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止觀輔行傳弘決 5.63

止觀輔行傳弘決 5.63

Language
Classical Chinese

5.63

次破無言。亦初明見由,由用觀破上之四句。「復起」下,正明見體。「謂出」下,責過。「略有」下,復以眾多絕言通責。「若謂」下,別判,判其不出複具四句。何謂絕言?所言「不出複見第二句」者,謂無無句,汝此絕言與無無不別。所言「不出具足見初句」者,即初四句中第四句也,謂有非有非無,及第四句中初句也,謂非有非無有。「故知」下,結其見惑難出故也。「法華云」下,引證也。此文通譬見網蒙蔓。經中鳩槃茶下,別譬見惑。《玉篇》云「山神為魑魅,水神為魍魎。」《西京賦》云「山神虎形為魑,宅神猪頭人形為魅。」《通俗文》云「木石變怪為魍魎。」以向二例攝鬼神盡,故以此鬼譬一切見。次複具中亦應複具,各各先明略境略觀,次廣以四句一一責之。乃至亦以二空之總,以對四句之別,一一結成二空十八空等。但例前可知,故不煩文。下絕言見雖無別相可對為總,應但用別,具如有見。乃至先出見相,次出絕言,今文存略,亦先略出複具之見,於中略出見由見體,見相正破,結成轉計等。「又復」下,出複具下絕言之相,亦略出見由見體。「如此」下,正判屬見。「何以故」下,釋判也。何故判此而屬見耶?待對生故、言不絕故。四句本絕,何須避句別求於絕?空譬可知。「又竪」下,更復竪破絕言之計。前以諸絕相望故橫。又以不絕對破於絕,絕還不絕故名為橫。今以因果前後相望,故名為竪,因不絕故果亦不絕。「上來」下,重判前來單複等見所破橫竪也。如一有見中三假四句,相望成橫;展轉度入,至四名竪。於一見中因成內外相望故橫,相續念念相望故竪。相待待於前滅名竪,待三無為名橫。一一見初皆有總破,直以空破未分橫竪。「大途秖是橫破」者,若曲分委判,如向所說;大概而言但成橫破。何者?諸見體橫,還以三假四句破之,是故大判能所俱橫。

Next is the refutation of wordlessness. It also first explains the source of the view: it comes from using contemplation to refute the above four propositions. From "again giving rise to" onward, it directly shows the substance of the view. From "claiming to transcend" onward, it reproves the fault. From "briefly there are" onward, it again generally reproves it with numerous instances of cutting off speech. From "if it is claimed" onward, it separately classifies it, determining that it does not transcend the compound and fully equipped four propositions. What is called cutting off speech? When it says "not transcending the second proposition of the compound views," it refers to the proposition of "non-[existence of] non-[existence]"; your cutting off of speech is not different from "non-[existence of] non-[existence]." When it says "not transcending the first proposition of the fully equipped views," it refers to the fourth proposition among the initial four propositions—namely, "having neither existence nor non-existence"—and the first proposition in the fourth proposition, namely, "neither existence nor non-existence having existence." From "hence it is known" onward, it concludes that the affliction of this view is difficult to transcend. From "the Lotus says" onward, it cites proof. This text generally serves as an analogy for the overspreading tangle of the net of views. In the sūtra, from kumbhāṇḍa downward, it specifically serves as an analogy for the afflictions of views. The *Yupian* says: "Mountain spirits are *chimei*; water spirits are *wangliang*." The *Xijing fu* says: "A mountain spirit with a tiger's shape is a *chi*; a household spirit with a pig's head and human body is a *mei*." The *Tongsuwen* says: "Monstrous transformations of trees and rocks are *wangliang*." Because these two analogies encompass ghosts and spirits completely, these demons are used as an analogy for all views. Next, among the compound and fully equipped views, they should also be compound and fully equipped: each first clarifies the brief object and brief contemplation, and next broadly reproves them one by one with the four propositions. It even matches the general of the two emptinesses against the particulars of the four propositions, concluding each with the two emptinesses, the eighteen emptinesses, and so forth. But since they can be known by analogy with the preceding, the text is not burdened with them. Although the view of cutting off speech below has no distinct marks to be matched as a general, one should merely use the particulars, fully as with the view of existence. Even down to first presenting the marks of the view and next presenting the cutting off of speech, the present text preserves brevity: it also first briefly presents the compound and fully equipped views, within which it briefly presents the source of the view, the substance of the view, the marks of the view, the actual refutation, the conclusion, the shift of grasping, and so forth. From "furthermore" onward, it presents the marks of cutting off speech under the compound and fully equipped, and also briefly presents the source of the view and the substance of the view. From "such as this" onward, it directly determines that it belongs to views. From "why is this" onward, it explains the determination. Why is this determined to belong to views? Because it arises in dependence on opposition, and because speech is not cut off. The four propositions are originally cut off; why must one avoid the propositions and seek cutting off separately? The analogy of space makes this clear. From "furthermore, vertically" onward, it further vertically refutes the grasping of cutting off speech. Previously, because the various [instances of] cutting off were viewed in relation to one another, it was horizontal. Also, using non-cutting-off to refute cutting off, so that cutting off is still not cut off, is termed horizontal. Now, because cause and effect, earlier and later, are viewed in relation to each other, it is called vertical: because the cause is not cut off, the effect is also not cut off. From "above" onward, it re-evaluates the horizontal and vertical nature of what was refuted by the preceding single and compound views. For example, within the single view of existence, the three provisionalities and the four propositions form the horizontal when viewed in relation to one another; shifting and passing through one another down to the fourth is vertical. Within a single view, cause and condition viewed in relation to internal and external are horizontal; continuity viewed in relation to thought-moment after thought-moment is vertical. Relative dependence depending on previous cessation is vertical; depending on the three unconditioned dharmas is horizontal. At the beginning of each and every view there is a general refutation, directly refuting with emptiness before horizontal and vertical are distinguished. "In general terms, it is merely horizontal refutation": if one were to make intricate divisions and detailed determinations, it would be as stated above; but speaking in general terms, it only constitutes horizontal refutation. Why is this? The substance of the various views is horizontal, and they are refuted back with the three provisionalities and the four propositions; therefore, broadly determined, both the refuting and the refuted are horizontal.

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