止觀輔行傳弘決 5.30

5.30

Next is the vertical refutation. The initial horizontal refutation merely took the ālaya and dharma-nature as internal and external, already differing from the Tripiṭaka and shared teachings. The Tripiṭaka and shared teachings only consider the arising and ceasing, up to the neither-arising nor non-ceasing, of mind and objects as they face each other to be "vertical"; whereas here, the four clinging views of the three thousand are taken as arising, and the impossibility of finding the three thousand when examined through the four propositions is taken as ceasing. Thus this arising and ceasing is still different from the distinctive teaching, let alone the Tripiṭaka and shared teachings! Hence we know that if one clings to the ālaya and dharma-nature, it amounts to the distinctive teaching; now, wishing to elucidate the perfect, it must be refuted. These four propositions are also expounded to prevent shifted clinging. When examining "both arising and ceasing": when isolated arising and isolated ceasing are refuted and shown not to produce, one shifts to clinging to both together producing all dharmas; hence this must be refuted. Since each does not produce on its own, when the two non-producing [factors] combine, how could they produce? Thus it is said, "Their natures are mutually opposed, just like fire and water." When fire and water combine, both are ruined; how could they produce dharmas? In refuting the fourth proposition: ceasing is that which produces, and non-ceasing is that which is produced; since both are negated, there is neither producer nor produced—how could they further produce the three thousand dharmas? Regarding "both horizontal and vertical": the preceding two sets of four propositions, solely in terms of the horizontal and the vertical, having been scrutinized and refuted, one might fear a joint clinging that the horizontal and vertical together can produce, and therefore they are scrutinized once more. As for "both horizontal and vertical," in each of the four vertical propositions, the horizontal is grasped. Grasping the four in the first proposition is precisely the initial passage. Grasping the four in the proposition of ceasing refers to asserting production from self-ceasing, production from other-ceasing, production from both ceasing, and production from causeless ceasing. The third and fourth can be understood by analogy to this. Since the characteristics of clinging are like this, the refutation can also be known accordingly. This is taking the horizontal to weave the vertical as the characteristic of clinging. If discussed in general, it means asserting that only the horizontal and vertical together produce all dharmas; the refutation can also be known accordingly. Regarding "neither horizontal nor vertical": since single and dual clingings have all been refuted, one then claims that freedom from both produces the three thousand dharmas. When combining both still cannot produce the three thousand, how could freedom from both produce dharmas? Question: What is the characteristic of the mind-nature that is free from both? Answer: Since the horizontal is arising and the vertical is arising and ceasing, "both are" is simply being both arising and ceasing, and "neither is" is simply being free from both arising and ceasing. The substance of the mind in reality has not yet accorded with freedom from both; this is merely clinging to this and asserting it to be capable of producing, and therefore it must be refuted. Since production cannot occur through the horizontal, the vertical, and so forth, arising is non-arisal. From "Words and language..." onwards, it concludes with the inconceivable object. Although the object of the nature of principle was concluded before, if not scrutinized and examined, how would it differ from the "emptiness of a bird's flight"? This concludes the object of cultivated virtue. From "The Great Sūtra..." onwards, this is citing proof. The four [modes]—"arising-arising" and so forth—are ineffable, and because their meaning and purport embrace this, they are cited collectively to prove that the preceding two sets of four propositions are all non-arising. The passage on "arising-arising" and so forth has already established the vertical. If proving the horizontal: "arising-arising" is simply self, "arising-non-arising" is simply other, "non-arising-arising" is simply both, and "non-arising-non-arising" is simply apart from both; the third is simply jointly clinging to the horizontal and vertical, and the fourth is simply neither horizontal nor vertical. Proving just the first two proves the third and fourth. Question: Both in the preceding object of the nature of principle and in Zhang'an's critical appraisal passage, it is said that the single mind naturally and spontaneously possesses [all things]. Why does the present text scrutinize it in relation to conditions? Answer: The present text precisely scrutinizes the three thousand already possessed in a single thought of an arisen mind, and therefore examines whether this possession is mind or conditions. If one scrutinizes this arisal, arisal cannot be found; thought and the three thousand are both impossible to find; yet without finding, they are found, and the three truths are vividly present.