止觀輔行傳弘決 5.64.2

5.64.2

論之圓宗有此兼含，如何被破伏無中道？ 如汝被破，正當論文所兼通藏，即此初文是也。 「若生若滅」下，為出論文含別之義。 「若生滅」下，正顯論文圓宗本意。 初言「破二十身見」等者，此果破見。 經論列數多少不同，《毘曇》云「如《須陀洹喻經》說，斷無量惑名須陀洹。 」何故《大經》但斷三結？ 或隨病故、或隨根故，為鈍根者說八十八； 為利根者說斷三結。 今此即是《大論》之文，約處中說，言破二十。 又或時為鈍，但說斷三。 《婆沙》云「如昔一時有毘黎子佛法出家。 時佛已制二百五十戒，令族姓子隨作樂行。 彼人聞已乃生憂慮：『誰能守護如是諸戒？ 』便詣佛所，頭面禮佛，白佛言：『我不堪護如是諸戒。 』爾時世尊現親善相而不訶責，以軟美語而慰喻之：『善哉善哉！ 為能善持三戒不耶？ 謂戒、心、慧。 』彼人聞已即大歡喜：『我能善持如是三戒。 』」斷惑亦爾，若世尊說斷八十八使及無量苦名須陀洹，則受化者心生憂慮，何能拔除八十八樹、度八十八大河、竭八十八大海、摧八十八大山、修八十八對治？ 若佛但說斷三結者，則受化者生大歡喜。 言二十者，五陰各四，謂色大我小我在色中、我大色小色在我中、即色是我、離色有我，四陰亦爾，故此二十名為身見。 八十八使具如前釋。 「案文」下，結也。 「兼二」，謂通藏。 「龍樹」下，推功論主。 解釋自我，論意本然，如何弘論受他暗破自愜無中？ 「若開脣」下，釋傷文也。 「吃」者，不利也。 寄事以斥論師如吃。 即《論語》第九有楚狂接輿，見孔子領徒而行，乃為歌曰：「鳳兮鳳兮，何德之衰。 」《爾雅》云「雄曰鳳，雌曰凰。 」意斥孔子秖如鳳兮，出不遇時。 周道若斯，欲行禮教，亦如鳳兮出非時也。 故鄧艾對魏主以此為譏警。 魏主令其破蜀，艾為性吃，對魏主時頻稱艾艾。 魏主戲曰：「艾艾為有幾艾？ 」答曰：「鳳兮鳳兮秖是一鳳。 」今以此意斥彼論師，秖如鄧艾以鳳兮鳳兮酬於吃譏。 當知不下加不，如重吃聲，雖云不不，秖是一不，縱欲顯中，失論兼意。 此則斥其所說傷文。 「抽筆」下，正斥著述傷文。 傷者，損也。 已損圓文，徒加點淰。 既能著述，從錔抽筆染毫於硯不能開拓演其深致，而於不下加點淰乎，徒增不不之聲，却失兼含之富。 秖得雙非但中一意，全失通藏及論圓宗。 「懸疣」下，重約喻責。 疣者，肉之餘也。 橫生一肉，著體為贅，贅又生疣。 不字加點，如贅生疣。 被破無中，意欲補助，還成却失圓及藏通。 「今解」下，兼約彼非以顯今是，為扶含顯存本不生。 依汝加不，亦有多種不生不不生也。 故今責彼見心，為是何等不生不不生耶？ 故初標云且略出其十種。 於中分為三意：第一第二明非但破生不生，不生須破，故更加不不生。 此乃以正而破於邪。 第三至第九皆以兩不破兩惑生，故云不不生。 即是以一生字對上兩不，義而言之開為兩生。 故上不生是一不不見生，次一不生是一不不思生。 及論結句一一但云「不不生」者，還存略故。 故以下句不字次前不下，故云不不。 下去諸句準此可知，故云正習乃至別圓。 第十約妙覺位，智斷永滿兩生不生，名不不生。 此中三釋同在妙覺，初但標十意在於此。 又從第三至第九一一文中，皆釋前竟次生後句，前雖不生望後猶生。 如釋三藏二乘，不見不思兩不生竟，即生後云「習氣猶生」。 若不爾者，後何所破？ 初文長爪成第四句及絕言者，一切能破義似雙非，語皆可轉義似絕言，是則一計前後四出，謂無見、亦有亦無、非有非無及以絕言。 今總判之似一不生，不生邪見是故須破，名不不生。 「如非想」下，復引須跋非想無生，無生須破，名不不生。 犢子例此。

The perfect doctrine of the treatise contains this inclusiveness; how could it be refuted and reduced to lacking the middle path? When you were refuted, it corresponded precisely to the treatise's inclusion of the shared and Tripiṭaka [teachings], which is this opening text. From "If arising or ceasing" downward, it brings out the meaning of the treatise containing the distinctive [teaching]. From "If arising-and-ceasing" downward, it directly reveals the original intention of the treatise's perfect doctrine. When it initially says "refuting the twenty [views of] identity-view" and so forth, this refers to the fruit refuting views. The sutras and treatises list varying numbers: the *Abhidharma* says, "As explained in the *Srotāpanna Parable Sūtra*, cutting off immeasurable afflictions is called becoming a srotāpanna." Why does the *Mahāparinirvāṇa Sūtra* speak only of cutting off the three fetters? Either it follows the illness or it follows the faculties: for those of dull faculties it speaks of eighty-eight; for those of sharp faculties it speaks of cutting off the three fetters. Now, this passage from the *Dazhidulun* speaks according to an intermediate position, saying it refutes twenty. Furthermore, sometimes for the dull it speaks only of cutting off three. The *Vibhāṣā* states: "For example, once in the past, a son of the Bilizhi went forth into the Buddhist Dharma. At that time, the Buddha had already laid down the two hundred and fifty precepts, enjoining sons of noble families to practice them with joy. Having heard this, that person gave rise to worry and anxiety: 'Who could guard such precepts?' He then went to the Buddha's dwelling, bowed with his head at the Buddha's feet, and addressed the Buddha, saying: 'I am unable to uphold such precepts.' At that time, the World-Honoured One manifested a warm and friendly manner and did not reprimand him, but comforted and instructed him with gentle and soothing words: 'Excellent, excellent! Would you be able to uphold three precepts well or not? Namely: precept, mind, and wisdom.' Having heard this, that person was immediately overjoyed: 'I can uphold these three precepts well.'" Cutting off afflictions is likewise: if the World-Honoured One had said that cutting off eighty-eight proclivities and immeasurable suffering constitutes a srotāpanna, then those being transformed would give rise to worry in their minds: 'How could one uproot eighty-eight trees, cross eighty-eight great rivers, dry up eighty-eight great oceans, crush eighty-eight great mountains, and cultivate eighty-eight antidotes?' If the Buddha speaks only of cutting off the three fetters, then those being transformed give rise to great joy. As for the twenty: each of the five aggregates has four—namely, form is large and the self is small, the self is within form; the self is large and form is small, form is within the self; form is identical to the self; or there is a self separate from form; the [other] four aggregates are also like this. Hence these twenty are called identity-views. The eighty-eight proclivities are fully explained as before. From "Examining the text" downward is the conclusion. "Incorporate two" refers to the shared and Tripiṭaka [teachings]. From "Nāgārjuna" downward attributes the merit to the treatise's author. The explanation originates from me, but the treatise's intention was fundamentally so. How could one propagate the treatise, suffer another's covert refutation, and complacently accept that it lacks the middle? From "If opening the lips" downward explains the injury to the text. "Stuttering" means not being fluent. This borrows a circumstance to reprimand the treatise masters for being like stutterers. That is, in the ninth chapter of the *Analects*, there was the Madman of Chu, Jieyu, who saw Confucius leading his disciples along and sang a song to him: "Phoenix, phoenix! How has your virtue declined!" The *Erya* states: "The male is called *feng*, the female is called *huang*." The intention was to reprimand Confucius as being just like a phoenix that has appeared out of season: the way of the Zhou being like this, to wish to practice ritual and education was also like the phoenix appearing out of season. Therefore Deng Ai used this to mockingly caution the Ruler of Wei. When the Ruler of Wei ordered him to conquer Shu, because Ai was naturally a stutterer, when addressing the Ruler of Wei he frequently said, "Ai, Ai." The Ruler of Wei teased him, saying: "'Ai, Ai'—how many Ais are there?" He replied: "'Phoenix, phoenix' is just a single phoenix." Now, this idea is used to reprimand those treatise masters: it is just like Deng Ai using "Phoenix, phoenix" to respond to the ridicule of stuttering. You should know that adding a "not" under a "not" is like a double-stuttering sound: although one says "not not," it is just a single "not"; even if one wishes to reveal the middle, one loses the treatise's inclusive intention. This, then, reprimands their spoken words for injuring the text. From "Drawing the brush" downward directly reprimands their writings for injuring the text. "Injuring" means damaging. Having already damaged the perfect text, they uselessly add dots and marks. Since they are able to write treatises, drawing the brush from its sheath and dipping the bristles into the inkstone, they cannot broaden and expound its profound purport, yet they add dots and marks under "not"! They merely increase the sound of "not not," but lose the richness of its mutual inclusion. They obtain only the single meaning of the "exclusive middle" of double negation, completely losing the shared and Tripiṭaka [teachings] as well as the treatise's perfect doctrine. From "A hanging wart" downward reprimands them again by analogy. A wart is an excess of flesh. A piece of flesh that grows unnaturally and adheres to the body is an excrescence; and from the excrescence, a wart grows again. Adding a dot to the character "not" is like an excrescence growing a wart. Having been refuted as lacking the middle, their intention was to supplement it, but it resulted instead in losing the perfect as well as the Tripiṭaka and shared [teachings]. From "Now I explain" downward concurrently addresses their error to reveal the present correctness, in order to support the inclusion and reveal the retention of fundamental non-arising. In accordance with your addition of "not," there are also multiple kinds of "non-arising of not non-arising." Therefore, I now examine their view-holding mind: what kind of "non-arising of not non-arising" is it? Thus it initially states that it will briefly set forth ten kinds. Within this, it is divided into three intentions: The first and second explain that it is not merely refuting arising and non-arising; non-arising must be refuted, so one further adds "not non-arising." This is using the correct to refute the heterodox. The third to the ninth all use two "nots" to refute the arising of two afflictions; hence it is called "not non-arising." That is, it takes the single word "arising" and contrasts it with the preceding two "nots"; in terms of meaning, it unfolds into two [kinds of] arising. Thus the preceding "non-arising" is one "not" not having the arising of [afflictions of] views; the subsequent "non-arising" is one "not" not having the arising of [afflictions of] thought. When the treatise's concluding phrase in each case merely says "not non-arising," it still preserves brevity. Therefore, because the "not" of the subsequent phrase follows beneath the preceding "not," it says "not not." The subsequent phrases can be understood by following this; hence it says "true and residual," up to "distinctive and perfect." The tenth concerns the stage of wondrous awakening, where wisdom and elimination are forever fulfilled, and both arisings do not arise, which is called "not non-arising." The three explanations here all pertain to wondrous awakening; initially it merely marked ten intentions on this basis. Furthermore, in each passage from the third to the ninth, after explaining the preceding, it gives rise to the subsequent phrase: although the preceding does not arise, looking forward to the subsequent, it still arises. For example, when explaining the two vehicles of the Tripiṭaka, after the two non-arisings of [afflictions of] view and [afflictions of] thought, it then generates the subsequent statement that "residual habits still arise." If this were not so, what would the subsequent refute? In the first text, Dīrghanakha forming the fourth proposition and the ineffable: because everything can be refuted, its meaning resembles the double negation; because all words can be altered, its meaning resembles the ineffable. Thus, this single view appears four times, earlier and later: namely, the view of nothingness, both existence and non-existence, neither existence nor non-existence, and the ineffable. Now I judge it overall as resembling a single non-arising; this non-arising is a wrong view, and therefore it must be refuted, being called "not non-arising." From "Like neither-conception" downward, it further cites Subhadra's non-arising of neither-conception; this non-arising must be refuted, being called "not non-arising." The Vātsīputrīyas are an example of this.