十不二門指要鈔 1.101

1.101

答：「雖欲依於舊本，其如義理殘缺，必是往時讀者不諳境觀，故妄有改削矣。且文標所觀境有內外，豈以依正色心陰入之境而為假觀邪？遍尋荊谿之意，必不闕此一觀。何者？如《止觀》破思假文中云『因緣生法即空即中』，《輔行》云，且以法性空中對幻假說其實，幻假即不思議假。既云且以，知非盡理；須即妙假，故云其實。文中不云即假，尚欲據義加之，豈自著述而特略之？況彼云，因緣生法方有幻假之義，今直云依正等，且未成幻假，況妙假乎！又第一記中釋十二入各具千如中云，境據假邊，且存其數。空中尚無，其數安在？然必約假以立空中，此雖將境為假，然與今文不同。何者？彼約十二入各具千如為境，即已成不思議假，故非此例。恐未解者以此為據，故粗引之，仍出其意。又上若不立假觀，下何亡之而云無空假中邪？又若更云空中兼上依正俱亡，故云無空假中者，文已自云色心體絕，何繫重乎？若以色心體絕亡所觀陰境，無空假中泯能觀妙觀，則無是過也。又準內體三千即空假中，三千已是妙境猶尚更立三觀，今但云依正等，未結成妙境，那便略慈假觀邪？」

Answer: "Although they wish to rely on the old edition, what of its doctrinal deficiency? It must have been that past readers were unfamiliar with object and contemplation, and thus made erroneous alterations and deletions. Furthermore, the text indicates that the contemplated objects consist of internal and external; could one take the object of environmental and primary, form and mind, skandhas and āyatanas to be the provisional contemplation? Searching everywhere for Jingxi's intent, he would certainly not lack this single contemplation. Why? As in the passage refuting the provisionality of thinking in the Zhiguan, which says 'dharmas arisen from causes and conditions are namely empty and namely middle', the Fuxing says that for the time being it uses the emptiness and middle of dharma-nature to speak of its reality in contrast to illusory provisionality; illusory provisionality is the inconceivable provisional. Since it says 'for the time being', we know it does not exhaust the principle; it must be identical to the wondrous provisional, hence it says 'its reality'. When the text does not say 'namely provisional', one still desires to add it based on the meaning; how could he, in his own composition, deliberately omit it? Moreover, that text says that only when dharmas arise from causes and conditions is there the meaning of illusory provisionality; here it directly speaks of environmental and primary rewards and so forth, which have not yet even formed illusory provisionality, much less wondrous provisionality! Furthermore, in the first volume of the Ji, in explaining that the twelve āyatanas each possess the thousand suchnesses, it says: 'The object is based on the provisional side, temporarily preserving its number. Even in the empty and middle it does not exist; where could its number reside?' Yet one must establish the empty and middle in reference to the provisional. Although this takes the object as provisional, it is not the same as the present text. Why? There, taking the twelve āyatanas each possessing the thousand suchnesses as the object, it has already formed the inconceivable provisional, so it is not an instance of this. Fearing that those who do not understand would take this as evidence, I have roughly cited it and still brought out its meaning. Furthermore, above, if one does not establish the provisional contemplation, below, why would one eliminate it and say 'there is no emptiness, provisionality, or middle'? Moreover, if one were to say further that the empty and middle together with the environmental and primary above are all eliminated, and therefore it says 'there is no emptiness, provisionality, or middle', the text itself already says 'the substance of form and mind is eliminated'; why repeat it unnecessarily? If by 'the substance of form and mind is eliminated' one eliminates the passive skandha-objects, and by 'there is no emptiness, provisionality, or middle' one eradicates the active wondrous contemplation, then there is no such error. Furthermore, on the model of the internal substance's three thousand being namely empty, provisional, and middle, the three thousand is already a wondrous object, yet one still further establishes the threefold contemplation; here it merely speaks of environmental and primary rewards and so forth, which have not yet been concluded into a wondrous object, so how could one then omit this provisional contemplation?"