止觀輔行傳弘決 1.68

1.68

Next, from 'The doubter...' onward raises an objection to resolve doubt. In the first objection, it adduces ineffability to challenge showing [the teachings] to people: Principle originally has no exposition; why must one show three? Regarding 'shared and distinctive': not distinguishing between the great and small but simply speaking of all dharmas is called 'shared'. Adducing the four different phrases such as 'arising of arising' in correlation to the distinctions among teachings is called 'distinctive'. Śāriputra facing the goddess represents the ineffability of the Tripiṭaka [teaching]. 'No exposition and no showing' represents the ineffability of the perfect [teaching]. Briefly raising the first and the last, the middle two are known by comparison; they are the shared and distinctive. Both the shared and the distinctive are ineffable; why then show three texts to people? From 'However, merely citing...' downward is the reply. The text encompasses both meanings; why only use non-exposition to challenge exposition? Now, these three texts are themselves exposition; not permitting attachment to the text is itself ineffability. How can one biasedly claim that the three texts are exposition? Therefore, it thoroughly reprimands them, saying: 'Seeing only one side and not seeing the two.' First, citing the Mahāparinirvāṇa Sūtra, it directly matches exposition to respond to the previous objection; this generally clarifies exposition. Next, citing the Lotus Sūtra's 'innumerable expedients' is great exposition, while 'for the five monks' is small exposition; this distinctively clarifies exposition. It also raises the first and the last; the middle two are known by analogy. Next, citing the text from fascicle twelve of the Mahāparinirvāṇa Sūtra: milk is truly ineffable to one born blind, yet it can also be demonstrated by shell-powder and the like; the principle of suchness is truly ineffable, yet it can also be explained through the four [virtues] such as permanence. Now the three types of calming and contemplation are also like this: dhāraṇī is the inconceivable conventional truth, and this conventional truth is also not expressible in words; although ineffable, it is also expressed through the words of conventional truth. Thus both truths are expressible. If the true principle, having no exposition, is still awakened to by means of exposition, how much more so conventional truth—how could it be said to have no exposition? Therefore, any exposition must rely on the two truths. Having already cited texts on exposition to answer non-exposition, it cites Vimalakīrti and others to harmoniously merge the two paths. The first text clarifies that the essence-nature of exposition and non-exposition are mutually identical: written words are form-dharmas, form-dharmas are the true mark, and since the true mark has no separate exposition, this is non-exposition. Next, citing the Mahāparinirvāṇa Sūtra: the Tathāgata originally has no exposition, but catering to beings is called 'great hearing'; great hearing does not depart from principle, so non-exposition is itself exposition. Next, citing the Viśeṣacintābrahma-paripṛcchā Sūtra, it also harmonizes the two paths, hence it says 'always practicing'. Next, from 'citing the Lotus up to seeing the Buddha', it re-clarifies exposition to overturn the previous objection. 'Guiding' means showing and directing; the Analects says: 'To guide means to make correct instruction for them.' Next, citing the Mahāparinirvāṇa Sūtra on clouds and thunder in the sky and so forth, it clarifies that the intention of exposition is nothing other than stimulus and response. Earlier, clarifying causes and conditions, the meaning was still general; now it again distinctively uses a simile to reveal stimulus and response. Fascicle eight says: 'For example, when thunder claps and clouds arise in the sky, flowers bloom on all elephant tusks.' Without thunder they do not bloom, nor do they even have names. The sūtra matches the simile, saying: 'Hearing the teaching of permanence, one sees the buddha-nature.' Therefore it now concludes: 'When is it ever entirely without exposition?' The one who expounds is the response; the one who hears is the stimulus. Both the bodily and vocal wheels possess stimulus and response; now, to answer the objection, it provisionally speaks of exposition. Regarding 'elephant tusks' and so forth, the commentary has three explanations: one says it is the name of a plant called elephant-tusk; the second says flower-patterns bloom upon animal elephant tusks; the third says grassy flowers bloom on top of elephant tusks. Although the three differ, each is capable of illustrating the meaning of stimulus and response. Elephant tusks and thunder are as far apart as heaven and earth, yet relying on celestial thunder, flowers still bloom; how much more so when the sacred exposition is applied to beings and matches their capacity—could it be without benefit? Empty space is the dharma-body. Clapping thunder is expounding the Dharma. Arising clouds is manifesting the body. Elephant tusks are the capacities and conditions. The blooming of flowers is the attainment of benefit, referring to the four different benefits of contemplation-practice and so forth.