宗鏡錄 54.17

54.17

答。聲塵生滅。動靜皆空。聲不至於耳根。根不往於聲所。既無一物中間往來。則心境俱虛。聲不可得。如首楞嚴經云。復次阿難。云何十二處。本如來藏。妙真如性。阿難。汝且觀此祇陀樹林。及諸泉池。於意云何。此等為是色生眼見。眼生色相。阿難。若復眼根生色相者。見空非色。色性應消。消則顯發一切都無。色相既無。誰明空質。空亦如是。若復色塵生眼見者。觀空非色。見即消亡。亡則都無。誰明空色。是故當知。見與色空。俱無處所。即色與見。二處虛妄。本非因緣。非自然性。又推聲處文云。阿難。汝更聽此祇陀園中。食辦擊鼓。眾集撞鐘。鐘鼓音聲。前後相續。於意云何。此等為是聲來耳邊。耳往聲處。阿難。若復此聲來於耳邊。如我乞食室羅筏城。在祇陀林。則無有我。此聲必來阿難耳處。目連迦葉。應不俱聞。何況其中一千二百五十沙門。一聞鐘聲。同來食處。若復汝耳往彼聲邊。如我歸住祇陀林中。在室羅城。則無有我。汝聞鼓聲。其耳已往擊鼓之處。鐘聲齊出。應不俱聞。何況其中象馬牛羊。種種音響。若無來往。亦復無聞。是故當知。聽與音聲。俱無處所。即聽與聲。二處虛妄。本非因緣。非自然性。又推香處文云。阿難。汝又嗅此鑪中栴檀。此香若復燃於一銖。室羅筏城。四十里內同時聞氣。於意云何。此香為復生栴檀木。生於汝鼻。為生於空。阿難。若復此香生於汝鼻。稱鼻所生。當從鼻出。鼻非栴檀。云何鼻中有栴檀氣。稱汝聞香。當於鼻入。鼻中出香。說聞非義。若生於空。空性常恒。香應常在。何藉鑪中爇此枯木。若生於木。則此香質因爇成煙。若鼻得聞。合蒙煙氣。其煙騰空未及遙遠。四十里內。云何已聞。是故當知。香鼻與聞。俱無處所。即嗅與香。二處虛妄。本非因緣。非自然性。推味處文云。阿難。汝常二時。眾中持鉢。其間或遇酥酪醍醐。名為上味。於意云何。此味為復生於空中。生於舌中。為生食中。阿難。若復此味。生於汝舌。在汝口中。只有一舌。其舌爾時已成酥味。遇黑石蜜。應不推移。若不變移。不名知味。若變移者。舌非多體。云何多味。一舌之知。若生於食。食非有識。云何自知。又食自知。即同他食。何預於汝。名味之知。若生於空。汝噉虛空。當作何味。必其虛空。若作鹹味。既鹹汝舌。亦鹹汝面。則此界人。同於海魚。既常受鹹。了不知淡。若不識淡亦不覺鹹。必無所知。云何名味。是故當知。味舌與嘗俱無處所。即嘗與味。二俱虛妄。本非因緣。非自然性。推觸處文云。阿難。汝常晨朝。以手摩頭。於意云何。此摩所知。誰為能觸。能為在手。為復在頭。若在於手。頭則無知。云何成觸。若在於頭。手則無用。云何名觸。若各各有。則。汝阿難。應有二身。若頭與手一觸所生。則手與頭。當為一體。若一體者。觸則無成。若二體者。觸誰為在。在能非所。在所非能。不應虛空與汝成觸。是故當知。覺觸與身。俱無處所。即身與觸。二俱虛妄。本非因緣。非自然性。今推十二根塵。處所既無。則前六根門無處而入。後十八界無界而分。可驗眾生界中。即今現行心境俱空。世俗諦中。假施設法悉皆無有。夫宗鏡所錄。皆是現證法門。一入全真。更無前後。如或不信。但靜思看。若見一念無生。自然與經冥合。如菩薩念佛三昧經偈云。此身常無知。如草木瓦礫。菩提無形色。寂滅恒不生。身不觸菩提。菩提不觸身。心不觸菩提。菩提不觸心。而能有相觸。實為不思議。釋曰。故知色不至眼。耳不到聲。而有見聞。是不可思議。以自性離中。而有顯現。故知六根無對。皆是無諍法門。諸境含虛。盡冥不二之道。即今眾生境界。真不可思議矣。曷用遠求諸聖作用。而自鄙劣者哉。此宗鏡。是照眾生之癡闇。同諸佛之光明。使法界含生。一時圓證。如法集經云。須菩提白佛言。世尊。眼色二法無所諍競。以不和合故。以此二法不相到故。夫不合不到法。皆無違諍。世尊。法無有二。是故不諍。廣百門論破根境品云。復次若耳根境合。知者。不應遠近一時俱聞。聲從質來。既有遠近。不應一念同至耳根。耳無光明。不應趣境。又聲離質。來入耳聞。亦不應理。鐘鼓等聲。現不離質。遠可聞故。若耳與聲無聞而取。如香等。不辯方維。若耳與聲不合而取。應無遠近一切皆聞。不合體無。相無別故。或應一切皆不能聞。是故耳根。聲合不合。實取自境。二俱不成。又云。心若趣塵。體則不遍。心常往境。我應無心。然微細心。身中恒有。睡眠悶等。諸位常行。有息等故。夢可得故。勞倦增故。引覺心故。任持身故。觸身覺故。又若內身恒無心者。如死屍等。害應無愆。供應無福。則與空見外道應同。有執。心體不遍不行。但用有行。亦同此過。心用心體。不相離故。又若心體往趣前塵。有觸內身。應無覺受。應動思慮。不損內心。如是諸宗。執實根境。皆不應理。應信非真。又一切世間有情無情。諸法義相。如依陽焰有水想生。誑惑自心。亦為他說。由此妄想。建立根塵。及餘世間諸事差別。如顯此想。依多法成。是假非真。故說想蘊乃至如諸幻事。體實雖無。而能發生種種妄識。眼等亦爾。體相皆虛。如矯誑人。生他妄識。想隨此發。境。豈為真。根境皆虛。猶如幻事。大集經偈云。至心念法思惟法。是故不見色與聲。若得入於深法界。爾時則無色聲等。般若燈論偈云。眼不見色塵。意不知諸法。此名最上實。世人不能度。是以根境唯心。名相俱寂。故知世諦真諦。同趣佛乘。有情無情。咸歸智地。以真無中。絕名絕相。心智路斷。是不可思議。以俗有中。如幻如化。無中顯現。是不可思議。不可以情識知。不可以有無測。所以廣百門論。明世間法有五種難測。頌云。世間諸所有。無不皆難測。根境理同然。智者何驚異。論曰。如一思業。能感當來內外無邊果相差別。極善工匠。所不能為。是名世間第一難測。又如外種。生長芽莖。無量枝條華葉根果。形色間雜。嚴麗宛然。是名世間第二難測。又如華樹。名曰無憂。婬女觸之。眾華競發。枝條垂拂。如有愛心。是名世間第三難測。又如華樹。名如樂音。聞作樂聲。舉身搖動。枝條裏娜。如舞躍人。是名世間第四難測。又如華樹。名好鳥吟。聞鳥吟聲。即便搖動。枝條裏娜。如喜抃人。是名世間第五難測。如是難測。世事無邊。根境有無。方之甚易。世俗故有。勝義故空。諸有智人。不應驚異。如中觀論偈云。以法知有人。以人知有法。離法何有人。離人何有法。法者。眼耳苦樂等。人者。是本住。汝謂以有法故知有人。以有人故知有法。今離眼耳等法何有人。離人何有眼耳等法。復次一切眼等根。實無有本住。眼耳等諸根。異相而分別。眼耳等諸根。苦樂等諸法。實無有本住。因眼緣色。生眼識。以和合因緣。知有眼等諸根。不以本住故。如是。故偈中說。一切眼耳等根。實無有本住。眼耳等諸根。各自能分別。

Answer: Sound-objects arise and cease; movement and stillness are both empty. Sound does not reach the ear faculty, nor does the faculty go to the place of the sound. Since not a single thing comes and goes between them, citta and objects are both void, and sound is unattainable. As the Śūraṅgamasūtra states: “Furthermore, Ānanda, how are the twelve āyatanas fundamentally the tathāgatagarbha, the wondrous nature of tathatā? Ānanda, just observe this Jeta Grove and these springs and pools. What do you think? Are these forms producing the sight of the eyes, or are the eyes producing the characteristics of form? Ānanda, if the eye faculty produced the characteristics of form, then upon seeing space, which is not form, the nature of form would be annihilated. If it were annihilated, this would reveal that all is completely nonexistent; and since the characteristics of form would be nonexistent, who would elucidate the substance of space? The same is true of space. If the form-object produced the sight of the eyes, then upon viewing space, which is not form, sight would be extinguished; and being extinguished, all would be nonexistent, so who would elucidate space and form? Therefore, you should know that sight, form, and space all have no fixed place. Thus the two āyatanas of form and sight are false; fundamentally, they are neither [caused by] causes and conditions nor a spontaneous nature.”

Also, the passage investigating the āyatana of sound states: “Ānanda, listen further to the striking of the drum when food is prepared in this Jeta Grove, and the ringing of the bell when the assembly gathers, the sounds of the bell and drum following one another in succession. What do you think? Do these sounds come to the ear, or does the ear go to the place of the sound? Ānanda, if this sound came to the ear, it would be as when I go to beg for food in Śrāvastī: while in the Jeta Grove, I am not there [in the grove]. If this sound must come to Ānanda’s ear, then Maudgalyāyana and Kāśyapa should not both hear it at the same time—how much less the one thousand two hundred and fifty śramaṇas who, upon hearing the sound of the bell, come together to the refectory! If your ear went to the side of the sound, it would be as when I return to dwell in the Jeta Grove: while in Śrāvastī, I am not there [in Śrāvastī]. When you hear the drum, your ear would have already gone to the place where the drum was struck; then when the sound of the bell rang out at the same time, you should not be able to hear it as well—how much less the various sounds of elephants, horses, cattle, and sheep! If there is no coming and going, there is also no hearing. Therefore, you should know that listening and sound both have no fixed place. Thus the two āyatanas of listening and sound are false; fundamentally, they are neither [caused by] causes and conditions nor a spontaneous nature.”

Also, the passage investigating the āyatana of odor states: “Ānanda, smell again the sandalwood in this censer. If even a single grain of this incense is burned, its scent is smelled simultaneously within forty li in the city of Śrāvastī. What do you think? Does this scent arise from the sandalwood tree, does it arise from your nose, or does it arise from empty space? Ānanda, if this scent arose from your nose, then being said to arise from the nose, it should issue forth from the nose. The nose is not sandalwood; how could there be the scent of sandalwood in the nose? Since you are said to smell incense, it should enter into the nose; that incense issues from the nose cannot properly be called ‘smelling’. If it arose from empty space, the nature of space is permanent and constant, so the scent should always be present; why rely on burning this dry wood in a censer? If it arose from the wood, then this fragrant substance becomes smoke through burning. If the nose could smell it, it ought to be shrouded in the smoke; yet before the smoke has risen far into the air, how could it already be smelled within forty li? Therefore, you should know that odor, nose, and smelling all have no fixed place. Thus the two āyatanas of smelling and odor are false; fundamentally, they are neither [caused by] causes and conditions nor a spontaneous nature.”

The passage investigating the āyatana of taste states: “Ānanda, twice a day you hold your bowl among the assembly, and in it you may encounter curd, cheese, or clarified butter, which are called superior tastes. What do you think? Does this taste arise from empty space, does it arise from the tongue, or does it arise from the food? Ānanda, if this taste arose from your tongue, there is only one tongue in your mouth; if that tongue has already become the taste of curd at that time, when it encounters dark cane sugar it should not alter. If it does not alter, it cannot be called cognising taste. If it does alter, the tongue is not multiple substances; how could multiple tastes be cognised by a single tongue? If it arose from the food, the food has no consciousness; how could it cognise itself? Moreover, if the food cognised itself, it would be the same as someone else eating; what would that have to do with you being said to cognise the taste? If it arose from empty space, when you ate empty space, what taste would it have? If empty space must have a salty taste, since it saltened your tongue, it would also salten your face, and the people of this realm would be just like ocean fish. Constantly experiencing saltiness, they would have no knowledge of blandness; and if they did not recognise blandness, they would not perceive saltiness either. If there were necessarily no cognition, how could it be called taste? Therefore, you should know that taste, tongue, and tasting all have no fixed place. Thus both tasting and taste are false; fundamentally, they are neither [caused by] causes and conditions nor a spontaneous nature.”

The passage investigating the āyatana of tangible objects states: “Ānanda, each morning you rub your head with your hand. What do you think? In this cognition of rubbing, what is that which touches? Is the touch in the hand, or is it in the head? If it were in the hand, the head would have no sensation; how could contact be established? If it were in the head, the hand would have no function; how could it be called contact? If each had its own, then you, Ānanda, would have two bodies. If head and hand arose from a single contact, then hand and head would be one substance; if they were one substance, contact could not be formed. If they were two substances, where would the contact reside? If it resided in the subject, it would not be in the object; if it resided in the object, it would not be in the subject. Empty space could hardly form contact with you. Therefore, you should know that feeling, touch, and the body all have no fixed place. Thus both body and touch are false; fundamentally, they are neither [caused by] causes and conditions nor a spontaneous nature.”

Now, investigating the twelve faculties and objects, since they have no fixed place, the former six sense gates have no place through which to enter, and the latter eighteen dhātus have no realms into which to divide. It can be verified that within the realm of sentient beings, the currently functioning citta and objects right now are both empty; within conventional truth, all conventionally designated dharmas are completely nonexistent. Indeed, what is recorded in this Mirror of the Source consists entirely of teachings of immediate realization: once entered, it is completely true, without before or after. If you do not believe this, simply reflect in quietude and see. If you see that a single thought is unarisen, you will naturally merge with the sūtras. As a verse in the Bodhisattva-buddhānusmṛti-samādhi-sūtra states:
“This body is perpetually without sentience, / like grass, trees, tiles, and rubble. / Bodhi has no form or color; / it is quiescent and ever unproduced. / The body does not touch bodhi, / and bodhi does not touch the body. / Citta does not touch bodhi, / and bodhi does not touch citta. / Yet that they are able to touch one another / is truly inconceivable.”

Commentary: Therefore we know that form does not reach the eye, and the ear does not go to the sound; yet that seeing and hearing occur is inconceivable. Because appearance occurs within the separation of self-nature, we know that the six faculties having no counterpart are all the Dharma-gate of non-contention. The various objects contain emptiness, entirely merging into the path of non-duality. The present realm of sentient beings is truly inconceivable! Why seek afar the functions of the sages and belittle oneself? This Mirror of the Source illuminates the dark ignorance of sentient beings and is identical to the radiant light of all buddhas, causing sentient beings throughout the dharmadhātu to attain complete realization all at once. As the Dharmasaṃgītisūtra states: “Subhūti said to the Buddha: ‘World-Honoured One, the two dharmas of eye and form have no dispute, because they do not unite, and because these two dharmas do not reach one another. Dharmas that do not unite and do not reach one another are free from conflict and dispute. World-Honoured One, dharmas are without duality; therefore there is no dispute.’”

Chapter on Refuting Sense Faculties and Objects in the Śatakaśāstra-vaipulya states: “Furthermore, if the ear faculty and its object united to cognise, one should not hear both far and near simultaneously. Since sound comes from a physical source and thus has far and near, it should not reach the ear faculty in a single moment. The ear has no light, so it should not proceed toward the object. Moreover, that sound leaves the physical source and enters the ear to be heard is also illogical, because the sounds of bells, drums, and so forth are perceptually not separated from their source, since they can be heard from afar. If the ear grasped sound without hearing, like scent and so forth, it would not discern direction. If the ear grasped sound without contact, it should hear all sounds regardless of distance, since the non-contact has no substance and its characteristics have no distinction; or else it should be unable to hear anything at all. Therefore, whether the ear faculty contacts sound or does not contact it, its actual grasping of its own object is untenable in both ways.”

It also states: “If citta proceeded to the dust-object, its substance would not be pervasive. If citta constantly went to the object, ‘I’ should be without citta. Yet subtle citta is ever-present within the body, constantly functioning in various states such as sleep and fainting—because there is respiration, because dreams can occur, because fatigue increases, because an awakening citta is induced, because it sustains the body, and because touch on the body is felt. Moreover, if the internal body were constantly devoid of citta, it would be like a corpse: killing it would incur no fault, and offering to it would produce no merit; thus one would be identical to the non-Buddhists who hold the view of voidness. If one holds that the substance of citta does not pervade or go, but only its function goes, this also incurs the same fault, because citta's function and citta's substance are not separate. Furthermore, if the substance of citta went forth to the external object, when the internal body was touched, there should be no feeling, and movement of thought should not impair the internal citta. Therefore, the assertions of various schools clinging to real faculties and objects are all illogical; one should have faith that they are not real. Furthermore, regarding the semantic characteristics of all dharmas, whether sentient or insentient, in all worldly realms: just as the thought of water arises based on a mirage, deluding one’s own citta and also being spoken to others, so based on this false thought the faculties, objects, and other various differences of worldly phenomena are established. As this thought is shown to be established based on multiple dharmas, it is conventional and not real; therefore it is said that the saṃjñā-skandha, up to all illusory things, although devoid of real substance, can produce various false consciousnesses. The eyes and so forth are also like this: substance and characteristic are both empty; like an impostor deceiving someone and giving rise to other false consciousnesses, saṃjñā arises in accordance with this—how could the object be real? Faculties and objects are both empty, just like illusory affairs.”

A verse in the Mahāsaṃnipātasūtra states:
“With the utmost citta mindfulness of the Dharma and contemplation of the Dharma, / one therefore does not see form and sound. / If one is able to enter the profound dharmadhātu, / at that time there is neither form nor sound.”

A verse in the Prajñāpradīpaśāstra states:
“The eye does not see form-objects, / and the manas does not know dharmas. / This is called the supreme reality, / which worldly people cannot fathom.”

Therefore, faculties and objects are citta only; name and characteristic are both quiescent. Thus we know that conventional truth and ultimate truth together tend toward the Buddha vehicle, and the sentient and the insentient alike return to the stage of wisdom. Because in true nonexistence, names and characteristics are severed and the path of citta and intellect is cut off, it is inconceivable. Because in conventional existence, phenomena are like illusions and apparitions, appearing out of nonexistence, it is inconceivable. It cannot be known through emotional consciousness, nor measured through existence and nonexistence. Therefore the Śatakaśāstra-vaipulya explains that worldly dharmas have five kinds of unfathomability. A verse says:
“Among all things in the world, / there is none that is not difficult to fathom. / The principle of faculties and objects is just the same; / why should the wise be astonished?”

The treatise states: “As a single volition-karma can produce the infinite differences of internal and external fruition-characteristics in the future, which even the most skilled craftsman could never make—this is called the first unfathomability in the world. Again, as external seeds give rise to sprouting stems, countless branches, leaves, flowers, roots, and fruits, with variegated shapes and colors, vividly adorned—this is called the second unfathomability in the world. Again, as with the flower tree named ‘Aśoka’: when touched by a courtesan, its many flowers burst forth competing, and its branches hang down brushing, as if possessing a loving heart—this is called the third unfathomability in the world. Again, as with the flower tree named ‘Like Musical Sound’: hearing the sound of music, its whole body shakes, and its branches sway like a dancing person—this is called the fourth unfathomability in the world. Again, as with the flower tree named ‘Singing of Fine Birds’: hearing the sound of birds singing, it immediately shakes, and its branches sway like an applauding person—this is called the fifth unfathomability in the world. With such unfathomable worldly phenomena being boundless, comparing the existence or nonexistence of faculties and objects to them is very easy: they exist conventionally, yet are empty ultimately; those who have wisdom should not be astonished.”

As a verse in the Mūlamadhyamakakārikā states:
“Through dharmas one knows there is a person; / through a person one knows there are dharmas. / Apart from dharmas, how could there be a person? / Apart from a person, how could there be dharmas?”
“Dharmas” refers to the eyes, ears, suffering, pleasure, and so forth. “Person” refers to the fundamental dweller. You claim that because there are dharmas one knows there is a person, and because there is a person one knows there are dharmas; now, apart from dharmas such as eyes and ears, how could there be a person? Apart from a person, how could there be dharmas such as eyes and ears? Furthermore, all faculties such as the eyes truly have no fundamental dweller; the various faculties such as eyes and ears are distinguished through different characteristics. The various faculties such as eyes and ears, and the various dharmas such as suffering and pleasure, truly have no fundamental dweller. Due to the eye conditioning form, visual consciousness arises; through harmonious causes and conditions one knows that the various faculties such as the eye exist, not because of a fundamental dweller. Therefore the verse says: “All faculties such as the eyes and ears truly have no fundamental dweller; the various faculties such as eyes and ears are each able to distinguish.”