止觀輔行傳弘決 6.36

6.36

第三正修中觀者，初文先舉難知難觀。若云初心直令觀中，破細無明顯於實相，凡尚不識欲界無明，故云「懸絕」。非前四眼二智所及，豈肉眼見、情慮知耶？文中隔字，故云「眼慮見知」。二智四眼既未知見中道之理，是故斥之非眼慮等。「例如」下，例釋。例易況難、引難從易，故以空假二觀況於中觀。何但中道難觀，二觀應知不易。雖曰不易，亦由觀成，故知中觀亦可例之。初舉真況，云觀真之時亦無色像方所可觀，但觀現在麁陰入心，止觀研窮三假四句，漸生燸解發真無漏，見真分明，名真智發。如是所見，良由觀陰。次以假況者，恒沙佛法無量三昧，云何可觀？為發眼智但觀真空，於空心中漸思諸法，諸法漸發，漸深漸廣、漸利漸明，洞曉藥病種智開發，故俗智發但由研真。「今觀」下，正舉中觀。例前二觀今使可觀。但研二智，漸見中理。何者？夫見中道須識無明，二智之體既是無明，以觀研之中理可顯，即下三重觀法是也。但觀二智體是無明，無明法性非一非異，觀之不已、自然雙亡、自然雙照。如此竪說中尚非遙，況觀陰入一切皆實。故知二智能破所破，並是中道所觀之境。於中先釋智障。言「智障」者，有三重釋。初重釋者，二智即是中智家障故名智障。次「又此智障」下，明中智被障名為智障。次「又能障」下，明能所相對得智障名。初重釋者，智障兩字全屬能障。次重釋者，智障兩字全屬所障。後重釋者，障字屬能、智字屬所。至此卷末引達磨欝多羅雖有多解，不出此三。準文合在此中引釋，彼解稍煩恐妨文旨，故在後明。「云何」下，欲觀中道，先審觀意。云何觀此二智無明？以觀審之知非智相，既非智相即是無明。故下用觀雖分三別，秖是為破無明顯中。「觀此」下，正明用觀。先列三番。三番秖是三假異名，一一假中亦用四句推檢研覈。初觀無明即成因成假。言「空假之智與心相應」者，法性為因、二智為緣，與心相應，名所生法。法即無明，即重立無明以為觀境。「觀此」下，正用觀也。四句推檢，二智叵得。問：既云二智即是無明，應以自他推此無明，何故復云為從無明、為從法性？答：中智望之名為無明。今觀無明，但推二智，為從法性？為從無明？乃至共離複推雙責，具如破見因成中說。「作此」等者，次明能推止觀之相。初明觀相，有法、譬、合。法說可見。至此亦應結成二空二諦等也，止文亦爾，並是文略。次「譬如」下，譬說中云「遙望」等者，《大論》十四云「如夜見杌，謂之為人。是不實中能令心生謂之為人。」人又疑無六分動相。杌如法性、人如無明，人之與杌俱未審定，故云「不了」。「起四句」下，合。既云起於四句執等，故知即是初心觀中為成次第，故二觀後明於中也。若執四句不會中理，故成無常；若離性執，即於無明見於中道生法二空，故名為常。「前見思」等者，更重述於所破不同。二觀但破見思塵沙，故今所破唯二觀智，即是無明。言「金剛」者，亦用《大經》利钁斸地，唯至金剛不能穿徹。即喻無明非前二觀之所能破，能破即是中智龜甲白羊角也。「觀破」下，結名也。二觀如文。「此理不可」下，即不觀觀，故云「非智非不智」。「復次」下，明三止也。初總明用止，亦用四句推檢無明，乃至二空與觀不別，故略引而已。但體是即寂，與前為異，故須辨相。「如持」下，舉譬也。故《大經》第八云「譬如持戒比丘觀無蟲水，見塵似蟲，即作是念：此中動者蟲耶塵耶？久觀不已，雖知是塵，亦不明了。十住見性亦復如是。」今全未見，義同不了，故得借用彼十住喻。無明如蟲、法性如塵，雖用四句推檢叵得，亦未了了見於法性。前人杌喻，意亦如之。「若謂」下合喻，可知。「前生死」下結名，可知。「復次」下，用六十四番。「如是」下，重示四句方法之相。句即是門，門名能通。由一一句皆能通理，隨用一門咸應見實。為不了者及以多人施設多門，雖立多門見必隨一，即以四句為修觀處。非所觀理，名之為處。故第五卷中正以四句為修觀法。法謂方法，即是能通入理之法。是故此法亦可名處。因能通處至所通處，故云因門。二處名同，能所別也。隨用一句既得見理，無復餘句，故名為「融」。自行既爾，化他亦然。他機不同，隨句見理，即名得入以之為融。故須諸句一一研試，會有相應，相應即融。「若執」等者，更判用觀得失之相。雖破四句必離能執，執即門壞，故名為「燒」。次觀法性即相續假。何者？由觀無明，謂無明滅但有法性。雖作此解，未破無明，當知此是情想之解。是故更觀法性之計為從何生？無明為前念，法性為後念。於中先牒前法性解，此解成惑為所觀境。先法、次譬。譬中云「塵杌」等者，雙指前來觀無明譬。前觀無明即是法性，如觀塵杌蟲人叵得，今觀法性如觀塵杌復非明了。「即當」下，正示觀法。應須觀破不了之相，所以移觀而推法性，具如破見相續假中。準前亦應結成三觀三止等相，文略不說。「如是」下，用六十四番。亦應如前明得失等，文略不說。「雖未」等者，勸於行者勤用止觀。雖六十四，不出止觀，故勸常學，不得餘途。三觀真緣即相待假，初明自行。先出待相為所觀境，即前觀於無明法性之觀智也。「為智為非智」者，總立也。應知此智未見中理即是無明，無明非智，此之非智待誰得名？故有自他、橫竪二待。諸佛在現，對我為橫。我悟在當，望今為竪。「如是」下，次列句觀法。「若緣修」下，約句破執，但破真緣共離自壞。緣在地前故云無常，非謂分段生死無常。若言緣修生智明者，義當無常生於常也。無此理故，故云「云何生常」。若彼諸佛及我將來是真修者，真即是證，證不名修。「釋此」下，寄彼異釋以辨性過。「真自」下，正判。「四句」下，略明觀成無四句計，求橫竪相皆不可得，故智障亦不可得。「何以故」下，釋也。何故？無明體不可得，待諸佛智說為無明。佛智本無，無明叵得，所觀無明既不可得，能觀觀智亦復非有，故云「亦無」。「若執」下，辨得失也。初判屬智障，即是失也。次「若不執」下，即是得也。初云四門，即能通門，以成門故名能通得。「若得契」下，明所通理，契此理故名所通得。雖觀四句，理實非四。此中闕六十四番者，但是略耳。「若有」下，次明化他。問：觀前二假何故不明化他相耶？答：前觀法未周、自行未滿，是故至此方名利他。初文總舉，「所謂」下別釋。初釋緣修中，先法、次喻。初法中云「無常生常」，如前所說。前為破故，故云不應無常生常；今明隨機，宜聞得益。語同意異，不可一準。無常望常，無常是他。故《大經》破十仙中云「如汝法中因是常、果是無常，何妨我法因是無常而果是常。」今亦如是，因於緣修無常因故，生於真修常住果也。「又云」下，譬他生。「伊蘭」如無明，「栴檀」如法性故。是故《大經》闍王聞法得授記已，自述歎云：「我見世間從伊蘭子生伊蘭樹，不見伊蘭生栴檀樹。我今得見從伊蘭子生栴檀樹。栴檀樹者，即是我心無根信也。言無根者，我初不知恭敬如來，今蒙生信故曰無根。」如來望我，如來為他。法王種性，自也。從穀生穀故名為種，穀種不變故名為性。從我身中法性而生，義之如種。無始至今其種不變，故名為性。不同從佛而生信心，故名為自。「因滅」等，共生也。由內法性及外觀智，無明滅已即得菩提，故名為共。「或言」下，離生也。「非內」謂非法性，「非外」謂非緣修，離此二故名為無因。「而得是」等者，雖非內外，不無所得中道之智。言「云云」者，一一句末皆應結云「得是智慧」，以離執故名為得智。「無得」等者，結釋前文以成三觀。離性過故名為無得，離過得智故云之得。證無得故名「得無得」，即此無得假名為得。得與無得皆不可得，義兼雙遮，復能雙照得與無得。「諸菩薩」下，次明菩薩作論利他，即是菩薩作論申門。天親《地論》法性依持即屬自生，是論正意，故云「正主」。他共無因，例此可知。《中論》申空，空為正主。餘有等三，準此亦爾。「豈離四門」者，攝教顯門。一切諸教四門攝盡，四門雖殊通理不異，若得此意無所乖違。「牟楯」者，牟字應作矛、或作𨥨，兵器也。長二丈，建於兵車。楯字應作盾，亦是兵器，即旁牌也。此楯是欄楯字耳，此牟是牛鳴也，並非文意。如楚有賣矛及賣盾者，有來買矛，語買者言：「此矛壞千盾。」有來買盾者，語買者言：「此盾壞千矛。」買矛者猶在，買盾者復至，買矛者語賣者言：「還與汝矛而壞汝盾，為得幾盾？」賣者無答。自相違故。「若用」下，用四門中四論四悉以修止觀。「經論」下，明門功能。「如此」下，明門中觀行之功能也。允，亦合也。「明眼」下，舉得辨失。「問」下，料簡也。初問中，無明法性既其相即，法性即無明，故應當俱破。無明即法性，故應當俱顯。二法不二，故俱破顯。二法若二，為理不成。答意者，二法無體但有假名，雖俱假名必無並住，故法性顯無明已傾，無明傾時法性尚無，況復更立無明之名？故無破顯而破而顯。次問意者，如向所答，無明既其即是法性，但唯法性何有無明？而前文云二法相即。若相即者，何但無明即是法性，復有法性即是無明。今文但舉一邊為問，故云「無復無明與誰相即」？亦應更云：法性即無明，無復法性與誰相即？所以不論後一邊者，於迷示理，明理不二，是故相即。推不二理，一對即足，何須重並下一對耶？若示迷性，應存後對。答中二喻。初喻意者，具用二對。無明如水、法性如氷。「如為不識」一句冠下兩句。為迷氷者指水為氷，為迷水者指氷為水。如迷法性即指無明，如迷無明即指法性。若失此意，俱迷二法。故知世人非但不識即無明之法性，亦乃不識即法性之無明。猶如濕性本無二名，假立二名以示迷者。為計二名不了無二，故以二法更互相即。恐迷氷水更引珠喻，珠非水火遇緣故生，理性非二從緣故說。

Regarding the third [section], 'Directly Cultivating the Contemplation of the Middle': the opening passage first presents what is difficult to know and difficult to contemplate. If one says that a beginner should be directed immediately to contemplate the middle, breaking subtle ignorance to reveal the true mark, yet an ordinary person does not even understand the ignorance of the desire realm, this is why it is called 'remote and completely cut off.' It is beyond the reach of the previous four eyes and two knowledges—how could it be seen by the physical eye or known by emotional deliberation? Characters are separated in the text, hence it says 'seen or known by eye or deliberation.' Since the two knowledges and four eyes do not yet know or see the principle of the middle way, it is therefore rejected [by stating that it is] not [reached by] eyes, deliberation, and so forth. From 'Just as...' onward is an illustrative explanation. Drawing an analogy with what is easy to illustrate what is difficult, and guiding the difficult by following the easy, it therefore uses the two contemplations of emptiness and provisionality to illustrate the contemplation of the middle. Not only is the middle way difficult to contemplate, but one should know that the two contemplations are also not easy. Although they are said not to be easy, they also come about through the completion of contemplation; hence one knows that the contemplation of the middle may also be illustrated by them. First, raising the true [emptiness] as an illustration: it says that when contemplating the true, there is likewise no visible form or spatial location that can be contemplated; one merely contemplates the present coarse mind of aggregates and sense bases, investigates and exhausts the three provisionalities and four propositions through calming and contemplation, gradually generates the understanding of warmth, produces true outflows-free [knowledge], and sees the true distinctly—this is called the arising of true knowledge. That which is seen in this way is genuinely due to contemplating the aggregates. Next, using provisionality as an illustration: how could the sands-of-the-Ganges Buddha-dharmas and immeasurable samādhis be contemplated? In order to give rise to eyes and knowledge, one merely contemplates true emptiness; within the empty mind, one gradually reflects on all dharmas, and all dharmas gradually unfold, becoming gradually deeper and wider, sharper and brighter, penetratingly understanding medicines and illnesses, and the knowledge of all forms opens up; therefore the arising of conventional knowledge comes about merely from investigating the true. From 'Now contemplating...' onward, it directly presents the contemplation of the middle. Taking the former two contemplations as an example, it now makes it contemplatable. Merely by investigating the two knowledges, one gradually sees the principle of the middle. Why is this? To see the middle way, one must recognize ignorance; since the substance of the two knowledges is itself ignorance, by investigating it through contemplation, the principle of the middle can be revealed—this is precisely the threefold contemplation method below. One merely contemplates that the substance of the two knowledges is ignorance; ignorance and the dharma-nature are neither one nor different; contemplating this unceasingly, both naturally perish and both naturally illumine. When spoken of vertically in this way, the middle is still not far off; how much more so when contemplating the aggregates and sense bases where all are real! Therefore one knows that the two knowledges, both as the able-to-refute and the refuted, are entirely the objects contemplated in the middle way. Within this, it first explains the cognitive obstruction. As for the term 'cognitive obstruction,' there are three layers of explanation: The first layer of explanation is that the two knowledges are precisely the obstruction belonging to the knowledge of the middle, hence called cognitive obstruction. Next, from 'Moreover, this cognitive obstruction...' onward, it clarifies that the knowledge of the middle being obstructed is called cognitive obstruction. Next, from 'Moreover, being able to obstruct...' onward, it clarifies that it gets the name cognitive obstruction through the opposition between the able and the object. In the first layer of explanation, both characters 'cognitive' and 'obstruction' belong entirely to the able-to-obstruct. In the second layer of explanation, both characters 'cognitive' and 'obstruction' belong entirely to the object obstructed. In the latter layer of explanation, the character 'obstruction' belongs to the able, and the character 'cognition' belongs to the object. Although many interpretations by Dharmottara are cited at the end of this fascicle, they do not go beyond these three. According to the text, it should have been cited and explained here, but his explanations are somewhat tedious and it was feared they would obstruct the text's intended meaning, so they are clarified later. From 'How...' onward, wanting to contemplate the middle way, one first examines the intent of contemplation. How does one contemplate this ignorance of the two knowledges? By examining it through contemplation, one knows it is not the characteristic of knowledge; since it is not the characteristic of knowledge, it is precisely ignorance. Therefore, although the application of contemplation below is divided into three distinctions, it is merely to break ignorance and reveal the middle. From 'Contemplating this...' onward, it directly clarifies the application of contemplation. It first lists three rounds. The three rounds are merely different names for the three provisionalities; within each single provisionality, one also uses the four propositions to investigate, scrutinize, and examine. First, contemplating ignorance forms the provisionality of causal arising. As for 'the knowledge of emptiness and provisionality corresponding with the mind': the dharma-nature is the cause and the two knowledges are the conditions; corresponding with the mind, it is called the produced dharma. The dharma is precisely ignorance; that is, ignorance is re-established as the object of contemplation. From 'Contemplating this...' onward, it directly applies the contemplation. Investigating via the four propositions, the two knowledges are unattainable. Question: Since you say that the two knowledges are precisely ignorance, one should investigate this ignorance through self and other; why do you further say 'is it from ignorance, or is it from the dharma-nature'? Answer: Looking at it from the knowledge of the middle, it is called ignorance. Now contemplating ignorance, one merely investigates the two knowledges: Is it from the dharma-nature? Is it from ignorance? Down to both together or separated, investigating anew and interrogating both, fully as explained in the causal arising [section] of refuting views. 'Making this...' and so forth next clarifies the characteristics of the calming and contemplation that can investigate. First, clarifying the characteristics of contemplation: there are the doctrine, the simile, and the application. The doctrinal explanation is clear. At this point, one should also conclude with the two emptinesses, two truths, and so forth; the text on calming is also like this; both are abridged in the text. Next, from 'Just as...' onward, within the simile it says 'looking from afar...' and so forth. Fascicle fourteen of the Dazhidulun says: 'Like seeing a stump at night and calling it a person. Within this unreality, it can cause the mind to arise and call it a person.' A person also suspects the absence of the six parts' moving characteristics. The stump is like the dharma-nature, and the person is like ignorance; both the person and the stump are not yet determined with certainty, hence it says 'not understood.' From 'Arising the four propositions...' onward is the application. Since it speaks of arising attachments to the four propositions and so forth, one therefore knows that this is the initial mind contemplating the middle; in order to accomplish the sequence, the middle is therefore explained after the two contemplations. If one attaches to the four propositions, one does not accord with the principle of the middle, which therefore becomes impermanent; if one departs from attachment to intrinsic nature, then right within ignorance one sees the middle way and the two emptinesses of persons and dharmas, hence it is called permanent. 'The previous [views and desires]...' and so forth restates the differences in what is refuted. The two contemplations only break views-and-deliberations and dust-and-sand; therefore what is now refuted is only the knowledge of the two contemplations, which is precisely ignorance. As for the term 'diamond,' it also uses the Great Scripture's sharp hoe digging into the earth: only when reaching diamond can it not penetrate. This is an analogy for ignorance not being able to be broken by the previous two contemplations; that which can break it is precisely the tortoise shell and white sheep horn of the knowledge of the middle. From 'Contemplating and breaking...' onward concludes the names. The two contemplations are as in the text. From 'This principle cannot...' onward is precisely the contemplation of non-contemplation, hence it says 'neither knowledge nor non-knowledge.' From 'Furthermore...' onward clarifies the three types of calming. First, generally clarifying the application of calming: it also uses the four propositions to investigate ignorance, down to the two emptinesses being no different from contemplation, so it is merely cited in brief. But its substance is immediate quiescence, which differs from the previous one, so its characteristics must be distinguished. From 'Like holding...' onward presents a simile. Thus fascicle eight of the Great Scripture says: 'Like a precept-holding monk looking at water without insects, who sees dust resembling insects and then thinks: Is the moving thing in this an insect or dust? Looking for a long time without ceasing, although he knows it is dust, it is also not clearly understood. The tenth abode seeing the nature is also like this.' Now, not seeing it at all, its meaning is identical to not understanding, so one may borrow that simile of the tenth abode. Ignorance is like the insect, and the dharma-nature is like the dust; although one investigates with the four propositions and it is unattainable, one also does not clearly and distinctly see the dharma-nature. The previous simile of the person and the stump is also of like intent. From 'If one says...' onward applies the simile, which can be known. From 'The previous saṃsāra...' onward concludes the names, which can be known. From 'Furthermore...' onward uses the sixty-four rounds. From 'Such...' onward re-demonstrates the characteristics of the method of the four propositions. A proposition is a gate; a gate means that which can provide passage. Because each and every proposition can lead into the principle, whichever single gate is used, one should see the real. For those who do not understand, and for many people, multiple gates are established; although many gates are set up, the seeing must follow one, taking the four propositions as the locus for cultivating contemplation. It is not the principle contemplated, but is named 'the locus.' Therefore, in the fifth fascicle, the four propositions are precisely taken as the method of cultivating contemplation. 'Method' means the technique, which is precisely the dharma that can provide passage into the principle. Therefore this method can also be called a locus. Because of the locus that can provide passage, one reaches the locus passed into; hence it is called the causal gate. The names of the two loci are the same, but the able and the object are distinct. Since by using any single proposition one comes to see the principle, there are no remaining propositions; hence it is called 'harmoniously merged.' As one's own practice is like this, converting others is also so. The capacities of others differ; when they see the principle following a proposition, it is called gaining entry, which is taken as harmonious merging. Therefore one must investigate and test every single proposition; eventually there will be a correspondence, and where there is correspondence, there is harmonious merging. 'If one attaches...' and so forth further judges the characteristics of gain and loss in applying contemplation. Although one breaks the four propositions, one must depart from the able-to-attach; attachment means the gate is destroyed, hence it is called 'burned.' Next, contemplating the dharma-nature is the provisionality of continuity. Why is this? Because from contemplating ignorance, one claims that when ignorance is extinguished there is only the dharma-nature. Although one forms this understanding, one has not yet broken ignorance; one should know that this is an understanding of emotional conceptualization. Therefore, one further contemplates: from where does this reckoning of the dharma-nature arise? Ignorance is the preceding thought, and the dharma-nature is the subsequent thought. Within this, it first takes up the previous understanding of dharma-nature; this understanding becomes a delusion and serves as the object of contemplation. First the doctrine, then the simile. Within the simile, 'dust and stump' and so forth points back to both previous similes for contemplating ignorance. Previously, contemplating ignorance was precisely the dharma-nature, just as in looking at the dust and stump the insect and person are unattainable; now contemplating the dharma-nature is like looking at the dust and stump, again not being clear and distinct. From 'One should then...' onward directly indicates the contemplation method. One must contemplate and break the characteristics of non-understanding, which is why one shifts the contemplation to investigate the dharma-nature, fully as in the provisionality of continuity under refuting views. In accordance with the preceding, one should also conclude with the characteristics of the three contemplations, three types of calming, and so forth; the text is abridged and does not state them. From 'Such...' onward uses the sixty-four rounds. It should also clarify gain, loss, and so forth as before; the text is abridged and does not state them. 'Although not yet...' and so forth encourages the practitioner to diligently apply calming and contemplation. Although there are sixty-four, they do not go beyond calming and contemplation; hence it encourages constant learning, with no other path. The third, contemplating the real and conditioned [cultivation], is the provisionality of relativity. First it clarifies one's own practice. It first brings out the characteristic of relativity as the object of contemplation, which is precisely the contemplative knowledge that previously contemplated ignorance and the dharma-nature. 'Whether knowledge or non-knowledge' establishes it generally. One should know that this knowledge, before seeing the principle of the middle, is precisely ignorance; ignorance is non-knowledge; relative to what does this non-knowledge obtain its name? Therefore there are self and other, horizontal and vertical, two types of relativity. All Buddhas are in the present; relative to me, it is horizontal. My awakening is in the future; looking from the present, it is vertical. From 'Such...' onward next lists the contemplation method of the propositions. From 'If conditioned cultivation...' onward refutes attachments with respect to the propositions; merely by refuting the real and the conditioned, both together and separated naturally fall apart. Conditioned [cultivation] is prior to the stages, hence called impermanent; it does not mean the impermanence of portion-and-segment saṃsāra. If one says that conditioned cultivation gives rise to the clarity of knowledge, in principle it would mean the impermanent giving rise to the permanent. Since there is no such principle, it therefore says 'how could it give rise to the permanent?' If those Buddhas and my future are real cultivation, the real is realization itself, and realization is not called cultivation. From 'Explaining this...' onward draws upon other differing explanations to distinguish the error of intrinsic nature. From 'The real from self...' onward directly judges. From 'The four propositions...' onward briefly clarifies that when contemplation is accomplished, there are no reckonings of the four propositions; seeking horizontal and vertical characteristics, neither is attainable; therefore the cognitive obstruction is also unattainable. From 'Why is this?' onward explains it. Why? The substance of ignorance is unattainable; relative to the Buddhas' knowledge it is spoken of as ignorance. If the Buddhas' knowledge is fundamentally nonexistent, ignorance is unattainable; since the contemplated ignorance is already unattainable, the contemplative knowledge that can contemplate is also nonexistent, hence it says 'is also absent.' From 'If one attaches...' onward distinguishes gain and loss. First, judging it as belonging to cognitive obstruction is precisely the loss. Next, from 'If one does not attach...' onward is the gain. First it says 'the four gates,' which are the gates that can provide passage; because they are accomplished as gates, it is called the gain of that which can provide passage. From 'If one succeeds in tallying...' onward clarifies the principle passed into; because one tallies with this principle, it is called the gain of the principle passed into. Although one contemplates the four propositions, the principle is truly not four. That the sixty-four rounds are missing here is merely an abbreviation. From 'If there are...' onward next clarifies converting others. Question: Why was the characteristic of converting others not clarified in contemplating the previous two provisionalities? Answer: Previously, the contemplation method was not yet complete and one's own practice was not yet fulfilled; therefore, only upon reaching this point is it called benefiting others. The opening text presents it generally; from 'That is to say...' onward explains it separately. In the first explanation of conditioned cultivation, first is the doctrine, then the simile. In the first doctrinal part it says 'the impermanent gives rise to the permanent,' as stated earlier. Previously, for the sake of refutation, it therefore said the impermanent should not give rise to the permanent; now, clarifying the following of capacities, it is fitting to hear this to gain benefit. The words are identical but the meanings differ; they cannot be treated uniformly. Viewing the impermanent in relation to the permanent, the impermanent is 'other.' Thus, in the Great Scripture's refutation of the ten ṛṣis, it says: 'Just as in your teaching the cause is permanent and the fruit is impermanent, what prevents my teaching from having an impermanent cause and a permanent fruit?' Now it is also like this: based on the impermanent cause of conditioned cultivation, it gives rise to the permanent fruit of real cultivation. From 'It also says...' onward is a simile for arising from other: the eraṇḍa is like ignorance, and the candana is like the dharma-nature. Therefore, in the Great Scripture, after King Ajātaśatru heard the Dharma and received the prediction, he recounted and praised, saying: 'I have seen in the world that from an eraṇḍa seed an eraṇḍa tree grows; I have not seen an eraṇḍa produce a candana tree. I now have come to see a candana tree grow from an eraṇḍa seed. The candana tree is precisely the rootless faith of my mind. As for "rootless": I initially did not know to revere the Tathāgata; now receiving the arising of faith, it is therefore called rootless.' The Tathāgata relative to me: the Tathāgata is other. The lineage of the Dharma King is self. Producing grain from grain is therefore called a seed; the grain seed not changing is therefore called nature. Arising from the dharma-nature within my own body, its meaning is like a seed. From beginningless time until now its seed does not change, hence it is called nature. It is not like generating faith from the Buddha, hence it is called self. 'Because of cessation...' and so forth is arising from both. Through the internal dharma-nature and the external contemplative knowledge, when ignorance has ceased, bodhi is immediately attained, hence called 'both.' From 'Or saying...' onward is arising without cause. 'Not internal' means not the dharma-nature; 'not external' means not conditioned cultivation; departing from these two, it is therefore called causeless. 'Yet attaining this...' and so forth: although neither internal nor external, it is not without the attained knowledge of the middle way. Saying 'and so on' means that at the end of each and every proposition one should conclude by saying 'attains this wisdom'; because of departing from attachment, it is called attaining knowledge. 'Non-attainment...' and so forth concludes and explains the preceding text to accomplish the three contemplations. Because of departing from the error of intrinsic nature, it is called non-attainment; departing from error to attain knowledge, it therefore says 'attains it.' Realizing non-attainment is called 'attaining non-attainment'; this very non-attainment is provisionally named attainment. Both attainment and non-attainment are unattainable; its meaning simultaneously encompasses dual negation, and can further dually illumine both attainment and non-attainment. From 'All bodhisattvas...' onward next clarifies bodhisattvas composing treatises to benefit others; this is bodhisattvas composing treatises to expound the gates. Vasubandhu's Daśabhūmika-śāstra takes the dharma-nature as support, which belongs to arising from self; this is the primary intent of the treatise, hence called 'the primary master.' Other, both, and causeless may be understood by analogy with this. The Madhyamaka-śāstra expounds emptiness, so emptiness is the primary master. The remaining three, such as existence, are also like this by analogy. 'How could they depart from the four gates?': this subsumes the teachings to reveal the gates. All teachings whatsoever are completely subsumed by the four gates; although the four gates are distinct, their passage into the principle is not different; if one grasps this intent, there is nothing contradictory. As for 'móu shùn' [lance and shield]: the character móu should be máo or máo, which is a weapon. It is two zhang long and mounted on a war chariot. The character shùn should be dùn, which is also a weapon, namely a shield. This shùn is merely the character for railings; this móu is the mooing of an ox; neither is the intended meaning of the text. For example, in Chu there was a person selling lances and selling shields. When someone came to buy a lance, he told the buyer: 'This lance breaks a thousand shields.' When someone came to buy a shield, he told the buyer: 'This shield breaks a thousand lances.' While the lance buyer was still there, another shield buyer arrived; the lance buyer said to the seller: 'Taking your lance to break your shield, how many shields would you get?' The seller had no answer. This is because they contradict each other. From 'If using...' onward uses the four treatises and four siddhāntas within the four gates to cultivate calming and contemplation. From 'Sūtras and treatises...' onward clarifies the function of the gates. From 'In this way...' onward clarifies the function of contemplative practice within the gates. 'Yǔn' also means to accord. From 'Clear-sighted...' onward raises gain to distinguish loss. From 'Question...' onward is analysis. In the first question: since ignorance and the dharma-nature are mutually identical, if the dharma-nature is precisely ignorance, then both should be refuted; if ignorance is precisely the dharma-nature, then both should be revealed. The two dharmas are non-dual, so both are refuted and revealed together. If the two dharmas were dual, the principle could not be established. The intent of the answer: the two dharmas have no substance, having only provisional names; although both are provisional names, they definitely do not abide together; therefore, when the dharma-nature is revealed, ignorance has already collapsed; when ignorance collapses, even the dharma-nature does not exist, so how could the name of ignorance be further established? Therefore, there is neither refuting nor revealing, yet there is refuting and revealing. The intent of the second question: according to the answer just given, since ignorance is precisely the dharma-nature, there is only the dharma-nature—how could there be ignorance? Yet the previous text says that the two dharmas are mutually identical. If they are mutually identical, not only is ignorance precisely the dharma-nature, but there is also the dharma-nature being precisely ignorance. The present text merely raises one side as a question, hence saying 'there is no longer ignorance, so with what is it mutually identical?' It should also further say: the dharma-nature is precisely ignorance, so there is no longer dharma-nature, with what is it mutually identical? The reason for not discussing the latter side is that, to reveal the principle to the confused, one clarifies that the principle is non-dual, and for this reason they are mutually identical. In investigating the principle of non-duality, one pair is sufficient; why must one duplicate the next pair? If demonstrating the nature of delusion, the latter pair should be retained. In the answer, there are two similes. The intent of the first simile uses both pairs: ignorance is like water, and the dharma-nature is like ice. The phrase 'just as for those who do not recognize' governs the two lines below it: for those confused about ice, one points to water as ice; for those confused about water, one points to ice as water. Like being confused about the dharma-nature, one points to ignorance; like being confused about ignorance, one points to the dharma-nature. If one loses this intent, one is confused about both dharmas. Therefore one knows that worldly people not only do not recognize the dharma-nature that is precisely ignorance, but also do not recognize the ignorance that is precisely the dharma-nature. Just as the nature of wetness fundamentally has no two names, two names are provisionally established to demonstrate it to the confused. Because they reckon two names and do not understand non-duality, the two dharmas are therefore made mutually identical. Fearing confusion over ice and water, it further cites the simile of the jewel: the jewel is neither water nor fire, but produces them upon encountering conditions; the nature of principle is non-dual, but is spoken of in dependence on conditions.