宗鏡錄 14.3.4

14.3.4

無不圓足。 華嚴論云。 若少見性者。 亦得佛乘。 如大海中一毫之渧。 乃至多渧。 一一渧中。 皆得大海。 如是菩薩五位之中。 十位十地一一位內。 皆有佛果。 如彼海水一毫之渧。 不離佛性。 得諸行故。 以彼佛性。 而有進修。 如華嚴經。 直以全佛果不動智等。 十智如來。 示凡信修。 如有凡夫。 頓昇寶位。 身持王位。 遍知臣下。 一切群品。 無不該含。 華嚴經中法門。 菩薩行相。 亦復如是。 從初發心十住之始。 頓見如是如來法身佛性。 無作智果。 遍行普賢一切萬行。 隨緣不滯。 悉皆無作。 涅槃經云。 佛性非是作法。 但為客塵煩惱所覆故。 是故今從十住初位。 以無作三昧自體應真。 煩惱客塵。 全無體性。 唯真體用。 無貪瞋癡。 任運即佛。 故一念相應。 一念成佛。 一日相應。 一日成佛。 何須數劫。 漸漸而修。 多劫積修。 三祇至果。 心緣劫量。 見障何休。 諸佛法門。 本非時攝。 計時立劫。 非是佛乘。 又經云。 一切世界海微塵數劫。 所有諸佛出興于世。 親近供養者。 明無功之智遍周。 無法不佛。 佛即法也。 十方虛空。 無有間缺。 針鋒毛端。 無不是一切法一切佛故。 但有微塵許是非染淨心。 皆不是見佛也。 以智眼印之。 又云。 都舉佛剎微塵數佛者。 智滿行遍。 無非佛故。 皆悉承事者。 即聖凡同體。 無一不佛。 法。 空無間也。 以普眼觀之。 徹其心境無不佛也。 智隨諸行。 一切皆佛故。 如是見者。 以事而論。 亦實如是。 表法而論。 一切總實。 是佛故。 若一法一物不是佛見者。 當知是人。 即是邪見。 非正見也。 即有能所是非。 諸見競生。 不得入此普賢文殊智眼境界。 是以若有異想雜念。 續續而起。 故號眾生。 則能所互興。 是非交諍。 即是邪見。 若了妄念無相。 外境自虛。 則一切剎塵。 無非正覺。 所以釋摩訶衍論云。 一念初起無有初相者。 謂心起者。 無有初相可知。 而言知初相。 即謂無念者。 則是除疑。 令生勝解。 謂有眾生作如是疑。 極解脫道。 會本覺時。 微細初生。 知得有耶。 知得無耶。 若知有者。 極解脫道。 當非無念。 所以者何。 知有初念。 有初念故。 若知無者。 極解脫道。 當不能有。 所以者何。 既無初念。 待何念無。 立解脫有。 如是疑故。 今自通言。 所知之相。 從本已來。 自性空無。 能知之智。 從本已來。 無有起時。 既無所覺之相。 亦無能覺之智。 豈可得言有細初相。 智慧可知。 而言說知初相者。 即是現示無念道理。 所以者何。 法性之理。 雖無所知之初起相。 亦無能知之始覺智。 而能通達無所知相。 無能知智。 無所有覺。 都非空無。 是故今且依此道理。 作如是說。 知初相耳。 是故一切眾生。 不名為覺。 以從本來。 念念相續。 未曾離念。 故說無始。 無明者。 即是成立上無念義。 謂金剛已還。 一切眾生。 獨力業相大無明念。 未出離故。 則是現示一切眾生皆是有念。 名為眾生。 一切諸佛皆得無念。 名為佛故。 自此已下。 現示始覺境界。 周遍圓滿。 謂大覺者。 已到彼岸。 遍知一切無量眾生。 一心流轉。 作生住異滅四相。 故如論云。 若得無念者。 則知心相生住異滅故。 以何義故。 如是知耶。 得自無念時。 一切眾生平等得。 故如論云。 以無念等故。 以何義故。 唯一行者。 得無念時。 一切眾生悉得無念。 一一眾生。 皆悉各各有本覺故。 此義云何。 謂一行者。 始覺圓滿。 同本覺時。 遍同一切無量眾生。 本覺心中。 非自本覺。 所以者何。 自性本覺。 遍眾生界。 無不至故。 清淨覺者。 得無念時。

…is completely and fully replete. The Huayan Treatise says: 'If one sees the nature even slightly, one also attains the Buddha Vehicle. It is like a single hair's-tip drop in the great ocean, or even many drops: in each and every drop, one attains the great ocean. In this way, within the five positions of the bodhisattva, within each and every position of the ten stations and the ten stages, there is the buddha-fruit. It is like that single hair's-tip drop of ocean water: not departing from the buddha-nature, all practices are attained. Relying on that buddha-nature, there is advancement in cultivation.' As in the Avataṃsaka Sūtra, it directly uses the complete buddha-fruit of immovable wisdom and so forth—the ten wisdoms of the Tathāgata—to reveal faith and cultivation for ordinary people. It is like an ordinary person who suddenly ascends to the precious throne: holding the kingship in person, he knows all his ministers and all the various classes beneath him, fully encompassing all. The Dharma-doors and bodhisattva practices in the Avataṃsaka Sūtra are also like this: from the initial arising of the mind, the beginning of the ten abodes, one suddenly sees such a Tathāgata dharmakāya and buddha-nature, the unconditioned fruit of wisdom, and universally practices all the myriad deeds of Samantabhadra; according with conditions without obstruction, all are unconditioned. The Nirvāṇa Sūtra says: 'The buddha-nature is not a conditioned phenomenon; it is merely covered by adventitious defilements (kleśa).' Therefore, now from the initial position of the ten abodes, through the substance of unconditioned samādhi corresponding to the real, the adventitious defilements entirely lack an essential nature, being solely the real substance and function, free of greed, anger, and delusion; operating naturally, it is just the Buddha. Therefore, corresponding in a single thought, in a single thought one achieves buddhahood; corresponding for a single day, in a single day one achieves buddhahood. Why should one require numerous kalpas, cultivating gradually? Amassing cultivation over many kalpas and reaching the fruit after three asaṃkhyeyas—when the mind conditions itself to kalpa-measures, how can the hindrance of views cease? The Dharma-doors of all buddhas are fundamentally not subsumed by time; calculating time and establishing kalpas is not the Buddha Vehicle. Moreover, the sūtra says: 'To attend upon and make offerings to all the buddhas appearing in the world through kalpas as numerous as dust motes in seas of worlds' clarifies that wisdom free of effort is all-pervading: there is no dharma that is not buddha, and buddha is itself dharma. The empty space of the ten directions is without gap or lack; the point of a needle and the tip of a hair are nothing that is not all dharmas and all buddhas. If there is merely a dust mote of mind discerning right and wrong, defiled and pure, none of this is seeing the Buddha: seal it with the eye of wisdom! It also says: 'Universally bringing forth buddhas as numerous as the dust motes of buddha-lands' means that wisdom is full and practice is pervasive, for there is nothing that is not buddha. 'Serving them all' means that sages and ordinary beings share the same substance, and there is not one that is not buddha. Dharma is empty and without interval; viewing it with the universal eye, penetrating both mind and object, there is nothing that is not buddha. Wisdom follows all practices, because all are buddha. Seeing in this way, discussed in terms of phenomena, it is indeed truly so; discussed as an expression of the Dharma, everything is entirely real, for it is buddha. If there is a single dharma or a single thing that is not seen as buddha, one should know that this person has wrong views, not right views. Then subject and object, right and wrong, and various views arise in contention, and one cannot enter this realm of the wisdom-eye of Samantabhadra and Mañjuśrī. Therefore, if disparate thoughts and mixed mental acts arise continuously, one is called a sentient being; then subject and object arise mutually, and right and wrong contend with each other, which is just wrong view. If one understands that delusional thoughts are formless and that external objects are naturally empty, then all dust motes of the lands are nothing other than right enlightenment. Therefore the Treatise on the Explanation of the Mahāyāna says: 'The initial arising of a single thought is without an initial characteristic' means that when the mind arises, there is no initial characteristic that can be known; and speaking of 'knowing the initial characteristic' means being without thought, which dispels doubts and causes superior understanding to arise. That is to say, there are sentient beings who have this doubt: 'At the culmination of the path of liberation, when one converges with original enlightenment, is the subtle, initial arising known to exist, or is it known not to exist? If it is known to exist, the culmination of the path of liberation should not be without thought. Why is this? Because one knows there is an initial thought, and the initial thought exists. If it is known not to exist, the culmination of the path of liberation should not be able to exist. Why is this? Since there is no initial thought, in reliance on what thought's absence is liberation established to exist?' Because of such doubts, it now resolves this by saying: 'The characteristic that is known has from the beginning been empty and non-existent in its self-nature; the wisdom that knows has from the beginning had no time of arising. Since there is neither a characteristic that is apprehended nor a wisdom that apprehends, how could one say that there is a subtle initial characteristic that can be known by wisdom? And as for speaking of knowing the initial characteristic, it is to demonstrate the principle of thoughtlessness. Why is this? Although the principle of dharmatā has no initial arising characteristic to be known, nor an initial enlightenment wisdom that knows, it can comprehend that the absence of a characteristic to be known, the absence of a wisdom that knows, and the absence of any apprehension whatsoever are not completely empty non-existence. Therefore, relying for now on this principle, it speaks in this way: