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宗鏡錄 65.11

宗鏡錄 65.11

Language
Classical Chinese

65.11

答。從六七二識。緣識所起。唯識論云。諸心心所。依他起故。亦如幻事。非真實有。為遣妄執心心所外實有境故。說唯有識。若執唯識真實有者。如執外境。亦是法執。然諸法執。略有二種。一者俱生。二者分別。俱生法執。無始時來。虛妄熏習內因力故。恒與身俱。不待邪教及邪分別。任運而轉。故名俱生。此有二種。一者常相續。在第七識。緣第八識。起自心相。執為實法。二者間斷。在第六識。緣識所變蘊處界相。或總或別。起自心相。執為實法。此二法執。細故難斷。後十地中。數數修習緣法空觀。方能除滅。分別法執。亦由現在外緣力故。非與身俱。要待邪教及邪分別。然後方起。故名分別。唯在第六意識中。有此亦二種。一緣邪教所說蘊處界相。起自心相。分別計度。執為實法。二緣邪師所說自性等相。起自心相。分別計度。執為實法。此二法執麁故易斷。入初地時。觀一切法。法空真如。即能除滅。如是所說一切法執。自心外法。或有或無。自心內法。一切皆有。是故法執。皆緣自心內法。一切皆有。是故法執。皆緣自心所現似法。執為實有。然似法相。從緣生故。是如幻有。所執實法。妄計度故。決定非有。故世尊說。慈氏當知。諸識所緣。唯識所現。依他起性。如幻事等。如是外道餘乘。所執。離識我法。皆非實有。故心心所。決定不用外色等法。為所緣緣。緣用必依實有體故。釋云。若執唯識真實有者。如執外境。亦是法執者。由是理故。但應遣彼心外之境。同兔角無。能緣彼心。如幻事有。故少分不同。非謂即心。亦名實有。又夫心外執我執法者。有其兩種。一者如外道等。執離心等。別有一物。是常是一名之為我。此乃是妄計所執。其體都無。二者疎所緣緣。本質之法。能緣之心親緣之不著。亦名心外。此是依他。其體是有。

Answer: They arise from the sixth and seventh vijñānas taking consciousness as an object. The Vijñaptimātratāsiddhiśāstra states: "Because all cittas and caittas are dependently arisen (paratantra), they are also like magical illusions and are not truly existent. In order to dispel the erroneous attachment that there are real objects outside cittas and caittas, we say there is consciousness only. If one clings to vijñaptimātra as truly existent, it is like clinging to external objects and is also a clinging to dharmas. Furthermore, clinging to dharmas is generally of two kinds: the first is innate (sahaja), and the second is conceptually differentiated (vikalpita). Innate clinging to dharmas, by the power of internal causes through beginningless perfuming, is constantly co-present with the body; without relying on heterodox teachings or perverse differentiation, it operates spontaneously, and is therefore called innate. This has two kinds: the first is constantly continuous, located in the seventh vijñāna, taking the eighth vijñāna as object, giving rise to an image of its own citta, and clinging to it as a real dharma. The second is intermittent, located in the sixth vijñāna, taking as object the characteristics of the aggregates, bases, and elements transformed by consciousness, either collectively or individually, giving rise to an image of its own citta, and clinging to it as a real dharma. Because these two clingings to dharmas are subtle, they are difficult to sever; only by repeatedly cultivating the contemplation of the emptiness of dharmas across the subsequent ten bhūmis can they be eliminated. Conceptually differentiated clinging to dharmas is also due to the power of present external conditions; it is not co-present with the body, but must await heterodox teachings and perverse differentiations before arising, and is therefore called conceptually differentiated. It exists solely in the sixth manovijñāna and also has two kinds: the first takes as object the characteristics of the aggregates, bases, and elements expounded in heterodox teachings, gives rise to an image of its own citta, conceptually discriminates, and clings to it as a real dharma; the second takes as object characteristics such as the primordial nature (prakṛti) expounded by heterodox teachers, gives rise to an image of its own citta, conceptually discriminates, and clings to it as a real dharma. Because these two clingings to dharmas are coarse, they are easily severed; upon entering the first bhūmi, contemplating all dharmas as the tathatā of dharma-emptiness, one can eliminate them. As for all such clingings to dharmas described: dharmas outside one's own citta may exist or not exist, but dharmas within one's own citta all exist. Therefore, clinging to dharmas always takes as object the semblances of dharmas manifested by one's own citta, clinging to them as real existents. Yet, because the characteristics of these semblances of dharmas arise from conditions, they exist like magical illusions; whereas the real dharmas that are clung to, being falsely conceptualized, definitely do not exist. Therefore the World-Honoured One said: 'Maitreya, you should know that the objects taken by all consciousnesses are manifestations of consciousness only; their dependently arisen nature is like a magical illusion and the like.' Thus, the ātman and dharmas apart from consciousness clung to by non-Buddhists and the other vehicles are not truly existent. Therefore, cittas and caittas definitely do not use external dharmas such as form as the objective condition (ālambanapratyaya), because the conditioning function must rely on a real substance." The commentary states: "As for 'if one clings to vijñaptimātra as truly existent, it is like clinging to external objects and is also a clinging to dharmas'—for this reason, one should merely dispel those objects outside citta as non-existent like hare's horns, while the citta capable of apprehending them exists like a magical illusion; thus there is a slight difference, but this does not mean that citta is called a real existent." Furthermore, those who cling to an ātman and cling to dharmas outside citta are of two kinds: first, like the non-Buddhists and others, who cling that apart from citta and so forth there is a separate entity that is permanent and one, naming it ātman. This is purely imagined (parikalpita), and its substance is entirely non-existent. Second, the fundamental entity (mūladravya) that serves as the distant objective condition (dūra-ālambanapratyaya), which the cognitive citta cannot directly grasp, is also called outside citta. This is dependently arisen (paratantra), and its substance does exist.

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