Pramāṇa · Search · About · API

止觀輔行傳弘決 7.3

止觀輔行傳弘決 7.3

Language
Classical Chinese

7.3

次明「橫別」者,先法、次喻。初明法中,先寄三人以明觀相,一一文中皆先出觀相;次明檢校。此三觀者,依《大品》文。經云「有菩薩摩訶薩,初發心時行六波羅蜜,上菩薩位,得阿鞞跋致。有菩薩摩訶薩,初發心時便成阿耨多羅三藐三菩提轉法輪,與無量眾生化益厚已入於涅槃。有菩薩摩訶薩,從初發心時與薩婆若相應,與無量百千萬億從一佛國至一佛國淨佛世界。」今文所引,開彼第三為第一第二,以第二為第三。又經列前深後淺,今列從淺至深,依隨義便,於理無失。第一文云六波羅蜜,即是舉行。第二文云便成菩提,即是舉位。行位雖殊,同顯一意,是故今文略於第一。第三文中初云薩婆若,又云淨佛土,雖同一文既具二義,是故開為第一第二。餘文所引,並擬三教初發心也。通雖有假,意多在空;別雖有中,文多在假;圓雖三觀,從初觀中。是故今引以對三觀,同初發心,故名為橫。分屬三人,故名為別。「如此」下,斥權異實。圓中雖云從初心修,彼般若部帶二教權猶未開顯,是故斥云「三法各別」。「大論」下,次引論文三喻,亦證橫別。於中先喻、次合。故《大論》四十三云「是三菩薩未發心前,聞佛說大,發菩提心。譬如道行,或乘羊去、或乘馬去、或乘通去,是故到彼有遲有疾。初者鈍根、次者漸行、後者即到。」又云「初者罪多福少、次者福多罪少、後者無罪唯淨。」今此文中以步替羊者,以羊遲故不異於步。故知今文用《法華》意,故得破彼權部縱橫。論五十六又云「如三人行,一人避走、一人錢求、一人隨王。」破意亦爾,橫別義意如向所釋。次明一心者,初斥橫竪、次正明一心功能破權。初斥橫竪中,先重列出通相通塞,是即空假兩觀能破見思、塵沙,於當位中雖得為通,望於中觀仍具無明,故名為塞。若後中觀勝下二觀,雖得名通,隔於空假,故名為塞。橫中通塞,尋文可知。「法相」下,況出今文橫竪別相通中之塞。橫竪法相已有通塞,況復於通起著成塞,當知橫竪通別並塞,故云「皆塞無復有通」。欲出通相,一心為通,故先辨於橫竪之塞。「若一心」下,正明一心。即是檢校一心破遍,前破遍中既已結成出其元意,秖應立於一心檢校於義即足。又為成就前橫竪門,故更節節以論檢校。復引《法華》善知通塞,顯今檢校須破諸師。論其正意秖在一念,故前之三種為顯一心舉破遍等,例之可見。又前三種望於破遍但成於竪,至下度入方始以竪而入於橫。如諦緣度橫織竪成,竪橫別之橫三俱初發,雖名為橫,三觀望之終名為竪。今破權功能,正顯一心。初破橫竪中破竪者,竪通漸入,雖屬一人,前後次第三時各異。以各異故,故非一三。今一心具三破次第之三,故云一心三觀破竪通塞。三觀一心能破橫者,彼橫三觀離屬三人,並在初心,故三不合一。今以三秖是一,破彼分張之三,故云「三觀一心破橫通塞」。應知一心三觀與三觀一心,言互理同,為破橫竪翻對而說。如此橫竪一一諦中,具諦緣度若通若塞。橫竪若破,諦緣度中通塞隨破,故不煩破諦等通塞。故向文云「況復於中起苦集無明蔽」等,況出此塞以圓破之。有人云:破諦緣度橫名為破橫。深不見文旨,故前文中先明竪竟、次橫織之,一一皆具諦緣度三,況復於通復起苦集無明等塞,故知破竪苦等自破,不須更指苦等為橫。

Next, in explaining the "horizontal distinctiveness," first is the doctrine, and next the analogies. In the initial explanation of the doctrine, it first draws upon three kinds of persons to illuminate the aspects of contemplation; each passage first sets forth the aspects of contemplation, and next explains the examination. These three contemplations are based on the text of the *Dapin*. The sūtra states: "There is a bodhisattva mahāsattva who, upon first generating the aspiration, practices the six pāramitās, ascends to the bodhisattva stage, and attains the stage of non-retrogression (avaivartika). There is a bodhisattva mahāsattva who, upon first generating the aspiration, forthwith realizes anuttarā-samyak-saṃbodhi, turns the wheel of the Dharma, and after bringing vast and profound benefit to boundless sentient beings, enters nirvāṇa. There is a bodhisattva mahāsattva who, from the time of first generating the aspiration, is in accord with all-knowledge (sarvajña), and with immeasurable hundreds, thousands, myriads, and kotis [of beings] goes from one Buddha-realm to another Buddha-realm, purifying the Buddha-worlds." What the present text cites splits that third passage into the first and second, and takes the second as the third. Furthermore, the sūtra lists them from deep to shallow, whereas the present text lists them from shallow to deep; following what is conceptually convenient, there is no error in principle. The first passage mentions the six pāramitās, which is citing practice. The second passage mentions forthwith realizing bodhi, which is citing the stage. Although practice and stage differ, they equally reveal a single meaning; hence the present text omits the first. In the third passage, it first mentions sarvajña and also mentions purifying the Buddha-lands; although it is a single passage, since it already possesses two meanings, it is therefore split into the first and the second. What the rest of the text cites is entirely intended for the initial generating of the aspiration in the three teachings. Although the shared teaching possesses provisionality, its focus is largely on emptiness; although the distinctive teaching possesses the middle, its text is largely on provisionality; although the perfect teaching has three contemplations, it contemplates the middle from the very beginning. Hence they are cited now to correspond to the three contemplations: being alike in first generating the aspiration, it is called "horizontal"; being apportioned among three persons, it is called "distinctive." From "Such..." downwards, it rebukes the provisional as differing from the real. Although it says that within the perfect one cultivates [the middle] from the initial mind, that Prajñā section still carries the provisionality of the two teachings and has not yet been opened and revealed; therefore it rebukes it, saying, "the three dharmas are each distinct." From "*Dazhidulun*..." downwards, it next cites the three analogies of the treatise's text, which also verify the horizontal distinctiveness. Therein, first are the analogies, and next their application. Thus fascicle 43 of the *Dazhidulun* states: "Before these three bodhisattvas had generated the aspiration, they heard the Buddha teach the Great [Vehicle] and generated the bodhicitta. It is like traveling on a road: some go riding a sheep, some go riding a horse, and some go riding supernatural powers; therefore their arrival there has slowness and swiftness. The first has dull faculties, the next progresses gradually, and the latter arrives immediately." It also states: "The first has much sin and little merit; the next has much merit and little sin; the latter has no sin and is purely clean." In the present text, replacing the sheep with walking on foot is because a sheep is slow and thus no different from walking on foot. Hence we know the present text adopts the intent of the *Lotus*, and is thereby able to refute the vertical and horizontal of those provisional sections. Fascicle 56 of the treatise also states: "It is like three people walking: one flees to avoid danger, one seeks wealth, and one follows the king." The intent of the refutation is also like this; the meaning of horizontal distinctiveness is as explained above. Next, in explaining the single mind, it first rebukes the horizontal and vertical, and next directly explains the functional capacity of the single mind to refute the provisional. In first rebuking the horizontal and vertical, it first lists once again the general-aspect pass and blockage: namely, the two contemplations of emptiness and provisionality are able to break view-and-thought and dust-and-sand [afflictions], and within their respective stages they may be considered passes, yet looking toward the contemplation of the middle they still possess ignorance, and are thus called blockages. If the subsequent contemplation of the middle surpasses the lower two contemplations, though it may be called a pass, it is separated from emptiness and provisionality, and is thus called a blockage. The passes and blockages in the horizontal can be known by examining the text. From "Dharma-aspects..." downwards, it illustrates by comparison the blockage within the pass of the specific aspects of the horizontal and vertical in the present text. If the horizontal and vertical dharma-aspects already have pass and blockage, how much more so when attachment arises toward the pass, turning it into a blockage! One should know that the horizontal and vertical, general and specific, are all blockages; hence it says, "all are blockages, and there is no longer any pass." Intending to bring forth the aspect of the pass, taking the single mind as the pass, it therefore first distinguishes the blockages of the horizontal and vertical. From "If in a single mind..." downwards, it directly explains the single mind. That is, examining the single mind's universal refutation. In the preceding universal refutation, having already concluded and revealed its original intent, one need only establish the single mind's examination for the meaning to be sufficient. Furthermore, in order to complete the preceding horizontal and vertical gates, it therefore discusses examination section by section. Again, it cites the *Lotus* on "well knowing pass and blockage" to show that the present examination must refute the various masters. Discussing its true intent, it lies solely in a single thought-moment; hence the preceding three kinds were to reveal the single mind by citing the universal refutation and so on, which can be seen by analogy. Furthermore, looking at the preceding three kinds in relation to universal refutation, they only form the vertical; only when arriving at the entry through pāramitā below does one begin to use the vertical to enter the horizontal. It is like the truths, conditions, and pāramitās being horizontally woven and vertically completed; as for the three [bodhisattvas] of the horizontal distinctiveness of vertical and horizontal, all three are at the initial aspiration, and though called horizontal, looking at the three contemplations they are ultimately termed vertical. Now the functional capacity of refuting the provisional directly reveals the single mind. First, among refuting the horizontal and vertical, refuting the vertical: the vertical pass is entered gradually; although belonging to one person, its earlier and later sequence in the three times are each distinct. Because they are each distinct, they are not "one and three." Now, the single mind possessing the three refutes the sequential three; hence it says that the threefold contemplation in a single mind refutes the vertical pass and blockage. That the three contemplations in a single mind can refute the horizontal: those horizontal three contemplations separately belong to three persons, all at the initial mind, and thus the three do not unite into one. Now, taking the three as being merely one, it refutes those dispersed three; hence it says, "the three contemplations in a single mind refute the horizontal pass and blockage." One should know that "threefold contemplation in a single mind" and "three contemplations in a single mind" differ in phrasing but are identical in principle, being stated in inverse correspondence to refute the horizontal and vertical. In such horizontal and vertical, each single truth possesses truths, conditions, and pāramitās, whether passes or blockages. If the horizontal and vertical are refuted, the passes and blockages in the truths, conditions, and pāramitās are refuted accordingly; hence there is no need to trouble oneself with refuting the passes and blockages of the truths and so forth. Therefore the preceding text says, "How much more so when therein there arise the suffering, accumulation, ignorance, and hindrances, etc.," illustrating this blockage by comparison so as to refute it perfectly. Someone says: "Refuting the horizontal of the truths, conditions, and pāramitās is called refuting the horizontal." He deeply fails to see the text's aim. Therefore, in the preceding text, having first explained the vertical, it next horizontally wove it, with each possessing the three—truths, conditions, and pāramitās—how much more so when, in relation to the pass, there arise again the blockages of suffering, accumulation, ignorance, and so forth! Hence we know that when the vertical is refuted, suffering and the rest are naturally refuted; there is no need further to point to suffering and the rest as the horizontal.

English (machine translation) (machine translation)

Translations (1)