宗鏡錄 64.7

64.7

答。謂緣他身扶塵根相分色。亦不親得。但託為質。如自身眼識緣第八識所變器世間色時。亦但託為質。亦不親得。其耳等四識。緣本識所變聲等。亦耳以本質是第八識變。今望五識。故名影識。如五識等緣本識所變本質境。亦不親得。雖亦得緣。只成疎所緣緣。若如實知即是佛境者。論云。二智於境。各各由無知所覆蔽故。不知如佛所行。不可言境。此有二解。一云。是真如妙理。言詮不及。不可言境。謂此離言真如之境。唯佛獨能顯了分別證。餘不能證者。由第七恒行不共無明所覆。故不知。二云。不可言境者。即他心智境。及自心智境。此二智。名不可言境。謂真如自相。假智及詮。俱非境故。詮謂名言能詮之名。既不得自相。即顯自他二智之境。是佛智所行。不可言境。由此二智所知之境自相。是佛智所行。不可言境。餘人由恒行不共無明所覆蔽。故不得如實而知也。又既言此人緣他人心時。託他人心為質。自變相分緣者。即相分不離此人心。是唯識。若他人心本質緣不著者。即離此人心外。有他人心。何成唯識耶。因此便申第九異境非識難。小乘云。唯識之義。但離心之外更無一物。方名唯識。既他人心。異此人心為境。何成唯識耶。又他人境。亦異此境。即離此人心外有異境。何成唯識。答責云。奇哉固執。觸處生疑。豈唯識言。但說一識。汝小乘何以此堅執處處生疑。豈唯識之言。但說一人之識。若言有一人之識者。即豈有凡聖尊卑。若無佛者。眾生何求。若無凡夫。佛為誰說。應知我唯識言。有深旨趣。論云。唯識言。總顯一切有情。各有八識。六位心所。所變相分分位差別。及彼空理所顯真如。言識之一字者。非是一人之識。總顯一切有情。各各皆有八識。即是識之自體。五十一心所。識之相應。何獨執一人之識。

Answer: It is said that when cognizing the form that is the nimittabhāga of another's gross physical sense faculties, one does not directly grasp it either; one merely relies on it as the substantive cause (mūla-ālambana). Just as when one's own visual consciousness cognizes the forms of the receptacle world transformed by one's eighth consciousness, it also merely relies on them as the substantive cause and does not directly grasp them. The four consciousnesses such as the auditory consciousness, in cognizing sounds and so forth transformed by the fundamental consciousness, do likewise: because the substantive cause is transformed by the eighth consciousness, when viewed from the perspective of the five consciousnesses, they are called shadow-consciousnesses. Just as the five consciousnesses cognize the substantive objects transformed by the fundamental consciousness without directly grasping them—though they cognize them, they only constitute a distal objective condition (dūra-ālambana-pratyaya)—if knowing as it truly is constitutes the Buddha's realm, the treatise says: 'With respect to the object, each of the two cognitions is obscured by ignorance, and therefore neither knows the ineffable realm as traversed by the Buddha.' There are two interpretations of this. The first says: it is the wondrous principle of tathatā, which verbal descriptions cannot reach—the ineffable realm. That is, this ineffable realm of tathatā is something that only a Buddha alone can clearly, determinately realize; others cannot realize it because they are veiled by the seventh [consciousness's] constantly operating unshared avidyā, and so they do not know it. The second says: the ineffable realm refers to the object of the cognition of others' minds and the object of the cognition of one's own mind. These two cognitions are called the ineffable realm, meaning that the svabhāva of tathatā is not an object for either nominal cognition or verbal designation. Verbal designation refers to the designating names of linguistic expressions. Since they do not grasp the svabhāva, this reveals that the realm of the two cognitions of self and other is that which is traversed by the Buddha's cognition—the ineffable realm. Because the svabhāva of the object known by these two cognitions is that which is traversed by the Buddha's cognition—the ineffable realm—other people, being obscured by the constantly operating unshared avidyā, cannot know it as it truly is. Furthermore, since it is said that when this person cognizes another's mind, they rely on the other's mind as the substantive cause and transform their own nimittabhāga to cognize it, then the nimittabhāga is not apart from this person's mind: this is consciousness-only. If one cannot directly reach the substantive cause of the other person's mind, then apart from this person's mind there is another person's mind: how could that be consciousness-only? Thereupon, the ninth objection is raised: 'the objection that a distinct object is not consciousness.' The Hīnayāna says: 'The meaning of consciousness-only is that only when there is not a single thing apart from the mind can it be called consciousness-only. Since another person's mind is an object distinct from this person's mind, how can it be consciousness-only? Moreover, another person's object is also distinct from this object; thus, apart from this person's mind, there are distinct objects: how can that be consciousness-only?' The answer rebukes them, saying: 'How extraordinary is your stubborn obstinacy, giving rise to doubts at every turn! Does the statement of consciousness-only speak of only a single consciousness? Why do you, [followers of] Hīnayāna, cling firmly to this and give rise to doubts at every turn? Does the statement of consciousness-only speak of only one person's consciousness? If one were to say that there is only one person's consciousness, then how could there be ordinary and noble, exalted and base? If there were no Buddhas, what would sentient beings seek? If there were no ordinary persons, for whom would the Buddha preach? You should know that our statement of consciousness-only has a profound purport.' The treatise says: 'The term consciousness-only generally reveals that all sentient beings each possess eight consciousnesses, the differentiated states of the nimittabhāga transformed by the six categories of mental factors, and the tathatā revealed by that principle of emptiness. The single word "consciousness" does not refer to the consciousness of one person; it generally reveals that all sentient beings each possess eight consciousnesses, which are the svabhāva of consciousness, and fifty-one mental factors, which are the associates of consciousness. Why do you cling solely to the consciousness of one person?'