止觀輔行傳弘決 9.44

9.44

次明不思議境中，言「無量定散」者，明一念禪心具十界定散。從「何以故」下，釋。若未識法性，則十界俱散；若解法性，十界俱定。如此定散非迷非解，故知一念定散不二，法性無明不一不異，名不思議。「雖超越」下，釋句法性無明定散即離等，非二乘所知。二乘不知，亦是常情所攝。亦應云三教菩薩皆不能知。理性本寂，故云「超越」。無始未顯，故云「不離」。「經言」下，引《大經》證。「雖即」下，釋經意。滅盡本是小宗事定，經文既云「即眾生是」，故不得以小乘而云即是。當知即指眾生心性，理本滅盡故不非不是。「何以故」下，轉釋。理雖本滅，若以此理望於眾生，非即非離，性尚無性，何有眾生？恐迷理境，故未始非；恐凡濫聖，故未始是。以不即故未始是，以不離故未始非。言「未始」等者，謂無始等也。此中語略，故但云始。即無始未是、無始未非故也，故云不即不離。是故須以六即判位，六故不即、即故不離。常作是觀，一切妙定不出眾生。「難量若空」者，顯究竟即，唯佛能了。「不雜毒」等，如前第五發心中簡。安心中云善巧等者，即六十四番。「若觀」去，明不次第三止三觀。寄顯體中三止三觀之名，一一止觀三諦具足。如體真中云二邊寂滅者，當知三諦俱寂，名為體真。故體真義，不與次第體真同也。空觀中云照法性淨，當知三惑為不清淨，照三諦空名為空觀。初止初觀尚具三諦，餘二止觀準例可知。為令識知不思議止觀，不別而別，是故初觀但云即空假、云即空即假，中方具三。恐涉次第，故後結云在一念心。「為破二邊名一名中」等者，三諦之體本無一三中邊之異，約破二故名一、為破邊故名中、為破偏故名圓、為破生滅故云寂滅、為破次第故名一心，妙理實無如是等別。從「何意不悟」去，約禪治蔽。六治不同，廣如前文。味著十禪望真諦理，尚自是蔽，故云「隨禪受生」。況望妙理而非蔽耶？問：九想已去既云無漏，云何名蔽？答：此但能為無漏作緣，秖指無漏尚為中障。何況於緣及於緣生著，是故名蔽。若委釋者，歷一一禪一一位，皆須別識六蔽之相，並以六治而治諸蔽，故以不捨十禪名慳。檀中尚捨十界依正，何但事相十禪而已？若著禪味，尚破空假道共自在等戒，況復隨道具足戒耶？餘之四蔽，準例可知。「黑齒梵天」者，隨禪生彼尚自有瞋，況發薄禪寧免瞋恚？皆云「當苦到」等者，禪體是蔽尚須苦到，況煩惱業魔縱而不悔？世人自謂無罪不須悔者，謬矣。一一治中皆用事度治於事蔽，使生理度，故云「破隨道戒」等。次結中，具如第七卷中事理攝法。「行人觀法極至於此」等者，始從觀境終至助治，觀法已足。下之三番，意如文說。又次位者，止謂防濫，餘之二法策淺令深，當知並非正觀之體。餘文準望陰入，亦應可見。

Next, in explaining the inconceivable object, the statement 'immeasurable concentration and distraction' clarifies that a single thought-moment of the dhyāna mind possesses the concentration and distraction of the ten realms. From 'why is this?' onward, it explains: if one does not yet know the dharma-nature, then the ten realms are entirely distracted; if one understands the dharma-nature, then the ten realms are entirely concentrated. Such concentration and distraction are neither delusion nor understanding; thus we know that in a single thought-moment, concentration and distraction are non-dual, and dharma-nature and ignorance are neither one nor different; this is named inconceivable. Under 'although transcending,' the phrase explains that the identity and separation of dharma-nature and ignorance, concentration and distraction, are not known by the two vehicles. That the two vehicles do not know them is also included within ordinary thinking. It should also be said that the bodhisattvas of the three teachings are all incapable of knowing them. The principle-nature is fundamentally quiescent, hence it is said to 'transcend.' From beginninglessness it has not been manifested, hence it is 'not separate.' Under 'the sūtra says,' it cites the Great Sūtra as proof. Under 'although immediately,' it explains the sūtra's meaning. Cessation is originally a phenomenal concentration of the Hinayana school, but since the sūtra text says 'it is immediately sentient beings,' one must not say it is identical in terms of the Hinayana. One should know that this points directly to the mind-nature of sentient beings: the principle is fundamentally cessation, and therefore it is neither not [so] nor is [so]. Under 'why is this?' it further explains: although the principle is fundamentally cessation, if this principle is viewed against sentient beings, it is neither identical nor separate. Since the nature has no nature, how could there be sentient beings? For fear of straying from the objective realm of principle, it has never been 'not'; for fear of ordinary people confusing themselves with the noble, it has never been 'is.' Because it is not identical, it has never been 'is'; because it is not separate, it has never been 'not.' The statement 'has never [begun]' and so on means beginningless and so on. The wording here is abbreviated, hence it merely says 'begun.' This is because from beginninglessness it has never been 'is,' and from beginninglessness it has never been 'not'; hence it is said to be neither identical nor separate. Therefore one must determine the stages through the six identities: because of six, they are not identical; because of identity, they are not separate. Constantly performing this contemplation, all wondrous concentrations do not go beyond sentient beings. 'Difficult to measure like space' reveals the ultimate identity, which only Buddhas can fully understand. 'Not mixed with poison' and so on is discriminated as in the previous fifth [chapter on] arousing the aspiration for awakening. In calming the mind, the statement 'skillful' and so on refers to the sixty-four turns. From 'if contemplating' onward, it clarifies the non-sequential three calmings and three contemplations. Drawing on the names of the three calmings and three contemplations in embodying substance, each calming and contemplation is fully equipped with the three truths. As in 'embodying the real,' which says the two extremes are quiescent, one should know that all three truths are quiescent, which is named embodying the real. Therefore the meaning of embodying the real is not the same as embodying the real in sequence. In the contemplation of emptiness, it says it illumines the purity of the dharma-nature; one should know that the three delusions are impurity, and illumining the emptiness of the three truths is named the contemplation of emptiness. Even the initial calming and initial contemplation possess the three truths; the remaining two calmings and contemplations can be understood by analogy. In order to make known the inconceivable calming and contemplation, which are differentiated without being differentiated, the initial contemplation merely says 'immediately emptiness and provisionality,' and says 'immediately emptiness and immediately provisionality,' and only in the middle does it possess the three. Fearing that this might involve sequence, it concludes later by saying that they are in a single thought-mind. In 'for the sake of breaking the two extremes it is named one and named middle' and so on: the substance of the three truths fundamentally lacks the distinctions of one and three, middle and extremes; in terms of breaking two it is named one, for the sake of breaking extremes it is named middle, for the sake of breaking bias it is named perfect, for the sake of breaking arising and perishing it is said to be quiescent, and for the sake of breaking sequence it is named a single mind; the wondrous principle truly lacks such differentiations. From 'how could one not awaken?' onward, it treats hindrances by means of dhyāna. The differences among the six remedies are extensive as in the earlier text. Relishing and clinging to the ten dhyānas, when viewed against the principle of the truth of the real, is already a hindrance in itself, hence it says 'taking rebirth according to dhyāna.' How much more so when viewed against the wondrous principle—how could it not be a hindrance? Question: Since the nine contemplations and beyond are said to be undefiled, why are they called hindrances? Answer: These merely serve as conditions for the undefiled; pointing out that even the undefiled is still an obstacle to the middle, how much more so the conditions, and clinging to what arises from conditions! Therefore they are called hindrances. If fully explained, progressing through each dhyāna and each stage, one must individually recognize the marks of the six hindrances and apply the six remedies to cure the various hindrances. Therefore, not relinquishing the ten dhyānas is called stinginess. In dāna, one even relinquishes the environment and body of the ten realms, so how could it only be the phenomenal ten dhyānas? If one clings to the flavor of dhyāna, one violates even the precepts of emptiness and provisionality, the path-concomitant, and sovereignty, so how much more so the complete precepts that follow the path? The remaining four hindrances may be known by analogy. 'Black-toothed Brahmā-heavens': even when reborn there in accordance with dhyāna, they still possess anger; how much less can one who arouses flimsy dhyāna avoid anger? Where it consistently says 'one should earnestly' and so on: since the substance of dhyāna is a hindrance and still requires earnestness, how much more so if afflictions, karma, and demons are indulged without repenting? Worldly people who consider themselves without sin and not needing repentance are in error. In each remedy, the phenomenal perfection is used to remedy the phenomenal hindrance, causing the principle-perfection to arise; hence it says 'violating the precepts that follow the path' and so on. Next, in the conclusion, the inclusion of phenomenal and principle dharmas is fully as in the seventh fascicle. In 'the practitioner's contemplative method reaches its ultimate here' and so on: starting from the object of contemplation and ending with the auxiliary remedies, the contemplative method is already complete. The intention of the three turns below is as the text explains. Furthermore, regarding the sequence of stages, it only means preventing confusion; the other two dharmas spur the shallow to make it deep; one should know that neither is the substance of correct contemplation. The remaining text can also be understood by analogy with the aggregates and sense-fields.