宗鏡錄 63.2

63.2

第四作用不定難者。於中分出三難。第一難云。復有何因。患眩瞖者所見髮蠅等。即無髮蠅等實用。餘不患眩瞖者。所見髮蠅等物。是實用非無。汝大乘既許皆是唯識者。即須一時有實作用。不然。一時無實作用。今既不同。未審何者是其唯識。第二難云。復有何因。有情於夢中所得飲食刀杖毒藥衣服等。即無實作用。及至覺時。若得便有實用。第三難云。復有何因。尋香城等。即無實作用。餘甎土城等。便有實作用。論主答前四難。引三十唯識論頌云。處時定如夢。身不定如鬼。同見膿河等。如夢損有用。若依此頌。答前四難即足。且第一答前處定難者。論主云。汝還許。有情。於夢中有時見有村園。或男或女等物。在於一處。即定。其有情夢心。有時便緣餘處。餘處便不見前村園等物。即夢心不定。汝且總許是唯識不。經部答云。我宗夢中雖夢境處定。夢心不定。然不離有情。夢心。皆是唯識。論主云。我覺時境色。亦復如然。雖山處長定。其有情能緣心不定。然。皆不離現心。總是唯識。立量云。我宗覺時所見境色。是有法定是唯識為宗。因云。境處定心不定故。喻如汝宗夢中之境。皆是唯識。第二答前時定難者。論主云。且如有情於夢中所見村園等物。其夢心若緣時。可是唯識。若不緣時。應非唯識。經部答云。我夢中之境。若夢心緣時。亦是唯識。若夢心有不緣時。然不離夢心。亦是唯識。論主云。我覺時境色。亦復如然。我今長時緣南山。山不離心。是唯識。有時緣山。心雖不生。然不離現心。亦是唯識。頌云。處時定如夢。此一句答前二難。第三答身不定難。論主云。汝經部還許眾多餓鬼。同於一處。於中有三有五。業同之者。即同見膿河定。又有三五。隨自業力。所見不定。即同於一處。或有見猛火。或有見糞穢。或有見人把棒欄隔。如是餓鬼。同於一處。一半見境定。一半所見各異。汝總許是餓鬼唯識不。答云。雖見有同異。然。不離餓鬼自業識所變。皆是唯識。論主云。我宗唯識。亦復如然。雖一類悉眩瞖者。所見各別。有一類不患眩瞖者。所見即同。然不離此二類有情識之所變。皆是唯識。頌云。身不定如鬼。同見膿河等。此兩句頌。答此一難。成唯識。寶生論偈云。身不定如鬼者。實是清河。無外異境。然諸餓鬼。悉皆同見膿滿而流。非唯一覩。然於此處。實無片許膿。血可得。何容得有溢岸而流。雖無實境。決定屬一。理定不成。此即應知觀色等心。雖無外境。不決定性。於身非有。遮却境無。即彼成立有。境之因。有不定過。於無境處。亦有多身。共觀不定。如何實無膿流之事。而諸餓鬼不別觀之。由其同業。感於此位。俱見膿流。慳悋業熟。同見此苦。由昔同業。各熏自體。此時異熟。皆並現前。彼多有情。同見斯事。實無外境。為思憶故。準其道理仁亦如斯。共同造作。所有熏習成熟之時。便無別相。色等相分。從識而生。是故定知。不由外境。識方得起。豈非許此同一趣生。然非決定。彼情同業。由現見有良家賤室。貧富等異。如是便成見其色等。應有差別。同彼異類。見成非等。故知斯類。與彼不同。彼亦不由外境力故。生色等境。然諸餓鬼。雖同一趣。見亦差別。由業異相。所見亦然。彼或有見大熱鐵團融煮迸灒。或時見有屎尿橫流。非相似故。雖同人趣。薄福之人。金帶現時。見為鐵鎖。赫熱難近。或見是蛇。吐其毒火。是故定知。雖在人趣。亦非同見。若如是類。無別見性。由其皆有同類之業。然由彼類。有同分業。生同分趣。復有別業。各別而見。此一功能。隨其力故。令彼諸人。有同異見。復以此義。亦答餘言。有說別趣有情鬼傍生等。應非一處。有不別見。由別作業異熟性故。此雖成趣。業有差別。同觀之業。還有不異。即諸有情自相續中。有其別異業種隨故。彼任其緣。各得生起。第四總答作用不定中三難者。論主云。汝經部等還許有情夢中所得刀杖飲食等。無實作用。是唯識不。答云。爾。又問。只如有情於夢中有時遺失不淨。及失尿等事。即有實作用。汝亦許是唯識不。答云。爾。論主例答。汝既許夢中有實作用。及無實作用。俱是唯識者。即知我宗患眩瞖。及不患者。并夢中現覺。兼假城實城。此三般。皆是有實作用。亦如汝夢中有實無實作用。皆是唯識。論主以量成立云。我宗覺時。境色是有法。定是唯識。宗因云。有實作用故。如汝夢中境色。不然。汝夢中境色是有法。應非唯識。宗因云。有實無實作用故。如汝覺時境色。唯識頌云。如夢損有用。此一句答上難境。又都將一喻。總答四難。三十唯識頌云。一切如地獄。同見獄卒等。能為逼惱事。故四義皆成。且如世間處定。時定。身不定。作用不定等事。亦如地獄中受罪有情。各見治罰事。亦有處定。時定。身不定。作用不定。此皆唯識。但是諸有情惡業增上。雖同一獄。然受苦時。所見銅狗鐵蛇。牛頭獄卒。治罰之具。或同或異。如是苦器。逼害罪人。此皆是罪人。自惡業心現。並無心外實銅狗等物。今世間事法。亦復如然。若罪人同一獄者。是總報惡業力。若各別受苦者。即是別報惡業力。諸經要集云。夫云罪行。妄見境。染執定我人。取著違順。便令自他。皆成惡業。是以經偈云。貪欲不生滅。不能令心惱。若人有我心。及有得見者。是人為貪欲。將入於地獄。是故心外雖無別境。稱彼迷情強見起染。如夢見境。起諸貪瞋。稱彼夢者。謂實不虛。理實無境。唯情妄見故。智度論說。如夢中無善事而善。無瞋事而瞋。無怖事而怖。三界眾生。亦復如是。無明眠故。不應瞋而瞋等。故知心外雖無別境。稱彼迷情。妄見起染。心外雖無地獄等相。惡業成時。妄見受苦。如正法念經云。閻摩羅人。非是眾生。罪人見之。謂是眾生。手中執持焰然鐵鉗。彼地獄人。惡業既盡。命終之後。不復見於閻羅獄卒。何以故。以彼非是眾生數故。如油炷盡。則無有燈。業盡亦爾。不復見於閻羅獄卒。如閻浮提。日光既現。則無暗冥。惡業盡時。閻羅獄卒。亦復如是。惡眼惡口。如眾生相。可畏之色。皆悉磨滅。如破畫壁。畫亦隨滅。惡業畫壁。亦復如是。不復見於閻羅獄卒可畏之色。以此文證。眾生惡業應受苦者。自然其中妄見地獄。

Regarding the fourth objection, the objection concerning the indetermination of function: within it three objections are distinguished. The first objection says: 'What is the cause that what is seen by those afflicted with cataract, such as hairs and flies, lacks the actual function of hairs, flies, and so forth, while what is seen by others not afflicted with cataract, such objects as hairs and flies, possesses actual function and is not nonexistent? Since you of the Mahāyāna maintain that all are consciousness-only, then all must simultaneously possess actual function, or else all must simultaneously lack actual function. Now, since they are not alike, we do not know which of them is consciousness-only.' The second objection says: 'What is the cause that what sentient beings obtain in dreams, such as food and drink, knives and staves, poisons, and clothing, lacks actual function, whereas upon awakening, if obtained, it possesses actual function?' The third objection says: 'What is the cause that a gandharva city and the like lack actual function, whereas other cities of brick and earth possess actual function?' The Master of the Treatise responds to the preceding four objections by citing a verse from the Triṃśikā-vijñaptimātratā: 'Spatial and temporal determination are like in a dream; indetermination of stream is like in ghosts, / Who together see rivers of pus and the like; as in a dream, an emission has function.' If one relies on this verse, responding to the preceding four objections is sufficient. First, to respond to the preceding objection concerning spatial determination: The Master of the Treatise says: 'Do you also concede that when a sentient being in a dream sometimes sees a village, a garden, or men and women in one place, it is fixed, yet that sentient being's dreaming citta sometimes directs itself toward another place, and in that other place does not see the former village, garden, and so forth, so that the dreaming citta is indeterminate? Do you generally concede that this is consciousness-only, or not?' The Sautrāntika answers: 'In my school, although in a dream the place of the dream object is fixed while the dreaming citta is indeterminate, nevertheless it is not separate from the dreaming citta of the sentient being; it is entirely consciousness-only.' The Master of the Treatise says: 'The objective forms of my waking state are also like this. Although the place of a mountain is permanently fixed, the grasping citta of sentient beings is indeterminate; yet none of them are separate from the present citta; all are consciousness-only.' He sets up a formal syllogism (prayoga): 'The objective forms seen in the waking state of our school are the subject (pakṣa / dharmin); they are necessarily consciousness-only is the proposition (pratijñā / sādhya); the reason (hetu) is: "because the place of the object is fixed while the citta is indeterminate"; the example (dṛṣṭānta) is: "like the objects in a dream in your school, which are all consciousness-only."' Second, to respond to the preceding objection concerning temporal determination: The Master of the Treatise says: 'Take, for instance, when a sentient being in a dream sees such things as a village or garden: if the dreaming citta is directing itself toward them, it may be consciousness-only; if it is not directing itself toward them, it should not be consciousness-only.' The Sautrāntika answers: 'Regarding the objects in my dream, if the dreaming citta directs itself toward them, they are consciousness-only; if there are times when the dreaming citta does not direct itself toward them, yet they are not separate from the dreaming citta, they are also consciousness-only.' The Master of the Treatise says: 'The objective forms of my waking state are also like this. Now, when I direct myself toward the Southern Mountain for a long time, the mountain is not separate from the citta and is consciousness-only; when there are times I do not direct toward the mountain and the citta does not arise, yet it is not separate from the present citta, it is also consciousness-only.' The verse says: 'Spatial and temporal determination are like in a dream.' This single line answers the preceding two objections. Third, to respond to the objection concerning the indetermination of stream: The Master of the Treatise says: 'Do you, Sautrāntika, also concede that among numerous hungry ghosts together in one place, three or five among them whose karma is identical will together see a river of pus definitely, while another three or five, following their own karmic power, will have indeterminate perceptions, so that in the very same place some see raging fire, some see excrement and filth, or some see men holding clubs barring the way? Among such hungry ghosts together in one place, half see a fixed object, while half see diverse objects. Do you generally concede that this is the consciousness-only of the hungry ghosts, or not?' The answer is: 'Although what is seen has identity and difference, nevertheless they are not separate from the transformations of the hungry ghosts' own karmic consciousness; all are consciousness-only.' The Master of the Treatise says: 'The consciousness-only of my school is also like this. Although one class, all of whom are afflicted with cataract, see differently, and another class, who are not afflicted with cataract, see identically, nevertheless they are not separate from the transformations of consciousness of these two classes of sentient beings; all are consciousness-only.' The verse says: 'Indetermination of stream is like in ghosts, / Who together see rivers of pus and the like.' These two lines of verse answer this single objection. As the verse in the Ratnagotravibhāga-vyākhyā says: '"Indetermination of stream is like in ghosts": in reality it is a clear river, without an external distinct object. Yet the hungry ghosts all together see it as full of pus and flowing; it is not seen by only one. Yet in this place there is actually not the slightest bit of pus or blood to be found; how could there be an overflowing of the banks? Although there is no real object, that it should definitely belong to only one [person] is logically impossible. From this it should be known that the citta observing form and so forth, although without an external object, does not have indetermination regarding the stream. If one rejects the nonexistence of objects, then the reason establishing the existence of objects has the fallacy of indetermination (anaikāntika). In a place where there is no object, many streams also collectively observe without determination. How is it that, although there is really no flowing pus, the hungry ghosts do not observe it differently? Because of their shared karma, they are brought to this state and together see flowing pus; their stingy karma ripening, they together see this suffering. Because former shared karma separately perfumed their own substances, at this time the maturation of both appears before them. Those many sentient beings together see this phenomenon; there is really no external object, for it is due to memory. In accord with its principle, for you, noble one, it is also like this. When the perfuming of what was collectively created ripens, there is no distinct characteristic; the nimittabhāga of form and so forth arises from consciousness. Therefore it is definitely known that consciousness does not arise by relying on external objects. Is it not conceded that beings born in this same destiny do not have determinately identical karma? Since one sees differences such as highborn and lowborn families, rich and poor, in this way the forms seen should have differences, just as different kinds of beings see unequally. Therefore one knows this class is different from that; neither do they generate objects like form by the power of external objects. However, although hungry ghosts belong to the same destiny, what they see also differs; because of the different characteristics of their karma, what they see is also like this. Some among them see large, red-hot iron balls boiling and bursting; or at times they see feces and urine overflowing, which are not alike. Although belonging to the human destiny, when a gold belt appears to a person of meager merit, he sees it as an iron shackle, blazing hot and unapproachable, or sees it as a serpent vomiting poisonous fire. Therefore it is definitely known that even within the human destiny they do not see alike. If such classes had no distinct visual nature, it would be because they all have the same kind of karma. However, because those classes have common-share karma, they are born into a common destiny, and because they have individual karma, they see individually. This single capacity, following its power, causes those persons to have identical and different perceptions. Furthermore, by this principle one also answers other assertions: Some say that sentient beings of different destinies, such as ghosts and animals, should not have non-distinct perceptions in the same place, because of the ripening nature of their individually created karma. Although they form different destinies and their karma has differences, the karma of collective observation is still not different. That is, within the personal continuity of sentient beings, individual distinct karmic seeds accompany them; when they encounter their conditions, each arises.' Fourth, to generally answer the three objections within the indetermination of function: The Master of the Treatise says: 'Do you, Sautrāntika and others, concede that what sentient beings obtain in dreams, such as knives, staves, food, and drink, lacking actual function, is consciousness-only, or not?' The answer is: 'Yes.' He asks again: 'Just as when a sentient being in a dream sometimes emits impurities or discharges urine, having actual function, do you also concede that this is consciousness-only, or not?' The answer is: 'Yes.' The Master of the Treatise answers by analogy: 'Since you concede that in a dream both having actual function and lacking actual function are consciousness-only, then you should know that in my school the afflicted with cataract and the unafflicted, waking and dreaming, as well as an illusory city and a real city—these three pairs all possess actual function, just as in your dream both possessing and lacking actual function are consciousness-only.' The Master of the Treatise establishes it by a syllogism, saying: 'The waking objective forms of my school are the subject; they are necessarily consciousness-only is the proposition; the reason is: "because they possess actual function"; like the objective forms in your dreams. Otherwise, the objective forms in your dreams are the subject; they should not be consciousness-only is the proposition; the reason is: "because they possess and lack actual function"; like the objective forms in your waking state.' The Triṃśikā verse says: 'As in a dream, an emission has function.' This single line answers the objection regarding objects above. Furthermore, using a single analogy, he generally answers the four objections. The Triṃśikā verse says: 'All is like in hell, / Where they together see the wardens and the like, / Which are able to inflict torment; / Therefore all four points are established.' Take, for instance, mundane spatial determination, temporal determination, indetermination of stream, and indetermination of function: they are also like the punishment seen by suffering sentient beings in hell, which also have spatial determination, temporal determination, indetermination of stream, and indetermination of function. All these are consciousness-only. It is merely that by the predominance of sentient beings' evil karma, although they are in the same hell, when undergoing suffering, the copper dogs, iron serpents, ox-headed hell wardens, and instruments of punishment seen by them may be identical or different. Such instruments of suffering oppress and torment the sinners; these are entirely manifested by the sinners' own citta of evil karma, and there are no real copper dogs and the like outside citta. Mundane phenomena of today are also like this: if sinners share the same hell, it is by the power of collective retribution karma; if they undergo suffering individually, it is by the power of individual retribution karma. The Zhujing yaoji says: 'Regarding sinful conduct: falsely perceiving objects, defiled grasping firmly to self and person, and grasping at agreeable and disagreeable cause both self and others to accomplish evil karma. Therefore a sūtra verse says: "Desire does not arise or cease; / It cannot afflict the citta. / If a person has the idea of a self / And possesses graspings and views, / This person, on account of desire, / Will enter into hell." Therefore, although outside citta there is no distinct object, conforming to that deluded sentiment, they forcefully perceive and generate defilement. It is like seeing objects in a dream, generating greed and anger; conforming to that dreamer, he deems them real and not false, but in true principle there are no objects, and they are only falsely seen by sentiment. Therefore the Mahāprajñāpāramitopadeśa says: "Like in a dream, where without good things one feels good, without angry things one is angry, and without frightening things one is frightened, sentient beings of the three realms are also like this: because of the slumber of avidyā, where they should not be angry they are angry, and so forth." Therefore one knows that although outside citta there is no distinct object, conforming to that deluded sentiment, false seeing generates defilement. Although outside citta there are no characteristics of hell and the like, when evil karma is accomplished, they falsely see and undergo suffering. As the Saddharmasmṛtyupasthānasūtra says: "The men of Yama are not sentient beings; sinners see them and deem them sentient beings, holding blazing iron pincers in their hands. When the evil karma of those hell dwellers is exhausted, after their life ends they no longer see the hell wardens of Yama. Why? Because they do not belong to the category of sentient beings. Just as when oil and wick are exhausted there is no lamp, when karma is exhausted it is also like this: they no longer see the hell wardens of Yama. Just as in Jambudvīpa when the light of the sun appears there is no darkness, when evil karma is exhausted, the hell wardens of Yama are also like this: their evil eyes and evil mouths, appearing like sentient beings, their terrifying forms, are all wiped out. Just as when a painted wall is broken, the painting is also destroyed along with it, the painted wall of evil karma is also like this: they no longer see the terrifying forms of the hell wardens of Yama." Corroborated by this text, when the evil karma of sentient beings is such that they should undergo suffering, naturally therein they falsely see hell.'