止觀輔行傳弘決 6.30

6.30

次料簡中，五重問答。初問意者，以空例假。「謂情」下答中，先分別三根以例出假。以情為上、似中真下，情在五停、四念處位，似在燸等四善根位；真在見道已上位也。「情入」者下，重釋上根。言「觸人」者，於似真前念處位中緣苦諦觀，未發相似，所緣之境全同法塵。「與此空想法塵相塵」，亦得名為情入空也，非謂爾前凡情名入。然此四念人皆能入，故曰觸人。恐濫外凡已前，故云「非謂散情」。或云：發八觸人方名情入。未審此意（云云）。「若爾」下，更難。但是情入，於空何益？「此有」下，答。亦但情益，雖未證空與散情異，即此名益，何必似真？為通前難以辨三根，於實入空未為真益。「若益」下，更難。凡云益者，應異退人。既云有益，應當不退。「不併退」者，答也。雖未名為不退之位，此位何必一切盡退？「設」下，縱釋。設使有退，亦能數修。何以故？是人以用五停治法，深重惑謝，故能數修四念處觀。次「問」者，通別上根初心之時即能入假，當知即假復能入空。是則空假二觀相即，以圓空假相即何別？答中列出三人不同。通人雖即正出假時似即入空，此教始終不能入中，故知不同圓教相即。別人雖亦初心出假復即入空，教體終須先空次假，習佛法備後方修中，故名次第。故此兩教與圓永乖。況通別入空但照六界，兩教出假長短不同，尚未能出佛法界假，豈能九界見即中耶？是故兩教與圓不同。況復初心空假並用，一往似即二俱未滿。縱帶此空即十界假，既無法性的非圓融，何須難云與圓何別？從「圓人」去，辨圓異別。而言一心亦能作別者，謂勝能兼劣，能別能圓。「謂多入」下，次釋圓人次第之相。文列五句，但成四句，以第五句與初句同。但是文誤，應無別意。義推應有六句不同，前四如文，除初同句，更加假中與空相對以為兩句，謂多入空少入假中、多入假中少入空，文無者略。「若爾」下，難向六句。雖有多少，三觀俱時，何名圓人能觀次第？故云「則非次第之別」。「然」下答。如向六句即是勝別。別教次第名為劣別，圓觀自在勝劣俱能，是故以勝而況於劣。二明出假利益者，欲明出假真實利益，必在別圓初地初住。是知三根雖益而微，此是第四示文妙旨。故知明益正示文意，次第假相利益非無。於中且先總序真應，於中先明真應之由。文云真應復云法眼，故此法眼必非地前，以不思議假為法眼耳。次「應以」下，略明應益以格藏通，驗知此益定在法身。「三藏」下，歷教正釋。判前兩教菩薩之人非真起應。縱約佛者尚非真應，況復菩薩。言「佛非」者，亦且約於當分教道。准彼教門未明法身，是故當教無真應義。若開顯說即是法身，與誰相形云無真應。即是《玄》文跨節義也。「應有」下，明真應相以斥藏通。如釋迦過去過去久得法身，於六道中與物結緣，今於王城出家成道，是故名為「應有始終」。別教地前尚非真應，況復藏通。「別教」下，正明真應，即登地已上乃至妙覺。深水曰「淵」，水本曰「源」。見眾生病，知病根本，如人見水知水源底。覩諸法藥識藥內實，如人見藥知藥體性。「印」謂符印，以銅為之，使天下同。今亦如是，使用諸教與機不差，故名為同。是則無明為病淵源，中道為藥府藏，真種智知如印不差，不思議眼所見無失。「和光」下，釋現身也。同四住塵處處結緣，作淨土因為利物之始，眾生機熟八相成道，見身聞法終至實益，仍存教道以約初地。次明圓教證道不別，是故但云「乃至亦復如是」。「若得」下，對邪料簡。魔亦能為，故須決擇。「所以者何」下，釋簡邪也。言「以有漏形作無漏像」者，如優波毱多調伏魔竟，欲見如來在日之形，謂魔曰：「汝為我現。」魔曰：「如教。但現相之時，莫為作禮。」便於林中放大光明，八部導從乘空而出。毱多見已生希有心，不覺作禮，以偈讚曰：「快哉清淨業，能成是妙果。非自在天生，亦非無因作。面如紫金色，目淨若青蓮，端正超日月，奇妙勝華林，湛然若大海，不動逾須彌，安步猶師子，顧視同牛王。無量百千劫，淨修身口意，以是故獲得，如此殊妙身。怨見尚歡喜，況我不欣慶。」魔被作禮，更復本形。《大經．四依品》云「若魔變為佛形，三十二相八十種好，如是莊嚴來向汝者，汝當檢挍定其虛實。世尊！魔等尚能化作佛形，況不能作阿羅漢像？」〈邪正品〉云「天魔波旬為壞法故，作四眾像、四果、佛像。」「老子」等者，彼《化胡經》乃是道士王浮偽造，今且縱之，借使老子化作佛者，亦是以有漏形作無漏像，亦同天魔化身之例。況復彼經自化十胡，何關五印？「變釋為羊」等者，《大經》三十五文，具如《釋籤》第三所引。「尚非三藏五通」者，未斷惑故，無無漏通。所得神通，亦依根本期心異故，通用亦勝。彼諸外道尚無念處煖頂等法，故云世智。如是現者，但是如意身通少分，如何得比三藏五通？尚劣三藏，豈同別圓？「化語」下，責奪也。「雷同」者，如陰陽發雷同生萬物。亦作「靁」字，字義同前。「故知」下，示真應益。「三結破法遍者」，准文次第，破無明盡方可云遍，亦是取意不次第說。先寄三諦以意斥文，次舉要以結示。初三諦中，先約真諦。前明文相，於文相中又先出凡情。未破見位，尚未次第入真，況不次第入實？初獨舉見，意則兼思，故此次文見思並舉。譬中，略引三譬。「如盲問乳」，具如前引。「若繩若杵」者，《大經．如來性品》云「譬如有王，令一大臣牽一白象示諸盲人，眾盲各各以手觸象。王問眾盲：象為何類？其觸牙者言象如萊茯根，其觸耳者言象如箕，其觸鼻者言象如杵，其觸脚者言象如臼，其觸脊者言象如床，其觸腹者言象如瓮，其觸尾者言象如繩。」次合喻云「或有說言色是佛性、或有說言受是佛性、想行識我亦復如是。」各執俱非，故云「何關」。離此無象，方知各是。是故總云不即不離，不即故凡夫豈是，不離故離凡復無。是故各計皆名為見。以色等六合牙等七，故七喻通不須的對。「囈言」等者，應作此寱，睡中言也。《大經》第十八云「譬如二人共為親友，一是王子（能化）、一是賤人（所化），如是二人互相往反（感應相）。是時貧人（邪我名貧）見是王子有一好刀，淨妙第一（佛性），心中貪著（愛樂佛法）。王子後時執持是刀逃至他國（菩薩捨應也。感應事密，故云逃至。轉化餘方，故云他國），貧人於後寄宿他舍（受五道身），即於夢中寱言刀刀（無明暗寱妄謂有我。從此已下聲聞施化，即以似一名為旁人）。旁人聞已，收至王所。時王問言：『汝言刀者，為何所似？可以示我。』是人具以上事白王（初果）。『王今設使屠割臣身、分裂手足欲得刀者，實不可得（析觀）。臣與王子素為親友（曾受小化），共在一處（機感相應），雖曾眼見（聞慧），乃至不敢以手棠觸（思慧），況當故取（修慧唯得聞慧，無思修故）。』王復問言：『卿所見刀，相貌何似？』答言：『大王！刀者如羖羊角（剎利計神黃色）。』王聞是已欣然而笑，語言：『汝今隨意所趣，勿生憂怖。我庫藏中都無是刀，況汝曾於王子邊見。』王問群臣：『汝曾見不？』言已便終。尋立餘王紹繼王位，復問諸臣：『汝於庫藏曾見刀不？』臣答：『曾見。』問言：『何似？』答言：『如羖羊角。』如是展轉至第四王登位（即第四果），復問諸臣，皆答言見。王復問言：『相貌何似？』答言：『如優鉢羅華（婆羅門計神白）。』復有說言：『其色紅赤如火聚（毘舍計神赤色）。』有言：『猶如黑蛇（首陀計神黑色）。』王聞大笑：『卿等悉皆不見我刀真相。』」已上注文並是章安疏釋。經自合云「說已捨去，如王子逃。」凡夫說我如彼暗囈，聲聞緣覺問諸眾生：我有何相？或有說言如母指，或言如粟米等住在身中熾然如日。如來出世為斷我相，言無是刀。貝粖雪鶴、摸象囈言，並喻邪常。雖云佛性，而皆執我，故屬見攝。故今引之，破見思遍但是入空。「就文字」下，說意也。附文但是破見思遍，故云如此。若論元意，一見一思無非法界，不同次第，故曰「意則不然」。「見思即是」下，正出文意。若從文說，見思障真、無明障中。若從意說，見思之外無別無明。無明體性既即法性，當知見思亦即法性。若見見思無明法性，是約名等五即論遍；若取見性，應唯第五第六。今通論破，何須必至分證究竟名遍？次寄從空出假者，亦先明文相，次顯文意，故云「亦爾」。初文相中既是次第，且約法眼論遍不遍。「六根」已下，次明文意。文意本在不次第假，不次第假雖即從初不次第破，復約不次而論次位。即是六根麁惑先除，發得相似不思議假。相似即是中道前相，即是遍位之氣分也。「障通」下，約中道觀以示破遍。中道既是破遍之法，是故直約雙照論遍，不須復於文外論意。即指無明為障不思議化道神通之惑，此惑若破，任運雙照。雖復文中不論文相，然此中道居二觀後，復當次第文相故也。「故舉要」下，更總明文旨，謂不次第，具如前文。即觀見思即見法性，不復更論三惑三觀前後次第。如此結要，乃名遍耳。「前觀法」下，示結遍意。結遍應在中道文後，如何於此預明破遍？但後文明遍，理數而然。秖恐見前空假二觀觀法重沓，迷於文旨。言文旨者，向之重沓不出一心，故於此中且先略示。見思尚乃即是法性，豈有塵沙在見思外？豈有無明在二觀後？三惑既即，三觀必融，此是第五示文旨也。

Next, in the analysis, there are five exchanges of question and answer. As for the intention of the initial question, it uses emptiness to exemplify provisionality. In the answer below starting with 'it refers to the emotional,' first the three faculties are differentiated to exemplify emerging into the provisional. Taking the emotional as superior, the resemblance as intermediate, and the true as inferior: the emotional is at the stations of the fivefold stilling [of the mind] and the four stations of mindfulness; the resemblance is at the stations of the four roots of goodness such as warmth; the true is at the station of the path of seeing and above. Below, 'entering through the emotional' re-explains the superior faculty. The phrase 'the person who touches' refers to one who, at the station of mindfulness prior to resemblance and the true, conditions the contemplation of the truth of suffering, yet resemblance has not arisen, so the conditioned object is entirely identical with dharma-dust. 'Being in contact with this dharma-dust of the conception of emptiness' can also be called entering emptiness through the emotional; it does not mean that ordinary emotions prior to that are called entering. However, all people at these four stations of mindfulness are able to enter, hence the phrase 'person who touches.' Fearing confusion with [states] prior to external worldlings, it says 'not meaning scattered feelings.' Or it is said: only a person who arouses the eight touchings is called entering through the emotional. This intention is not yet certain (and so forth). Below, 'if so,' further poses an objection: If it is merely emotional entry, what benefit is there with regard to emptiness? Below, 'there is this,' answers: It is also merely an emotional benefit; although emptiness has not been realized, it differs from scattered feelings, and this itself is called a benefit—why must it be resemblance or the true? In order to resolve the previous objection so as to distinguish the three faculties, it is not yet true benefit in terms of actual entry into emptiness. Below, 'if there is benefit,' further objects: Whenever 'benefit' is spoken of, it ought to differ from those who regress. Since you say there is benefit, there ought to be no regression. 'They do not all regress' is the answer. Although it is not yet called the stage of non-retrogression, why must everyone at this stage entirely regress? Below, 'even if,' concedes and explains: Even if there is regression, they are also able to practice repeatedly. Why is this? Because this person, by using the fivefold stilling remedies, has eliminated deep and heavy afflictions, and is therefore able to repeatedly practice the contemplation of the four stations of mindfulness. Next, the 'question': Since practitioners of superior faculties in the shared and distinctive teachings are able to enter the provisional at their initial stage of aspiration, one should know that right in provisionality they are also able to enter emptiness. If so, then the two contemplations of emptiness and provisionality are mutually identical; how does this differ from the mutual identity of emptiness and provisionality in the perfect [teaching]? In the answer, the differences among the three types of persons are laid out. Although the practitioner of the shared teaching seems to enter emptiness right when actually emerging into provisionality, this teaching from beginning to end is unable to enter the middle; therefore, we know it is not identical to the mutual identity of the perfect teaching. Although the practitioner of the distinctive teaching also emerges into provisionality at the initial stage of aspiration and right then enters emptiness, the substance of the teaching ultimately requires first emptiness and then provisionality, cultivating the middle only after the Buddha-dharma has been completely mastered; hence it is called sequential. Therefore, these two teachings are eternally at variance with the perfect [teaching]. Moreover, entering emptiness in the shared and distinctive teachings illuminates only the six realms; their emergence into provisionality differs in duration between the two teachings, and they are not yet able to emerge into the provisionality of the Buddha-dharma realm—how could they see the nine realms as immediately the middle? For this reason, the two teachings differ from the perfect. Furthermore, when the initial aspiration employs both emptiness and provisionality, at first glance they seem mutually identical, yet neither is complete. Even if one carries this emptiness into the provisionality of the ten realms, since there is no dharma-nature, it is definitely not perfectly fused; why need one raise the objection asking how it differs from the perfect? From 'the person of the perfect [teaching]' onward, the perfect is distinguished from the distinctive. That a single mind is also able to act distinctively means that the superior is able to encompass the inferior, being capable of both the distinctive and the perfect. Below, 'meaning mostly entering,' next explains the sequential characteristics of the person of the perfect [teaching]. The text lists five clauses, but they only constitute four clauses, because the fifth clause is the same as the first. This is merely a textual error and should have no other meaning. Deduced by reason, there should be six different clauses: the first four are as in the text; removing the identical initial clause, if we additionally counterpose provisionality-and-middle against emptiness to form two clauses—namely, mostly entering emptiness and rarely entering provisionality-and-middle, and mostly entering provisionality-and-middle and rarely entering emptiness—what is missing from the text was omitted for brevity. Below, 'if so,' objects to the aforementioned six clauses: Although there are differences of more or less, the three contemplations occur simultaneously; how can this be called a person of the perfect [teaching] being able to contemplate sequentially? Hence it says, 'then it is not the sequence of the distinctive [teaching].' Below, 'however,' answers: The aforementioned six clauses are precisely the superior distinctive. The sequence of the distinctive teaching is called the inferior distinctive. The perfect contemplation is unfettered, being capable of both the superior and the inferior; therefore, the superior is used to illustrate the inferior. Second, on explaining the benefits of emerging into the provisional: if one wishes to explain the true benefit of emerging into the provisional, it must be at the first stage [of the distinctive teaching] and the first dwelling [of the perfect teaching]. Thus we know that although the three faculties have benefits, they are slight; this is the fourth [point], revealing the wondrous purport of the text. Hence we know that explaining the benefits directly reveals the intent of the text; the sequential provisional aspects are not devoid of benefit. Therein, first there is an overarching preface on the true and the responsive, within which the origin of the true and responsive is first explained. The text mentions the true and responsive and also mentions the Dharma-eye; therefore, this Dharma-eye definitely does not belong prior to the stages, for it takes the inconceivable provisional as the Dharma-eye. Next, below 'ought by means of,' briefly clarifies the responsive benefit to compare with the Tripiṭaka and shared [teachings], proving that this benefit definitely resides in the Dharma-body. Below, 'the Tripiṭaka,' directly explains through the teachings. It determines that the bodhisattvas of the prior two teachings do not manifest response bodies based on the true. Even regarding the Buddha, it is not yet the true and responsive, much less the bodhisattvas. The statement 'the Buddha is not' is also made provisionally regarding the teaching method within their own scope. According to those teaching gateways, the Dharma-body has not been explained; therefore, within those teachings there is no meaning of the true and the responsive. If explained according to the opening and revelation, it is precisely the Dharma-body; then with whom could it be compared to say there is no true and responsive? This is precisely the meaning of 'transcending the divisions' in the Xuan[yi] text. Below, 'responses have,' explains the characteristics of the true and responsive to refute the Tripiṭaka and shared [teachings]. Just as Śākyamuni obtained the Dharma-body in the distant, distant past and formed affinities with living beings in the six destinies, and now renounced the household and achieved the way in the royal city, this is why it is called 'responses have a beginning and an end.' Prior to the stages of the distinctive teaching it is not yet the true and responsive, much less in the Tripiṭaka and shared teachings. Below, 'the distinctive teaching,' directly explains the true and responsive, namely from ascending the stages up to wondrous awakening. Deep water is called a 'chasm' (yuan), and the source of water is called a 'spring' (yuan). Seeing the illnesses of sentient beings and knowing the root of the illness is like a person seeing water and knowing the spring and bottom of the water. Viewing the various Dharma medicines and recognizing the internal reality of the medicine is like a person seeing a medicine and knowing its essential nature. An 'impression' (yin) refers to a tally or seal made of bronze to ensure uniformity throughout the realm. Here it is also like this: applying the various teachings without erring against people's capacities is called uniformity. Thus ignorance is the chasm and spring of illness, the middle way is the storehouse of medicines, the true knowledge of species knows without error like a seal, and what is seen by the inconceivable eye has no deficiency. Below, 'harmonizing its light,' explains manifesting the body. Sharing the dust of the four dwellings and forging affinities everywhere, creating the cause for a pure land is the beginning of benefiting beings; when sentient beings' capacities are ripe, one achieves the way through the eight phases, and their seeing the body and hearing the Dharma ultimately reaches true benefit—still preserving the teaching method to apply to the first stage. Next, it explains that the realization of the way in the perfect teaching does not differ, which is why it merely says 'and so forth, it is also like this.' Below, 'if obtained,' analyzes in contrast to heresy. Demons can also do this, so it must be evaluated and discerned. Below, 'why is this,' explains distinguishing heresy. The phrase 'using an outflowing form to make an outflow-free image' is like when Upagupta, having subdued the demon, wished to see the form of the Tathāgata during his lifetime and said to the demon: 'Manifest it for me.' The demon said: 'As you instruct; but when the manifestation appears, do not bow to me.' Thereupon in the forest he radiated great light, and the retinues of the eight classes led the way and emerged through the air. Upagupta, upon seeing this, gave rise to a rare thought and unwittingly bowed, praising him in verse: 'How delightful is pure karma, / Able to accomplish this wondrous fruit! / Not born from Maheśvara, / Nor produced without a cause. / His face is like purple gold, / His eyes pure as blue lotuses, / His dignified poise surpasses sun and moon, / His marvels excel a grove of blossoms; / Serene like the great ocean, / Immovable, surpassing Mount Sumeru, / He walks peacefully like a lion, / Glances around like a bull king. / For immeasurable hundreds of thousands of kalpas, / He purely cultivated body, speech, and mind; / Because of this, he obtained / Such an extraordinarily wondrous body. / Even enemies are pleased upon seeing it; / How much more should I rejoice!' The demon, having received the bow, returned to his original form. The 'Chapter on the Four Reliances' in the Mahā[parinirvāṇa] Sūtra says: 'If a demon transforms into a Buddha's form, with the thirty-two marks and eighty secondary signs, and approaches you with such adornment, you should examine and determine its reality or falsehood. World-Honoured One! Even demons can transform into a Buddha's form, how could they not be able to make the image of an arhat?' The 'Chapter on Heresy and Correctness' says: 'The heavenly demon Pāpīyān, in order to destroy the Dharma, makes images of the four assemblies, the four fruits, and the Buddha.' The mention of Laozi and others refers to the Huahujing forged by the Daoist Wang Fu. For now we concede it: even if Laozi transformed into a Buddha, that too would be using an outflowing form to make an outflow-free image, following the same precedent as the celestial demon's transformed body. Moreover, that scripture itself speaks of transforming the ten barbarian [tribes]; what does that have to do with the five Indias? Regarding 'transforming Śakra into a sheep' and so forth, the text of fascicle thirty-five of the Mahā[parinirvāṇa] Sūtra is fully cited in the third fascicle of the Shiqian. 'It is not even the five supernormal powers of the Tripiṭaka' means that because afflictions have not been severed, there are no outflow-free supernormal powers. The supernormal powers attained also depend on the fundamental [absorptions], and because the initial aspiration differs, their supernormal functioning is also superior. Those heterodox paths do not even possess dharmas like the stations of mindfulness, warmth, or summits; hence it is called worldly wisdom. Manifesting like this is merely a small fraction of the supernormal power of the mind-made body; how could it compare to the five supernormal powers of the Tripiṭaka? If it is still inferior to the Tripiṭaka, how could it be the same as the distinctive or perfect? Below, 'transformed words,' rebukes and strips it away. 'In unison' (leidong) means like yin and yang producing thunder and simultaneously generating the myriad things. It is also written with the character lei (靁), the character's meaning being the same as above. Below, 'therefore we know,' demonstrates the benefit of the true and responsive. Under 'third, concluding the universal refutation of dharmas,' according to the sequence of the text, only when ignorance has been exhausted can it be called universal; this is also taking the purport rather than speaking sequentially. First, it relies on the three truths to implicitly criticize the text, and next, it summarizes to conclude and reveal. Among the initial three truths, it first deals with the ultimate truth. First it explains the literal textual aspects, and within the textual aspects it again first exposes ordinary emotions. When the stage of refuting views has not been reached, one has not yet entered the true sequentially, much less entered the real non-sequentially. Initially it singles out views alone, but the intent includes thought; therefore, the following text raises both views and thoughts together. In the metaphors, three metaphors are briefly cited. 'Like a blind man asking about milk' is fully cited as before. As for 'like a rope or a pestle,' the 'Chapter on the Tathāgata-Nature' in the Mahā[parinirvāṇa] Sūtra says: 'For example, a king ordered a great minister to lead a white elephant to show to various blind men. Each of the blind men touched the elephant with his hand. The king asked the blind men: What kind of thing is an elephant? He who touched the tusk said the elephant is like a radish root; he who touched the ear said the elephant is like a winnowing basket; he who touched the trunk said the elephant is like a pestle; he who touched the foot said the elephant is like a mortar; he who touched the back said the elephant is like a bed; he who touched the belly said the elephant is like an urn; he who touched the tail said the elephant is like a rope.' Next, applying the metaphor, it says: 'Some say form is Buddha-nature, some say feeling is Buddha-nature; and conception, volition, consciousness, and the self are also like this.' Clinging to each, all are wrong; hence it says 'what connection has it?' Apart from these there is no elephant; only then does one know that each is correct. Therefore, it is generally stated to be neither identical nor separate: because it is not identical, how could an ordinary person be it? Because it is not separate, apart from the ordinary person it does not exist. Therefore, each of these estimations is called a view. Correlating the six, such as form, with the seven, such as the tusks, the seven metaphors apply comprehensively and need not correspond strictly one-to-one. Regarding 'talking in one's sleep' and so forth, it should be written as this character ni (寱), meaning speaking in sleep. Fascicle eighteen of the Mahā[parinirvāṇa] Sūtra says: 'For example, two men were friends: one was a prince (the transformer) and one was an outcaste (the one to be transformed). These two men went back and forth with each other (the aspect of stimulus and response). At that time, the poor man (the false self is called poor) saw that this prince had a fine knife, supremely pure and wondrous (Buddha-nature), and in his heart he coveted it (loving and delighting in the Buddha-dharma). Later, the prince held this knife and fled to another country (the bodhisattva relinquishing the response. Because the matter of stimulus and response is secret, it says 'fled to.' Converting other regions, it says 'another country'). The poor man afterward lodged in another house (receiving a body in the five destinies), and in his dream he talked in his sleep, saying: Knife, knife! (In the dark sleep of ignorance, falsely claiming there is a self. From this point on, the śrāvaka provides conversion, taking the resemblance stage to be called a bystander). A bystander heard this and brought him to the king's presence. At that time, the king asked: The knife you speak of, what does it resemble? Show it to me. This man reported all the above events to the king (the first fruit). 'Even if Your Majesty now dismembers my body and splits my hands and feet to obtain the knife, it truly cannot be obtained (analytic contemplation). I was originally friends with the prince (previously received small conversion) and stayed together in one place (stimulus and capacity responding to each other); although I once saw it with my eyes (wisdom from hearing), I did not even dare touch it with my hand (wisdom from contemplation), how much less take it intentionally? (Wisdom from cultivation; having only attained hearing wisdom, there was no contemplation or cultivation).' The king again asked: What was the appearance of the knife you saw? He answered: Great King! The knife was like a ram's horn (the kṣatriya conceiving the spirit as yellow). The king, having heard this, laughed with delight and said to him: 'Now go wherever you wish, do not be anxious or afraid. In my treasury there is no such knife at all, how could you have seen it beside the prince?' The king asked his ministers: 'Have you ever seen it?' Having spoken, he passed away. Soon another king was established to succeed the throne, and he again asked the ministers: 'Have you ever seen the knife in the treasury?' The ministers replied: 'We have seen it.' He asked: 'What was it like?' They replied: 'Like a ram's horn.' In this way it passed down until the fourth king ascended the throne (namely the fourth fruit); he again asked the ministers, and all replied that they had seen it. The king again asked: 'What was its appearance like?' They replied: 'Like an utpala flower (the brāhmaṇa conceiving the spirit as white).' Others said: 'Its color was crimson like a mass of fire (the vaiśya conceiving the spirit as red).' Still others said: 'It was like a black snake (the śūdra conceiving the spirit as black).' The king heard and laughed heartily: 'None of you have seen the true form of my knife.'' All the notes above are Zhang'an's commentary. The sūtra itself applies the metaphor, saying: 'Having spoken, he departed, like the prince fleeing.' Ordinary people speaking of the self is like that sleep-talking in the dark; when śrāvakas and pratyekabuddhas ask sentient beings: 'What characteristic does the self have?' some say it is like a thumb, or say it is like a millet grain residing in the body, blazing like the sun. The Tathāgata appeared in the world to sever the characteristic of self, saying there is no such knife. Cowrie shells, powdered snow, cranes, touching the elephant, and sleep-talking all metaphorically illustrate false permanence. Although they speak of Buddha-nature, they all grasp at a self, so they are subsumed under views. Therefore, quoting them now, the universal refutation of views and thoughts is merely entering emptiness. Below, 'according to the text,' explains the intent. Following the text, it is merely the universal refutation of views and thoughts, hence it says 'like this.' If discussing the original intent, not a single view or single thought fails to be the dharma-dhātu, which does not follow a sequence; hence it says 'the intent is not so.' Below, 'views and thoughts are precisely,' directly reveals the intent of the text. If explained according to the text, views and thoughts obstruct the true, and ignorance obstructs the middle. If explained according to the intent, outside of views and thoughts there is no separate ignorance. Since the essence of ignorance is itself dharma-nature, one should know that views and thoughts are also itself dharma-nature. If one sees that views, thoughts, and ignorance are dharma-nature, this is discussing universality in terms of the five identities, such as verbal identity; if one takes seeing the nature, it should only be the fifth and sixth. Now discussing refutation generally, why must it reach partial realization or ultimate [identity] to be called universal? Next, relying on emerging from emptiness into provisionality, it also first explains the textual aspect and next reveals the textual intent, hence it says 'likewise.' In the initial textual aspect, since it is sequential, it provisionally discusses universality and non-universality in terms of the Dharma-eye. From 'the six sense faculties' onward, it next explains the textual intent. The textual intent originally lies in the non-sequential provisional; although the non-sequential provisional is refuted non-sequentially from the beginning, it also discusses sequential stages in terms of the non-sequential. This means that the coarse afflictions of the six faculties are first eliminated, generating the resemblance inconceivable provisional. Resemblance is precisely the prior sign of the middle way, which is the atmosphere of the universal stage. Below, 'obstructing supernormal powers,' demonstrates the universal refutation in terms of the middle-way contemplation. Since the middle way is the teaching of universal refutation, it directly discusses universality in terms of dual illumination, without needing to discuss an intent outside the text. It refers to ignorance as the affliction that obstructs the supernormal powers of the inconceivable path of conversion; if this affliction is refuted, dual illumination occurs spontaneously. Although the textual aspect is not discussed within the text, this middle way stands after the two contemplations and also represents the sequential textual aspect. Below, 'therefore summarizing,' further comprehensively explains the textual purport, meaning non-sequential, fully as in the previous text. That is, contemplating views and thoughts is immediately seeing dharma-nature, no longer discussing the chronological sequence of the three afflictions and three contemplations. Only concluding the summary in this way is called universality. Below, 'the former contemplation method,' indicates the intent of concluding universality. Concluding universality should be after the middle-way text; why explain the universal refutation in advance here? It is merely that the subsequent text explains universality as a matter of principle. It only fears that seeing the repetitive contemplation methods of the prior two contemplations of emptiness and provisionality, one might become confused about the textual purport. As for the textual purport, those prior repetitions do not go beyond a single mind; therefore, it is briefly indicated here first. Since views and thoughts are themselves dharma-nature, how could dust-and-sand afflictions exist outside views and thoughts? How could ignorance exist after the two contemplations? When the three afflictions are identical, the three contemplations must fuse; this is the fifth [point], revealing the purport of the text.