宗鏡錄 59.29

59.29

答。此相仗因緣生。但是依他性幻有之法。而非是我。由彼妄執為我故。名妄執。此有兩重相。約此相從因緣生。有力能生心。此乃是有。名依他性法。於此不稱所執法義邊。名遍計所執。乃名為無。如人昏冥。執石為牛。石體不無。我見所緣緣。依他相有。如石本非牛。妄心執為牛。此所執牛。其體全無。如相分本非我。妄心執為我。此所執。其體全無。但有能執心。而無所執我。謂於此石處。有所緣石。而無所執牛。於此相分上。有所緣法。而無所執我。又況云。如南方人不識駝毛。曾於一處聞說龜毛。後忽見駝毛。由不識故。妄謂駝毛以為龜毛。此所見駝毛是有故。如依他性法。其駝毛上無龜毛。妄心謂為龜毛。如所執實我法故。論云。有義。一切及心所法。由熏習力。所變二分。從緣生故。名依他起。遍計依斯。妄執定實。有無一異。俱不俱等。此二名遍計所執性。

Answer: This characteristic arises relying on causes and conditions; it is merely an illusory existent phenomenon of the other-dependent nature, not a self. Because that [mind] falsely grasps it as a self, it is called false grasping. Here there is a twofold characteristic: in terms of this characteristic arising from causes and conditions and possessing the capacity to produce mind, this is indeed existent, and is called a phenomenon of the other-dependent nature. In terms of this not matching the sense of the grasped phenomenon, it is called the imagined grasping, and is thus called non-existent. It is like someone in the dark grasping a stone as an ox: the substance of the stone is not non-existent. The objective condition (*ālambanapratyaya*) of the view of self exists as an other-dependent characteristic; just as the stone is fundamentally not an ox, but the deluded mind grasps it as an ox—this grasped ox is completely devoid of substance. Just so, the nimittabhāga is fundamentally not a self, but the deluded mind grasps it as a self—this grasped [self] is completely devoid of substance. There is only the grasping mind, but no grasped self. That is to say, at this stone there is the stone as object, but no ox as grasped; upon this nimittabhāga, there is a phenomenon as object, but no self as grasped.

Another analogy says: It is like a person from the south who does not recognize camel's hair; having once heard tortoise hair spoken of elsewhere, when suddenly seeing camel's hair later, because of not recognizing it, falsely takes the camel's hair to be tortoise hair. Because this camel's hair that is seen exists, it is like the phenomenon of the other-dependent nature. That there is no tortoise hair on the camel's hair, and yet the deluded mind takes it to be tortoise hair, is like the grasped real self and phenomena.

The treatise says: "Some say: all [citta] and caitta phenomena, by the power of perfuming, transform into the two parts; because they are produced from conditions, they are called other-dependent. The imagined nature relies on these to falsely grasp determinate reality, existence, non-existence, identity, difference, both, neither, and so forth. These two are called the imagined nature."