止觀輔行傳弘決 5.56

Next, in directly clarifying universal refutation of phenomena: First, three chapters are listed. The statement in each chapter heading, "from beginning to end, exhausting its source and bottom," pre-states within the heading the meaning of the chapter. Because it exhausts the source, it is horizontally pervasive; because it exhausts the bottom, it is vertically deep. Vertical refutation clearly has a beginning and an end, because in each view and each grade of thought [affliction], there is nothing that is not the dharma-dhātu. Within horizontal gates, each likewise has [its progression] from beginning to end. In the gate of non-duality, horizontal and vertical are not absent; thus, all are mutually non-dual, both horizontal and vertical. If one wishes provisionally to speak in terms of the three chapters separately: the three afflictions, being each pervasive, are called "horizontally pervasive"; penetrating through to the true mark is called "deeply exhaustive." In each affliction and wisdom, the principle is neither horizontal nor vertical, and within the horizontal each is also like this. Furthermore, horizontally encompassing all is called "horizontally pervasive"; each reaching the ultimate is called "vertically deep." In the gate of non-duality, fully encompassing all horizontals is called "horizontally pervasive"; because there is nothing that is not completely and perfectly ultimate, it is called "vertically deep." Although there are three passages of text, they constitute only two meanings—namely, gradual and non-gradual—because horizontal and vertical merely constitute the gradual sequence. Although there are two meanings, together they form a single mind. One should know that within the vertical, the horizontal and non-duality are fully present; the remaining two are to be inferred accordingly. Hence it says, "Vertically, it discusses height [...] down to there being no vertical that is not broad." The intention of the great carriage in the Lotus [Sūtra] is also like this: one should know that it is simply the high and broad great carriage. Hence we know that horizontal and vertical merely discuss mutual inclusion; without non-duality, one cannot avoid vertical and horizontal [dispersion]. Although both horizontal and vertical are pervasive, one must recognise non-duality; therefore it is next explained as "neither horizontal nor vertical." Those who only see according to the literal text—alas, how they are confused by the depth! Therefore, in our school's interpretation of meaning, first comes the general, next the specific, and finally it is summarised and returned to the original intention. Although the intention is such as to reveal non-duality, by still following the chapter headings to explain horizontal and vertical, within the single [mind] horizontal and vertical are distinguished, and shallow and deep are not disordered. Under "First, the gate of non-arising," the vertical chapter is first listed. Having first listed it, next, under "Like this," it expounds the intention of the vertical chapter. This passage clearly lodges in the three to reveal the one; how could one discard this and vaguely point to one-sided texts? Under "The Dazhidulun," it cites the treatise to verify the intention of lodging in the three to reveal the one. Therefore, in this text, the passages are three and the meanings are three, but the intention lies in guiding one into and returning to refutation within the non-dual single mind. Hence one knows that in the text below, within every phrase there is a text, a meaning, and an intention; to avoid cluttering the text, six places are provisionally established. Under "The Avataṃsaka," it re-cites the intention of the Avataṃsaka to illuminate the present text. In that sūtra, two faculties are divided into two intentions; here too, it first treats the gradual and later discusses the non-gradual, so it resembles that [sūtra]. When that [sūtra] speaks of the gradual, its intention is also to establish the perfect and sudden non-gradual, resembling the present [text]. If one discusses the present text, in terms of contemplation it merely borrows the distinctive to reveal the general, being entirely not the distinctive teaching; thus the intention again becomes different. "In the Lotus [Sūtra] there is only one": this opens the dull into the sharp; there is no person who is not opened, and phenomena are also non-dual, directly matching the present intention. Under "Now wishing to," the original intention of the text is revealed. Since the various teachings are like this, the present [text] also relies upon it. Therefore, to instruct the reader, in advance of the text it points distantly to six places to summarise the essential intention: first, after the stage of refuting views; second, after the stage of refuting thought [afflictions]; third, within the analysis of the four gates; fourth, at the stage of the benefit of emerging into the provisional; fifth, after the text on concluding the universal refutation of phenomena; and sixth, at the beginning of the text on cultivating the middle contemplation. These six passages occur repeatedly, earnestly and specifically indicating, revealing, and making manifest [the intention]; yet readers are still benighted. Were it obscure, deep, hidden, and screened, how could they gain understanding? Therefore, it anticipates and raises the main guidelines, re-presenting them when arriving at the text. This is still without discussing the marking of chapters and pointing out of intentions; it directly indicates that within the text there are these six layers. In the initial explanation of entering emptiness from the provisionality of views, it first clarifies deriving its name from understanding, and next explains receiving its title from its intrinsic nature. In the initial passage, it provisionally explains in general terms "view afflictions," etc., clarifying that from which views arise and their capacity to obstruct. Under "Like a mirage," it gives an analogy. The mirage and dream are the view afflictions; the empty sky and awakening are the true essence. Under "These afflictions," it applies the analogy. Under "Yet viewing means viewing the principle," it explains deriving its name from understanding. Under "View afflictions," it lists and explains them. Among the simple four views, it also first lists the four views. Under "Regarding one," it first clarifies the ten sharp and dull entanglements within the view of existence. First, among the sharp, "positing that there is a self" means that non-Buddhists posit a self, either like a sesame seed, a bean, or a thumb, or positing it as all-pervading the body, the four propositions of soul and body, or identical and different. Positing a self without forgetting it is called "view of self"; positing that the self is annihilated or eternal is called "extreme view." Due to positing annihilation or eternity, they do not believe in cause and effect, and further posit this self as natural, primordial darkness, or world-nature; world-nature refers to the twenty-five truths and six truths, etc. Or they posit that it arises from parents, atoms, Brahmā, and so forth: all are called "wrong views." Grasping the wrong as the path is called positing a cause where there is no cause, named the view of "attachment to precepts." Positing that through this view one penetrates to the sphere of neither-perception-nor-non-perception, believing this and not anything else, is called "attachment to views." Under "Attachment to one's own doctrines," it clarifies that due to view afflictions, dull entanglements arise. Under "Like this," it goes through the three realms and the four noble truths to conclude with the eighty-eight entanglements, as can be seen in the text. In the three realms together there are fifty-two dull and thirty-six sharp [entanglements]. As for the fifty-two dull ones: in the desire realm there are twenty, five under each of the four truths. In the higher realms there is no hatred, so there are only sixteen; the two higher realms together make thirty-two. Combined with the twenty of the desire realm, this makes fifty-two in total. As for the thirty-six sharp ones: this is because there are twelve in each of the three realms. For instance, in the desire realm, under suffering all five are present; under the path there are three, excluding identity and extremes; under arising and cessation there are two each, excluding identity, extremes, and attachment to precepts—making twelve in total. The two higher realms are also like this. Thirty-six and fifty-two make eighty-eight in total. Question: Under which principle and teaching do the afflictions under the four truths decrease differently? Answer: According to the Abhidharma, ill-will does not operate in the higher realms. Question: Why are the views of identity and extremes located only under suffering? Answer: This view relies on the body, hence it is called the view of identity; relying on the view of identity, the extreme view arises. The other three [truths] are not the body, so these views do not exist there. Furthermore, because they are severed upon seeing suffering, they are placed under suffering. Question: Why is attachment to precepts located only under suffering and the path? Answer: It arises only from those. Question: Attachment to precepts posits a cause, while the truth of suffering is a fruit; why is it under suffering? Answer: They posit many ascetic practices, regarding them as the real cause, so it is placed under suffering. That which is not the path of departure is falsely considered the path of departure, so it can also arise in relation to the path. Arising and cessation are different from this, so they have no view of identity; having no view of identity, they also have no extreme view. Arising and cessation are not the path, so attachment to precepts does not arise. Furthermore, the reason attachment to precepts is under the two truths of suffering and the path is that those originally within the Buddhist path can sever it upon seeing suffering, while those who were originally non-Buddhists can sever it upon seeing the path; hence it is located only in these two.

Question: Among the eighty-eight [afflictions], since what is severed by the first fruit (srotāpanna) consists only of the afflictions of view, why are there fifty-two [afflictions] of thought among them? Answer: This thought relies upon views, and views serve as its root; when views alone are severed, the root is broken and the branches wither. If it were the thought that is deluded about phenomenal matters, it would not be subsumed here. Therefore, the text states that it is love for one's own dharmas, which directly points to the five views as being one's own dharmas. Question: Why is there no doubt among what is severed by cultivation? Answer: It has already been severed in the path of seeing, so in principle there should rightly be no doubt. Below, where the remaining three views are merely analogized to existence, the three views can thus be understood; they merely take non-existence and the like as their root, such as reckoning 'I am non-existent,' up to 'neither existent nor non-existent.' Below, where it says 'if traversing,' this explains traversing the sixty-two [views], each generating eighty-eight [afflictions]. 'Lan' (pronounced li + dan, or li + dan): 'lan' refers to unrestrained, roaming waves. 'Man' also means dispersed, loose, and unrestrained. This says that these inverted delusions are as unrestrained as waves. Below, where it says 'fifty calibrations,' this clarifies the generation of the one hundred and eight. This sūtra was translated by An Shigao in the Later Han, and its presentation of dharmic marks is slightly different from other sūtras. The sūtra says: The Buddha was in Rājagṛha, and the bodhisattvas of the ten directions asked the Buddha: 'Why are the causes and conditions of the conditioned formations not the same?' The Buddha said: 'Calibrating the five sense faculties and the mental consciousness serves as the root of all dharmas, through which one attains the wisdom of the Buddhas of the ten directions.' They asked: 'How does one practice the path completely?' 'One who constantly guards the faculties and consciousness and cultivates calibration is a wise bodhisattva; if one does not cultivate calibration, one is a foolish bodhisattva.' They asked: 'Why is not cultivating calibration being foolish, while cultivating calibration is being wise?' The Buddha answered with fifty dharmas, and within every single dharma it spoke of calibration, which is why it is called the fifty calibrations. Within every single dharma there are one hundred and eight: first exhausting the one hundred and eight foolishnesses, next exhausting the one hundred and eight desires, up to attaining the one hundred and eight true realizations and the one hundred and eight exhaustive powers. The bodhisattvas asked: 'What are the one hundred and eight?' The Buddha said: 'Having a thought and not knowing it oneself, where within the arising and ceasing of mind there is aggregate and there is accumulation, not knowing it is foolishness. Proceeding into the mental ground is also like this, and consciousness is also like this; these are the three of the mind. Seeing good form, intermediate form, or bad form, not knowing attachment oneself, not knowing cessation oneself, having aggregate and having accumulation, up to contact being also like this.' That sūtra merely lists six for each of the six sense faculties, and although it lacks the words 'three periods of time,' it concludes by stating one hundred and eight; thus we know it treats the kṣaṇa as the three periods of time. Since it takes the three—mind, thought, and consciousness—as the three of the mental ground, they thus pervade the three periods of time. For instance, accumulation and arising is called 'mind,' deliberation is called 'thought,' and distinctive knowing is called 'consciousness.' Since the three of the mind are like this, they cause the five sense faculties upon which they rely to be likewise. Because the three periods of time each have thirty-six, there are thus one hundred and eight. The sūtra further asks: 'Supposing I know the cessation of the one hundred and eight foolishnesses, is that foolish or wise?' The Buddha said: 'Not yet wise.' The bodhisattvas said: 'Why is that so?' The Buddha said: 'There are still one hundred and eight foolishnesses, up to not having yet attained the one hundred and eight exhaustive powers.' Because in thought after thought they do not leave the six sense faculties and the kṣaṇas of the three periods of time, each and every view has one hundred and eight, up to fifty sets of one hundred and eight afflictions. Therefore that sūtra states: 'With every stir of the mind and movement of thought, saṃsāra is endless.' If based on the Dazhidulun, the six sense faculties each have three feelings, the three feelings correspond to the three dusts (sense objects), and the three periods of time yield one hundred and eight. This discusses the three periods of time in terms of karmic retribution. In the various treatises, they furthermore add the ten entanglements to the eighty-eight to make ninety-eight, and add the ten contemplations to total one hundred and eight. As for the ten entanglements, the treatise states: 'The eight entanglements are shamelessness, remorselessness, jealousy, stinginess, along with regret and torpor, as well as restlessness and drowsiness; or ten by adding anger and concealment.' Thus we know that in thought after thought there are many hundreds and eights, their underlying principle implicit and their meanings distinct. The Dazhidulun also summarily subsumes the sixty-two views with the fourteen unanswerable questions, meaning four propositions for each of the three periods of time, along with the two root propositions. When such questions are raised, one should not provide an answer. Below, where it says 'one should know,' this is the conclusion. The mind is dim and the eyes are blind: blind, thus they do not see; dim, thus they do not awaken. This means that with ignorance the mind is dim and the eye of wisdom is blind, so that they neither see nor awaken to the principle of the truth of reality. Below, where it says 'worldly lecturers,' this refutes their error. Because they do not know that all alike are views, they erroneously make selections and rejections, which is the lecturers' own private interpretation. Below, where it says 'these words,' this clarifies that their erroneous views 'contravene the sūtras and betray their own minds.' Worldly people merely say that the first and third are views while the second and fourth are not views, in which case there is only half among the sixty-two, which is why it says 'deficient and missing,' and thus contravenes the sūtras. As for 'betraying their own minds,' if they truly hold this view, there is merely the error of contravening the sūtras; but if they secretly know [the truth] yet speak falsely, then there is the fault of betraying their own minds. Below, where it says 'Mūlamadhyamakakārikā,' this provisionally verifies that both existence and non-existence are reckonings of inherent nature, and reckoning is precisely view. Since non-existence is established as a view, one should know that the fourth proposition is also entirely a view. Below, where it says 'furthermore this,' it proves that non-existence is not realization, so we know it belongs to view. Below, where it says 'the various heterodox practitioners,' this is what is attained by deviant people, proving and verifying that it is view. The opening text generally brings up what is reckoned by the heterodox to discern the errors of the persons. As for 'the views of the original kalpa,' the thirteenth fascicle of the Dīrgha Āgama states: 'The Buddha told the Brahmin Supratiṣṭha: "These views of the original and the subsequent do not exceed sixty-two. The views of the original kalpa are eighteen, and the views of the subsequent kalpa are forty-four, totaling sixty-two. As for the eighteen, there are four tetralemmas and two root [propositions]. As for the first tetralemma: first, seeing twenty kalpas of formation and destruction; second, seeing forty kalpas; third, seeing eighty kalpas; fourth, expounding through rapid wisdom (every single phrase says that the spirit and the world are eternal). As for the second tetralemma: first, I and the world are half-eternal and half-impermanent; second, reckoning that it arises from joking and play; third, reckoning that it arises from loss of mindfulness; fourth, expounding through rapid wisdom (elaborated as in the first proposition). As for the third tetralemma: first, the spirit and the world are bounded; second, unbounded; third, the vertical directions are bounded while the four horizontal directions are unbounded; fourth, expounding through rapid wisdom (elaborated as in the first proposition. The beginning of each of these three tetralemmas says: there may be a śramaṇa or brāhmaṇa who, through various expedient methods of concentrated mind, contemplates and sees twenty kalpas, etc.). As for the fourth tetralemma: first, 'I neither know nor see whether good and evil have retribution or no retribution'; second, 'I neither know nor see whether there is another world or no other world'; third, 'I neither know nor see what is good and what is evil'; fourth, being foolish, ignorant, and obtuse, answering according to what others ask (the head of each of these four propositions speaks of answering differently to different questions). As for the two root propositions: first, knowing with concentrated mind that sentient beings in the future exist without causes and conditions; second, expounding through rapid wisdom."

Next, regarding the forty-four propositions of views on the future limit (the final kalpa): in the first four sets of tetralemmas, the first is the tetralemma of having perception: 1. After I end here, I will be reborn with form and with perception; 2. I will be reborn without form and with perception; 3. I will be reborn both with form and without form and with perception; 4. I will be reborn neither with form nor without form and with perception (explained at length like the first proposition). The second tetralemma pairs having an edge and being edgeless against having perception to make a tetralemma. The third tetralemma pairs having pleasure and not having pleasure against having perception to make a tetralemma. The fourth tetralemma is: 1. having perception; 2. having multiple perceptions; 3. having limited perception; 4. having immeasurable perception. The second [category] has two tetralemmas. The first tetralemma pairs having form and being formless against lacking perception to make a tetralemma—just as in the first tetralemma, only substituting 'lacking perception' for 'having perception'. The next tetralemma pairs having an edge and being edgeless against lacking perception to make a tetralemma, as described in the second tetralemma of the first text, only replacing 'having perception' with 'lacking perception'. The third [category] has two tetralemmas. The first tetralemma pairs having form and being formless against neither having perception nor lacking perception to make four. The next tetralemma pairs having an edge and being edgeless against neither having perception nor lacking perception to make a tetralemma. These two pairs of tetralemmas together with the previous four tetralemmas make thirty-two propositions in total. Furthermore, there are seven propositions of annihilationist views: 1. If a recluse or brāhmaṇa asserts the proposition: 'My body is born and nurtured through my parents' milk, food, and clothing, and ultimately returns to destruction'; 2. Rebirth among the devas of the desire realm, being completely annihilated; 3. Rebirth among the devas of the form realm, being completely annihilated; 4. The sphere of empty space; 5. The sphere of consciousness; 6. The sphere of nothingness; 7. The sphere of neither perception nor non-perception (explained at length like the desire-realm proposition). Next, there are five propositions of eternalist views, positing that all sentient beings attain nirvāṇa in the present: 1. Positing that one attains nirvāṇa by indulging in the five desires in the present; 2. The first dhyāna; 3. The second dhyāna; 4. The third dhyāna; 5. The fourth dhyāna (all positing the attainment of nirvāṇa). These make twelve propositions, which together with the previous thirty-two propositions make forty-four propositions in all.' The sūtra's explanation is very broad; although their number is sixty-two, they do not go beyond the simple tetralemma of views. 'Grabbing by the head and pulling the hair' refers to the mutual disputes between views such as existence and nonexistence among the sixty-two views. As chapter eighteen of the Mahāparinirvāṇa Sūtra says in Jīvaka's parable of non-Buddhists told to King Ajātaśatru: 'One sees two small children dragging each other and fighting, grabbing by the head and pulling the hair.' Zhang'an explained: 'The two small children are annihilationism and eternalism, existence and nonexistence, mutually condemning one another, like grabbing by the head and pulling the hair.' Because the cause is unwholesome, the painful fruit is boundless, and thus birth and death are vast and unending. 'Like Dīrghanakha,' and so forth: next, Dīrghanakha is cited, who also did not go beyond the tetralemma. Fascicle 1 of the Dazhidulun says: 'There was a non-Buddhist brāhmaṇa named Dīrghanakha (Long-Nails), also named Śreṇika, also named Vātsa, also named Saccaka, also named Māgandiya. He was a great dialectician who posited that all treatises can be refuted, all speech can be broken, and all attachments can be overturned; therefore, there is no real dharma to be trusted or venerated.' As recounted in the Sūtra on the Origins of Śāriputra, Śāriputra's mother was his elder sister. The sister had a dream in which she saw a person, fully related in the Lotus Commentary under the conditions regarding Śāriputra (and so on). Having completed his studies, he returned to his home country, but when searching for his nephew could not find him, so he went to challenge the World-Honoured One, saying: 'All treatises can be refuted,' and so forth. The Buddha rebuked him with a single sentence, saying: 'Do you accept this view of yours or not?' Having pondered for a long time without finding a single dharma that could stand in his mind, he thought: 'The recluse Gautama has placed me between two horns of defeat. If I answer that I accept it, this is a coarse horn of defeat, which everyone will know: why did I claim myself not to accept anything, yet now say that I accept? A falsehood would be plainly seen. If I answer that I do not accept my own view, this is a subtle horn of defeat that no one will know.' He immediately answered: 'I do not accept even this view.' The Buddha said: 'If you do not accept this view, with what will you refute others? You are no different from the crowd; why puff yourself up with conceit?' Dīrghanakha was thereupon unable to answer the Buddha and realized he had suffered defeat: 'The World-Honoured One did not expose my fault, nor did he declare right or wrong.' His mind was tamed and softened, and he obtained the purity of the Dharma eye. This belongs to the purview of the view of neither existence nor nonexistence within the simple tetralemma. If evaluated according to the text below and the meaning here, Dīrghanakha's purport corresponds to the latter three views within the simple four views, as well as the view of wordlessness. If he says he accepts nothing at all, it resembles the view of nonexistence. 'Highly attached' and what follows explains this by analogy. That is, it points to Dīrghanakha as someone among the high ranks and upper class of non-Buddhists: what he studied was already deeply attached, yet had not even surpassed the simple [tetralemma]; how much less could the remaining dull-witted people who merely answer questions from moment to moment? 'Now determining' and what follows: our school determines that the aforementioned fundamental and derivative views and the like do not go beyond the simple [tetralemma]. Next, the compound views are explained. Since each proposition possesses two [features], they are named 'compound'. Each and every one arises in reliance upon dharma-dust (and so forth). 'In each and every' and what follows explains how compound views produce afflictions. 'Complete' and what follows explains the complete propositions. The formula of propositions reaches four; here, one [proposition] possesses all four, so it is called 'complete'. Although simple and compound are different, they both take four as the propositional formula, and so both are called 'four'. It is only that within the three sets of four, the simple, compound, and complete differ, and they receive the name of three sets of tetralemmas. The simple involves four persons, the compound eight persons, and the complete sixteen persons. In the compound, though listing the propositions at first glance seems like adding existence and nonexistence to each of the simple four propositions, existence-existence is the same as simple existence, and nonexistence-nonexistence is the same as simple nonexistence; one merely adds nonexistence to existence, and existence to nonexistence. To the third and fourth, two propositions are added each; the propositional formula should run: 'both existence and nonexistence [with] existence', 'both existence and nonexistence [with] nonexistence', 'neither existence nor nonexistence [with] existence', 'neither existence nor nonexistence [with] nonexistence'. The present text opens up the two 'both' and the two 'neither', combining existence and nonexistence. This opening and combining is either a scribal error or has another intended meaning; the second manuscript does not list the propositions at all, but merely marks them as 'compound' and 'complete'. This was added during later revision, and must have been what was heard in full from the original lecture when listing the explanation; now it was added without stating 'I personally consider'. Thus, six propositions are added on top of the four simple ones to make the compound propositions. As for the complete four propositions, at first glance it also seems like adding four propositions to each of the simple four; however, existence-existence is the same as simple existence, and nonexistence-nonexistence is the same as simple nonexistence. Although adding both-both on top of both-both, it is the same as the simple both-both. Although adding neither-neither on top of neither-neither, it is the same as the simple neither-neither. Thus, on top of the previous simple ones, twelve propositions are added in all, and on top of the previous compound ones, only six more are added, which together with the previous simple and compound make sixteen. Thus, on top of a single tetralemma, separating them yields twenty-eight persons, but calculated they merely make sixteen propositions. Therefore, among the sixty-two, there are neither compound nor complete [views]. Next, 'a single proposition' and what follows explains the afflictions produced by the complete [views]. Next, the view of ineffability (severing words) is explained.

'Each and every' and what follows: after the various tetralemmas, each has ineffability and each gives rise to a certain number [of afflictions]; because the various afflictions do not cease, it says 'each and every'. 'Furthermore, in terms of' and what follows: next, it explains the arising of views in dependence on the Buddhadharma, which also has ineffability along with the afflictions produced thereby. The rest is as in the text.