止觀輔行傳弘決 10

English (machine translation) 10

Language: English

10.1

Expounded by the Śramaṇa Zhanran of Piling during the Tang.

In the initial explanation of the object of views, there is first a general explanation, followed by opening headings for specific explanations. At the beginning, as for the word "various," the self-commentary explains it as "not one," meaning many. Although many arise, they do not exceed one hundred and forty. Arising not in accord with principle is called "view." Below "further, understanding and knowing...," the word "view" is re-explained. Arising one view each within the one hundred and forty, all infer principle improperly; thus they are termed "deviant." As for "Those who listen and study...," etc., it distinguishes faults that are not views. Those who listen and study claim to have proof on their own, whose meaning is like "living"; they denounce practitioners of contemplation as having no realization, whose meaning is like "dead." The Zhuangzi states: "If there is an explanation, it is permissible; if there is no explanation, it is dead." Below "Those who practice dhyāna...," it clarifies that practitioners of contemplation inwardly contemplate principle, claiming that their feelings have penetrated, taking this as marvelous awakening, and denounce students as "watching the stump." What they call "feelings" refers to affective nature, not deluded passions. As for "watching the stump," it is like the plowman of Song: in the field, a hare ran into a stump and died. He subsequently abandoned plowing to constantly watch this stump, hoping there would be another hare. Bystanders admonished him, but he was all the more unwilling to stop. Hence, as popularly transmitted, those who cling in delusion are called "watching the stump." These two persons originally have the two faculties of faith and Dharma. Because they do not understand the intention of mutual penetration, they negate each other, yet have not formed views. Therefore, both the refuted and the refuter are judged as not having manifested views; thus each has stagnation. Now they are evaluated and both said to have failed. From "If view-understanding..." onwards, it briefly demonstrates the manifestation of views. Question and answer are both inexhaustible. The first is inexhaustible questioning; below "if explaining...," it is inexhaustible answering. The term "curved shooting" is an analogy for the inexhaustible raising of questions. The Shujing states: "Like Yi who was skilled in archery. In the ninth year of Yao, during the flood, seven suns appeared together, and Yi shot down six of them." This is also an exaggerated account by scholars. It also says: "Like Yang Youji who was skilled in archery: a hundred paces away from tree leaves, he shot them with a hundred hits out of a hundred. Going hunting with King Xiang of Chu, they saw a troop of gibbons circling a tree. The king ordered his attendants to shoot them, but the gibbons leaped and bounded even more wildly. The king ordered Youji to shoot them, and the gibbons held onto the tree, wailing mournfully." View-understanding is the view manifested by dhyāna; names and letters are the view manifested by hearing. Possessing these two, they are not like the previous group of students and meditators who lack views; therefore, questioning others is like shooting with a curved trajectory to hem in birds. Following the convenience of phrasing in the text, only one side is mentioned; fully stated, it should be like shooting with a curved trajectory to surround birds and beasts, causing neither flying fowl nor running beasts to fail to lose their way. With this, a person who has manifested views and is conversant in terminology can refute a dhyāna practitioner who lacks views, like causing flying creatures to lose their way; and can refute a student who lacks views, like causing running beasts to lose their way. For the one hundred and forty, each and every one is thus. As for chuo, Guo Pu says: "It means broad and ample." The Shijing states: "Broad, broad with ample room." "Like shooting into empty space" is an analogy for inexhaustible answers. This distinguishes them from persons without views. Those who sit in dhyāna or study all succeed through learning, unlike those who manifest views, which are born from concentration. Below "these views...," it clarifies that what they depend on is different. Below "for example...," it cites an analogy. The practice of faith is like depending on hearing; the practice of Dharma is like depending on dhyāna. Hearing and thinking should be understood accordingly. As for "clever eloquence in questioning and answering," the person who has manifested views is skilled in questioning and answering, completely resembling the four unhindered eloquences. As for "resembling marvelous penetration," whatever they refute or harmonize is like penetrating marvelous principle. These two belong to views and have nothing to do with eloquence or awakening. Below "In the south, practitioners of dhyāna are few...," etc., it properly distinguishes errors from the past. The Chen and Qi were separated by territory, and Chen was referred to as the south; this refers to place to distinguish the quantity, existence, or nonexistence of persons manifesting views. "True path" refers to the confusion of those who manifest views through dhyāna. "Dhāraṇī" refers to the confusion of those who manifest views through hearing. As for "dark regarding knowing people...," etc., those ignorant fellows, being dark in knowing people, judged those who manifested views as being in high positions, even calling it the non-arising Buddha-ground; or alternatively, disbelieving, they judged them as demonic madness. Both judgments are incorrect. Below "now it is stated...," it judges and concludes that they are neither mad nor sage. From "Now, when possessed by a ghost..." onwards, it explains being neither mad nor sage. Because views belong to the nature of wisdom, it is called "view-wisdom."

10.3

Below "speaking generally...," in properly clarifying the purpose of the arising of the object of views, the statement "two meanings are many" means: dhyāna having already manifested views, and dhyāna and views manifesting together—these two are many. If the view manifests first and dhyāna manifests only afterward, this meaning is rare. It is not completely nonexistent; thus it is merely said to be rare. The meaning of this text now does not discuss before and after: wherever there is a view, it is all contemplated, while also distinguishing differences; therefore it says "many and few." Below "for example, the various dhyānas...," it uses an analogy to explain the difference in sequence between dhyāna and views. That which is called "the various dhyānas universally manifesting...," etc., refers generally to the desire, form, and formless [realms]—namely, manifesting in the six grounds or nine grounds. Like the previous two meanings, the access [concentration] also has the meaning of manifesting the undefiled, but it is not as abundant as manifesting based on dhyāna; therefore it is said to be few. Thus this is used as an analogy for dhyāna manifesting after views. The "six grounds" are the four dhyānas, the intermediate, and the desire[-realm] concentration. The "nine grounds" add the three formless [absorptions] to the previous six. This is judged according to the Chengshilun and is not the intention of the present text. If according to the Abhidharma, one takes the access [concentration] and excludes the desire[-realm] concentration. One should say that the six grounds and nine grounds universally manifest the undefiled, but the access manifests few, while the other grounds are many. However, the citation of this analogy seems somewhat unequal. If one says that dhyāna and the undefiled manifesting together, and manifesting the undefiled after dhyāna—these two meanings are many; whereas if one says that after attaining the undefiled one manifests dhyāna, this meaning is rare—then it seems somewhat equal. Although the meaning seems equal, it is also only a preliminary statement. Although dhyāna and the undefiled have an order of precedence, they are not completely identical to dhyāna and the manifestation of views; there are definitely differences in quantity and order of precedence.

10.4

Below "if a person...," it clarifies harm and benefit. As for "being able to regulate and adjust oneself...," etc., it means that investigating the sūtras and treatises and meeting good spiritual friends both enable one to self-regulate the error of clinging to views. This only eliminates the clinging nature, not the substance of the view. Since views depend on dhyāna, those who manifest dhyāna are few; attaining dhyāna and manifesting views while also being able to regulate oneself is therefore called "hard to obtain." Nurturing views to examine the mind has precisely this meaning. As for "true Dharma...," etc., it cites the passage of the Dazhidulun to substantiate the person hard to obtain: the true Dharma substantiates the sūtras and treatises investigated; the speaker substantiates the good spiritual friend; the listeners substantiate the person who self-regulates. The true Dharma and the speaker are already hard to obtain in themselves, how much more so that one clinging to views becomes a listener receiving the true Dharma, entering correctness through deviance and altering clinging to examine the mind—this is called hard to obtain. As for "dense forest...," etc., ye means to pull; it can also be written with the hand radical. The Zilin states: "To pull while lying down." Birth-and-death is like a dense forest, deviant schemes are like "crooked wood." Because of not meeting a master and not regulating oneself, the mind of views does not cease, making it difficult to emerge from birth-and-death, like crooked wood. Therefore, the thirty-eighth fascicle of the Dazhidulun states: "If the mind is deviant and crooked, it is difficult to obtain escape. Just as pulling wood in a dense forest, the crooked piece is difficult to bring out."

10.5

Next, in opening the sections to explain, regarding the "tenets of the three masters": the assertions of all non-Buddhists do not go beyond two gods and three sages. The "two gods" refer to Maheśvara and Viṣṇu. [Viṣṇu] is also called Weiniu or Weirou. This is translated as "Universally Superior," also "Universally Bewildering," and also "Universally Pure." The Āgamas say, "He is a form-realm god." The Abhidharmakośa says, "The topmost god of the third dhyāna." Jingying says, "He abides at the limit of the desire realm." The Dazhidulun says, "The god Universally Pure has four arms, grasps a conch, holds a discus, and rides a garuḍa. He possesses great supernormal powers yet has much anger and harm. People at that time feared his majesty and thus came to venerate and serve him. At the beginning of the kalpa, there was a person whose hands rippled the ocean waters, having a thousand heads and two thousand hands." This is detailed in the Commentary on the Lotus Sūtra. The Commentary says, "He has twenty-four hands and one less than a thousand heads, being born by transformation upon the waters. From his navel is a thousand-petaled lotus flower, within which is light as if ten thousand suns shone simultaneously. King Brahmā was born down from this flower. Having been born, he formed this thought: 'Why is it empty of sentient beings?' While he was thinking this, sentient beings from other worlds who were due to be born here [appeared]—eight gods suddenly born by transformation. The eight gods are the parents of sentient beings; King Brahmā is the parent of the eight gods; and Viṣṇu is the parent of King Brahmā. Tracing back to the root, he is respected by the world, hence called the World-Honoured One." The Dṛṣṭānta-sūtra says, "Non-Buddhists assert that King Brahmā produced the four castes: from his mouth were born the Brahmans, from his arms the Kṣatriyas, from his flanks the Vaiśyas, and from his feet the Śūdras." The Madhyamāgama says, "Kṣatriyas, Brahmans, householders, and artisans are called the four castes." The Dīrghāgama says, "Kṣatriyas, Brahmans, householders, and Śūdras are identical in occupation and differ only slightly in name." As for "Maheśvara," this is translated as the "Great Sovereign," the topmost god of the form realm, having three eyes and eight arms, riding a white bull and holding a white whisk. He possesses great awesome power, capable of overturning the world, and the entire world honors him as the origin of transformation. The Dazhidulun says, "In the heaven of the Great Sovereign there are bodhisattvas whose abode is named Maheśvara." The Avataṃsaka says, "He is a bodhisattva of the tenth ground, and even [the kings of] the Four Heavenly Kings heaven are bodhisattvas of the first ground." One should know that the traces of the gods appear ordinary and low, but their root is great provisional [manifestation]. Regarding the "three sages": the first is Kapila, translated as "Yellow Head," because his head was gold-colored. It is also said that both his head and face were gold-colored, hence he was named for this. Fearing bodily death, he went to the Sovereign God to ask [for aid]. The god instructed him to go to the Vindhya mountains and take myrobalan (āmalaka) fruits to eat, which could prolong life. Having eaten them, he transformed in the forest into a stone the size of a couch. When there were those who did not understand [his teachings], they wrote verses and questioned the stone. Later he was refuted by the Bodhisattva Dignāga, and the stone inscribed with verses cracked, and so forth. Having attained the five supernormal knowledges, he knew eighty thousand kalpas before and after. Contemplating throughout the world who was capable of being saved, he saw a Brahman named Śūri wandering among human beings. He asked, "Are you playing?" He replied, "Yes." After another two thousand years, he asked, "Can you cultivate the Path?" He replied, "I can." He then explained the three types of suffering to him: first, internal suffering, meaning hunger, thirst, and so forth; second, external suffering, meaning tigers, wolves, and so forth; third, celestial suffering, meaning wind, rain, and so forth. He expounded a treatise of one hundred thousand verses called the Sāṃkhya-śāstra, translated here as "calculation." Using twenty-five truths, he explained that the effect exists within the cause, positing oneness as the main tenet. Regarding the twenty-five truths: first, from the primordial darkness intellect is born. Prior to eighty thousand kalpas, there was obscurity and ignorance; he only saw the initial arising of the intermediate existence (antarābhava), and through the power of past lives he constantly recalled and conceptualized it, naming it the truth of primordial darkness (pradhāna/prakṛti). It is also called worldly nature, meaning that sentient beings in the world exist from primordial darkness, which is the original nature of the world. It is also called spontaneity, because it proceeds from nothing; from this intellect is born. It is also named mahat ("great"), which is the consciousness of the intermediate existence. Next, from intellect is born the ego-mind; this is the ego of egoistic pride, not the spiritual self (ātman/puruṣa), and is the third truth. From the ego-mind are born form, sound, smell, taste, and tangibles. From the five sense-objects are born the five great elements, namely the four great elements and space. The sense-objects are subtle and the elements are coarse; compounding the sense-objects forms the elements, hence it is said that from sense-objects the great elements are born. However, the arising of these elements differs in quantity: from sound is born the space element; from sound and touch is born the wind element; from form, sound, and touch is born the fire element; from form, sound, touch, and taste is born the water element; and the five sense-objects give birth to the earth element. The earth element relies on many sense-objects, hence its power is weakest; up to the space element, which relies on few sense-objects, hence its power is strongest. Thus the four discs form the world: the space disc is the lowest, followed by wind, then fire, then water, and then earth. From the five great elements are born the eleven faculties: the eye and other [sense] faculties, which, because they can perceive, are called faculties and named the five knowing faculties; hands, feet, mouth, and the organs of evacuation and reproduction, which, because they are capable of action, are named the five action faculties; and the equal faculty of the mind, making eleven faculties in total. Because the mind can universally cognize, it is named the equal faculty. If each of the five knowing faculties employs one great element: the form object forms the fire element, the fire element forms the eye faculty, and the eye faculty in turn sees form. The space object forms the ear faculty, and the ear faculty in turn hears sound. Earth forms the nose, water the tongue, and wind the body; it is also like this. These twenty-four truths are what belongs to the self (ātman); they all rely on the spiritual self, which is named the master truth (puruṣa). Discussed together as the active and the passive, they make twenty-five. The second is Ulūka-Sāṃkhya, whose doctrine asserts universal creation, yet in the eye faculty fire is predominant, up to the body faculty where wind is predominant, fully explained in the Suvarṇasaptati. Among these non-Buddhists there was a sect leader who went to the Golden Land, wearing a fire basin on his head and iron plates on his belly, sounding the king's debate drum and summoning the monks to debate. A monk from Eastern India debated with him. The opponent posited that the world is permanent. The monk challenged: "Now there must be destruction, because when the world disintegrates the world must perish; therefore it is proven and known that it perishes now." The opponent said: "It definitely does not perish, like a mountain of gold and so forth." At that time the king sided with the non-Buddhist, and consequently made this monk ride a donkey to suffer humiliation. The king venerated the non-Buddhist and rewarded him with seventy pounds of gold. Because of this, he composed a treatise named the Saptati [in Gold]. Later Vasubandhu composed the Paramārthasaptati, extensively refuting their tenets and rescuing the position of the former monk. The king then venerated the former monk, and ordered the people of the country to circulate widely the treatise composed by Vasubandhu. They exhumed the corpse of the non-Buddhist, and as for those who had certified the doctrine, they whipped their bones. That school also posits that the Sovereign God has three bodies, as cited fully in the third fascicle. Ulūka-Sāṃkhya is translated here as "Owl Sage" (Ulūka); by day this person hid in mountain valleys to compose scriptures and treatises, and by night he traveled to preach the Dharma and transform others, just like that bird, hence he gained this name. He is also called "Eye-Foot" (Akṣapāda), having three eyes on his feet. When he debated with the Sovereign God, that god had three eyes on his face, and he compared them to his feet, hence he gained this name. This person appeared in the world eight hundred years before the Buddha, also attained the five supernormal knowledges, and expounded a treatise that also had one hundred thousand verses, named Vaiśeṣika, translated here as "Unexcelled." He took the six categories (padārtha) as his tenets. First, dravya, translated here as the master category, meaning the five great elements as well as time, direction, self (ātman), and mind (manas); these nine are what the myriad things rely upon, hence named "master." Second, guṇa, translated here as the dependent category, meaning the five sense-objects of form and so forth, oneness and difference, separation and conjunction, number and measure, beauty and ugliness, ignorance and wisdom, love and hate, suffering and pleasure, diligence and sloth; these twenty-one rely upon the preceding nine phenomena, hence named "dependent." Third, karma, translated here as the action category, meaning bowing and looking up, bending and stretching, going out and coming in, leaving and coming, and so forth, hence named "action." Fourth, sāmānya, translated here as the general characteristic category, meaning the universal subsumption of the myriad phenomena into one great existence (bhāva), hence named the "general category." Fifth, viśeṣa, translated here as the particular characteristic category, meaning the dense array of myriad phenomena are each mutually distinct, hence named "particular characteristics." Sixth, samavāya, meaning particles forming a jar without mutual obstruction. Within guṇa, they assert that washing three times a day and making offerings to fire twice constitutes wholesome practice. They also assert that the Ganges water can eradicate sinful obstacles, hence one must wash three times. They also consider fire to be the mouth of heaven, through which heaven eats, hence called the "celestial mouth." At the two times they burn incense, ghee, and so forth, causing the vapors to ascend to heaven as an offering, hoping to seek blessings and eliminate sins. The third is Ṛṣabha, translated here as "Asceticism"; the time of his appearance is not known; he took reckoning and calculation as the holy Dharma. He composed scriptures that also had one hundred thousand verses, named Nirgrantha-putra. For this person, severing defilements used the six hindrances and four turbidities as the Dharma, positing as his tenets that within the cause there is both an effect and no effect, and that it is both one and different. In the Dazhidulun, four positions are detailed: three are as before, with the addition of Jñātiputra. The time of his appearance in the world and the quantity of scriptures he composed are not known. He posited as his tenets that within the cause there is neither an effect nor no effect, and that it is neither one nor different. As for the six hindrances stated by Nirgrantha-putra, as the Upāyahṛdaya-śāstra states: "First, the hindrance of not seeing; second, the hindrance of delusion; third, the hindrance of experiencing suffering; fourth, the hindrance of the exhaustion of life; fifth, the hindrance of nature; sixth, the hindrance of names and words." Regarding the "four turbidities," they refer to anger, arrogance, greed, and flattery. Furthermore, the Upāyahṛdaya-śāstra states: "The assertions of Ulūka and Kapila differ from this." That treatise also has the Nayama who posited ten truths. Furthermore, in terms of the two wisdoms of hearing and reflection: the wisdom of hearing has eight [branches]—first, astronomy; second, arithmetic; third, medicine; fourth, incantations; together with the four Vedas, making eight. The wisdom of reflection has eight [levels]: first, the Heaven of Long Life; second, the Heaven of the Constellations; third, the Heaven of the Four Heavenly Kings, up to Paranirmitavaśavartin, making eight. Asceticism is precisely the practice for the Heaven of Long Life. With the five heats scorching the body and so forth, there are six practices in all: first, self-starvation; second, throwing oneself into deep waters; third, hurling oneself into fire; fourth, throwing oneself from precipices; fifth, remaining silent; sixth, maintaining the precepts of dogs, chickens, and so forth. Some say: thinking they would surpass the śramaṇas, they thus engaged in asceticism; if a śramaṇa bared his shoulder, they went naked; if a śramaṇa shaved his head, they pulled out their hair. Those who speak like this lack deep discernment. They take asceticism as their fundamental tenet, so whatever is painful they practice, without regard to surpassing those śramaṇas and so forth. If we speak now of their surpassing one another, it is because seeing that other teachers' suffering was not extreme, they pulled out their hair and so forth: "He has not jumped from cliffs, so I jump from cliffs; seeing that he washes three times, I hurl myself into fire; seeing that he roasts in the five heats, I throw myself down." Following non-Buddhist sources, this originally arose as related in a scripture: there was a monk who encountered thieves who stole his robes; a Brahman saw this and imitated it in all respects, going naked and even throwing himself from precipices and so forth, as explained later; hence from this a non-Buddhist sect was established. Furthermore, they assert horse sacrifice to bring permanent blessing and so forth; thus the Mañjuśrīparipṛcchā-sūtra says: "Killing four thousand horses, removing the five viscera, and placing seven treasures inside to give as alms to Brahmans. Killing human beings and placing treasures inside is also like this. Furthermore, shooting arrows into the four directions, and as far as galloping horses reach, distributing treasures to give to Brahmans. Whether killing sentient beings within that much land, or burning everything, or worshipping all trees, or worshipping all mountain spirits—in this way there are twenty-six evil practices in all." Furthermore, non-Buddhists assert five things as permanent: first, the principle of space, which is permanent because it is not non-existent; second, time, which is permanent because it is without arising and perishing; third, direction, which is permanent because it exists throughout the ten directions; fourth, minute particles, which are permanent because being extremely subtle they cannot be divided; fifth, nirvāṇa, which is permanent because it is without change. Question: Why do they not assert cessation not through deliberation (apratisaṃkhyā-nirodha)? Answer: That is an internal doctrine of the Buddhadharma. Because within the Hīnayāna there are three unconditioned dharmas, such doctrines as these must be understood. If one does not understand them, in one's own practice it is difficult to distinguish: how would empty space and nirvāṇa differ from what is posited in the Buddhadharma?

10.6

Next, explaining the four doctrines in the *Introduction to the Mahāyāna* (*Rù dàchéng lùn*). Regarding 'action and the agent are one': the *Dazhidulun* states, 'The body, hands, feet, and so forth are called action. Delusionally positing a spiritual self (*ātman*) capable of performing action is called the agent. If one posits that the hands and so forth are one with the spiritual self, this is positing that the spirit and bodily actions are one.' In meaning, this is the same as positing that form is the self. Regarding 'the mark and the possessor of the mark are one': 'mark' refers to the four marks of birth and so forth of the physical form and four great elements; the 'possessor of the mark' is the spiritual self. This posits that the spiritual self and the four marks are one. Regarding 'the parts and the whole are one': 'parts' refers to portions of the body, such as the hands, feet, and head; 'the whole' refers to the body itself, because the body possesses parts such as hands and feet. This posits that the body is identical to the head, hands, feet, and so forth. Although there are the preceding three different kinds, the first two merely posit that the body and the spirit are one, and the latter one merely posits that the parts of the body and the body itself are one. If [one considers] Ulūka's positing of difference, up to [the view that] the clay contains the jar and so on, it is also like this. Passing in detail through the four views (and so on), it is merely that the spirit and the body are different. The marks, parts, and so forth may be understood accordingly by analogy to the above. The third and fourth lines may also be understood likewise. Furthermore, the *Po sizong lun* states: 'Sāṃkhya posits oneness; Vaiśeṣika posits difference; the Nirgrantha posits both oneness and difference; the Jñāti[putra] posits neither oneness nor difference.' Moreover, according to the *Po niepan lun*, there are twenty masters whose doctrines differ, each positing one kind [of state] as nirvāṇa. These two treatises were composed by Jñāti[putra]. According to the *Aṅgulimālīya Sūtra*, which clarifies the origin of the establishment of these heterodoxies: the Buddha asked Mañjuśrī, 'Have you heard of whether there were non-Buddhists? In the past, there was a Buddha named Krakucchanda. When that Buddha appeared, there were no non-Buddhists, but only the one Buddha vehicle. After that Buddha's parinirvāṇa, there was a monk dwelling in an araṇya named Fotihui (Buddhabuddhi). Someone gave him an invaluable jeweled robe, which was seized by hunters. They took this monk into the mountains, stripped his body naked, and tied him by his head hanging from a tree. A brāhmaṇa saw this and sighed, saying, "Formerly wearing the kāṣāya, but now naked; I certainly know that the kāṣāya is not the garment of liberation!" Following this example, he hung himself up naked, taking this to be the true path. This monk untied himself and freed his body; he smeared his body with red stone, covered himself with tree bark, and tied grass to brush away mosquitoes and gnats. Those who saw this again said that wearing such clothing and holding such a whisk was the path of liberation, and immediately imitated it. Renunciant non-Buddhist brāhmaṇas arose from this. In the evening, the monk entered the water to wash his wounds, covered his head with clothing, and wrapped his body in the worn-out rags of cowherds. Those who saw this again imitated it: bathing three times a day, and the ascetic non-Buddhists with unkempt hair were born from this. This monk, having washed his body's wounds, was again bitten by flies and bees, so he smeared his wounds with white earth. Those who saw this again imitated it; the body-smearing non-Buddhists arose from this. This monk lit a fire to scorch his body. Those who saw this again imitated it; the non-Buddhists who scorch their bodies with five fires arose from this. The pain from scorching his body grew unbearable, and he cast himself from a cliff to commit suicide. Those who saw this again imitated it; the non-Buddhists who cast themselves from cliffs arose from this. Thus, up to ninety-five kinds [of non-Buddhists], all were brāhmaṇas imitating this monk, and they have not ceased to this day.'

10.7

Next, listing the seven masters: the original ancestors were Kapila and the others, whose branch traditions diverged into the six teachers. Now, Kumārajīva's explanation is listed first, followed by the distinction of differences in the *Mahāparinirvāṇa Sūtra*. First, regarding 'Pūraṇa': Kumārajīva says, 'Kāśyapa is his mother's clan name. Pūraṇa is his personal name. He posits that all dharmas are like empty space, neither arising nor ceasing.' Sengzhao says, 'This person posits that all dharmas are annihilated like space, and that there are no ways of loyalty and filial piety between ruler and minister or father and son.' Regarding 'Maskarin': Kumārajīva says, 'Maskarin is his personal name. Gośālī is his mother. He posits that the sins and merits of sentient beings have no causes and conditions.' Sengzhao says, 'He posits that the suffering and pleasure of sentient beings are cut off without cause, and are naturally so.' Regarding 'Sañjayin': Kumārajīva says, 'Sañjayin is his personal name. Vairaṭī is his mother. He posits that one must pass through birth-and-death and traverse kalpas, after which the limit of suffering will naturally exhaust itself on its own.' Sengzhao says, 'He posits that his path need not be sought; like a ball of thread rolling down a high mountain, when the thread is exhausted, it stops. What need is there to seek it?' Regarding 'Ajita Ke[sakambalin]' and so forth: Kumārajīva says, 'Ajita Kesakambalin is his personal name. Kambala means coarse garment. Positing a non-cause as a cause, wearing coarse garments, plucking out hair, smoking the nostrils, and so forth, he takes various ascetic practices to be the path.' Sengzhao says, 'Asceticism in the present life leads to eternal bliss in future lives.' Regarding 'Kakuda [Kātyāyana]' and so forth: Kumārajīva says, 'This is the name of a non-Buddhist. This person raises views according with the object. If someone asks him "Is there?", he replies "There is." It is the same with "Is there not?" and so forth.' Sengzhao says, 'Kātyāyana is the clan name. The rest is his personal name. He posits that all dharmas both exist and do not exist.' Regarding 'Nirgrantha' and so forth: Jñāti is his mother. He posits that sin, merit, suffering, and pleasure are entirely caused by previous lives and must inevitably be repaid. Even if one practices the path now, they cannot be cut off. These six masters were all naked and proclaimed themselves to be omniscient people. Furthermore, these four doctrines and six doctrines do not go beyond the sixty-two views, such as views concerning the past and views concerning the future, as fully explained in the fifth fascicle. They can be understood by comparing them with it. Sengzhao says, 'Nirgrantha is the general name for renunciant non-Buddhists, like the name śramaṇa in the Buddha's teaching.' Before the Buddha appeared, these six masters all reigned as kings of doctrines in India. By the time the Buddha appeared in the world, their schools were already flourishing; hence it says 'until the Buddha appeared in the world.'

10.8

Next, in citing the Mahāparinirvāṇa-sūtra to distinguish similarities and differences, where it says "derived from Kumārajīva's commentary" and so forth, Kumārajīva wrote no separate commentary on the Vimalakīrti-nirdeśa, but only the Annotated Sūtra together with the worthy masters such as Daosheng and Sengzhao. What is used in the present text encompasses the interpretations of Daosheng and Sengzhao in meaning. Comparing their explanations with the Mahāparinirvāṇa-sūtra, the names of the six masters are identical, but what they maintain has three similarities and three differences. The three differences are the second, fourth, and fifth, whose texts differ from one another. The three similarities are that the first in the Mahāparinirvāṇa-sūtra is the same as Kumārajīva's first, the third is the same as the sixth, and the sixth is the same as the third. In the sūtra, because King Ajātaśatru's karmic hindrances were activated, boils broke out all over his body, and no skilled physician could heal his body and mind. Six great ministers each addressed the king, saying: 'If one constantly grieves, grief will only increase. Just as with a person who loves sleep, sleep will become more abundant, and indulging in lust and wine is also like this. There are now great masters residing in their respective cities who expound such teachings to their disciples.' Pūraṇa taught that there is no black karma and no retribution of black karma, and that there are no superior or inferior actions. This is the same as the first passage of the Annotated Sūtra. The Annotated Sūtra says: 'All dharmas are like empty space; there is no karmic retribution,' and so forth. Second, Maskarin taught that the bodies of all sentient beings have seven factors, namely: earth, water, fire, wind, suffering, pleasure, and life-span. These seven dharmas cannot be harmed or destroyed; they remain unmoved like Mount Sumeru. Even if one strikes them with a sharp blade, no injury occurs; there is neither killer nor victim. Thus the text of the Mahāparinirvāṇa-sūtra differs from the second of the Annotated Sūtra. That second in the Annotated Sūtra says: 'Suffering and pleasure have no causes and conditions,' and so forth. Third, Sañjaya taught: 'Among all sentient beings, what a king does is sovereign like the earth, bearing both the pure and the defiled equally. The other three great elements are also like this, washing equally, burning equally, and blowing equally. Just as a tree whose branches are lopped off in autumn sprouts again in spring, because it sprouts again, what sin could there be? When one dies here, one is reborn here again. Retributions such as suffering and pleasure are not caused by present karma, but are due to the past. The present has no cause, and the future has no fruit; by observing precepts in the present, one blocks present evil retribution.' This is the same as the sixth text of the Annotated Sūtra. That sixth master in the Annotated Sūtra says: 'Sin, merit, suffering, and pleasure are all caused by previous lifetimes.' Fourth, Ajita Keśakambala taught: 'Whether one kills oneself or causes others to kill, stealing, sexual misconduct, lying, and so forth are also like this. If one slaughters a village, a city, or a country, or bestows gifts on sentient beings south of the Ganges, or slaughters sentient beings north of the Ganges, there is neither sin nor merit.' This differs from the fourth in the Annotated Sūtra. That fourth in the Annotated Sūtra says: 'One undergoes suffering in this life and receives pleasure in the next life.' Fifth, Kakuda Kātyāyana taught: 'Even if one slaughters all beings, if one has no shame, one does not fall into hell, just as empty space does not receive dust or water; if one has shame, one immediately falls into hell. All sentient beings are created by Īśvara; when Īśvara is angry, sentient beings suffer afflictions; when Īśvara is pleased, sentient beings are at peace and happy.' This differs from the fifth in the Annotated Sūtra. That fifth says: 'There is both existence and non-existence, answering according to the inquiry.' Sixth, Nirgrantha Jñātiputra taught: 'There is no giving and no receiving, no present world and no future world. Passing through eighty thousand kalpas, one is naturally liberated; whether sinful or sinless, it is completely like this. Just as the four great rivers all enter the great ocean without any further distinction.' This is the same as the third in the Annotated Sūtra. That third says: 'He maintains that the path of all sentient beings does not need to be sought; it is like a ball of thread rolling to its end.' Furthermore, the vinaya text cited in the Shizong differs again from this, expanding them into ten persons, though the doctrines are only six: first, Kāśyapa Pūraṇa; second, Maskarin; third, Gośālī; fourth, Ajita; fifth, Keśakambala; sixth, Modiye Poxiu; seventh, Kātyāyana; eighth, Xunruo; ninth, Vairāṭīputra; tenth, Nirgranthaputra. It then harmonizes them, stating: The first of the Nirvāṇa corresponds to this first; the second of the Nirvāṇa corresponds to these second and third; the third of the Nirvāṇa corresponds to these eighth and ninth; the fourth of the Nirvāṇa corresponds to these fourth and fifth; the fifth of the Nirvāṇa corresponds to these sixth and seventh; the sixth of the Nirvāṇa corresponds to this tenth. However, Tripiṭaka Master Kumārajīva personally went to the Five Indias, and his translations were brilliant and widely circulated in his time; how could the son be designated by the mother's name? The Shizong divides them into two persons, and I do not know the reason for this. Furthermore, although the surnames of the non-Buddhists are manifold, most belong to the Brahmins. Taking the Brahmin surnames as a whole, they are the most supreme among surnames. As the tenth fascicle of the Dīrghāgama says: 'There was a māṇava named Ambaṭṭha who came to the Buddha with five hundred disciples and spoke thus: "Kṣatriyas and other castes constantly revere the Brahmins." The Buddha thought that he should subdue him, and so spoke to him: "What is your surname?" He answered: "The surname Kaṇhāyana." The Buddha said: "You are the lineage of a slave of the Śākyas." The five hundred disciples all raised their hands and said: "This māṇava is of a true noble clan, handsome in countenance, endowed with eloquence, and able to debate with Gautama." The Buddha told the five hundred disciples: "If your master is inferior, you should abandon your master, and I will debate with you. If your master is superior, you should remain silent." Thereupon the five hundred disciples were silent. The Buddha told the māṇava: "Long ago in the past, King Okkāka fathered four sons: the first was named Ulkāmukha, the second Hastinīka, the third Rājyanirdeśa, and the fourth Alaṅkāra. These four sons, having incurred a minor wrongful charge, were banished to the Snow Mountains. King Okkāka had a maidservant named Diśā, who had relations with a Brahmin and thereupon became pregnant. She gave birth to a māṇava who could speak as soon as he touched the ground, and so he was named Kaṇhāyana. From then on, the Brahmin caste took Kaṇhāyana as their surname." He also asked the māṇava: "Have you previously heard the ancient senior Brahmins recount the origins of your clan and lineage, or not?" He remained silent, and even when asked a second time, he remained silent. The Buddha said: "If you do not answer after my third inquiry, Guhyaka, who holds a vajra pestle, is at your side and will split your head into seven pieces." At that time, the vajra-wielding yakṣa stood in the air above the māṇava's head, ready to strike with the pestle if he did not answer promptly. The Buddha told him: "Look up!" He looked up and saw him; having seen him, he was terrified, moved his seat close to the Buddha, and relied upon the World-Honoured One for rescue and protection. He said to the Buddha: "Let the World-Honoured One ask, and I will answer." The Buddha asked him, and he answered: "I have also heard the ancient senior Brahmins recount it." The five hundred disciples all raised their hands and shouted loudly: "The māṇava is of the lineage of a slave of the Śākyas!" The Buddha again thought: "I fear these five hundred disciples will arrogantly call him a slave. I should now employ skillful means to remove his designation of slave." He then told the five hundred disciples: "Do not consider this māṇava to be of the lineage of a slave of the Śākyas. The Brahmin was a great ṛṣi endowed with great majestic virtue. He defeated King Okkāka and demanded his daughter; because the king feared him, he gave him his daughter." Due to these words of the Buddha, he was spared the designation of slave.'

10.9

Next, explaining the non-Buddhists who attach themselves to the Buddha-Dharma: they too take Buddhist sūtras as the basis for generating their views. The assertions of these two traditions derive from Fascicle 1 of the Dazhidulun. Both traditions generally hold that tortoise hair and hare horns are impermanent and not-self, while the Fangguang (Vaitulya) further asserts emptiness and illusion as its doctrine. Regarding the Vātsīputrīya assertion that the self resides in a fifth receptacle, this falls outside the four propositions. Question: The treatise explains the four propositions; why is that different from the present text? The present text posits four for each of the five aggregates, totaling twenty propositions, which are precisely the twenty identity-views asserted by externalists. Having first listed the four propositions, it next cites the treatise as proof; yet the text of the treatise is completely different from the Abhidharma. Answer: The texts differ, but the meaning is the same. The first fascicle of the treatise, in explaining the Vātsīputrīyas, states: 'As the four propositions of the Vātsīputrīya-abhidharma say: The five aggregates are not separate from the person; the person is not separate from the five aggregates. One cannot say that the five aggregates are the person, nor can one say that the person is the five aggregates; the person is subsumed within the fifth ineffable receptacle.' Thus we know that the first two propositions of the Abhidharma already subsume the twenty propositions of identity-view. The twenty propositions are merely the four propositions, made into twenty with respect to the five aggregates. The latter two propositions of the Abhidharma clarify that the self lies outside the four propositions; hence it says that one cannot state the five aggregates to be the person, and so on. Below, from 'Now, the Vātsīputrīya...', it distinguishes the similarities and differences. The self asserted by the present Vātsīputrīyas has four differences in total from the external non-Buddhists: First, external non-Buddhists assert that the self lies within the four propositions, whereas the present Vātsīputrīyas hold it to be outside. Second, external non-Buddhists expand the original four persons into twenty, whereas the present Vātsīputrīyas assert only one person. Third, external non-Buddhists assert the self to be real, or permanent, or annihilated, whereas the present Vātsīputrīyas still regard it as conventional truth. Fourth, external non-Buddhists assert a spiritual self (puruṣa), whereas the present Vātsīputrīyas assert only a personal self (pudgala). Because of these meanings, they are called 'attached to the Buddha-Dharma' and differ from the six teachers. Therefore, when the present text cites the twenty identity-views, they correspond precisely to the self refuted by the Vātsīputrīyas—the self being the one, different, large, or small of the four propositions. It also says 'the three periods of time and the unconditioned': the three periods of time are understandable; the unconditioned is the unconditioned of space. Because non-Buddhists also hold that space is permanent and so forth, the present Vātsīputrīyas state that the self transcends the four propositions; they definitely do not take analytical cessation as the fourth proposition or the ineffable receptacle. The Vātsīputrīyas also employ analytical cessation to refute the self. Next, explaining the Fangguang practitioners: first, the views they hold are presented. Regarding 'reading the Buddha's ten metaphors' and so forth: the previous views of the Vātsīputrīyas were based on the Hīnayāna, while the present views of the Fangguang are based on the Mahāyāna; hence they give rise to their views on the basis of the ten metaphors. The ten metaphors are as explained previously. One should know that the Fangguang also possesses four aspects and is not a gate to the Mahāyāna: first, not recognizing the true principle relied upon; second, not recognizing the marks of delusion that arise; third, not recognizing the latent afflictions that can generate views; fourth, the contemplation methods being unable to refute the views. Therefore, although its doctrine is attached to the Buddha-Dharma, it is still called non-Buddhist. Hence Nāgārjuna cites and rebukes it in the Dazhidulun. In the third section, on studying the Buddha-Dharma, first comes the Hīnayāna and next the Mahāyāna. First, citing the Dazhidulun's 'failing to attain the skill-in-means of prajñā' and so on: the Vātsīputrīyas lose the skill-in-means of the Hīnayāna, while the Fangguang lose the skill-in-means of the Mahāyāna gate. The treatise means: even those studying the Buddha-Dharma still fall into existence and non-existence, and if one misapprehends the intention in the Mahāyāna gate one is likewise burned by the fire of perversion; how much more so for the Vātsīputrīya, Fangguang, and their like? Regarding 'skill-in-means': this refers to taking the gate that accesses the true as real; losing the gate that can access it is called losing skill-in-means. How much more so when the Vātsīputrīyas and others lose both that which accesses and that which is accessed—are they not truly non-Buddhists? Regarding 'the Mūlamadhyamakakārikā says: grasping at neither existence nor non-existence' and so on: this cites the Mahāyāna to illustrate the Hīnayāna. Although the Mahāyāna gate is superior, if one grasps at the negation of both to refute emptiness and existence, it still constitutes foolishness; how much more so when the Hīnayāna grasps at the fourth gate and fails to see it as a view? Regarding 'Therefore the Śataśāstra...' and so on: the various meanings here precisely rebuke the treatise masters for refuting the Hīnayāna as non-Buddhist. If grasping views are produced, the Mahāyāna also becomes non-Buddhist; why only the Hīnayāna? If there are no grasping views, the Hīnayāna gate is also correct; why only the Mahāyāna? How could one rashly refute them so as to equate them with those externalists? First it clarifies the correct meaning of the Śataśāstra; below 'the Mahāyāna treatise masters...', it clarifies the fault of erroneous refutation. What is called 'blaze' (yan) is like the blaze of a fire; a blaze is secondary (by the side). Establishing the Mahāyāna and refuting the Hīnayāna is primary; refuting the Hīnayāna as non-Buddhist is secondary. It is also said: the treatise master was named Yan, who made such a refutation. If one refutes the mind capable of forming views in the masters of the two treatises—giving rise to attachment and anger—it is indeed the same as a non-Buddhist. Now, the Mahāyāna treatise master directly refuted the other two treatises as being non-Buddhists asserting existence or non-existence; hence this constitutes an error. Therefore, the subsequent text rescues them, saying, 'Wherever the treatises arose, people all attained the path... and one must not sweepingly conflate them with Kapila' and so on. If the Mahāyāna refutes the Hīnayāna, one may only compare them in terms of skillful and clumsy, biased and perfect, temporarily deprecating them to guide and advance them; one should not abruptly equate them with those non-Buddhists. Hence this refutation by the Mahāyāna master constitutes an error. From 'However, the Tattvasiddhi says...' downward, it cites the text of the treatise to rescue it: this is truly the meaning of emptiness, not the same as externalist views. Regarding 'resembling non-existence': the non-existence of correct emptiness resembles the view of non-existence, yet in reality it reveals the principle and is forever different from perverse non-existence. If one refutes the Hīnayāna's non-existence simply because it resembles perverse non-existence, the Mahāyāna also resembles it; why only the Hīnayāna? Regarding 'further, agreeing with what the hundred schools deem right' and so on: next, the commentator evaluates the similarities and differences in what the treatise master and the Śataśāstra uphold and refute. Both houses take their treatise's doctrine to be right and what is refuted to be wrong. The treatise master and the Śataśāstra both take the Mahāyāna as their doctrine; hence it says 'agreeing with what the hundred schools deem right.' The treatise master refutes the Hīnayāna, while the Śataśāstra refutes externalists; hence it says 'differing from what the hundred schools deem wrong.'

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止觀輔行傳弘決 — Classical Chinese