯實報八相被物，發起權實施開廢等；此唯初心依理生解，無性執已為他四說，亦通後心仍在習果無生忍位，四執實破赴物說四。問：前自行中具破四性，今此化他何故各一？受化之徒還成自行，何故與前自行不同？答：聖人設化逗彼所宜，受者成觀實離四執。若其執自，佛豈增執而為說耶？餘之三句準此應知。「或作世界」下，正明逗物。依四悉檀作四句說，即十六番說化他境，化他遍被故列十六。若彼受者，隨用一句或二三四。《觀心論》中遍約四性各三十六問者，為遍責故、遍生法故，仍略四悉直舉自等；今但約四悉，望彼仍總。今初，世界中四者，若言心具，心即是自。「善知識者」，即是他也。以水銀他和真金自，即是共也。自爾秖是無因異名。此四皆須順歡喜義，成世界悉。為人四中，言「唯信」者，信即是自。云「但發心」，發心是自。若云「見佛」，佛即是他。自珠待他水清，即共也。又他慈善根令我自見，亦共也。「非內」非自，「非外」非他，即無因也。「先尼」者，以證四句無著即屬於離，離即無著。若有著者如先尼梵志，於小乘中生信尚難，況復大乘？《大論》四十七云「若佛法中有微法而可得者，先尼於一切法中終不生信。云何生信？信般若波羅蜜不以有相、不以無相，不取相故住信行中。」論「問：此中何故引先尼耶？答：此經種種因緣說法空乃至無有微相可得，人心疑怪不信；此理難見，是故須菩提引小乘中尚有法空，況大乘法。」論文引意先尼有著，信小乘法空尚難，況信大乘法空？小乘法空，如《阿含》中是老死誰老死也。餘二悉比知。「佛旨盡淨」下，明佛意體性，即明自行化他相即。「不在因緣」等，即是第一義，即化他心不乖自行，故即世諦是第一義諦。「又四」下，化他中，初法。「若為盲」等者，重約譬說體性相即。為盲四說，貝等俱是。如前四四一十六說皆契悉檀，故云「見乳」。「即世諦」者，以法結譬。「當知」下，結意也。不說即默，即是終日說默相即，終日雙非說默、終日雙照說默。破即不說，立即四說。又破即雙遮，立即雙照經論者，如前所引。

From "One should know" below, the text concludes what preceded and gives rise to what follows. It concludes the preceding self-practice and gives rise to the subsequent conversion of others. If one's self-practice is complete, there must be the conversion of others; hence multiple meanings are cited to conclude what preceded and generate what follows. First, it is addressed in terms of the two truths. The ultimate truth concludes the preceding self-practice by examining phenomena as unproduced. As for the conventional truth, desiring to speak for others, the explanation must use the four propositions in order to give rise to the three thousand [realms]; this also uses an analogy to clarify that there are the three thousand [realms] which can be explained for others. From "As the Buddha told" below, this refers to the Buddha speaking to the virtuous woman in the *Dapin*: the World-Honoured One asked and the virtuous woman answered, and the words of her answer all conclude the preceding self-practice. "The Buddha said: It exists in this manner" generates the subsequent conversion of others. Next, Nāgārjuna is cited, and furthermore the four inexpressibles of the *Mahāparinirvāṇa-sūtra* are cited: to conclude what preceded, because there are causes and conditions; to generate what follows, that is, because there are causes and conditions for benefiting others. From "Although the four propositions" below, this explains the preceding passages, concluding what preceded and generating what follows. "The four propositions are profoundly quiescent" explains the preceding self-practice to conclude what preceded; "with compassion and pity" explains the subsequent conversion of others to generate what follows. Whether sage or ordinary person, whenever one wishes to benefit others, one must use the four propositions in their horizontal and vertical dimensions to refute attachments; only then can one use the four propositions with compassion for others. However, this acting for others differs in meaning from the subsequent arousing of the teachings: that pertains solely to the eight aspects of the reward-body responding to beings, launching the provisional and real, bestowing, opening, discarding, and so forth; this pertains solely to the initial mind generating understanding based on the principle, which, having eliminated attachments to natures, speaks the four [propositions] for others; it also extends to the subsequent mind still in the stage of non-arising forbearance of fruition through practice, where the four attachments are truly refuted and the four are spoken responding to beings. Question: In the preceding self-practice, the four natures were fully refuted; why are they here in converting others taken one by one? Those who receive conversion also achieve self-practice; why does it differ from the preceding self-practice? Answer: Sages set up conversions accommodating what is suitable for them; those who receive it achieve contemplation and are truly free from the four attachments. If they were attached to "self", would the Buddha increase their attachment by speaking it? The remaining three propositions should be understood accordingly. From "Or treating it as worldly" below, this directly explains accommodating beings. Speaking the four propositions based on the four siddhāntas constitutes sixteen rounds of speaking the objective realm of converting others; because conversion of others covers everything universally, sixteen are listed. As for those recipients, they apply one, two, three, or four propositions as appropriate. In the *Treatise on the Contemplation of the Mind*, the thirty-six questions universally covering each of the four natures are for the sake of universal questioning and universal generation of dharmas, yet they omit the four siddhāntas and directly bring up "self" and so forth; here, addressing only the four siddhāntas, it remains general compared to that. First, among the four in the worldly [siddhānta]: if one says the mind is endowed [with them], the mind is "self". "A good spiritual friend" is "other". Blending mercury as "other" with real gold as "self" is "both". "Naturally so" is merely an alternative name for "without cause". All four must accord with the meaning of joy, completing the worldly siddhānta. Among the four for the individual: stating "faith alone"—faith is "self". Stating "merely arousing the aspiration"—arousing the aspiration is "self". If one states "seeing the Buddha"—the Buddha is "other". One's own jewel awaiting the clarity of other's water is "both". Moreover, the other's root of compassion causing me myself to see is also "both". "Neither internal" is not self, and "nor external" is not other, which is "without cause". As for "Śreṇika": this is used to verify that non-attachment in the four propositions belongs to transcendence, and transcendence is non-attachment. If there is attachment, as with the Śreṇika brāhmaṇa, generating faith even in the Hīnayāna was difficult, how much more so in the Mahāyāna! Fascicle forty-seven of the *Dazhidulun* states: "If in the Buddha-Dharma there were the slightest phenomenon that could be apprehended, Śreṇika would never have generated faith among all phenomena. How did he generate faith? Believing that the Perfection of Wisdom is neither by marks of existence nor by marks of non-existence, and because he did not grasp at marks, he abided in the practice of faith." The treatise asks: "Why is Śreṇika cited here? Answer: This sūtra speaks of the emptiness of phenomena through various causes and conditions up to having not the slightest mark that can be apprehended, and people's minds are suspicious and do not believe; this principle is difficult to see, therefore Subhūti cited that there is still emptiness of phenomena even in the Hīnayāna, how much more so in the Mahāyāna teachings." The intention of citing this in the treatise is that Śreṇika had attachment, and believing in the Hīnayāna emptiness of phenomena was already difficult, how much more so believing in the Mahāyāna emptiness of phenomena? Hīnayāna emptiness of phenomena is like "who is it that undergoes aging and death?" in the *Āgamas*. The other two siddhāntas can be understood by analogy. From "The Buddha's intent is utterly pure" below, this clarifies the essential nature of the Buddha's intent, that is, clarifying the mutual identity of self-practice and converting others. "Not residing in causes and conditions" and so forth is the ultimate truth; that is, the mind converting others does not diverge from self-practice, so the conventional truth is precisely the ultimate truth. From "Furthermore, the four" below, in converting others, first is the doctrine. "If for the blind" and so forth reiterates the mutual identity of essential nature through an analogy. The four explanations for the blind—seashells and the like—are all such. Just as the preceding four times four, the sixteen explanations, all accord with the siddhāntas, it says "seeing milk". "It is precisely the conventional truth" concludes the analogy with the doctrine. From "One should know" below, it concludes the intention. Not speaking is silence; this means speaking and silence are mutually identical all day long; all day long one doubly negates speaking and silence, and all day long one doubly illuminates speaking and silence. Refutation is not speaking; establishment is the four explanations. Furthermore, refutation is double negation, and establishment is double illumination; the sūtras and treatises are as cited above.