釋摩訶般若波羅蜜經覺意三昧 1.25

1.25

答曰：行者先以大誓莊嚴，善修如上六度法門以調其心。信知諸法畢竟空寂，而我為無明所覆未能覺了，必須勤修正觀，行到乃知，豈可虛心妄解而自毀傷？既能善自調和，然後隨心所起，以無所住著之心，反照觀察未念、欲念、念、念已之相。爾時諦觀未念心為滅，欲念心生？未念心為不滅，欲念心生？未念心為亦滅亦不滅，欲念心生？未念心為非滅非不滅，欲念心生？如此於未念四句中，觀欲念心生皆不可得。若不得欲念心生，亦不得不生，即於心性而得解脫。云何名於未念四句中觀欲念心生不可得？一、先約未念初句觀欲念心生不可得。若謂未念心滅有欲念心生者，未念心已滅，欲念何處生？為即未念滅生？為離未念滅生？若即未念滅生欲念者，滅法不應生，以生滅性相違故。若謂即滅中有生，生滅不相違者，是事不然。若爾，應如熟果皮中有核，皮爛核出，皮非是核、核非是皮，何得皮即是核？心法亦如是，即滅不得有生，是故即未念滅欲念心生不可得。若謂離未念滅有欲念心生者，則為無因而有生，是事不然。以生無所從生，是則不名為生。如虛空無所從生，故虛空不名為生。當知離未念滅，欲念心生不可得。行者如是，若即若離中觀未念心滅欲念心生畢竟不可得。二、明約未念第二句觀欲念心生不可得。若謂未念心不滅，欲念心生者，為即不滅生？為離不滅生？若即不滅生，不滅已是生，是生何得生？若是生能生，此生復應有生生，則有無窮生。若此生生生，是事不然。若是一體生，一中不應有多生，如一指中則無多指。若是異體生，則不應名生生，以生體別不能相生故。如桃柰體別，桃不生柰，柰不生桃。是故，即未念不滅，欲念心生不可得。若謂離未念不滅有欲念心生者，欲念何處生？若生無處生，即是無因生。若是無因生，是則為非生。非生而說生者，是事不然，以墮無因果過，如說石女之子、黃門之兒。當知離未念不滅有欲念心生不可得。行者如是，若即若離中，觀未念不滅欲念心生畢竟不可得。三、明約未念第三句觀欲念心生不可得。若謂未念心亦滅亦不滅有欲念心生者，若是亦滅生，何須亦不滅？若是亦不滅生，何須亦滅？以不定因不能有定果故，如不定根人不能生定根之子。若謂亦滅亦不滅，體一無異故，有欲念心生者，是事不然。而今亦滅非亦不滅，亦不滅非亦滅，性相違故，不應體一不異能生於欲念，如不定根人二根體非一故，不能生一子。若謂亦滅亦不滅體異，二各能生欲念者，體異即還是定滅、定不滅，何名亦滅亦不滅？若是定滅定不滅各能生欲念者，即應二欲念生，今實不爾。若二各不生，則無欲念生。行者如是觀時，未念亦滅亦不滅欲念心生畢竟不可得。次明約未念第四句觀欲念心生不可得。若謂未念心非滅非不滅有欲念心生者，若因非滅生，不須非不滅；若因非不滅生，則不須非滅。以非滅非不滅所非各異，不應俱以為因，亦是相違之因不能共有一果故。如水火互非，終不於中而生果實。若謂俱因二非而有生者，是事不然。若二非之處各是有者，二有還應生二生，今實不爾。若二非之處各是無，則無能生，何能生所生？若無能生所生者，即所生不名為所生，以所生無所從生故。行者如是觀非滅非不滅欲念心生畢竟不可得。復次，行者既能如是約初運未念四句中觀欲念心生不可得已，即當還約欲念心生四句轉觀，觀未念心滅不可得。云何為觀？若謂未念心是滅者，為欲念心生未念心滅？為欲念心不生未念心滅？為欲念心亦生亦不生未念心滅？為欲念心非生非不生未念心滅？如是還反約欲念中四句推求未念心滅畢竟不可得。（推檢之相還轉用上，約未念中四句觀欲念意言句一類，細比作自得具作云云）若行者不得未念欲念心生滅，則不得不生滅，亦生滅亦不生滅，非生滅非不生滅。但以凡夫顛倒妄，於未念欲念及一切法中，計有生滅乃至非生滅、非不生滅，虛誑無實，皆不可得，但有名字。名字之法，不在內、外、兩中間，亦不常自有，即是無名字。若不得生滅等四句名字，亦不得無名字。不得名字故非假，不得無名字故非空，不得假故非俗，不得空故非真，不得俗故非世間，不得真故非出世間，不得世間故非有漏，不得出世間故非無漏，不得有漏故非生死，不得無漏故非涅槃。行者如是觀未念欲念時，若不得二邊，則不取二邊；若不取二邊，則不執二邊起諸結業；若無二邊結業障覆，正觀之心猶如虛空湛然清淨。因是中道正慧朗然開發，雙照二諦，心心寂滅，自然流入大涅槃海。若觀未念、欲念如是，餘念、念已及一切心法類亦可知，是則略說正觀相。

The answer states: The practitioner first adorns himself with the great vows and skillfully cultivates the Dharma-gates of the aforementioned six perfections to attune his mind. Knowing with faith that all dharmas are ultimately empty and tranquil, yet that I am covered by ignorance and not yet able to awaken and comprehend, one must diligently cultivate correct contemplation, only knowing it when practice is attained; how could one vainly make false interpretations with a hollow mind and harm oneself? Having skillfully attuned oneself, thereafter, following whatever arises in the mind, with a mind that has no abiding or attachment, one reflectively contemplates and observes the characteristics of prior to thinking, intending to think, thinking, and having thought. At that time, carefully contemplate: does the mind prior to thinking cease, so that the mind intending to think arises? Does the mind prior to thinking not cease, so that the mind intending to think arises? Does the mind prior to thinking both cease and not cease, so that the mind intending to think arises? Does the mind prior to thinking neither cease nor not cease, so that the mind intending to think arises? In this way, within the four propositions concerning prior to thinking, contemplating the arising of the mind intending to think, it is in all cases ungraspable. If one cannot grasp the arising of the mind intending to think, nor can one grasp its non-arising, then right in the nature of the mind one attains liberation. What is meant by contemplating, within the four propositions concerning prior to thinking, that the arising of the mind intending to think is ungraspable? First, one initially contemplates with reference to the first proposition of prior to thinking that the arising of the mind intending to think is ungraspable. If one says that when the mind prior to thinking ceases, the mind intending to think arises: since the mind prior to thinking has already ceased, from where does the intention to think arise? Does it arise identical to the cessation of prior to thinking? Or does it arise apart from the cessation of prior to thinking? If the intention to think arises identical to the cessation of prior to thinking, a ceased dharma should not arise, because the natures of arising and ceasing are contradictory. If one says that right within cessation there is arising, and arising and ceasing are not contradictory, this is not so. If that were the case, it should be like a ripe fruit that has a pit within its skin; when the skin rots and the pit comes out, the skin is not the pit and the pit is not the skin—how could the skin be identical to the pit? Mental dharmas are also like this: identical to cessation there cannot be arising. Therefore, the mind intending to think arising identical to the cessation of prior to thinking is ungraspable. If one says that apart from the cessation of prior to thinking there is the arising of the mind intending to think, then this would be arising without a cause, which is not so. Since arising has nowhere from which it arises, it cannot be called arising. Just as space has nowhere from which it arises, so space is not called arising. One should know that apart from the cessation of prior to thinking, the arising of the mind intending to think is ungraspable. The practitioner, in this way, in both identical and separate [alternatives], contemplates that the mind intending to think arising from the cessation of the mind prior to thinking is ultimately ungraspable. Second, explaining with reference to the second proposition of prior to thinking, contemplating that the arising of the mind intending to think is ungraspable. If one says that when the mind prior to thinking does not cease, the mind intending to think arises: does it arise identical to non-cessation? Or does it arise apart from non-cessation? If it arises identical to non-cessation, non-cessation is already arising; how could this arising arise? If this arising can produce arising, then this arising must again have a production of arising, which would result in infinite arising. If this arising produces arising, this is not so. If it is of a single substance that arises, within one there should not be many arisings, just as within a single finger there are not multiple fingers. If it arises as a distinct substance, then it should not be called arising producing arising, because differing substances of arising cannot produce one another. Just as peaches and crabapples are of differing substances—a peach does not produce a crabapple, and a crabapple does not produce a peach. Therefore, identical to the non-cessation of prior to thinking, the arising of the mind intending to think is ungraspable. If one says that apart from the non-cessation of prior to thinking there is the arising of the mind intending to think: where does the intention to think arise? If the arising has nowhere to arise, it is an uncaused arising. If it is an uncaused arising, then it is a non-arising. To speak of arising when there is no arising is not so, for it incurs the fault of having an uncaused effect, like speaking of the son of a barren woman or the child of a eunuch. One should know that apart from the non-cessation of prior to thinking, the arising of the mind intending to think is ungraspable. The practitioner, in this way, in both identical and separate [alternatives], contemplates that the mind intending to think arising from the non-cessation of prior to thinking is ultimately ungraspable. Third, explaining with reference to the third proposition of prior to thinking, contemplating that the arising of the mind intending to think is ungraspable. If one says that when the mind prior to thinking both ceases and does not cease, the mind intending to think arises: if it arises from both ceasing, why is both not-ceasing necessary? If it arises from both not-ceasing, why is both ceasing necessary? For an indeterminate cause cannot have a determinate effect, just as a person of indeterminate faculties cannot produce a child of determinate faculties. If one says that because both ceasing and both not-ceasing are of a single substance without difference, there is the arising of the mind intending to think, this is not so. Now, both ceasing is not both not-ceasing, and both not-ceasing is not both ceasing; because their natures are contradictory, they should not, being of a single substance without difference, be able to produce the intention to think, just as a person of indeterminate faculties having two faculties whose substances are not one cannot produce a single child. If one says that both ceasing and both not-ceasing are of different substances, and each of the two can produce the intention to think, then being of different substances, they are just determinate cessation and determinate non-cessation; how could they be called both ceasing and both not-ceasing? If determinate cessation and determinate non-cessation could each produce the intention to think, then two intentions to think should arise, but in reality this is now not so. If neither of the two produces, then no intention to think arises. When the practitioner contemplates in this way, the arising of the mind intending to think from the mind prior to thinking both ceasing and not ceasing is ultimately ungraspable. Next, explaining with reference to the fourth proposition of prior to thinking, contemplating that the arising of the mind intending to think is ungraspable. If one says that when the mind prior to thinking neither ceases nor does not cease, the mind intending to think arises: if it arises due to neither ceasing, there is no need for neither not-ceasing; if it arises due to neither not-ceasing, there is no need for neither ceasing. Because the negations in neither ceasing and neither not-ceasing are each distinct, they should not together serve as the cause, and also contradictory causes cannot share a single effect. Just as water and fire mutually negate each other and can never produce a fruit between them. If one says that caused jointly by the two negations there is arising, this is not so. If the locus of the two negations is each an existent, the two existents should again produce two arisings, but in reality this is now not so. If the locus of the two negations is each a non-existent, then there is no producer; how could it produce what is produced? If there is neither producer nor produced, then the produced is not called what is produced, because what is produced has nowhere from which it arises. The practitioner contemplating in this way, the arising of the mind intending to think from neither ceasing nor not ceasing is ultimately ungraspable. Furthermore, having in this way contemplated that within the four propositions of prior to thinking—the initial movement—the arising of the mind intending to think is ungraspable, the practitioner should then inversely turn the contemplation to the four propositions of the arising of the mind intending to think, contemplating that the cessation of the mind prior to thinking is ungraspable. What is this contemplation? If one says that the mind prior to thinking is ceased: does the mind prior to thinking cease when the mind intending to think arises? Does the mind prior to thinking cease when the mind intending to think does not arise? Does the mind prior to thinking cease when the mind intending to think both arises and does not arise? Does the mind prior to thinking cease when the mind intending to think neither arises nor does not arise? In this way, turning back to the four propositions regarding the intention to think and investigating them, the cessation of the mind prior to thinking is ultimately ungraspable. (The characteristics of the investigation are applied by turning back to the above; with reference to the four propositions of prior to thinking contemplating the mental verbal phrases of intending to think, they are of the same kind; by making fine comparisons one will naturally obtain the full formulation, etc.) If the practitioner cannot grasp the arising and ceasing of the minds prior to thinking and intending to think, then neither can one grasp non-arising and non-ceasing, both arising-and-ceasing and non-arising-and-non-ceasing, nor neither arising-and-ceasing nor non-arising-and-non-ceasing. It is merely through ordinary beings' inverted delusions that in prior to thinking, intending to think, and all dharmas, they reckon there to be arising and ceasing, up to neither arising-and-ceasing nor non-arising-and-non-ceasing; these are false and without reality, all ungraspable, existing merely as names. The dharma of a name is not within, not without, nor in between the two, nor does it eternally exist of itself; that is, it is without a name. If one cannot grasp the names of the four propositions such as arising and ceasing, neither can one grasp the absence of names. Because one cannot grasp a name, it is not conventional; because one cannot grasp the absence of names, it is not empty. Because one cannot grasp the conventional, it is not mundane; because one cannot grasp the empty, it is not ultimate. Because one cannot grasp the mundane, it is not worldly; because one cannot grasp the ultimate, it is not transworldly. Because one cannot grasp the worldly, it is not with outflows; because one cannot grasp the transworldly, it is not without outflows. Because one cannot grasp what has outflows, it is not birth-and-death; because one cannot grasp what is without outflows, it is not nirvāṇa. When the practitioner contemplates prior to thinking and intending to think in this way, if one does not grasp the two extremes, one does not seize upon the two extremes; if one does not seize upon the two extremes, one does not cling to the two extremes and give rise to defilements and karmas; if one is free from the obstruction and covering of the defilements and karmas of the two extremes, the mind of correct contemplation is like empty space, limpid and pure. Due to this, the correct wisdom of the middle way shines forth brightly, illuminating both of the two truths; thought after thought is tranquil and ceased, naturally flowing into the great ocean of nirvāṇa. If one contemplates prior to thinking and intending to think in this way, the remaining thinking, having thought, and all categories of mental dharmas can also be known. This is a brief explanation of the characteristics of correct contemplation.