宗鏡錄 38.7.1

38.7.1

答。 地人云。 一切解惑真妄。 依持法性。 法性持真妄。 真妄依法性也。 攝大乘論云。 法性不為惑所染。 不為真所淨。 故法性非依持。 言依持者。 阿賴耶是也。 無沒無明。 盛持一切種子。 若從地師。 則心具一切法。 若從攝師。 則緣具一切法。 此兩師各據一邊。 若法性生一切法者。 法性非心非緣。 非心故。 而心。 生一切法者。 非緣故。 亦應緣生一切法。 何得獨言法性是真妄依持耶。 若言法性非依持。 賴耶是依持。 離法性外。 別有賴耶依持。 則不關法性。 若法性不離賴耶。 賴耶依持。 即是法性依持。 何得獨言賴耶是依持。 又違經。 經言。 非內非外。 亦非中間。 亦不常自有。 又違龍樹。 龍樹云。 諸法不自生。 亦不從他生。 不共不無因。 更就譬檢。 為當依心故有夢。 依眠故有夢。 眠法合心故有夢。 離心離眠故有夢。 若依心有夢者。 不眠應有夢。 若依眠有夢者。 死人如眠應有夢。 若眠心兩合而有夢者。 眠人那有不夢時。 又眠心各有夢。 合可有夢。 各既無夢。 合不應有。 若離心離眠而有夢者。 虛空離二。 應常有夢。 四句求夢尚不得。 云何於眠夢見一切事。 心喻法性。 眠喻賴耶。 云何偏據法性賴耶。 生一切法。 當知四句求心不可得。 求三千法亦不可得。 既橫從四句生三千法不可得者。 應從一念心滅生三千法耶。 心滅尚不能生一法。 云何能生三千法耶。 若從心亦滅亦不滅生三千法者。 亦滅亦不滅。 其性相違。 猶如水火。 二俱不立。 云何能生三千法耶。 若謂心非滅非不滅生三千法者。 非滅非不滅。 非能非所。 云何能生三千法耶。 亦縱亦橫求三千法亦不可得。 非縱非橫求三千法亦不可得。 言語道斷。 心行處滅。 故名不可思議境。 大涅槃經云。 生生不可說。 生不生不可說。 不生生不可說。 不生不生不可說。 即此義也。 當知第一義中一法不可得。 況三千法。 世諦中。 一心尚具無量法。 況三千耶。 如佛告德女。 無明內有不。 不也。 外有不。 不也。 內外有不。 不也。 非內非外有不。 不也。 佛言。 如是而有。 大涅槃經云。 有因緣故。 亦可得說。 謂四悉檀因緣也。 雖四句冥寂。 慈悲憐愍。 於無名相中。 假名相說。 或作世界說心具一切法。 聞者歡喜。 如言三界無別法。 唯是一心造。 即其文也。 或說緣生一切法。 聞者歡喜。 如言五欲。 令人墮惡道。 善知識者。 是大因緣。 所謂化導令得見佛。 即其文也。 或言因緣共生一切法。 聞者歡喜。 如偈言。 水銀和真金。 能塗諸色像。 功德和法身。 應現處處往。 即其文也。 或言離生一切法。 聞者歡喜。 如言十二因緣非佛作。 非天人脩羅作。 性自爾。 即其文也。 此四句即世界悉檀。 說。 心生三千一切法。 云何為人悉檀。 如言佛法如海。 唯信能入。 信則道原功德母。 一切善法由之生。 汝但發三菩提心。 是則出家。 禁戒具足。 聞者生信。 即其文也。 或說緣生一切法。 如言若不值佛。 當於無量劫墮地獄苦。 以見佛故。 得無根信。 如從伊蘭出生栴檀。 聞者生信。 即其文也。 或說合生一切法。 如言心水澄清。 珠相自現。 慈善根力。 見如此事。 聞者生信。 即其文也。 或說離生一切法。 如言非內觀。 得是智慧。 乃至非內外觀。 得是智慧。 若有住著。 先尼梵志。 小信尚不可得。 況捨邪入正。 聞者生信。 即其文也。 是為為人悉檀四句。 說心生三千一切法也。 云何對治悉檀。 說心治一切法。 如言得一心者。 萬邪滅矣。 即其文也。 或說緣治一切惡。 如說得聞無上大慧。 明。 心定如地。 不可動。 即其文也。 或說因緣和合治一切惡。

Answer: Masters of the Dilun school say, 'All understanding and delusion, truth and falsity, rely on and are sustained by the dharmatā. Dharmatā sustains truth and falsity; truth and falsity rely on the dharmatā.' The Mahāyānasaṃgraha states, 'The dharmatā is not defiled by delusion, nor is it purified by truth. Therefore, the dharmatā is not that which sustains. What is called that which sustains is the ālayavijñāna. Undiminishing avidyā abundantly holds all seeds.' If one follows the Dilun masters, then citta possesses all phenomena. If one follows the Shelun masters, then conditions possess all phenomena. These two masters each rely on one side. If the dharmatā were to produce all phenomena, the dharmatā is neither citta nor condition. Because it is not citta, yet citta produces all phenomena; because it is not condition, conditions should also produce all phenomena. How could one exclusively say that the dharmatā is the support of truth and falsity? If one says that the dharmatā is not the support, but the ālayavijñāna is the support, and apart from the dharmatā there were separately an ālayavijñāna as support, then it would not pertain to the dharmatā. If the dharmatā is not apart from the ālayavijñāna, the support of the ālayavijñāna is simply the support of the dharmatā. How could one exclusively say that the ālayavijñāna is the support? Furthermore, this contradicts the sūtra. The sūtra says, 'It is neither internal nor external, nor in between, nor does it eternally exist by itself.' It also contradicts Nāgārjuna. Nāgārjuna said, 'Phenomena do not arise from themselves, nor do they arise from others; neither from both, nor without cause.' Further examining by means of an analogy: is there a dream relying on citta, relying on sleep, relying on the combination of sleep and citta, or relying on separation from both citta and sleep? If a dream arises relying on citta, one should have dreams when not asleep. If it arises relying on sleep, a dead person who resembles someone asleep should have dreams. If a dream arises from the combination of sleep and citta, how could a sleeping person ever not dream? Furthermore, if sleep and citta each had dreams, then in combination there could be dreams; since each has no dream, there should not be any when combined. If a dream arises apart from citta and apart from sleep, space, being apart from both, should constantly have dreams. Searching for a dream through the four propositions cannot be attained; how could one see all events in a dream while sleeping? Citta is an analogy for the dharmatā; sleep is an analogy for the ālayavijñāna. How can one biasedly rely on the dharmatā or the ālayavijñāna to produce all phenomena? One should know that searching for citta through the four propositions cannot be attained, and searching for the three thousand phenomena also cannot be attained. Since the arising of the three thousand phenomena horizontally from the four propositions cannot be attained, should the three thousand phenomena arise from the cessation of a single thought-moment of citta? If the cessation of citta cannot even produce a single phenomenon, how could it produce the three thousand phenomena? If the three thousand phenomena arise from citta being both ceased and unceased: being both ceased and unceased are mutually contradictory in nature, like water and fire; neither can be established, so how could they produce the three thousand phenomena? If it is said that the three thousand phenomena arise from citta being neither ceased nor unceased: neither ceased nor unceased has neither agent nor object, so how could it produce the three thousand phenomena? Searching for the three thousand phenomena both vertically and horizontally cannot be attained; searching for the three thousand phenomena neither vertically nor horizontally cannot be attained. The path of language is cut off, and the sphere of mental activity is extinguished; hence it is called the inconceivable realm. The Mahāparinirvāṇasūtra states, 'Arising arising cannot be spoken of; arising non-arising cannot be spoken of; non-arising arising cannot be spoken of; non-arising non-arising cannot be spoken of.' This is precisely the meaning. One should know that in the ultimate truth, not a single phenomenon can be attained, let alone the three thousand phenomena! In conventional truth, a single citta even possesses immeasurable phenomena, let alone three thousand! As when the Buddha asked Guṇavatī, 'Does avidyā exist internally?' 'No.' 'Does it exist externally?' 'No.' 'Does it exist both internally and externally?' 'No.' 'Does it exist neither internally nor externally?' 'No.' The Buddha said, 'Thus it exists.' The Mahāparinirvāṇasūtra states, 'Because there are causes and conditions, it can also be spoken of'—this refers to the causes and conditions of the four siddhāntas. Although the four propositions are profoundly quiescent, out of compassion and pity, in the midst of the absence of names and characteristics, [the Buddha] speaks with provisional names and characteristics. Or, making worldly discourse, he speaks of citta possessing all phenomena, so that listeners rejoice; as in the statement, 'The three realms have no separate phenomena; they are created solely by the one mind'—this is its text. Or he speaks of conditions producing all phenomena, so that listeners rejoice; as in the statement, 'The five desires cause people to fall into the evil destinies; a good spiritual friend is a great cause and condition, that is, transforming and guiding them to see the Buddha'—this is its text. Or he says that causes and conditions jointly produce all phenomena, so that listeners rejoice; as in the verse, 'When mercury is mixed with pure gold, / It can coat various forms; / When merits are mixed with the dharmakāya, / It manifests and goes everywhere'—this is its text. Or he says that separation produces all phenomena, so that listeners rejoice; as in the statement, 'The twelve links of dependent origination are not made by the Buddha, nor are they made by devas, humans, or asuras; their nature is just so'—this is its text. These four propositions are the mundane siddhānta speaking of citta producing all the three thousand phenomena. What is the individual siddhānta? As in the statement, 'The Buddha's Dharma is like an ocean, which only faith can enter. Faith is the source of the path and the mother of merits, from which all good phenomena arise. If you only give rise to the mind of sambodhi, this is leaving household life, and the prohibitive precepts are complete'—listeners give rise to faith; this is its text. Or he speaks of conditions producing all phenomena; as in the statement, 'If one does not encounter the Buddha, one will fall into the suffering of hell for immeasurable kalpas; because one sees the Buddha, one attains rootless faith, like candana emerging from an eraṇḍa tree'—listeners give rise to faith; this is its text. Or he speaks of combination producing all phenomena; as in the statement, 'When the water of citta is clear, the image of the jewel appears naturally; through the power of the roots of benevolence, one sees such things'—listeners give rise to faith; this is its text. Or he speaks of separation producing all phenomena; as in the statement, 'It is not by internal contemplation that one attains this wisdom, up to: it is not by both internal and external contemplation that one attains this wisdom. If there is abiding attachment, then like the wanderer Śreṇika, even slight faith cannot be attained, let alone abandoning the heterodox and entering the orthodox'—listeners give rise to faith; this is its text. These are the four propositions of the individual siddhānta speaking of citta producing all the three thousand phenomena. What is the antidotal siddhānta speaking of citta remedying all phenomena? As in the statement, 'For one who attains the one mind, the myriad evils are extinguished'—this is its text. Or he speaks of conditions remedying all evils; as in the statement, 'Hearing the unsurpassable great wisdom-clarity, citta is settled like the earth, immovable'—this is its text. Or he speaks of causes and conditions harmoniously combining to remedy all evils.