止觀輔行傳弘決 8.9

8.9

Next, within [the discussion of] the inconceivable [object], first [the Great Master] directly explains it, and next he unpacks the meanings of various sutras to explain and establish the wondrous object. Within the direct explanation, first he cites a sutra to establish the object, and next explains it. Within the explanation, first he briefly clarifies progress and regress; next he cites the *Vimalakīrti-nirdeśa* on 'not severing' and so on to explain 'not following' and so on; next he cites 'not abiding' and so on to explain 'not severing' and so on. In the first text, directly using the *Vimalakīrti-nirdeśa* to further explain the *Wuxing jing*: because ignorance is not severed, the three clarities arise—delusion is itself ignorance, and ignorance is itself clarity, unlike the two vehicles who sever ignorance to give rise to the lesser three clarities. Because craving is not severed, the eight liberations arise—craving is bondage, and bondage is itself liberation, unlike the two vehicles who, having severed greed and craving, give rise to the lesser eight liberations. In clarity and in liberation, all dharmas are fully present; therefore, it is unlike ordinary beings, the two vehicles, and the bodhisattvas of the various teachings within the provisional path of instruction. Next, as for citing 'not abiding' and so on to explain 'not severing' and so on: first he lists the clauses, and next explains them from 'why is this?' downward. First, explaining the sutra's meaning, he opens it into four clauses; next, from 'now I say' downward, he opens it into eight clauses. Regarding the first four clauses: first, explaining the sutra, he rebukes errors. That sutra originally established the meaning of the inconceivable primarily for bodhisattvas while also rebuking bias and falsity. Now, wishing to clarify the inconceivable object, [this text] also first rebukes bias and falsity, and next establishes the wondrous object. Hence he judges that ordinary beings and the Hinayāna suffer the faults of abiding in the first and second clauses. Next, from 'not severing afflictions' downward, he rebukes heresy and counterfeit, which is the fault of abiding in the third and fourth clauses. First, under 'ordinary beings' downward, in rebuking ordinary beings it says 'stubborn and perverse' and so on: 'stubborn' (*hen*) means contentious and litigious, and also perverse (*li*). 'Perverse' (*li*) means bent or crooked, like a dog bending its body as it exits a door. The character *li* [with the heart radical] means sorrowful groaning, which is not the present sense. 'Tame' (*xun*): the *Zilin* says, 'the natural conduct is regulated and tame.' The character *xun* has the fanqie *yu-lun*, and also the sound *xun*. Under 'two vehicles' downward, next he rebukes the Hinayāna. Under 'the arhat' downward, he re-analyzes the fault of the Hinayāna. 'The delusions of the three realms are exhausted, so there is no delusion to tame'—this explains the meaning of 'not tamed.' It is not like the Mahāyāna, where non-arising and non-arising is called 'not tamed'; rather, because [the arhats] use clumsy wisdom to partially sever the shared delusions, where the shared delusions are exhausted they are clearly 'not tamed,' and this 'not tamed' is precisely called 'tamed.' From 'scorched seeds' onward, he further rebukes the Hinayāna's fault. Thus the *Vimalakīrti-nirdeśa* says, 'like scorched grain sprouts,' and it is also like Kāśyapa, seeing the inconceivable deeds of the bodhisattvas, despising himself and saying: 'We, regarding this, are already like ruined seeds.' Under 'bodhisattvas' downward, he adduces the superior to contrast with the inferior so as to distinguish their attainment. First he sets up both, and next explains both. Within the explanation, first, explaining 'having courage', it says 'like a flower in the mud' and so on: the sutra says, 'Lotus flowers do not grow on dry high plateaus, but grow in the low, damp mud.' Hence we know that on the high plateau of nirvāṇa the flower of the bodhisattva's great compassion does not grow, while in the mud of saṃsāra there are the bodhisattva's superior functions of benefiting others. Though residing in saṃsāra, they are undefiled by saṃsāra. The physician metaphor is largely the same. Moreover, the flower compares to the bodhisattva's body wheel, and the physician compares to the bodhisattva's mind wheel. They may also both compare to the bodhisattva's three wheels; hence the *Dazhidulun* says, 'The Buddha is like the king of great physicians, the sutra teachings are like medicinal prescriptions, and the Sangha is like the one nursing the patient.' Hence we know that only upon attaining buddhahood is one called a great physician. It also says, 'When a bodhisattva transforms sentient beings, although seeing that sentient beings have various afflictions, refuse to accept transformation, and instead become angry at the bodhisattva, the bodhisattva at that time is like a great physician treating a person possessed by a ghost: the sick person reviles him in return. The physician at that time does not blame the sick person or match his wrath, for he knows that person is driven by a ghost. The bodhisattva is also like this, knowing that sentient beings are driven by the ghosts of afflictions.' Next, in explaining 'not savoring', it says 'like a bird flying in the sky' and so on: a bodhisattva-mahāsattva severs delusions and enters emptiness yet does not abide in emptiness; they must certainly emerge into provisionality to benefit sentient beings. First, the mud metaphor illustrates that suffering cannot taint them. Next, the healing metaphor illustrates that origination cannot defile them. Finally, the flying bird metaphor illustrates that they do not cling to cessation or the path. Although the text is framed in terms of the bodhisattva who emerges into provisionality, its primary intent is to accomplish the inconceivable object, which thereby accomplishes the inconceivable function of emerging into provisionality; hence, by distinguishing the bodhisattva from the two extremes, it directly reveals the wondrous object of the true, eternal middle path. In the earlier citation of the *Vimalakīrti-nirdeśa*, since the opening text already said that not severing delusion and craving gives rise to clarity and liberation, one should know that this text must be interpreted in terms of unconditioned [contemplation] to clarify the bodhisattva's ease of the real and response bodies. From 'not severing afflictions' downward, he rebukes heresy and counterfeit. First, he directly rebukes the fault of not abiding in the third and fourth clauses. Therein, first he directly analyzes the fault of the third and fourth clauses, and next he re-analyzes the fault of the fourth clause. In the first analysis of the third and fourth clauses: first he marks out the characteristics of the clauses about which they are deluded; next he concludes the previous and introduces the subsequent faults; next, from 'now, foolish people of the final age' downward, he rebukes the fault. The phrase 'gouging out the pit too excessively': fascicle ten of the *Mahāparinirvāṇa-sūtra* says, 'Good man! For instance, a person eats an āmra fruit, spits out the pit, and casts it on the ground. But he then thinks: "This pit must be sweet." He immediately retrieves it, breaks it open, and tastes it. Its flavor is extremely bitter; regret arises in his mind, and fearing he might lose the fruit seed, he immediately gathers it up and plants it in the ground. He diligently tends it, irrigating it in due season with ghee, oil, milk, and curds. Could it possibly grow or not? "No, World-Honoured One! Even if heaven were to shower supreme amṛta, it still would not grow."' 'Not growing' designates an icchantika. 'Tasting' means testing the flavor. Foolish people of the final age are also like this: hearing 'not severing' and so on, they take it to mean double negation, and claim that this double negation does not obstruct double abiding, taking this to be unhinderedness; they then turn their backs on the two extremes and practice 'unhinderedness.' Turning their backs on the method of taming is like losing the sweet taste; turning their backs on untamedness is like losing the fruit seed. A bodhisattva is not like this: because they attain clarity and liberation, it is called double negation; because they illuminate both extremes and benefit and transform endlessly, it is called double abiding. Hence we know that foolish people merely turn their backs on the Tathāgata's expedient means for subduing delusions, which is called 'not abiding in taming.' Giving free rein [to passions] in saṃsāra without abiding in contemplation is called 'not abiding in untamedness.' Hence we know that such people lose both. Losing the fourth clause means claiming there is no hindrance between being tamed and untamed. Hearing double negation, they claim it does not obstruct double abiding, and widely commit unlawful acts as 'double abiding'; hence we know this is precisely losing the third clause. Under 'this is' downward, he uses a metaphor to conclude the fault, rebuking the preceding 'unhindered' evil emptiness. Regarding 'eating salt too excessively': as for salt, in this land [of China] a minister of Duke Ling of Qi boiled sea water to make salt, but in that region [of India] it existed from antiquity. Saying that one does not know it likely refers to the beginning of salt, or it is a hypothetical metaphor. Thus the *Dazhidulun*, fascicle eighteen, says: 'Like a rustic who initially did not know salt, seeing people add salt to various vegetables and meats, asked others: "Why do you do so?" They answered: "This salt can make all flavors delicious." This man then thought: "Since salt can make all flavors delicious, its own flavor must be abundant." He then filled his mouth from an empty vessel and ate it. It was salty, bitter, and injured his mouth, so he blamed the other, saying: "Why did you say salt could make things delicious?" The other said: "Fool! One must measure the quantity and blend it to make things delicious. Why eat it plain?"' A person lacking wisdom hears the liberation gate of emptiness, does not practice any merits, but merely wishes to attain emptiness—this is wrong view, which severs all wholesome roots. If one understands the samādhi of emptiness, one knows that all principles do not contradict one another. Being able to know this matter is the power of prajñā; if one attains prajñā, in entering all dharmas one never holds wrong views. Again, fascicle ninety-nine of the treatise says: 'Like a person eating bean sauce too excessively. This is a metaphor for not practicing the five perfections but only practicing prajñā: because of desiring attachment, one only generates wrong views and cannot advance in any wholesome dharmas. One should blend the merits of the five perfections; only when the flavor of the principles is complete is it called unhindered.' In the present text, losing the meaning of double negation and so on also carries the same significance. One should know that a person who loses the meaning and practices 'unhinderedness' not only loses the flavor of the middle in all dharmas, but also injures the mouth of the eternal; it is like craving salt or sauce, losing the flavor and destroying one's body. Under 'a sutra says' downward, he adduces proof. First he cites the *Wuxing jing* to verify the fault of deviating from the Dharma; next he cites the *Mahāparinirvāṇa-sūtra* to confirm [the fault] through non-cultivation. Under 'this person' downward, he offers a general rebuke. Under 'there are also practitioners' downward, he re-analyzes those in the fourth clause as having the same fault as the second clause. Not abiding in taming or untamedness while looking toward and seeking the middle path: although they seek the middle path, this merely amounts to abiding in the second clause, and is therefore called a fault. Next, under 'the North' downward, he concludes that the northern [masters] fully possess the faults of both the third and fourth clauses. Although the text concludes that they incur the faults of abiding in the first and second clauses, this fault originally arises from the third and fourth clauses. Next, under 'furthermore, beginners studying middle contemplation' downward, he concludes the characteristics of the fault. First, concluding that double abiding constitutes a fault: no sutras or treatises say that an initial mind severs greed and desire, nor do they say that cultivating the middle is neither perfect nor gradual; hence it is contradictory, to say nothing of thereafter giving free rein to unhindered conduct. Under 'the Zhou house' downward, he adduces historical events as proof. As cited earlier in [the section on] cultivating according to one's own intention regarding Yuwen Yong and others, these are all the fault of the fourth clause. 'It is also abiding in untamedness and abiding in taming' means abiding in double abiding and the fault of double abiding. When a beginner studying middle contemplation severs greed and desire, it resembles abiding in taming; finding that abiding in taming brings no benefit, giving free rein to the mind to enter evil is called abiding in untamedness. Such a person grasps the middle, taking it to be not abiding in taming or untamedness, and later indulges the mind, which becomes abiding in untamedness; combined with the former, this amounts to the fault of abiding in taming and untamedness. 'What connection does it have to not abiding' and so on directly rebukes the fault of double negation. 'This is called great hindrance' and so on rebukes the previous fault of unhinderedness in abiding in the third and fourth clauses. These both lose the intended meaning of the *Vimalakīrti-nirdeśa* and *Wuxing jing*. Under 'such' downward, summarizing the previous four clauses, it again amounts to the fault of abiding in the second clause, hence called 'untamed'; therefore, all lose the meaning of the inconceivable.