宗鏡錄 60.43

60.43

答。三能變。謂異熟思量。及了別境。識此是能變自體。所變者。即見相二分。是自體分之所變故。是自體分之用故。說自體。是二分所依。識論云。云何應知。依識所變。假說我法。非別實有。由斯一切唯有識耶。頌曰。是諸識轉變。分別所分別。由此彼皆無。故一切唯識。是諸識者。謂前所說三能變識。及彼心所。皆能變似見相二分。立轉變名。所變見分。說名分別。能取相故。所變相分。名所分別。見所取故。由此正理。彼實我法。離識所變。皆定非有。離能所取。無別物故。非有實物。離二相故。是故一切有為無為。若實若假。皆不離識。唯言。為遮離識實物。非無不離識心所法等。或轉變者。謂諸內識轉似我法。外境相。現此能轉變。即名分別。虛妄分別。為自性故。謂即三界心。及心所。此所執境。名所分別。即所妄執。實我法性。由此分別變似外境。假我法相。彼所分別實我法性。決定皆無。前引教理。已廣破故。是故一切。皆唯有識。虛妄分別有。極成故。唯既不遮不離識法。故真如等。亦是有性。由斯遠離增減二邊。唯識義成。契會中道。釋云。是諸識轉變者。轉變是改轉義。謂一識體。改轉為二相起。異於自體。即見分有能取之用。相分有質礙之用。由識自體。轉起能取。及有礙故。所變見分。說名分別。能取相故者。前所變中。以所變見分。名為分別。是依他性。能取於所變依他相分故。起種種遍計所執分別。是此識體所變。用。能分別。故名分別。其識體所變依他。性相。分。似所執相分者。名所分別。是前能分別見分之所取相故。非謂識自體能緣。名為分別。起分別見者。識之用也。相見俱依自證起故。唯既不遮不離識法故。真如等亦是有性者。唯言不遮不離識法。真如及心所者。亦不離識。故體皆有。今此位。但遮離識所分別有。不遮不離識真如等有。如理應知。此意既有能變分別識。及所變境依他相分。所分別心外實法等。決定皆無。唯有真如心所等法。皆不離識。亦是實有。遠離增減二邊者。無心外法故。除增益邊。有虛妄心等故。離損減邊。離損減邊故。除撥無如空清辯等說。離增益邊故。除心外有法諸小乘執。唯識義成。契會中道。無偏執故。又諸師所明。總有四分義。一相分。二見分。三自證分。四證自證分。相分有四。一。實相名相。體即真如。是真實相故。二境相名相。為能與根心而為境故。三相狀名相。此唯有為法。有相狀故。通影及質。唯是識之所變。四義相名相。即能詮下所詮義。相分。是於上四種相中。唯取後三相而為相分相。又相分有二。一識所頓變。即是本質。二識等緣境。唯變影緣。不得本質。二見分者。唯識論云。於自所緣。有了別用。此見分有五類。一證見名見。即三根本智見分是。二照燭名見。此通根心。俱有照燭義故。三能緣名見。即通內三分。俱能緣故。四念解名見。以念解所詮義故。五。推度名見。即比量心。推度一切境故。於此五種見中。除五色根。及內二分。餘皆見分所攝。三自證分。為能親證自見分緣相分不謬。能作證故。四證自證分。謂能親證第三自證分緣見分不謬故。從所證處得名。此四分義。總以鏡喻。鏡。如自證分。鏡明。如見分。鏡像。如相分。鏡後弝。如證自證分。此四分。有四師立義。第一安慧菩薩。立一分自證分。識論云。此自證分。從緣所生。是依他起故。故說為有。見相二分。不從緣生。因遍計心。妄執而有。如是二分。情有理無。唯自證分。是依他起性。有種子生。是實有故。見相二分是無。更變起。我法二執。又是無。以無似無。若准護法菩薩。即是以有似無。見相二分是有體。變起。我法二執是無體故。安慧引楞伽經云。三界有漏心心所。皆是虛妄分別。為自性故。故知八識見相二分。皆是遍計妄執有。故唯有自證一分。是依他起性。是實有故。密嚴經偈云。愚夫所分別。外境實皆無。習氣擾濁心。故似彼而轉。故知但是愚夫依實自證分上。起遍計妄情。變似無體二分現故。理實二分。無其實體。但是愚夫不了。妄執為實故。所以論云。凡夫執有。聖者達無。

Answer: The three transformers refer to the consciousnesses of vipāka, cogitation, and discrimination of objects. These are the substance of that which can transform. What is transformed refers to the two aspects, darśanabhāga and nimittabhāga, because they are transformed by the substance-aspect and are the functions of the substance-aspect. Therefore, the substance is said to be the basis of the two aspects.

The Vijñaptimātratāsiddhiśāstra says:
'How should it be known that, relying on the transformations of consciousness, self and phenomena are provisionally designated, and are not separately real, and that from this everything is consciousness-only?'

The verse says:
'It is the transformation of these consciousnesses,
Discriminating and what is discriminated.
Due to this, both of those are non-existent;
Therefore, all is consciousness-only.'

'These consciousnesses' refers to the three transforming consciousnesses previously explained and their mental factors; they all can transform to resemble the two aspects, darśanabhāga and nimittabhāga, and are established under the name 'transformation.' The transformed darśanabhāga is called 'discriminating,' because it can grasp characteristics. The transformed nimittabhāga is called 'what is discriminated,' because it is what is grasped by the darśana. Due to this correct principle, those real selves and phenomena, apart from the transformations of consciousness, are all definitely non-existent. Apart from that which grasps and that which is grasped, there is no other entity, because there is no real entity apart from the two characteristics. Therefore, all conditioned and unconditioned [phenomena], whether real or provisional, are not apart from consciousness. The word 'only' is meant to exclude real entities apart from consciousness, not to deny mental factors and so forth that are not apart from consciousness.

Alternatively, 'transformation' means that the internal consciousnesses transform to resemble the external objective characteristics of self and phenomena that appear. This ability to transform is named 'discrimination,' having false discrimination as its nature—namely, the minds and mental factors of the three realms. The objects clung to by this are called 'what is discriminated'—namely, the falsely clung-to real natures of self and phenomena. Because of this discrimination transforming to resemble external objects, the provisional characteristics of self and phenomena appear; those discriminated real natures of self and phenomena are definitely all non-existent, as previously cited teachings and reasonings have already extensively refuted. Therefore, all is consciousness-only, because the existence of false discrimination is extremely well established.

Since 'only' does not exclude phenomena that are not apart from consciousness, tathatā and so forth are also of existent nature. Due to this, the two extremes of superimposition and denigration are left behind, the meaning of consciousness-only is established, and one tallies with the Middle Way.

The commentary explains:
'The transformation of these consciousnesses': 'Transformation' means the sense of altering and turning. That is, the one substance of consciousness alters and turns to give rise to two characteristics, differing from its own substance: namely, the darśanabhāga has the function of grasping, and the nimittabhāga has the function of obstruction. This is because the substance of consciousness turns and gives rise to that which can grasp and that which has obstruction.

'The transformed darśanabhāga is called discrimination, because it can grasp characteristics': Among what is previously transformed, the transformed darśanabhāga is called discrimination; it is of paratantra nature. Because it can grasp the transformed paratantra nimittabhāga, it gives rise to various parikalpita discriminations. It is the transformed function of this substance of consciousness, and because it can discriminate, it is called 'discrimination.' The paratantra nature-aspect transformed by the substance of consciousness, which resembles the clung-to nimittabhāga, is called 'what is discriminated,' because it is the characteristic grasped by the preceding discriminating darśanabhāga. It is not that the substance of consciousness itself being able to take objects is called 'discrimination'; giving rise to discriminating views is the function of consciousness, because both nimitta and darśana arise dependent on self-witnessing.

'Since only does not exclude phenomena not apart from consciousness, tathatā and so forth are also of existent nature': The word 'only' does not exclude phenomena that are not apart from consciousness. Tathatā and mental factors are also not apart from consciousness, and thus their substances all exist. At this stage, it merely excludes the existence of what is discriminated apart from consciousness; it does not exclude the existence of tathatā and so forth that are not apart from consciousness. This should be known in accordance with reason.

This means: since there exist the transforming, discriminating consciousness and the transformed objective paratantra nimittabhāga, the discriminated real phenomena external to the mind and so forth are definitely all non-existent; only phenomena such as tathatā and mental factors are not apart from consciousness, and are also truly existent.

'Far removed from the two extremes of superimposition and denigration': Because there are no phenomena outside mind, the extreme of superimposition is eliminated; because there are deluded minds and so forth, the extreme of denigration is avoided. Avoiding the extreme of denigration eliminates the repudiation of existence as like empty space taught by Bhaviveka and others; avoiding the extreme of superimposition eliminates the Hīnayāna clingings to the existence of phenomena outside mind. Thus the meaning of consciousness-only is established, tallying with the Middle Way without one-sided grasping.

Furthermore, what the various masters have clarified consists of a total of four aspects: first, the nimittabhāga; second, the darśanabhāga; third, the svasaṃvittibhāga; fourth, the saṃvittisvasaṃvittibhāga.

There are four kinds of nimittabhāga:
1. The real characteristic is called 'nimitta': its substance is tathatā, because it is the true characteristic.
2. The objective characteristic is called 'nimitta': because it can serve as an object for the faculties and mind.
3. The perceptual appearance is called 'nimitta': this is only conditioned phenomena, because they have visible appearances; it extends to both the reflection and the archetype, and is solely transformed by consciousness.
4. The conceptual characteristic is called 'nimitta': namely, the signified meaning under the signifier.
As for the nimittabhāga [here], among the above four kinds of characteristics, it takes only the latter three characteristics to be the characteristic of the nimittabhāga.

Furthermore, the nimittabhāga is twofold: first, that which is suddenly transformed by consciousness, which is the archetype; second, consciousness and so forth taking objects, which merely transform a reflection to take as object and do not attain the archetype.

Second, the darśanabhāga: The Vijñaptimātratāsiddhiśāstra says that it has the function of discerning its own object. There are five categories of this darśanabhāga:
1. Direct-witnessing seeing is called 'darśana': that is, the darśanabhāga of the three fundamental cognitions.
2. Illumination is called 'darśana': this applies to both sense faculties and mind, because both possess the sense of illumination.
3. Grasping of objects is called 'darśana': this extends through the three internal aspects, because all can take objects.
4. Thoughtful understanding is called 'darśana': because of thoughtfully understanding the signified meaning.
5. Inference is called 'darśana': that is, the mind of inference (anumāna), because it infers with respect to all objects.
Among these five kinds of seeing, excluding the five physical faculties and the two internal aspects, all the rest are subsumed under the darśanabhāga.

Third, the svasaṃvittibhāga: Because it can personally verify that its own darśanabhāga takes the nimittabhāga as object without error, it is able to act as witness.

Fourth, the saṃvittisvasaṃvittibhāga: It refers to that which can personally verify that the third, the svasaṃvittibhāga, takes the darśanabhāga as object without error; it receives its name from that which is verified.

The meaning of these four aspects is generally illustrated with the metaphor of a mirror: the mirror itself is like the svasaṃvittibhāga; the mirror's brightness is like the darśanabhāga; the mirror's reflections are like the nimittabhāga; the handle at the back of the mirror is like the saṃvittisvasaṃvittibhāga.

Regarding these four aspects, four masters establish doctrines. First, Bodhisattva Sthiramati establishes only one aspect: the svasaṃvittibhāga. The Vijñaptimātratāsiddhiśāstra says: 'This svasaṃvittibhāga arises from conditions; because it is paratantra-originated, it is said to exist. The two aspects of darśana and nimitta do not arise from conditions; they exist due to false grasping by the parikalpita mind. As such, these two aspects exist emotionally but are absent in principle. Only the svasaṃvittibhāga is of paratantra nature, born from seeds, and is truly existent.'

The two aspects of darśana and nimitta are non-existent, yet further transform and give rise to the two graspings of self and phenomena, which are also non-existent; this is using non-existence to resemble non-existence. If one goes by Bodhisattva Dharmapāla, it is using existence to resemble non-existence: the two aspects of darśana and nimitta have substance, while the two graspings of self and phenomena that they transform and give rise to are without substance. Sthiramati cites the Laṅkāvatārasūtra, which says: 'The defiled minds and mental factors of the three realms all have false discrimination as their nature.' Therefore, one knows that the darśana and nimitta aspects of the eight consciousnesses are all parikalpita falsely clung-to existences; thus only the single aspect of svasaṃvitti is of paratantra nature and is truly existent.

A verse in the Ghanavyūhasūtra says:
'What fools discriminate,
External objects, are all truly non-existent.
Vāsanās stir and defile the mind,
So it turns to resemble them.'

Therefore, one knows that it is merely fools who, relying upon the real svasaṃvittibhāga, give rise to parikalpita deluded sentiments, which transform to appear resembling the substanceless two aspects. In principle and reality, the two aspects lack real substance; it is merely that fools do not understand and falsely cling to them as real. Therefore, the treatise says: 'Ordinary beings cling to them as existent; the noble ones comprehend them as non-existent.'