釋淨土群疑論 3.7.1
English (machine translation) 3.7.1
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3.7.1
I explain: When Dhyāna Master Xinxing interpreted the exclusion and acceptance in these two sūtras by distinguishing the second and third levels, he missed the intended purport of the sūtras. If one relies on his interpretation, there will be the error of excessive inclusion and the error of deficient exclusion. As for the error of excessive inclusion, people of the second level also commit the five rebellious acts; since the name is identical, they should equally be excluded. As for the error of deficient exclusion, people of the third level do not commit the five rebellious acts, and there is no text stating that they are excluded, so they should equally be accepted. The sūtra's words 'only excluding those who commit the five rebellious acts and slander the correct Dharma' refer to the exclusion of persons, and this [interpretation] incurs the two errors of excessive inclusion and deficient exclusion. That sūtra should have said 'only excluding sentient beings of the third level', and thereby been free from these two errors. Thus, when the monk Dharmākara made these vast vows, his exclusion of persons would have had the errors of excessive inclusion and deficient exclusion. Was his holy wisdom deficient such that his words were not comprehensive? If Dharmākara's words are without fault, then the Dhyāna master has the guilt of an erroneous interpretation; moving forward or backward, how can he escape blame? Therefore, this must be the error of an ordinary mortal, not a mistake of the sage. The masters of the Three Levels defend this, saying: 'The words "only excluding the five rebellious acts, etc." mean excluding the entirety of the third level. Because those of the third level are all purely deviant without correctness and purely evil without good, possessing infractions from the beginning until now, they are all beyond the salvation of all Buddhas and are rejected by the pure lands of the ten directions. Therefore, Dharmākara's text stating the exclusion of the five rebellious acts and so forth means totally excluding all sentient beings of the third level without exception.' I refute this, saying: Although this seems to resolve the error of deficient exclusion, it completely fails to resolve the objection of excessive inclusion. If you say that the person of the lowest grade of the lowest class in the Guan jing resolves the objection of excessive inclusion, this defense is incorrect. Why is that? Amitābha set forth the forty-eight vast vows before his initial entry into the stage of generating the aspiration [for awakening]; Śākyamuni spoke the Guan jing on the sixteen contemplations after his realization of awakening at wonderful enlightenment. The interval between them is separated by an incalculable asaṃkhyeya [of kalpas]; how could he incur an objection across unreckonable kalpas and let the days of the lowest grade of the lowest class pass in vain—how can distant water save a nearby fire? That is, before Vaidehī made her request, on the days when the Guan jing had not yet been set forth, if this objection had been encountered within the vows, how would the Bodhisattva have resolved the dispute? This defense does not eliminate the error of excessive inclusion. Moreover, [by your view,] all persons of the third level are called those who commit rebellious acts. If they have already suffered the torments of Niraya in a past life, the karma and its fruition are completed, so they are not rebellious persons. If in this present life they are not aware of having committed an anantarya sin, how can it be permitted that all beings of the third level are persons of the five rebellious acts? If you say they are all rebellious persons, then they should all belong to the assembly of fixed deviance, their actions being none other than karma ripening in the next rebirth, so that after death they are definitively bound to fall into Avīci and will not be born into other evil destinies, nor could they enter the Buddha's Dharma to renounce the household life. Because they possess the monastic precepts, there would be no people of the indeterminate assembly and no indeterminate karma; thus the Mahāparinirvāṇa Sūtra's statement that 'for all sentient beings, indeterminate karma is plentiful, and determinate karma is scarce' would be erroneous. This defense also fails to resolve the error of deficient exclusion. The Dhyāna master defends [his view], saying: 'When it is said now that all are those of the five rebellious acts, it does not necessarily mean that they currently harm their two parents, shed the Buddha's blood, kill an arhat, or cause schism in the Saṃgha; it is not that only currently committing rebellious infractions makes one called a rebellious person. Rather, it is merely that this person's faculty and temperament are exceedingly evil, both deviant and correct are deviant to them, both good and evil are evil to them; their seven hatreds and seven loves have not departed from the six senses, and how could their five pleasures be abandoned in the three karmas? Since they possess the twelve inversions, they are beyond the salvation of the five kinds [of methods]. Although they do not immediately perform the rebellion, they are nevertheless of the faculty and temperament that commit rebellious acts; therefore, using that term "rebellion", it comprehensively excludes the class of the third level.' I refute this, saying: Although this seems to defend against the error of deficient exclusion, it also completely fails to defend against the objection of excessive inclusion. Moreover, this single explanation invites seven objections: First, if because one is able to commit rebellious acts one is termed a faculty and temperament that commits rebellious acts, then persons of the second level are also able to commit rebellious acts. Since their giving rise to rebellion is identical, how do the two levels differ? This is the first objection. (The faculties of persons of the first level are correct, and they are able to cover evil with good, so they commit fewer transgressions. The faculties of persons of the second level and third level are deviant, and they are able to cover good with evil; the arising of their faults is not equal to persons of the second level.) Furthermore, since the Dhyāna master asserts that persons of the third level are those of the five rebellious acts, they possess the thirteen impediments—how could they become great monks? They should merely be persons without the precepts; they could not be called violators of the precepts. If you say that they merely possess the faculty and temperament without currently committing rebellious sins and so can attain full precepts, since that [vow] only excludes the five rebellious acts, they are also persons who have not committed rebellious acts. How can you say that excluding the third level means they are called those who commit rebellious acts? This is the second objection. Furthermore, if a person of the third level has not committed the five rebellious acts and yet is called one of the five rebellious acts, do they belong to the assembly of fixed deviance? Or do they belong to the indeterminate assembly? If they belong to the assembly of fixed deviance, since they have not committed rebellious acts, how could they belong to the assembly of fixed deviance? If they belong to the indeterminate assembly, how can you say that excluding the five rebellious acts means all sentient beings of the third level? This is the third objection. Furthermore, if a person who has not committed rebellious acts is called one of the five rebellious acts because they are of the faculty and temperament that commits rebellious acts, then likewise a person who possesses pure precepts and is capable of attaining sagehood, even though they have not realized the noble path, should also be called a sage. If one says, 'I am a sage', one would become [established in] the assembly of correct fixation and ought to abandon the nature of an ordinary worldling; yet this also constitutes a pārājika offense—how could such a one be called a person who upholds the precepts? This is the fourth objection. Furthermore, the Guan jing says that the five rebellious acts are accepted, which refers to persons who have already committed rebellious acts. In the vow, where the five rebellious acts are excluded, how could it be spoken in terms of faculty and temperament? Comparing these two sūtras, it is therefore not about that faculty and temperament. This is the fifth objection. Furthermore, if a person of the third level, although having not committed rebellious acts, is called a person of the five rebellious acts because they are of that faculty and temperament, then could it also be that even if a person of the second level commits the five rebellious acts, because they are not of the rebellious faculty and temperament, they should not be a person of the five rebellious acts? This is the sixth objection. If you say that persons of the second level are also considered committers of rebellious acts in terms of faculty and temperament, then the three persons of the lowest class would share the error of forming a single grade, because none of them commit the five rebellious acts and all are of the faculty and temperament of the five rebellious acts; furthermore, there would be no distinction of early or late for the opening of the lotus flower, nor any difference in the amount of sins eradicated. This is the seventh objection. (The Mahāparinirvāṇa Sūtra states: 'Good son! When the Tathāgata expounds the Dharma, for the sake of sentient beings, there are seven kinds of speech: 1. causal speech; 2. fruitional speech; 3. cause-and-fruit speech; 4. metaphorical speech; 5. unspeakable speech; 6. worldly conventional speech; 7. speech as one wills.' Now, when exclusion is explained in terms of faculty and temperament, which kind of speech does it belong to? If you say causal speech, this is also not causal speech. Even if it were causal speech, what benefit would there be in making such an exclusion?)
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- 釋淨土群疑論 — Classical Chinese